The_Capt

I am honestly amazed that anything I write causes anyone to think about anything “all day”, but that must be the pressure of Canadian culture. I think “unmanned” as a phenomenon is the continuing emergence of something larger within warfare. What you describe here would be big enough to drive significant re-thinking of how we wage war. Since the beginning of this war, I have noted how many really fundamental concepts are being impacted: Mass (density, concentration of force), Offensive, Surprise, Connections, Speed (space and time) and Friction, to name several. These definitely signal a shift in the character of warfare. A change to the fundamental capability of infantry is enormous - on par with shifts we have seen in the last 200 years. But I honestly think it may be bigger. Most military technology has been developed to better project or protect human energy in the use of violence to shape human will. Rocks, spears, bow/arrow, horses, armor, chariots, walls, siege weapons, guns, artillery, air power and seapower - all designed around the human being. However, as Clausewitz (and others) have argued, these are all shifts in the “character” of warfare, not its fundamental nature. A shift in the nature of warfare has occurred at least twice in human history. The first time was when we invented civilization and made warfare an extension of human politics. Before, in pre-civilization, warfare occurred for what could be considered micro-political reasons but was also occurring for many other reason as well, the largest being survival. By upscaling warfare..in fact as a direct result as a pre-condition to upscaling itself, warfare changed to become an “act of violence to force political will”. Political will changed with civilization and so did war. The second time the nature of warfare changed was in 1945. The creation and operationalization of nuclear weapons changed the nature of warfare forever. The nature of warfare became “an act of viable violence to force political will”. War became bounded by the nuclear equation. Unlimited violence meant mutual destruction, so we were forced to view all war through a different lens. This new nature of warfare exists to this day. Now we are staring down the barrel of something else. And what this is exactly, I am not sure. We are essentially seeing technology augmenting and replacing human cognitive processing power. This has been happening for centuries but “unmanned” by definition is about replacing human beings. The larger question with “unmanned” is how far down this road does that replacement go? At a very high expression, unmanned can become a WMD and create a new mutual destruction spin. Even further down that road we are looking at warfare becoming a blend of “viable violence to force hybrid political will”. What “unmanned” really is about is creating and weaponizing artificial-human capabilities. We can see things like “synthetic mass”, “virtual manoeuvre” and of course the autonomy debate. So, “how far?” Is quickly followed by “how fast?” And based on this war…damned fast. It took roughly 2 million years for the first shift in the nature of warfare. Another 10k to get to the second. And now it looks like we could be at a single century for the next one. This is not to say that humans will be left out of warfare completely, but how we wage war shapes (and is shaped by) why and what. I suspect we will see an evolution as you note, towards human effort focused on creating “unmanned superiority”, yet this will include more than explodey stuff. At its fullest expression we get into things like predictive analytics that actually work. This puts one at temporal advantage over an opponent. We see AI commanders, maybe? AI staff is already happening. I strongly suspect there will be a race to see who can get the most unmanned, the fastest. I honestly do not know where this ends, but one thing this war is teaching me is that this entire thing looks and feels real. What we have seen in the last two years alone has been stunning. The fact that the character of warfare is changing is really moving past a debate. What we do not know is whether there will be a shift in war’s nature. But I am getting a weird feeling about the whole damned business at this point.

I am thinking that these unmanned surface vessels are probably going to evolve into platforms as opposed to suicide drones. They are fast (relatively), low profile and have incredibly long range. I suspect they are already working on using them for UAS or missile launching platforms. And I would not rule out small fast torpedoes. In the end they don’t even have sink the ship, only damage it enough and the effect is the same. That way these small sea drones can stand off kms and simply launch other systems until enough get through. At these ranges this will effectively deny sea space within the littorals and possibly further out.

