Maj. Battaglia

FTs are area weapons, so in the case Vader's Jester is talking about, I would bet that the flame attack took out both the FT team and the HT, rather than one victim causing the demise of the other. As for exploding FTs, there are other cinematic examples of this, such as HBO's "When Trumpets Fade." This does not prove anything, but since it and SPR were apparently well researched, it might be true. Having a special graphic, though, of the FT team on fire might be a little much. FT teams die pretty easily in CM. Whether it is by bullet to the body or exploding FT is only academic. Both the Germans and US had separate tanks for pressure gas (say, nitrogen--non-flammable) and for the fuel. US typically had three tanks (two fuel, one propellant), Germans two.

The Soviets did not have access to Ultra from the British, and, unless evidence is buried in an old Soviet archive, the Soviets did not crack the Enigma code. They may have known of Ultra through their spies in Britain. Unfortunately, the Soviets were not willing to exchange even basic intelligence with the Western Allies, so the Allies did not provide much, if any, in return. The British kept the existence of Ultra secret for many years after the war (one source says until the 1970's) because they thought such technology might be useful to the Soviets. The Soviets did, however, have many high placed contacts, including one in the German High Command who regularly provided operational plans to the Soviets in a very timely manner. Now whether they were believed or not was a different story (e.g. the contacts provided info on Fall Blau in 1942 but Stalin would only believe the Germans would attack Moscow from the center). Overall, the Soviet Union had a good success rate with agents in Germany. As Michael points out, the Soviets were also adept at sending small teams behind German lines to gather operational intelligence, and did so at Stalingrad, for example.

This sounds like a great resource. After doing a pretty exhaustive search on the Internet, I don't think it is among the many US Army documents digitized and available for download. However, those interested in related documents should check out the following links: US Army Center for Military History If you check out the first two links on the "Online Bookshelves" section, you will find some interesting material, including battle descriptions. US Army Military History Institute This page has some great documents from and about WWII by the US Army. Included is the Handbook on German Military Forces. The interview with Gen. DePuy is also an excellent account of infantry battalion operations in WWII.

Brian, You are correct about the backblast of the Püppchen: it had a breech lock so the gases would have been forced out the front. I'm sure it was quite a cloud, though. I would think the weight, 20.5 lbs. for the panzerschreck vs. 270 lbs. for the Püppchen would be a deciding factor in determining production priorities, along with the much more complicated production requirements and more resources required to produce the Püppchen. They fired the same ammo with the same killing power, so it would seem logical that the simpler launching platform would be preferable, although not to the exclusion of the other. BTW, I noticed in HBO's "Band of Brothers" the producers have the Germans using a Püppchen at Carentan.

Here is some info on the FG 42 from the US War Dept.'s Handbook on German Military Forces, p.313. Because it was written shortly before VE Day, the info may not be 100% accurate. But it is interesting nonetheless: "Although German nomenclature indicates that this rifle is intended to be an automatic weapon for use by parachute troops, it also can be used as a light machine gun or a machine carbine. The weapon is designed more like a light machine gun than a rifle. It is gas operated, fitted with a permanently attached folding bipod, and can be fired automatically or single shot. A compensator is attached to the muzzle, and provision is made for the attachment of a telescopic sight. A bayonet also is attached. The magazine is held in a horizontal position on the left of the receiver. The aperture rear sight is graduated from 100 to 1200 meters. The safety is located on the left side above the pistol grip, and the lever for selecting automatic or single shot fire is placed above and to the rear of the trigger. A later model of this weapon, slightly heavier and more solidly constructed, has the bipod closer to the muzzle. "Standard 7.92 mm ammunition is used in this weapon." Weight, incidentally, was nine pounds, the same as the Kar 98. According to p. 132 of the text, each 39-man parachute rifle platoon carried 9 SMG and 6 LMG, although it does not mention type (or if they consider FG 42 as LMG or SMG).

I made a map of my old neighborhood (Adams Morgan) in Washington, DC, using a topo map as guidance. While I have not used it yet for a scenario, one idea I had was for one called "Saturday Night Parking." Each side would get one jeep/kubelwagen and the idea was to get to the flag (the only open parking space) first.

