The_Capt

No need to argue here. This all tracks with what we have seen coming out of Russia before and during this war. An autocratic state that is somehow proud of its own misery. I guess my only counter-point is that this same country has had 2 major revolutions in roughly the last century. The run up to both of these were not sudden either, but they were both triggered (or at least helped along) by a war. I honestly do not know what it will take for Russia to "explode" but as a student of subversive warfare the symptoms are already there. Harsh class divisions backstopped by a massive internal security apparatus. Regional disparities in sacrifice and distribution of wealth. Bi-polar use of the normal social opiates (religion, popular culture). Economic stressors. Historical grudges and axe handles peeking above the surface. Central authority tying itself in knots to "not do things". Extra-judiciary executive actions. Reports of failures of social programs and infrastructure. Strange accidents and counter-military actions. And the big one...Priggy and Boys Roadtrip. These all add up to an unhealthy state...and it was not healthy to begin with. Will it break during this war? I really do not know. Will it break so that this war can be over? Again, very hard to predict. If it does happen it will be violent and fast. I think it more likely that Russia dies slower after this war as it stays isolated and a defacto client state to nations that will still fund it. Militarily it is serious trouble after this war. It would take years to rebuild what it has lost under normal circumstances - in the face of continued sanctions and isolation, that could turn into decades.

Not me man, they got their pints of blood out of this old warhorse years ago (f#ck, that really sounds like a statement that could come back to haunt me.) Seriously, I saw some noise about "western boots on the ground in Ukraine". Guys it has already happened. We are moving from covert to overt. Hell, someone I know very well turned down a tour in a J7 shop in Kyiv just last month. They have positions posted for in-country tours up and are trying to pull people in. This is all part of that slow boil strategy the West appears to be pursuing. We will put in staff and supports into HQ first. Then some sort of in country support mission on the western border. By the time this is over we might have a freakin multi-national division in country.

Ok, so let's throw out military history then, and I am only half joking - you do have a point on this war being off the conceptual map so historical example have limited traction. In this war we have seen one sustained river crossing, so there is that. Otherwise we only have opinion and informed assessment to go by. What we are seeing on the battlefield: - Light dispersed forces are doing better than large heavy concentrations of mass. - Light dispersed forces have had disproportionate effects on the battlefield from previous war. This is likely due to C4ISR and weapons developments. - Light dispersed forces have a much lower logistical footprint than heavy ones. - Russian forces are very thin in places on these fronts based on simple math. They have offset this through mine warfare and other forms of force multiplication. - We have no reports of massive fortresses or mine belts south of Kherson. All of that adds up to an option space down south for a sustained light force effort that may yield operational effects. You keep skipping past the fact that the UA has already demonstrated a proof of concept on this at Kryky. As to disagreements. I have no problem with well thought out, evidence based disagreement. It is when certain folks arrive on this forum with "wot I think" as if it has come from the right hand of the Almighty Himself while missing key observations and phenomenon, that I will point that out and call "BS". You are not the first person to Dunning-Kruger on this board, nor will you likely be the last. What you "do not know" based on your position is significant...and this is in a war where we can only see shadows. Normally, I can live with someone who embraces their own ignorance. However, when one arrives with an ulterior agenda that is when alarm bells go off. By your own admission, you do not want a southern light option to be workable - it counters your central theme - "this war has gone on too long and should be ended". This is perverse logic. Any military solution for Ukraine is unacceptable by taking this stance. There are no options for Ukraine, is what you are proposing, the issue of water crossings is secondary. I again disagree and openly say that you have no idea what you are talking about. You have presented no evidence or even analysis...only assessment based on "what you think". As I tell my students: "Rule # 4 - no one cares what you think. They care what you can prove." If you admire my posts, then you will note that I always try to ground my assessments on facts and evidence. I tried again here and you have dismissed them. I tried outlining force density on the ground..."whatever". I tried to outline what light forces could do..."uh uh". In short you are pitching a problem that does not want a solution. Then go all alligator tears and huffy with indignity when you are called out. You want respect for your analysis, well go do some research and come back with something that holds water. Do an UA options analysis that stands up to scrutiny and we have a start point for discussion. I have tried to present counter-factuals to your position but none are good enough because none will ever be good enough for someone whose position is pretty obviously unassailable. So like the others who have come through on the same train you are on: why are you here? To convince us all is lost and we should call out political leadership to sue for any peace we can get? I mean the UA has no hope down at Kherson. No hope at Zaporizhzhia. No hope in the Donbas. So what is the point of even doing military analysis and assessment, the outcome is clearly already decided? What are you here to learn? My bet is that you already answered the question in both our minds - "f#cking idiot" and "very stable genius", which in the end are the same thing.