On the topic of the day: Unmanned. Do we have a follow up on this? "One more thing. A strategic issue. I have just signed a decree initiating the establishment of a separate branch of our Defense Forces – the Unmanned Systems Forces. This is not a matter of the future, but something that should yield a very concrete result shortly. This year should be pivotal in many ways. And, obviously, on the battlefield as well. Drones – unmanned systems – have proven their effectiveness in battles on land, in the sky and at sea. Ukraine has truly changed the security situation in the Black Sea with the help of drones. Repelling ground assaults is primarily the task of drones. The large-scale destruction of the occupiers and their equipment is also the domain of drones. The current list of tasks is clear: special staff positions for drone operations, special units, effective training, systematization of experience, constant scaling of production, and the involvement of the best ideas and top specialists in this field. This is a task for the army, the Ministry of Defense, and the government as a whole. And to ensure the necessary coordination in the Defense Forces, to ensure the proper level of planning and quality of logistics, the Unmanned Systems Forces will be established within the AFU. The relevant proposals will be submitted for consideration by the NSDC." https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/pidpisav-ukaz-yakij-rozpochinaye-stvorennya-okremogo-rodu-si-88817#:~:text=Ukraine has truly changed the,also the domain of drones.

Are these really practical for warships? I mean the drag and weight alone seem problematic. And how resistant would they be to tandem attacks?

In reality there is a larger ISR architecture picking up targets and handing them off to FPV crews. Drones are not sent out blindly hunting targets, the do need to fix them and engage, however you are putting too much stock in this “spotting” drone theory. The UA is putting up hundreds of tac UAS, all with cameras and onboard ISR. That is a LOT of SHORAD to “push back”. Further, FPVs are “first person” they already have targeting ISR on board. If the spotters do get pushed back do you really think they are going to call off the attack. No, we need a C-UAS system that can push back all UAS, not just select spotters. Really, do share. What COIN operation were you in where tanks were of any use? I challenge IFVs but we needed to be in some armor but they demonstrated 1) they could kill our IFVs and 2) they were not deterred by them. Use of heavy mech in COIN has been a classic western screw up and I have Afghanistan to prove it. You are completely missing the larger lesson here. It is not about the tactical problem of that single attack. Sure you have saved the Bn…right up until the next wave…and the one after it…and the one after that. We will run out of 30 million dollar systems firing million dollar missiles well before they are going to run out of FPVs that cost 10k. Buying “The Battalion” an extra morning of life is meaningless if we spent all our money on that system because they will still be dead by nightfall. I think Steve put is best - spending 90% of funding on a 10% solution is a sure fire track to losing. As to dilemma, I was being extremely generous in my example. None of these AD systems have proven sub-munitions and I would bet beer money right now that it is single missile to single target. An opponent flying 100 FPVs is going to target both AD and fighting vehicles. Further they are going to do it a longer ranges, over the horizon. What? So our enemies are complete idiots? They can’t possibly come up with c-UAS systems. Hey here is a crazy idea…how about an opponent that invests in cheap c-UAS out of other UAS? So while we are feeling good about our multi-billion dollar SHORAD program they are killing all our FPVs and blasting our SHORADs away too? Once the Bde reserve of our fancy SHORAD are dead we are naked while they still have a system. Why? Because they invested in lower cost technology they could mass produce. You are pulling numbers out of your @ss here. These features will drive per unit cost up but economies of scaling will drive them down. They already have. We won’t have economies of scale for