One enhancement to fog of war I would like to see eventually is for "eliminated" enemy units. I think there is too much certainty about whether a unit has been destroyed or not. For example, when you discover an enemy gun emplacement, you might call in artillery. You know too well when you have had success because the info window tells you it is eliminated. You can call off the barrage next turn to save shells. Sure, often there would be a catastrophic explosion or some other clue that the thing is out of action, but occasionally it would be interesting to have the gun you thought you knocked out come back to life (a la Merli's 50 cal) or to continually pound a position you think is active but has actually been eliminated. The more friendly units spotting and the closer they are, the less likely this would happen. Ordering your crew or unit to hide might slightly increase the chance the enemy thinks you are dead. Again, this would not happen every time, but would add some uncertainty and force the player to close to the position to make certain. It would almost never happen with vehicles or moving units, only units (primarily defense) with decent cover. Just a thought--I don't recall this being mentioned before, but I'm sure it has.

JasonC raises excellent points concerning the Somme that are not only true, but worth putting into the context of tests that try to simulate this. No Man's Land: You can't expect Somme-size casualties over only 100 or 200m. More than two pillboxes: The Germans called in artillery on the advance and had infantry. They had defense in depth. (And the CM pillboxes, despite being listed as having 3 guns, only target one unit at a time with all 3; I assume they also have the same fire axis.) Density of troops: Although it varied, the plan of the division that included the Tyneside Scots, the brigade that suffered 80% casualties in 10 minutes, was to have an assault in four columns, three battalion waves to a column, each column covering 400 yards, and 150 yards between the waves. I daresay nothing like this was attempted on the Western Front. Tactics: Initiative was not expected. Therefore the disciplined, green British troops simply moved ahead leapfrog until 200m out, then a full-on bayonet charge. CM models WWII small unit tactics and therefore models a better inherent defense in open ground than their WWI fathers due to better formations, doctrine, etc. Capt: I can't explain the difficulty you've had in getting effects of MG fire on nearby units. A squad does cover at least 5m front, and CM won't let you put them closer (so that the LOS line reads less than 5m). I will readily agree that beaten zones should probably be bigger over longer distances. Lethality should be low but suppression present. I ran a test of my own, and came up with interesting results. I created a gauntlet of pavement 160m wide and 300m long. I placed 4 reg wooden bunkers 150m back from the center line of the gauntlet, 2 on each side (and filled in the space between them and the gauntlet with pavement), and each one about 120m from opposite "endzones." At one endzone I set up the unsupported US reg company shoulder to shoulder on a front 50m wide with the HQs spread out just behind and proportionately. All HQ leadership modifiers were deleted. I ran the test hotseat and had the bunkers hide, and the troops sneak for the entire length of the gauntlet. After the first turn I changed all commands to run and unhid the bunkers. This allowed for all troops to be in essentially a broad line (no varying command delays, and no opening fire with some to be grounded and others to leave first). After 60 seconds, there were 48 casualties (38%) and all units were either Broken!, Routed!, or eliminated. But more importantly, I followed who the MGs were targeting. After 30 seconds the targeting began to switch and the units began to break out of formation. Before this, however, the MGs predictably targeted only the nearest two units on each wing. At the 30 second mark, there were a total of 29 casualties, and the line was in full enfilade position realtive to the bunkers. What I found amazing was that the 4 targeted units suffered 8 (28%) while the untargeted units suffered 21 (72%) of those casualties!! The middle squad, C2, 10m away from the nearest targeted unit, suffered 3 casualties and was panicking. I only ran this once because it took some time to do the detailed analysis. But it shows, beyond a reasonable doubt to me, that some form of fire zone exists. And in 60 seconds, each of 4 MGs took out an average of 12 guys, many of them not even being the primary target. Are beaten zones and grazing fire modeled 100% accurately? No. As Lambshank points out, you can't model every bullet. Are they modeled? Yes. What priority should 100% realism for these receive in the context of Western Front tactics, and how much difference does it make to gameplay? I would say little. ASL Vet is right to point out that grazing fire was missing from the conversation. That's one reason I thought for beaten zone effects, The_Capt should place his MGs further back. That is also what I was alluding to when I mentioned that the Vickers slide rule did not give a beaten zone under 500m: the beaten zone is of infinite length, or more correctly, does not exist and the principles of grazing fire are in effect. Was there something else ASL Vet thought was wrong? Someone asked why continue to argue this point. For some time there has been criticism about MG modeling and seemingly mass clamor for more MG killing power. I, for one, think that there is always room for improving realism in any computer simulation (and some of these issues are being addressed re MGs, I know). Small tweaks to MGs, unit morale, infantry speed, etc. are fine as long as MGs aren't upgunned to the point of becoming much more fearsome than they already are.