I think you are understating Vietnam and Iraq - peace on Afghanistan (a backwater that every empire needs to take a run at for some reason). The internal repercussions of Vietnam on the American psyche were enormous. Iraqs geopolitical train wreck in the making is not small either. As to defence of “EU ramparts because $$$”. Let’s not oversubscribe trade - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_the_largest_trading_partners_of_the_United_States China - who many in the US government are openly selling as unavoidable war guys - is higher in trade than the EU. On Direct Foreign investment, however, you are correct it is about 50%. As to shoring ramparts - I think you hit upon the main point and it is not money. It is perception. US leadership and dominance depends a lot on perception. If the US is seen retreating from this war it could turn into an inverted Vietnam. Rather than inward impacts of self-doubt etc, we will see outward impact of doubt. My sense is the US internally really is not going to be impacted if Ukraine fails. Some will feel bad but no one is going to question the entire American Experiment inside the US because of this war. They very well might outside of the US. If Ukraine loses this war or even has to sue for peace from a position of weakness, you can use an egg timer to measure the time before cries of “Final US death rattle” start being flung around. EDIT: This sent me on a bit of a journey on US FDI: Good lord it constitutes 41% of US GDP? https://santandertrade.com/en/portal/establish-overseas/united-states/foreign-investment#:~:text=For the year as a,41.1% of the country's GDP. US outward foreign investment: Easy to see who the favorite is in all this.

My advice is to steer clear of this one. I am getting strong Macgregor vibes - not interested in actual military analysis...pushing a political position.

I have never fully subscribed to "LOLZ Russia" or "Russia Sux". Nor does a steady stream of one-sided war porn change that. As to the second point: a major personal gripe on this forum is "Monster Russia!." Undersubscribing Russia is as big a sin as oversubscribing Russia. We have posters who need to continually take the worst case for Ukraine, and best case for Russia at every instance. This is not healthy or useful, and as harmful as the overtly "LOLZ Russia" narratives I gotta be honest, I am astounded on what is still holding Russia together. As I said, I re-visited Oryx after a long absence and for tanks and AFVs, Russia has lost 3x what Ukraine had as their entire fleets at the beginning of the war. We have continually seen signs of Russian strain: lower quality equipment showing up at the front, conscription of excess human capacity, mass migration out of Russia, buying ammo from NK (FFS). However, one has to simply shake ones head at the level of Russian obstinance in all this. I am not sure how they are holding their military together right now based on these losses. Further, the shock of this war on Russia cannot be understated. Does anyone think Putin planned for all this? That Russian society was ready for this? No western nation would be ready for something like this war, the shock would cripple us. Imagine if Iraq in '03 had turned into something like this war; it would have broken the West. So what? Well first off, Russia clearly is not in great shape and their performance in this war compared to the advertising has fallen woefully short. Russian resilience is high, I will give them that. Yet we do not know where that breaking point is for them - further, they could have already crossed it...these sorts of things do not happen fast, until they do. But...and it is a big "but", Russia does have a breaking point. Every nation/society/human collective on earth has a breaking point. Russia is not invincible and homogeneous. Under enough stress it will fracture - economically, militarily and socially. What we have is a competition of breaking points - ours, Ukraine and Russia's. Our "breaking point" in the West (US in particular) is laughably low. I suspect Ukraine's breaking point is further out than Russia's as of all the parties to this conflict, only Ukraine is facing direct existential crisis. The question really is: can weak western will plus desperate Ukrainian will defeat Russian (??? metric ???) will? One can immediately see the two major variables here. Western will and Russian will are the two players on a Ukrainian fulcrum. The location of that fulcrum depends on how much western support we provide to Ukraine. I stand by my position that militarily this war has already been won; however, that does not mean it cannot still be lost. If the West totally fails Ukraine, Russia will take ground - it, in effect, expands Russian option spaces. Russian airpower seems intent on flexing, perhaps eyeing air superiority again. A complete withdrawal of US support is a strategic mistake of historic proportions. It is essentially ceding a proxy war and Ukraine could enter the annals with Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan of lost US ventures. The rest of the West will need to step up. If Ukraine falters, as some have insisted, then the whole conversation is moot. If the fulcrum shatters, there is no war. The West will write it off to "bad investment" and re-draw the lines. The longer I watch this war, the more in awe of what the WW1 and WW2 generations went through. We see those wars through the safe lens of history. It is another thing entirely to be in the middle of one with the future unwritten.