that SHORAD system because it costed billions in development and to manufacture a limited manufacturing run and the political level is only going to give us so much money. Physics has nothing to say that any of these ideas are impossible in this universe. Energy density, weight and processing power are the limiting factors and they are all trending towards smaller lighter. My ideal c-UAS weapon is another UAS - not sure how physics are denying these as we are already seeing them. As to a small infantry point defence weapon I am pretty sure we can invest billions in that and come up with something better than what is being pitched. Hell 40 mm airburst rounds might have a better point defence chance. There are but bigger, heavier and more expensive is not the way to go. That video has a single Boxer blasting away at single (white) drones. On the battlefield in Ukraine there are hundreds. This is a much bigger issue than a few shotguns and a multi-million dollar SHORAD system. We are likely going to have review a lot more than “better AD”. FFS, that War on the Rocks article is citing that 50% of T90 losses have been due to FPVs. We had another report of an entire Russia tank company stopped cold by 5 FPV crews. The ISR alone these things are pumping out has been noted as making it impossible to manoeuvre. So we had better get with the program in the West. Air spotters, shotguns and MGs are not going to do this. Our opponents are watching this very carefully and do you not think they are going to be investing very heavily in this space? You want The_Capt’s prescription for the unmanned problem space: - Rethink c-unmanned. It is not a “problem” we need to manage, it is a major shift in how wars are going to be fought. Best way to find and kill a small unmanned vehicle will very likely be another small unmanned vehicle. Invest heavily into UAS and UGVs suited to detecting and killing other unmanned systems on the outer envelop of controlled battle space. - Re-think ISR. We need to learn how to live on a completely illuminated battlefield. This means that deception, silencing and blinding need to become major campaign themes and not sprinkled on operations. They need to become central and drive what is possible on operations. - Rethink conventional capability and organization. Lose the weight, lose the heat, lose the tail. We can bubble wrap our F echelon in multi-million dollar SHORAD but it won’t do squat for the B echelon. We have long vulnerable logistics tails that are carrying too much weight. We need to dump the weight and offset with precision and do it quickly. No sacred freakin cows here either. We need dispersion and speed. And we will need a C2 construct that supports this. - Re-think manoeuvre. We are very likely facing a major doctrinal shift in western warfare. This love affair with Manoeuvre Warfare as “the solution” is likely over. We need to face the realities of attritional warfare and the capacity implications that will have. This will drive us towards cheaper many because we cannot sustain attrition warfare with what we have right now. Manoeuvre is not going away but it will need to be earned. We will need to win attrition in order to manoeuvre. - Re-think Denial. This is not a transitory annoyance, it is a projected condition. It is proving decisive in this war and very likely will in the next. - Re-think C4. Data is a resource more important than gas. We need to see the modern battlefield as a competitive data, information and knowledge environment. We need to stop going to war to validate what we already know and accept that things are evolving very quickly. - Re-think fundamental principles of warfare - Mass, Surprise, Manoeuvre and Offensive are all up for grabs right now. We need to understand what these mean in a modern context and stop assuming we know what they mean. Mass alone is changing in definition which is going to break our current doctrinal frameworks. There that is a start. My point being that this is an about a lot more than SHORADs and shotguns. This is about sustaining and gaining military options in the face of a highly accelerating evolution on the battlefield. Or, you know, we could spend a few billion on another AD system and get back to business as usual.