A post by The_Capt on MG beaten zones produced an interesting side topic on MG pillboxes. I did a search (subject only--all text timed out) and this has been tangentially and very briefly discussed once before, but no response by BTS or much feedback from others. MG pillboxes possess three MGs compared to one in the wooden bunker. However, the three MGs don't seem to be able to have independent targets. Therefore, the MG acts as one "super" MG and they expend three ammo points per burst. This might be fine at long ranges where one target can be suppressed and then the pillbox can move on, but at close ranges it is a handicap. From my experience, a tank's bow MG can target a separate unit when the turret is turned away. Since pillboxes are treated as immobile vehicles, I would think the same logic could be applied (obviously there's no turret, but you get the idea) to them. The point costs of reg. HMG 42, wooden bunker, MG pillbox are 28, 44, 76. The low point difference between single MG bunker and three-MG pillbox supports the idea that there is a single gun in the pillbox. I am wondering if there was an oversight at some point in the design of MG pillboxes. If they do have three MGs, then I would suggest they be able to target at least two different units at once (preferably three) and have a higher point value OR have only one MG (which is fine with me), fire one "ammo point" per burst, and cost the same or slightly less in points. I know BTS has said that they plan to enhance fortifications in CM:BB. Will this be addressed in CM:BB or at some point in the future? Have others noticed this issue?

I think a lot of intersting points have been raised by Jason C and the subsequent posts. These issues are related to the original question posed here, the general question of MG effectiveness, and the CM engine in general. Not to squelch debate, but it seems that we are getting off the point. The good ideas and debate topics, especially made by Lewis in his last post, deserve a thread of their own (although Lewis may have already addressed these before, I seem to remember so; that doesn't mean they can't be again). The_Capt originally brought up the topic of MG beaten zones and provided the methodology and results of a test he ran. I'd like to return to that again if I may. Capt, have you had a chance to run new tests? To clarify my point on range, I mentioned that as a trigonometric argument: the further the distance from MG to target, the longer the enemy is in a true enfiladed target area. True, increasing distance decreases numerical effectiveness, but I was suggesting maybe an extra 100m. This also allows a slightly wider beaten zone (or should). Also, the longer the "gauntlet," the more time the MGs have to work. I thought that was important because there were more individual units than MGs. I seemed to remember BTS saying, and have since confirmed with tests, that there is a "beaten zone," or at least a MG penetration model in CM. Squads have suffered casualties when a nearby squad was the target. Other nearby squads suffered suppression effects. I will agree that the model is probably not true to life, and I think this is being modified for CMBB. I found a site hosted by a guy who collects, of all things, slide rules. BUT, he does have a slide rule made for Vickers MG crews in WWII that includes a way to determine the beaten zone over range. Up to 500 yds, the length is infinte, but width is less than 2 meters. If you haven't seen one of these, it is worth checking out: Vickers MG slide rule At short ranges you will do severe damage to whatever is within the 2m wide zone and along your axis of fire. But if the men are spread out somewhat and moving quickly, you have to follow them because your fire covers fewer of them. The closer you are, the larger the angle to be changed and the faster targets pass through your field of fire. I would argue therefore that CM models things pretty well (with room for future enhancements) in terms of MG effectiveness. 1 MG vs. 1 squad, whether the MG has them in enfilade or the squad is making a frontal assault, and the squad is going to suffer heavily. Once you start adding more units, the MG can't cope with the numbers. In the former case, men will get by and in the latter the MG is doomed (but the infantry will still suffer some stiff casualties). From what I can tell, this is realistic.