Kinda looks like you have constructed a fortress of opinion. As I noted, almost every major military water crossing in history has been led by lighter forces establishing a bridgehead: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Badr_(1973)#:~:text=Operation Badr (Arabic%3A عملية بدر,Peninsula%2C on 6 October 1973. So the ability to push light forces across a water obstacle and support them is not new or novel. Nor are commando raids. Combining these two into sustained effect is the question - again, I assess as not only possible but plausible. As to UA light forces “buzzing around RU LOCs = fanciful”, they have already demonstrated this on repeated occasions in this war. First at Kyiv and then later at Kharkiv and Kherson. I think the issue here is you appear to have a bias against what light forces are capable of accomplishing. You then are combining this with over-subscribing their logistical and support demands. This is conceptual model that is pre-disposed to a “too hard for too little” frame which frankly appears unassailable even in the face of counter facts. You “think” Russia has created sufficient defences? Again, you appear to be enamoured by your own opinion here. I laid out the likely force-to-space issues Russia is facing. Even accounting for modern ISR and fire power those troop densities will be challenged to do much about a sustained Ukrainian force on their side of the river…like they already have had for months at Krynky. But you blow past that with the power of “what I think”. As to effect on “reserves” well time and place matter. Right now those Russian reserves are supporting Russian attacks and c-moves up near Adiivka as they try to gain more ground. If the RA has to pull them all the way to Kherson it will impact the RAs ability to exploit or make new gains. Further pushing support down to Kherson and sustaining it causes lateral friction over several hundred kms which is never a bad thing. I think it is your last sentence that clearly demonstrates your position. You are not here to discuss the viability or pros and cons of a possible UA operation. You have already answered that question and locked the cognitive door. You are instead here to promote the futility of Ukraine continuing this war and are instead pushing the idea that due to that futility they should sue for peace. This is the line from several parties on this forum before and really adds little to the discussion or analysis. However, on this “all is lost Ukraine, beg for peace” (which is a pro-Russian narrative), for that to be true Ukraine would need to be completely out of strategic or operational options. In addition, Russia would also need to be out of options or content with whatever gains they have to merit a “good enough” endstate. None of those conditions are clearly proven. Ukraine still has one big strategic option - defend and bleed the RA out. Russia has given no indication of what its negotiated end-state would look like. So as to “call it a day”, I do not think we are there yet by either pre-condition metric. As to Kherson and a possible light operation. Well no point discussing because you have already made up your mind in support of you larger argument…which is also, to be frank, fundamentally flawed.

The entire communist system was (and is) terrifying to those who hold all the power and money. It is a massive redistribution of wealth scheme. Of course it did not work and simply made welfare states and new elites. But hard capitalism, while definitely can build things, tends to create wealth divides which eventually come apart at the seams. During the Cold War this whole subversive under play was going on all the time. Some of it was laughable, while other times it was terrifying. Of course we are living through our own version of this today.