Totally missed that. Of course every counter has weaknesses.

Cripes that is deep in the backfield. No need to lob missiles at the bridge, hit the piers with these things.

Another option would be to go NLOS, like the Spike. That system can be fired blind and acquire the target in flight. One already has a rebroadcast platform on the unmanned boat. These systems also tend to have longer ranges.

You know someone is going to invent some small little underwater beasty that can plant a limpet mine, hell it will be the limpet mine...sheesh, glad I never went into the Navy.

This brings up what we are not seeing. Smoke. Treated it can obscure thermals.

Kinda modern version of grape shot. I like where the idea is going but claymores are pretty short range (around 100ms). The balls tend to give up energy pretty quickly. The bigger the explosives, the bigger the ball bearing, which actually makes range issues worse. And airburst frag mortar or somesuch would also be an idea. I am a big fan of incendiaries at sea - it hits naval pers deeply in their psyche and has for centuries. The fact that those surface drones can get within small arms range is already a sign of a local defence failure on the part of the Russian ship.

"Drones Today The ongoing war in Ukraine showcases small drones as key tools for ground combat in the modern era. The technology behind them will continue to improve, as machine guns did, by becoming more reliable, portable, and tactically useful. Ukraine and Russia are desperate for better and more drones to equip their forces. This year, the Ukrainian government aims to produce one million small drones for military use, and its partners are focusing on supplying thousands more. As much as 50 percent of Russia’s modern T-90 tank combat losses are attributed to small first-person-view drones. Over 3,000 verified drone strikes occurred along the front line in January 2024. At the same time, Russian forces are building and using drones with equal zeal. In at least one case, a bakery was converted to 3D printing drones, and public schools are teaching classes on drone flying along with other martial topics. Small drones are becoming the defining technology of the conflict." That is just nuts. Excellent article. As to western military integration, let's just say it has been "spotty". We are all watching this war, but just like on this forum at times, we are all seeing what we want to see and not necessarily what is actually happening. Before this war in the Canadian military UAS programs were a hot mess. The RCAF still does not have an unmanned platform within its fleets. They are getting one, but in typical fashion it will be some large Strategic/operational beast. This is not all bad as we need these too, but the smaller stuff, Class 2 and below, are all being handled internally by each service. This has led to the capability spinning off in a bunch of directions. So as to training and force development, it is kinda all over the map right now and changing daily. No one expected to see naval drones swarming a patrol ship that looks a lot like our AOPS. No one could have imagined "1 million" FPVs who appear to be doing most of the tank killing back in March of '22 - hell my money was on ATGMs, like Javelin, which definitely worked but were not even close to becoming the major shocker. We have major issues with deconfliction, training standards, training clearances, frequency management - ranges and training areas are not set up for FPV gunnery - I am not even sure what that looks like. Simulators are our best bet, but we will spend 5-10 years buying some massively bloated system or some app-garbage built by some "diversity group" (see: ArriveCAN app). All this is of course also held up by procurement friction. Some organizations are out in front - but they shall remain unnamed - however even they are struggling at times. We definitely do not have doctrine or established tactics. Frankly I do not even know where to start on Unmanned Battlefield Management, I mean what do the supply lines even look like? Training, C2 and effective employment are all behind the curve. Our reactions and culture are not competitive either. With few exceptions, I have largely heard of the "drone problem" as just that, a problem to be managed so we can get our current "stuff" to work like it used to. Few are pointing at the competitive opportunities here. And all the while the Chinese are pushing ahead: https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/List/ORIGIN_china--people-s-republic-of-d6ee02&DOM_air-e61af2&DOM_aircraft-42b8bd&DOM_unmanned-aerial-vehicles--uavs--bc8e46 https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/List/ORIGIN_china--people-s-republic-of-d6ee02&DOM_land-f5e1db&DOM_infantry-vehicles-0a6516&DOM_unmanned-ground-vehicles--ugv--453001 It is one of my final departing shots - we have seen this coming for years and largely ignored it. We either get with the program or we risk losing the few military options we have left.

So much of war is about projecting dilemma. So load up surface unmanned with air self loitering munitions. Make it a surface/air attack. Air stuff pops up basically where you see those MGs blasting away, so maybe 500ms out. CWIS and point defenses will get some but even 1 or 2 getting through will cause chaos - especially if one employs incendiaries. Add in good ol MGs, decoys etc and you basically have a swarming solution for probably in a few million dollars. The SK was worth 65 million plus crew and this approach would work on larger ships. Basically the entry cost for strategic sea denial just plummeted.