Capt: A couple of points about your last post: As you say, the model for beaten zone may need work, and may indeed be modified in CMBB. I also agree that infantry may move too fast, and again, this is something BTS said it is working on. Finally, I will argee that more dynamic targeting would be realistic, although I'm not sure if enemy casualties would increase as a result, rather more units might end up suppressed. My main issue was with your test parameters. Try the test with six wooden bunkers instead of two pillboxes. Use pavement if you want to simulate really open ground. Give the MGs more room. There will be even higher casualty rates than you originally recorded. Also, you say the test was meant to be worst case for the attacker, but it sounds to me like they did OK, and it is worst case for the defender before the test begins: an entire company has come within 200 m of the defenders' position unharmed before the test begins. Now each MG must take out or force to flee an average of 21 guys in the time it takes them to cover 200m. Good MG crews can create, and use, beaten zones 1000m or more away. When you say you've seen a whole company decimated by two MGs, at what range did the MGs open up? How long did it take to finish the job? Was there any other supporting fire? What can you say about the quality of their training (and who the heck were they)? I'm not doubting you, just curious. Like I said, I could be convinced to change my mind. I will say that MGs in WWII were often placed well over 100m behind the supporting infantry, which supports the idea that they were meant to be longer range (longer than 200m) support weapons (i.e. distance firing was more useful than close in). In CM scenarios, when used in conjunction with infantry and other assets, I think they perform quite well. Whether individual MGs perform historically, I am not 100% sure. But to me they seem to be a pretty good approximation.

Capt: First, I submit my comments and criticisms in a respectful, constructive manner. I could be convinced otherwise, but for now I don't think there is too much of a problem with the MG model. I do think it can be useful to discuss such matters and test CM's capabilities, and I often do this with various ideas in mind. What you say ("This is running between 2 MG Pillboxes, firing a total of 6 MGs, at less than 200ms!!") implies to me that your US troops started their charge 200 meters away. Unfortunately, this test builds into it a tactical blunder by the defense before the test begins. Remember, MGs are not primarily a close support weapon. Their strength is their ability to suppress troops over a fairly long distance. Setting up a MG with only a 200 meter field of fire is not utilizing it properly (at least, outside a city). Allowing a company of enemy troops to approach that close, especially considering you have no infantry support, spells doom for your pillboxes. This brings up the second problem, the lack of acompanying infantry. Even in WWI, the MG positions would be flanked by supporting infantry. I understand you want to find out how many casualties the MGs inflict, but realistically, there is more to it than that. In your test, had you added a platoon of infantry around the flag, the results would have been much worse for the attacker. When playing various CM scenarios, enemy MGs have done their worst when I was closing with his infantry, weakening my forces before they can engage his troops closely. I would argue that is the realistic employment of a WWII MG. I will add that I think there might be a problem using pillboxes. Use six wooden bunkers instead. This is the same amount of MGs, and they can target independently. Since you had two units and 13 opposing targetable units, I think some units would not be targeted and therefore get through unscathed. The bow MGs of tanks (pillboxes are immobile vehicles) can fire on separate targets when the turret is turned away. I am not sure what the pillboxes do, but it appears they only target one unit with all guns. Also, give the MGs a realistic field of fire. Start the charge 400 m out and 'move' the first 200 m. If you want a nice, flat, open surface, use pavement. This will still not be a realistic tactical exercise, but you will allow the MGs to use their strength in firing at a distance, at least at first. One further note about the use of MGs. They are not meant to be super-accurate weapons. Also, their rate of fire is theoretical. Troops on both side were trained to fire a few rounds and then adjust. This was to maintain some accuracy as well as prevent gun failure. I would argue that troops followed this procedure. If they had just fired away, they would be doing so very inaccurately and risk a breakdown, and probably not survive the firefight. What this means is that at a long distance, you fire a few rounds, wait a few seconds while you adjust your aim due to recoil, etc., and fire again. You may miss individuals, but your rounds will fall close together and cause suppression. Your horizontal angle does not change much due to the distance, even if you are switching to another nearby target. As the enemy comes closer and are runnning, they are harder to hit as a mass. You now have to move your MG back and forth much further than before. Even firing in a more sustained manner (which may cause you to begin firing over their heads), means that the horizontal movement dilutes the suppression effect as the rounds you fire are spead out over several meters. So you either move the gun slowly and concentrate on one unit, inflicting casualties there but allowing another unit to go untouched, or you move the gun back and forth, say about 60 degrees, to cover more of their approach. This might cause light casualties in a few units. Yes, there will be casualties, more than at a long distance, but barring a mass retreat, some will get through. I read an interesting article in the Boston Globe a while back. Most of it has nothing to do with this discussion, but is a worthwhile read. It is about the killing of SS concentration camp guards by some troops of the US 45th division. They lined up about 75 guards and shot at them with a M1919, a BAR, etc. 17 were killed. It is unclear how many were wounded, but when the CO came and stopped this after about 10 seconds, and ordered the survivors to stand, most did. This may prove little overall, but it shows in one situation one can't just mow people down so easily. Boston Globe article link