Don’t have a subscription. It appears there are different calculus for defensive vs offensive operations at play as well. Defensive the conventional metrics appear to align with “red lines” designed to re-establish norms and exert deterrence. Offensively they would likely need to be some sort of existential pre-emption. Of course none of these have actually been tested. Based on these papers, Russia is one major surface vessel away from nuclear release? Could be another reason the Russian government keeps claiming “accidents”, so they do not get trapped by their own policies. Interesting to note they are nervous about China. That whole relationship is just weird. At the same time they are doing combined joint exercises and military cooperation.

I think Alberque is saying that there is a different threshold for Ukraine due to threat of western response. Pretty much the same boat we are in. No one in the Washington or Moscow wants to die over South East Ukraine...it might be one of the few things we agree upon.

"William Alberque, director of strategy, technology, and arms control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, told the FT that Russia likely has a higher threshold for using tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine due to fears it would likely "escalate the conflict and lead to direct intervention by the U.S. or U.K." Heh, maybe the poor weak old West is having a bit more of a deterrent effect than popular opinion on this forum believes. Of course a major nuclear power bogged down in a losing war and nervous at both ends is not exactly good news either.

Digging around on this wars impact on the Russian economy and found this: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA2400/RRA2421-1/RAND_RRA2421-1.pdf Originally written in late ‘22 there is a Ch 6 update written in late ‘23. So the punchline as far as I can tell is that Russia can sustain this war at current intensity (note that important proviso) for several more years. However, the hurt is starting to settle in. Russia as a nation is definitely not becoming more wealthy as a result of this war. This report does not cover the overall cost to rebuild its military to pre-war levels, adjusting for military and sanctions inflation. So as we have discussed at length. Sanctions do work, but not how most people think. They apply strategic pressure over time while eroding the overall Russian economy. Further they will make it harder for Russia to rebuild after this: https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html (have not looked in awhile but these numbers are truly staggering - for those still counting tanks, Russian losses are coming up on 3x of the entire UA pre-war fleet. AFVs are similar).

Well some Russians are, but their government…not so much: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_budget_of_Russia