It appears that you have not kept up on this war. We are not seeing a "few recon drones spotting" - which will still be a serious problem with this sort of SHORAD system because LOS (with camera magnification) is much father than these systems can likely reach. We are starting to see drones being employed en masse on the sorts of scales that these systems cannot deal with. They are not solely being used for recon, but now strike. Production is reaching massive scales (e.g. reports of 100k per month). This is not "perfect so we shouldn't bother", it is "expensive and not useful for the environment." We have gone down this path before and wind up getting into trouble every time - let's send tanks to a COIN fight...anyone? Massed UAS are not a SHORAD problem, or at least one it can solve. But that wont stop big business from trying to convince us otherwise. Here is a scenario - 100 FPVs being driven by 10 crews with repeaters. These are not even fully autonomous, which we know is coming. They are EW hardened but we can even accept 50% attrition, so now 50 FPVs are coming in and attacking a position. These large SHORAD systems now need to track and engage small fast moving UAS capable of treetop and below. Assuming you have submunitions (which there is no evidence of), and each missile can engage 5 drones effectively - hell give them 100 percent; based on the photos, 5 Coyote systems needed to counter this one attack. Ok, doesn't sound too bad. Except for the fact that these FPVs are not working alone. They are linked into supporting fires. So as soon as those Coyotes start firing they are going to get lit up and engaged by PGM indirect fires. But these are trained crews and are scooting, so maybe you only lose half of them, lets say 2 out of 5. So how many Coyotes do we have in a Bde? Because the enemy has another 150 FPVs...for todays attack alone. You basically need to stick one or two in every platoon...fantastic, exactly what Raytheon wants. And here is the thing...it will not work. First problem will be clutter. The enemy will fill the sky with all sorts of junk to toss off detection. Fire control and coordination will be a nightmare. And now on a battlefield where everyone is whispering for fear of getting picked up by sound detection, we are going to have dozens of these missiles firing off all over the place. So we have solved the recon UAS problem by making ourselves visible from freakin space. And finally sustainment; the enemy is losing ammunition, we are losing platforms. We cannot keep that up over any period of time. Like other high end western equipment, we will run out and politicians will never sign off on massive "what if" production capacity. But let's put this all aside or the moment, this approach will not only be challenged by current reality, it will not solve for what is coming next. UAS are going to get cheaper and more distributed. They will combine with UGVs so you can lay them like mines and suddenly have them pop up a few meters away. Drone swarms will be in the hundreds with EFP and launchable sub-munitions of their own. So while we are investing billions in SHORAD as a solution, we are going to find out it was a half-measure, at best. We are so addicted to big, few and expensive platforms, that our solution to their possible extinction on the battlefield is, more big expensive platforms. So what is the solution? Cheap and many. I want a C-UAS weapon that fits under the barrel of a rifle like a GL but has a 1-2 km range and high Pk - so better than a shotgun. I want UAS, that hunt and kill other UAS. I want direct fire support on lighter unmanned platforms that do not drink a swimming pools worth of gas per km, and are big and hot. I want infantry that can carry more, move faster and go for days without resupply. What I do not want are more big, loud expensive platforms to protect my already big, loud and expensive platforms.

Looks like another bloated MID solution to my eyes. I count 2 tubes on the veh and 4 on the ground system, not sure how that is supposed to counter a “UAS swarm.” Do they break into sub munitions? If so, how many? The problem with a lot of these C-UAS solutions is that they have been designed for the last war. iSIL was using small numbers of drones in Iraq so efforts were directed to defeat that threat. No one predicted UAS employment at the levels in this war. Even if each Coyote missile could track and down 5 FPVs, at the scales of employment we are seeing one would need hundreds of these systems to begin to provide coverage. Further, none of this solves for tracking and engaging a UAS flying through trees or a hybrid one that can do both air and ground. It is a beginning of an arms race that will end up costing billions (if not trillions). And the MID will gladly spend that money on big expensive solutions…just like they have every other time.

With anything in these realms it is a cost/risk/payoff question. A lot of what they are getting is likely from captured Russian equipment so "hidden assets" may be less of a consideration. But if they do have people inside Russian manufacturing - and given the "money talks" dynamic of Russian corruption I am willing to bet they do - burning them by releasing insider info would have to lead to a significant gain. And here is the problem, widely publicizing is going to sell well with people already onside (like us) but those against are simply going to call it "lies...more lies!" and ignore it. So my guess is that it is being held inside the bubble and used to inform decisions.

In some ways I think I would be happier if it was kevinkin coming back around. Oh well, onto the seldom used ignore list then.