This topic has been covered ad infinitum before, but I think there were some points not made in the past that I would like to make since this is coming up again. First: Open Ground. Remember that open ground not only is abstracted to contain small undulations but also terrain features not significant enough to be shown: a light fence, a single boulder, very small out buildings (sheds, outhouses), etc. These do not dominate the terrain or restrict vehicular movement so they are not separate tile types. If you want to model real flat open ground, use pavement. It may not look like what you have in mind, but it has the properties you want. Second: Abstraction of unit disposition. The fact that these tests show several men making it shows to me the realism of the game's approximations. It shows the guys in there do value their lives. Although the squad icon may show three men running lock step a la a Russian human wave attack does not mean that is what they are actually doing (and the human wave tactics are one reason CMBB will change MG fire models if I understand BTS's posts on the subject). Some guys are running, others stopping to fire, others possibly causing diversions, some cowering. As a group, they are moving, but not in one tight knot. The point I am trying to make is that you have to view a lot of what goes on abstractly. All is not as it seems on the screen. Everything looks realistic and complete, but a lot more is assumed and not shown. Algorithms involved may not show everything that happens, or allow the player to control every aspect, but they take into account a lot of this from what I can tell. If you read US Congressional Medal of Honor citations, you come across many instances where one or two people rush a MG nest and take it out. This is often accomplished by others creating diversions or by sneaking up from different directions, etc. These types of things have to be assumed. Furthermore, the soldiers modeled in CMBO aren't using the same tactical doctrine as their fathers in WWI, even if both are charging. Their training on how to charge differed based on the WWI lessons. I am not arguing that all is perfect, and CMBB will make some adjustments to make a finer point on running versus assault moving, etc. Overall, I think the MG modeling is more realistic than some are giving credit. In fact, I would argue that the casualties The_Capt finds are high: over 1/3 KIA or WIA and 1/4 of the units not effective. This means out of 126 original men, you have lost about 40 men and another dozen or so are out of action for a few turns at least. That's quite a loss for 90 seconds' work. When employed well and in conjunction with infantry support, MGs are a tough nut to crack and one usually has to call in the arty or armor support if one wants to retain a cohesive force.

One thing to note about Valdor's comment is that mostly these proximity fuses had to be set by hand, i.e. the crew had to determine the rough altitude and set the fuse. Later in the war the US used radar (I believe) proximity fuses against aircraft. I saw a documentary that featured a P-47 pilot who spoke of how effective these shells were against his plane when he came under friendly fire! Fortunately for him the P-47 was a tank. I do believe he was at a fairly high altitude when this happened. I am not sure about using the 88mm (or 90mm for that matter) against fighters. Use of proximity fuses would certainly help effectiveness. In another Big Time game, Over the Reich, 88s do shoot at your FBs, though, when at lower altitudes. By the way, there is a nice site dedicated to the German 88: click here

I made a post to the other motorcycle thread just as this one got bumped. To summarize, motorcycle units were not as common as propaganda photos might lead one to believe. Basically, a few types of divisions may have had a company in their recon battalion, while Corps and Army HQs could have had an independent motorcycle battalion. For Blitzkrieg scenarios, e.g. Russia, motorcycle units could be found although fairly rare. They should not be in CMBO in my opinion. The Germans relied much more on bicycles for infantry recon mobility, with cavalry early in the war as well. They also used bicycle battalions for general infantry mobility (panzerwerfer42 also points this out), although they'd be dismounted pretty quickly and I can't see a use in the CM scale for them (or horses, despite their common use). That being said, it might be interesting to include them in meeting engagements, ambushes, etc. Small recon-type scenarios can be very interesting. Motorcycles should not be considered common near the front line. Just some thoughts.