Ok, well let’s start there then. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Washington's_crossing_of_the_Delaware_River https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Plunder And of course the big one: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Overlord And let’s pull some doctrine in: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-90-12/fm3-90-12.pdf So adding this all up, essentially it has and can be done but there are a lot of caveats. Ultimately it is a question of weight. How much weight is being projected across the river as combat power? How much weight is needed under combat conditions to sustain the weight of the combat power on the other side? There are multiple ways to get that weight across a river other than a fixed bridge. Fixed ferry, unfixed ferry, tac aviation and now, UAS. Forward foraging and cannibalization etc. Now doctrine agrees with you, the best is solid fixed LOC bridging but any crossing operations, even conventional ones come in phases. The opening phase is very often lighter more mobile resupply methods until the bridgehead force can push the enemy back far enough that it is safe to build a series of fixed bridges. Essentially almost every opposed military river crossing in history began with what we are describing south of Kherson - light forces establishing a bridgehead, sustained and then heavy force link up once conditions are established. D Day being an exception as were other amphib operations which all had to be sustained by air and sea. So “sustaining a scale of operation” without a bridge is not only possible, it is really the only way to get many water crossing started in the first place. Now as to “how long and how far?” Well that depends on a lot of factors. If the UA stays light it keeps the logistics bill low. They might not need a fixed pontoon bridge if they can advance - as you say - “10-30kms”. Pontoon ferry’s might be able to sustain them as they did for the RA for quite some time before the RA withdrew. So basically as an engineering and logistics problem what we are looking at south of Kherson is not new or novel. In the current environment it is going to be challenging and dangerous but it is not the thing being invented from zero in all this. Ok, so this one opens up the question of how well prepared are the RA forces on the other side? Light forces have proven pretty important in this war. They were critical in the first month pretty much everywhere and at Kharkiv constituted the breakout force. If the RA has built a heavy line of defence as you seem to indicate then you may be correct. But have they? We really do not know, but the fact that a small bridgehead at Krynky for months - no massive RA armoured c-attack, and a few maps of force lay down estimates may help: https://features.csis.org/ukraine-war-map/ https://militaryland.net/maps/deployment-map/ These seem to suggest that the RA have accepted risk in this sector exactly because there is a river there. So how dense are those RA fortifications? That map appears to show roughly a single Division covering off 100 kms of frontage. That is - and let’s be really generous and say that RA division is at full strength - approx 10,000 troops, or 100 troops per km..which is extremely thin. Estimates of the rest of the RA line are around 300 troops per km. 100 RA troops per km means that there are massive holes in that defensive line. Light troops can not only cross, they can infiltrate between forces and get into rear areas, which will force the RA to react. So we are not talking the Atlantic Wall here, we likely have RA hard points on obvious crossing sights, small c-moves forces and a bunch of RA ISR. So indications are that RA force density is quite low, which makes the light dispersed option a good fit. Now the UA has much better intel and will have to plan according to that but based on what we can see, the employment of light forces over that river in strength is not only possible, it is viable. An and now we get to the crux…but you kinda answer your own question here. “What can these light forces actually do?” Well at Kyiv they stopped the RA cold. Elsewhere they have been instrumental in causing the RA to collapse - please find me one major tank battle in this war? Hell it is hard enough to find a decent mech battle. This is a war dominated by fires, not manoeuvres. So the answer to your question is right in your post: ”RUS regroup, reassign reserves to the zone, pile on the drone/artillery/aviation support”. That is exactly the objective of a bunch of light forces running rampant in the backfield. Why? Because the RA will have to pull these (shrinking) assets from somewhere else. This is the minimum objective by the way. If the RA cannot or does not have “reserves” then an opportunity to redraw the lines south of Kherson presents itself. If those light forces can actually establish a bridge head then options open up for heavier forces and other crossing options. By that point the entire left end of the RA line is in trouble. But let’s leave that all as a branch plan and stretch goal. So the real question is not in your response or reasoning. They are not “can it be done” or “will it do anything?” The real question is: does the UA have the forces and capabilities to do it at scale? This we do not know and will have to simply wait and see.

They can do light…but can they upscale and pose an operational threat? I think they can but there are some aspect that have never been tried before on offensives. How far can light infantry, unmanned and fires go? Of course they need ammunition for those fires. I totally agree this is a good option. A difficult one but probably the best of what is left on the table.

Considering many Ukrainians speak Russian and understand the culture that makes it a subversive and asymmetric warfare nightmare for Russia. I am betting Ukrainian SOF teams are operating deeply in Russia. Now, have they linked up or supported the creation of organized resistance at scale? That would be the next step.

When it comes to AirPower, Russia is even in deeper trouble. The RUAF has to be ready to control and defend all Russian airspace and still project threats…at the same time. As they have become more jerkish in Ukraine, they have be worried about escalation but that means they need an airforce to do something about it. For example say - as some have been going on about - Russia does decide to invade Poland. And as we all know the weak kneed and pitiful West will simply let that happen (“NATO means nothing…blah, blah”). Well the problem will be that Russia won’t have enough air power to actually create air superiority in that war either. In fact after all these losses they will be in a worse position for a follow on war than they were in Ukraine. As you note modern airplanes take a long time and a lot of resources to build so that pushes the horizon of any flexing out even further. Frankly we would be nuts not to get behind whatever this is turning into. AirPower and Seapower are all viable strategic targets in this war and Ukraine has demonstrated acumen at these targets. The repercussions of these actions transcend this war and impact Russian ability to wage the next one.

And you are basing this on...? The RUS situation at Kherson was having mech forces on the wrong side of a river with a single LOC, that got blown up. Now, I think it is possible but will take a lot of force generation and support to do it. And some of what we are talking about has never been tried before. But at this point it may be time to try something new because simply sitting back and letting Russia slowly grind away does not seem like the better option. Frankly, I assess that Ukraine has a lower bar to go over for this sort of sustained light effort at Kherson than to try to do heavy-mech breaches further up the line.