Ok, help me out here because following the bouncing ball is becoming really difficult. Obviously, I am no stable genius, you are completely losing me. So to review: - You came back to this forum and opened with "Hey fellas, anyone think Ukraine is out of military gas and we should think about peace negotiations?" - Then we began a discussion on a possible operation down south at Kherson. You vehemently disagreed, ignored evidence and pretty much dismissed any and all Ukrainian military options at this point in the war. Steve even called you out for this. - Ok, I got tired of trying to explain why the southern operation is viable - you clearly were not in a listening mood on that one. Then I called you out and challenged to to provide your "solution. - Your solution was for the US to double-down on support and "threaten" Russia to a negotiation table. Some vague hand-waving but we could have a UN Zone of separation, Ukraine in the EU (but not NATO), some sort of vague Ukraine defence and security guarantees, Ukraine gives up Crimea and Donbas, and reparations and war crimes are pretty much a long shot. Did I miss anything? - Of course to do this, the US would need to commit an overwhelming amount of support to this war. Likely an order of magnitude more in order to "scare Russia to the table quickly". Side-stepping the obvious problems of US political will, process and internal frictions - Russia is not stupid and knows these issues as well - the ability for Ukraine to upscale and operationalize all that support could likely take years, but ok...for arguments sake let's just assume all that away. - As a self-proclaimed UK citizen, you are essentially making the end-state of this war entirely a US problem, which is frankly disingenuous; however, let's just put all that to the side too. If Ukraine receives a whole mountain load of military support...why negotiate? Increased military support would create new military options for the UA to renegotiate the current Russian position by f#cking killing them. If the only way to solve this is with overwhelming US support, why on earth wouldn't Ukraine use that support to push the RA out of their own country? "Hey Ukraine, here is enough capability for you to re-establish air superiority. What? Oh no, you aren't supposed to really do it. No, you can use that to give Crimea away, lock in exclusion from NATO and agree to a shaky ceasefire." Seriously...W.T.F?! - So after that little journey we are right back where we freakin started...Ukrainian military options in prosecuting this war until Russia can't do anything about it. Which you started off dismissing in the first place! So rather than come on here and advocate for more Ukrainian support (particularly out of the US) from the beginning, you took us on this personal exploration of Ukraine being out of options unless we support them better. We had to walk through what peace looked like in your mind...which frankly looks a lot like going back on the offensive once the UA is bombed up. I swear to gawd if you are not kevinkin back on another account I will be shocked. If you are honestly a Labour Party carrying member of the UK, you are locked in the mother of all Dunning-Kruger effects. Regardless...got it. Thank you so much for highlighting that we need to support Ukraine more, and any negotiations must be from a position of strength. Let's just move on...

So no discussion of the way forward can sidestep the MAGA/Trump/Biden issue, or the '24 election. The rest of the world can have all the opinions it wants but US power (as you argue) is central...then so is US politics, which by definition is how that power is governed. Your own argument boxes that fact right into the discussion, while you try to cite a broader perspective? I have to be honest, your strategic/political position is making less and less sense. Why don't you go back to arguing with a career military engineer on viabilities of water crossings south of Kherson?

Right...yet you bring up US power as the solution.

The grey ones are Priggy's Fleet...singing in the Pandemonium Choir.

What I really want to know is the quality of those T72s and T80s. Pushing a newer model out the door does not mean its internals are functioning as designed. I am assuming western intelligence is chasing after this stuff and the real answer is likely classified for now. But these are the types of indicators one watches out for - stuff like older sights, cheaper electronics and other corner cutting. We wrestle a lot with the actual state of the Russian military and that is hard only being able to see from this altitude.

Well you might want to sit down and have a conversation with yourself then because these are the exact same lines being used in the MAGA camp right now = "easy button of US power", "vague hand waving on details" and obstinate belief that there is an easy solution in face of obvious counter-facts. Oh, and let's not forget the obstinate refusal to see any viable solution other than your own because of "what you think". FFS we just had FlimFlam or whatever in here doing pretty much exactly what you are. Look, maybe you are who you say you are and this whole thing is a big miscommunication, but your timing and profile are highly suspicious. You posted once back in 2013 and then disappear for 11 years, only to come back on this specific thread espousing a lot of the same lines we have heard from the US political far right...just after Adiivka. Your problem space is straight out of the MacGregor school of analysis and your solutions are pull straight from the MAGA camp. Whatever, fine. You have clearly expressed your opinion and now we all know it.

