IPA

Michael, Superb write up and graphical presentation. It's the best OB for an Commonwealth Infantry Battalion that I've seen on the net. You'll be getting plenty of hits soon. Please add more! Thanks IPA

I believe 4 rifle companies is correct for conventional Commonwealth Infantry battalions. AFAIK that organisation dates back to before the First World War, (although infantry brigades were reduced from 4 to 3 battalions after the Somme). For info. Commonwealth Parachute Battalions normally had 1 HQ, 1 HQ Co, 1 Support Co and 3 Rifle Co. Commonwealth Glider Battalions normally had 1 HQ, 1 HQ Co, 1 Support Co and 4 Rifle Co. Each company had 4 Platoons, though they were smaller than Parachute Platoons due the restrictions of the Horsa Glider (ie 1 Glider per rifle platoon of 26 Men). CM has got the smaller glider rifle co OOB spot on. BTW Britwar.co.uk is an excellent OOB resource. IPA

Napoleon1944, Thanks very much for the info. I don't think there's any thing close amongst the allied units available in CM, shame I can't substitute a German 20mm Flak. IPA

I'm working on a historic scenario which contains a couple of Jeep towed Polsten Guns. My rudimentary understanding, is that these were fairly light weight anti-aircraft guns (20mm, 450 rpm) that could be also be employed in a ground role. I'd be grateful if any of the grogs could give me a more detailed description of Polsten Guns, their armament, range, specs, etc and also recommend the closest equivalent available in CM. Thanks in advance. IPA [This message has been edited by IPA (edited 01-25-2001).]

Annalist, I posted a similar thread on Artillery spotters some time back, and fully agree. I still maintain that in a heated battlefield, enemy FOs would not be easily distinguishable from normal infantry, officers or radio operators and should not be identified by the AI (friendly AI that is). It would be more a case like the sniper in SPR "That's where I'd be" ie when the shells are incoming, now looking for likely FO spotting locations and targeting those. IPA [This message has been edited by IPA (edited 01-23-2001).] [This message has been edited by IPA (edited 01-23-2001).]

Germanboy, "The pity of war", god that was heavy reading. I couldn't get past the first few chapters, but if you think it's worth it I'll give it another go. Annist, Yes there are numerous examples of last stands thoughout military history. But the very reason there are many books written about them is due to the extreme courage and rarity of such actions. I myself am fascinated by the them and the strength of human spirit in such situations. IPA

In CM although C&C is modelled, lets face it, CM allows you to give extremely detailed orders to squad level units, that would may or may not be issued by their platoon or company commanders in real life. ie exact movement, fast, crawl, etc., exact positioning, targets, fire commands. If we take the situation of that MG team, cut off (out of ammo?). The decision to surrender falls on the team commander. That theoretically becomes you. So for the sake of humanity having the surrender order would be a nice addition. IPA

I think I'd have to agree with Andrew here, that at the scale and type of battle depicted by CM, surrendering would not occur on large scale. On the other hand historically fighting to the last man was not the norm and when this did occur, accounts of such actions often became legendary. Historically the issue cannot be summed up using wide sweeping statistical info such as a particular nation's POWs for a fixed period of the War, though a general national ideology/culture may have contibruted to a limited extent. Whether troops surrendered historically was very much dependent on their specific situation and state of morale (I don't think for the allies that penalties under military law would be a major consideration). What would you list as the major factors affecting the likelihood of surrender common to both small units (squad level) and larger units say (company level)? Here's the start of a list (most are pretty obvious and pls excuse the less than eliqent terminology). 1/ Surrounded, outnumbered, cut off behind enemy lines without hope of relief. 2/ Leadership. Ultimately the decision to surrender would lie with the unit CO present not the ORs themselves. 3/ Are we winning the battle, defending the fatherland or what is mission purpose (have we got a reason worth dying for?) 4/ Low or no amunition. 5/ Ideology/level of fanatism. 6/ Chances of enemy taking prisoners. 7/ Level of casualties received. 8/ Level of hostile fire. There's probably a previous post where BTS states in detail how surrendering is determined in CM. If anyone's interested I do have fairly detailed statistics for British prisoners taken at the Battle of Arnhem, but that action is probably not a good example as it was a fairly unique situation. My 2p IPA