My understanding on the use of motorcycles by the Germans, especially in the time period covered by CMBO, was that they were limited and there really weren't whole units mounted on them. Certain recon units may have used them as their primary mode of transport. The early war recon battalion in a German infantry division (later known as a Fusilier battalion or company in the VG divisions), actually relied more on cavalry and bicycle, with the cavalry being later phased out. Some light divisions and mountain units might have had motorcycle companies in their recon battalion. The armored divisions relied mostly on armored cars. The use of motorcycles in large formation would have been more prevalent during the Blitzkrieg, as gatpr mentions, with such units riding in the vanguard. There did exist motorcycle battalions attached to corps or army HQ. So while there might be a motorcycle company in the recon elements (depending on the division type), for the most part larger infantry formations were not motorcycle mobile. Once encountering resistance, I'm sure motorcycles would have been dismounted. One source I consulted to double check is the Handbook on German Forces written by the US govt toward the end of the war. It is interesting to see how much the Germans used bicycles as a mode of transport. They may be relevant, even if rare, though, for other time periods.

Regarding wire, you are absolutely right, it can't be removed, I had a momentary lapse of reasoning there. In any case, infantry can get through, just very very slowly. Bocage probably won't be included in CMBB anyway, so my idea probably wasn't such a good one as the East is concerned. But high walls are something one would encounter occasionally, as Olandt mentions. Bocage at least does block LOS. I suppose the addition of wire and the slowdown for infantry could simulate them climbing or finding some opening. A very imperfect solution, I will agree. Olandt's point about reinforced positions is also a good one. I find it a problem that the Allies do not get the use of at least wooden bunkers. I have read many accounts by veterans, especially from the Bulge, where the US had hunkered down in thick log machine gun emplacements and the like. I think it would be too difficult coding wise to allow individual foxholes to be tinkered with, but perhaps there could be an option in the future that allows a higher defense value to be placed on all foxholes to simulate more preparation time. During this time deeper holes would be dug, camouflage improved, sandbags filled, etc. I don't know the details of the new trenches, and perhaps those will reflect in some way what I just mentioned rather than just a passageway with the same defense value as a foxhole. Foxholes in buildings may not be aesthetically pleasing, but I think that is also a good idea by Olandt. With a prepared defense option, you might be able to assign higher defense values to units setting up on defense in buildings, something they (and possibly the building) lose once they leave the building. Just throwing out ideas. Finally, I wonder about using infantry in heavy fortifications. I have no proof one way or the other, but I would think doctrine would reserve heavy fortifications for machineguns and larger ordnance, leaving the regular infantry to largely hold it out in their foxholes, trenches, and other cover. Does anyone have information either way on this?

I think Babra was 3 for 3. Check out this link, and I think all can be identified: Russian Battlefield - Artillery There is also a world of other useful info on this site, in case you haven't visited.

To answer the second question first, to some degree you can model forts now, and adding trenches in CMBB will enhance this. What you can do is use either bocage or walls to design the general shape of the "fort" and then place a number of bunkers and/or pillboxes just in front of the wall/bocage at points where your emplacements would be. In CMBB you could connect (or nearly so I suppose) the bunkers with trenches for added protection. You can place wire just in front of bocage or wall to keep infantry from crossing, and non-US/UK AFVs can't cross bocage (I can't imagine USSR tanks will be fitted with the Cullin device). Infantry placed just behind (10 m or so) the bocage can still shoot through. One problem is that once the occupants of a bunker are knocked out, no one else can then occupy it for cover. For a tall wall, you can use the bocage with wire. This allows demo charges to blow the wire and infantry to then pass through. The only problem is that bocage can be seen through if you get within 10 meters or so. I will add that I doubt many city wall fortifications were built in Imperial Russia, and those that were quite likely came down long before the war. In Vienna, for example, the huge city walls were removed in the 1860s and replaced by the ring road. If many of these solutions seem unorthodox, I think that is one of the beauties of the CM system. Scenario designers can use terrain features to simulate all sorts of terrain not included. It may not look like what you are trying to simulate, but you can usually achieve the combat effect with some imagination.