You guys are dancing around the central reason of why a UA action in this area would matter - it is where the RA is weakest and least prepared. The Krynki bridgehead has really been a proof of concept, not easy but the UA can sustain a light force against opposition on the other side of a river. Now, can they do that in multiple locations? The aim here is not to become Lords of Marshlands, it is to threaten Russian LOCs in the entire sector. This will force an RA response and reallocation of forces (in the biz we call this “seizing the initiative”) or risk having to pull out. That is the value of this operation, not water buzzard nesting grounds. The next question is “can they do it, light?” Can they upscale Krynki but not run afoul of the dangers of mass in this war? This we do not know. Light has done some pretty amazing stuff in this war, but mostly on the defence. We saw hints at Kharkiv as Light forces broke out, not heavy. But I am still not sure if light infantry, precision fires and unmanned can actually pull off a series of sustained raids that create (as opposed to enable) operational effects leading to decisions. All I can say is that if I wanted to try out that theory, I would pick the Kherson sector. My three points are 1) the value of the terrain is that it would put operational (and possibly) strategic pressure on Russia in an area of vulnerability. 2) The terrain favours a light force approach due to logistical and ISR realities, and 3) It expands Ukrainian strategic options, as opposed to locking them into a grinding war of attrition. But as you say, we will have to wait and see.

Damn, so this is not good news. I have been dreading Russian ISR getting better. Hopefully this was just a lucky week but if the RA get their C4ISR act together, or we pull back on support in this area, things could get very bad very quickly. Regardless, we will need to keep an eye on these sorts of strikes. Are they getting more frequent? Are they getting deeper. If the RA starts to look like the UA in the C4ISR and Deep Strike area, that will be a problem.

Hell, I don’t need to spend the ticket money. Pretty sure I could find completely out of touch here in Canada. It still boggles my mind.

What is hard to believe is that anyone outside of Russia would be desperate or ignorant enough to come anywhere near Russian military service/employment. “You will be a helper. A helper in spending Ukrainian ammunition.” I mean in year 1, maybe. Year 2? Year 3…c’mon. Beyond the morale and ethical equation (and I get that is a western bias), there are just too many stories of foreigners being cannon fodder. And now this one too.

Seriously? https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-68366861

They have heavy drones already in motion for cas evac. Or worst case do it the old fashion way and pull cas back to river. If you go in light, fast and dispersed one has about 85 km of river south of Kherson to play with. No hard xing sites, fast boats and UAS resupply. A corrosive sustained raiding campaign. As a min it will force the RA to shift effort. At best you might just get them to fold.

This kind of demonstrates the "western military thinking box". In western doctrine when we say "river crossing" it is exactly as you describe - getting heavy and mech across a water obstacle and then sustaining them as they push out and drive the opponent far enough back to build bridging infrastructure up to the point the obstacle is no longer an obstacle...and in this war that approach is pretty much broken. Russian ISR - even as lower quality as it is - will see pontoons, ribbon bridges and large build up of forces. They will then lob everything they can at the crossing and any forces in the bridgehead. Hopeless, impossible...modern technology has made it "impossible". So what? Well be something else. Light fast and distributed forces on ATV, motorcycles...hell bicycles. All armed to the teeth with FPVs and loitering munitions of their own. All linked into the massive C4ISR architecture. Only thing missing are UGVs which can reinforce distributed mass. Then let them loose on the enemy. Logistics are not zero but they are much lower than AFVs and tanks. The real question is can one go this way and sustain firepower? Are you losing fires for lighter forces? In the past the answer was unequivocally "yes". After seeing a video of 5 FPV teams stop a RA tank company, I am no longer so sure. So a modern Kherson break out could be a bunch of light teams on quads, all with ATGMs and FPV. The follow up with conventional fires once you push them out of support ranges...however, given RAP rounds and HIMARS, that is a good bubble. Once you get that in place...then try the heavy/mech stuff. Will it work. No idea. It is taking a raiding force and making it into something else. But right now it definitely would be worth exploring because that last sentence of yours is not the better option.