I actually think it matters quite a bit to be honest. It matters to quality. T90s are not surviving on this battlefield...how do we think T55s are going to do? Under the sanctions and pressure how well are those "refurbishments" going? Russian's are masters of "rolling out the numbers" but quality matters. I think the route to victory is clear to be honest. This and other analysis (by Rand) agree that Russia has until about 2026 until they start to hit production breaking points. So we keep Ukraine in the game for another 2 years. If we get lucky, Russia has operational collapses and Ukraine can retake ground. If this war remains a grinding mess, well we make sure we can outlast. The direction of Russian quality is going the right way...downward.

Ok, well now we know which camp you are in, and it definitely is not the "liberal peacenik" one. Hmm, and I wonder which presidential candidate should be best qualified to flex this immense political power and which one is "weak and indecisive"? Regardless, we are talking about negotiating from a position of strength here, which runs directly counter to your original position of "Ukraine is out of all options, therefore should sue for peace." In fact you have been arguing vehemently that there are no military solutions left...and now you want to make some? But, ok, lets put that all aside. So if the US is going to "threaten" it must be ready to follow through. What you are proposing is on an entire different scale than the support we have seen. First problem will be getting the US political machine to agree to these levels of spending, and very fast spending - cries of oversight and corruption will ring. Next problem is putting the UA in a position where they can actually absorb, integrate and operationalize these levels of support; not insurmountable but no small challenge. Next, Ukraine will need to demonstrate military victory on the battlefield. One cannot simply "threaten" with the Russians, we tried that. One has to demonstrate. So we are back to creating viable military options. And then there is this part: "In negotiations, West agrees not to take Ukraine into NATO, but accepts into EU, and makes concrete security guarantees to in any case. UN peacekeepers in along border. Russia gets symbolic non-NATO status for Ukraine. No future invasion of Ukraine for Russia." That is weak. EU is an economic and diplomatic union, not a military one. UN peacekeepers is actually an idea I have floated but one would definitely need a new Russian regime to even get Russia in the room to negotiate. Ukraine outside of NATO would need binding security bi-lats with western troops in Ukraine a la South Korea as a minimum. I think Ukraine outside of NATO leaves too many dangerous mouseholes open - this is why Finland and Sweden jumped in. NATO is the one thing that appears to deter Putin and Russia and I suspect it will be the only way to actually secure Ukraine in the long term. You are also pretty weak on reparations and war crimes. Maybe it is the medium but your position kind of feels "oh well...watcha gonna do?" There can be no road to renormalization with Russia without these conditions being met, that much must be clear. If we go soft on this, certain political parties will try and weasel back to "business as usual". The only way the US can use its power, short of an all out war, is to push support into Ukraine in order to sustain resistance until Russia falters - we can definitely agree on this. The idea that "this is easy" and "could be done tomorrow" is dangerously amateur and short-sighted thinking, currently being expressed by some sectors of the US political landscape...and not new to this board. Russia must be in forced into a position of "had enough?" and not "hey can you please?" At least under this regime. This cannot be done "overnight" or "easily" under the current constraints. This is in fact threading a pretty tough needle. Too much and one faces uncontrolled escalation, or a full on Russian collapse...both of which are worse that this current war. Too little and things drag on too long and western resolve and attention slips again. This is a tricky and challenging situation in that the US cannot employ its immense power to the fullest without making thing worse both internally or externally. This is also a pretty high stakes proxy war that must; stay limited and result in the slow death of the Putin regime and doctrine, create a secure and stable Ukraine, and somehow set the conditions for future broader regional stability. This is not a "deal" one can make in a weekend.