I want to second Scott B's vote for A World at Arms by Gerhard Weinberg. I wanted to add that it explains why high-level decisions were made at the time they were made, the constraints and perceptions each country operated under, and the way it dispels many myths about the realities facing the combatants. It does not have maps, and does not explain battles in great detail. But I think it is vital to understand the course of the war.

In my experience, weapons teams have fought close combat and inflicted casualties. Of course, they usually get mobbed. Since you (presumably) had a 2:1 advantage, your mortarmen got lucky. On paper (and as far as I can tell in reality), members of mortar teams, bazooka teams, etc., all carried rifles and/or other personal weapons. They are not modeled in CM, I suppose because then people would use them as infantry. But they can fight back in hand to hand combat. A good web site is dedicated to Canadians in Combat Mission, by the way. It is called Canuck and well worth checking out.

JasonC again makes a very good point when stressing the intended AA use for the M2. This is supported by an account I read where the veteran stated that international conventions at the time prohibited antipersonnel use of machine guns over 11 mm, except in self defense. Of course, I am sure these conventions were not observed by field commanders of either side, but the guys back in Washington drawing up the TO&Es would probably have them in mind. That would justify giving them to non-rifle, composite units of the division in need of AA. Secondarily, they could be used against light armor breakthrough or attacking personnel. I'd be interested to see a training manual for the M2HB from the time to see what role is stressed.

Thanks to all who have responded so far. Good points all around. We may never have a full picture of HMG use due to the dynamic nature of the equipment frontline infantry carry. The fact that it depends on whether they are in a defensive or offensive posture (and then that can change quickly) only complicates things. I am hoping to figure out what a realistic US HMG mix is. When reading accounts and after action reports that aid in scenario design, there is not usually a detailed list of what support weapons were in the hands of the participants. Infantry division TO&Es that I have seen put the M1917A1 only in the hands of the combat engineers (2 per platoon) and the infantry heavy weapons companies, eight to a company. (Cos. D, H, & M were heavy weapons--A,B,C,E,F,G,I,K,L were the rifle companies and (officially) had no HMGs, just two M1919A4 (or A6) each). These TO&Es are from 1944. A 1952 infantry battalion TO&E even showed 4 M1917A1 and 8 M2 per rifle battalion. Like I said earlier, TO&Es don't tell the whole story, but it is a start. Looking at production figures as Viceroy has done is also one approach, but in some ways it is opening Pandora's Box. It is hard to trace what happened to each weapon, where they were sent (Russia, Free French, etc.), if they were mounted on vehicles, etc. Lewis also points out that the M1917A1 had been in production for some time before the war and asks whether the figure in Gander's book is war production or the number of pieces in inventory at the end of the war. But in any case, with eight M1917A1 per battalion, 24 per regt, and 90 per division (including 18 with the engineer battalion), less than 10,000 would have been needed to equip every infantry & armor division in the Army (a 6/45 armor division TO&E shows 129 in the inf. and eng. bns.). Even replacing every one TWICE due to losses would require less than 30,000. (Note: my 1944 inf. div. TO&E info does not include divisional stores, while I think the 1945 armor one does.) According to the same 1944 TO&Es I have, there should be 156 M2s per infantry division. On the face of it it looks like the M2 would be more common. However, each infantry battalion would only be allotted 2, which resided in the battalion HQ. An infantry regiment had a total of 12, six from the infantry battalions and three each in the AT and Cannon companies. Of the 156, then, only 36 would be in the rifle regiments. The artillery brigade within the division held 89(!) of them, the engineer battalion had 12 (one per platoon and 3 in HQ) and the rest were scattered to other attached companies. The question is, how many filtered down to the rifle battalions/companies? Enough so that each rifle company could rely on one and a battalion six or more? Jason C's point about employment of HMGs is worth noting-used in defense or attack overwatch from at least a couple hundred yards back. Thank you for all your opinions and factoids. Useful links at US Army Military History Institute: WWII Docs & 6/45 US Armor Div TO&E [ 06-07-2001: Message edited by: Maj. Battaglia ]

I was recently conducting research for a scenario I am creating and found some information that challenged my perceptions on the use of the M2HB 50 caliber HMG in US rifle battalions and companies. The research took me to a web site on the US 106th infantry division. The person maintaining the site was a machine gunner in a heavy weapons company. His account is well worth reading. US 106th Inf Div What struck me was that he was used an M1917A1 water-cooled 30 cal HMG. I thought this was odd, as I understood that these were rarely used by the US in the ETO. I suspected that because the 106th was somewhat hastily organized and sent to a sector where the Allies felt it would be quiet, that they might have been equipped with some lower quality weapons. I decided to look further. A week plus later after poring over many personal accounts, war photos, sites on WWII weapons, info on the composition of infantry units, and, finally, the CM discussion boards, I do not have a clear answer. However, it appears that the M1917 was more common than I had imagined and that perhaps it is underrepresented in CM scenarios. Here is what I found (ask me if you want specific links): The M1917 was listed in infantry battalion TO&E until at least mid-1952. Dot mil sites and other US gov't sources assert it was the battalion-level HMG until the mid-50's. The M2 shows up only in non-rifle units (engineers, field artillery, regimental AT & cannon cos, etc.), except for two in the rifle battalion HQ co. The heavy weapons cos. had 8 M1917 and each rifle company had 2 M1919. Most photos I found of MG's in the field show M1917s as infantry support, and M2s in the context of artillery defense (each FA bn had 21!). Almost all personal accounts support the M1917 as the HMG support for rifle battalions, although one vet from the 3rd inf div posted a comment on their site, in reference to a picture, saying he had never seen M1917 in action (he didn't say what subunit he was with-if he was FA or cannon co, e.g., then that would make sense). A search of the CM board yielded little: the difference was mentioned briefly in one of the MG effectiveness marathons but without substantiation (please PLEASE let's not discuss MG effectiveness here). One interesting interview from the 1970s I read was with Gen. William DuPuy, who served in the 90th div. in ETO from D+2 to the end, including as a battalion commander beginning early December 1944. Shortly after he assumed command, he assigned M2s from "battalion trains" to his heavy weapons company and indicated that the battalion then had "eight heavy machine guns, six 50 caliber machine guns. . ." to support his maneuver companies. Since the US forces were notorious scroungers and US field commanders had more lattitude to deviate from approved field structure, I am quite certain that M2s saw frontline service. But I am now doubting that they were more common than the M1917 (in rifle battalions) or that they were integral components of rifle & heavy weapons companies. Examples like DuPuy are surely not isolated, but it takes initiative at some level, and initiative was not always plentiful. And of course, when on the defense, the US would have more M2s that had caught up with the infantry. What have others found, and what sources were relied on (particularly print sources)? I have had to rely solely on Internet sources since I am living abroad currently. Further, I am not confident that the TO&Es I referenced were in effect through the end of the war. The heavy weapons company one is TO&E 7-18, 15 July 1944, for example. My curiosity aside, in game terms the main difference is the anti-armor capability of the M2. It is a serious threat to Axis light armor, whereas the M1917 is not. This makes an impact on the defensive strength of the US, and therefore the game. I am less concerned about aesthetics or the superior effectiveness of the M2 vs. infantry targets. If, as it is beginning to appear to me, the M1917 was indeed the main HMG supporting infantry operations, it is not something that need be fixed by BTS (although allowing its use in 1945 could be something to change). Scenarios can be tweaked by the individual user if that is preferred, and in quick battles and DYO, one only need consider that the M1917 was more commonly the HMG supporting the frontline and stock US troops accordingly (that is, if historical accuracy is sought-buy the M2 if you want to kick some butt).

One cool thing I noticed while playing "All or Nothing" was that a Sherman of mine that had been hit and set alight on the main bridge got knocked off by an incoming arty round. Fortunately for me it did not fall on the halftrack sheltering under the bridge, but I wondered what if.... Truly amazing. ------------------ "You'll get the bloody Iron Cross for this, von Ryan!"