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh: LOB (Also, Canadian and British squads were led by corporals, not sergeants as in the American and German armies).<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Yes, except for Airborne and Commando units. IPA

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Los: Since I did the bulk of the historical research in this area (just call me Mister Smoke) for CM1 and 2 I'll tell you this. There is not enough evidence to justify their inclusion in a broad-based manner across all squads in CM1. I researched the ever living hell out of this. There's not much to go on, primarily, IMO, because it just isn't something people wrote much about. Remember for something like this to be included in CM we would have needed enough evidence that it was used on a regualr basis, (Even Rifle grenades only made it in at the last minute.) Plus we would have needed to create a new menu item for them to be used effectively. Without number one, the effort for number two isn't justified. Yes if you talk to any *infantry* vet from the western front period, (And we talked to few) he could remember the odd instance where some guy through a smoke grenade to get out of trouble, but it wasn't something that they did ALL the time, (like today) which justifies inclusion. However millions of masking type smoke grenades were manufactured and used. There is plenty of occurances where they were used in specialist scenaios like deliberate assaults on fortifications, tank killing, and what not. (Cm1 design philosophy was not particularly geared to address these situations competely) Our research on the Eastrn Front is turning up near SOP-type usage of the things for events such as bunker assaults and tank hunting. But these have to be figured in somehow and we are mulling over that. (i.e. perhaps a pioneer capability?) The German Army Handbook and other primary source material, unavailable at the time of CM, (written by the Western Allies in 1945) cleary documents their used on a regular basis by the Germans and interviews with Soviets vets Valera has been doing for us confirms this. So anyway, some form of a CM2 capability for at least some unit type remains an open issue. Hope that helps. Los<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Thanks Los for taking the time to give us info on the rationale, even though this topic has been debated several times. IMHO the smoke function should not be commonly available to all infantry units, but to the HQs units only, in order to limit the pop smoke fest situation whilst retaining a limited capability. IPA

BTS' stand is clear and unshakeable, in that their "research shows little credible evidence that this type of smoke (grenades)was used at the squad level in WWII for anything beyond signalling purposes" (page 99 CMBO manual). I also understand that BTS wanted to avoid the instant smoke popping tactics akin to games like Steel Panthers. IMHO I don't agree, but neither do I have the "evidence" to contend their stand. I do however have many sources to support that(SG) they were carried as a fairly standard piece of kit, if not always at squad level, most certainly by the platoon HQs. Anyway, perhaps there's no use in flogging that dead horse again. So OT (appologies to JeffRaider) here's one more alternative for their use other than signalling. I'd be grateful for feedback from the grogs enforcing or refuting this one. Quote: "The main purpose of a smoke grenade was an anti-tank weapon, and the tactic was to generate dense clouds of white smoke in order to force out the crew of an armoured vehicle" from "Remember Arnhem" by John Fairley (He served with the Reconnaisance Corps during WWII). Thanks IPA [This message has been edited by IPA (edited 12-10-2000).]

RE PS. Up s*** creek without a paddle?

Oh yeah, the Welsh and the Irish too. IPA

Steady on there old man, I don't think he was taking a shot at you. It's a cultural thing. For a Scot being called British is bad enough, being excluded from WWII would be down right insulting. The Scots have always formed a very large portion of the British Armed forces, but often don't get the recognition they deserve. OT off the top of my head, as I recall at least 50% of the British Troops in the Gulf were Scots. I guess they have a right to feel slighted. IPA

Correct me if I'm wrong. Generally the standard British Infantry Division had the equivalent of 1 Engineer Battalion. The Engineers did not form part of a standard TO & E at a Company or Platoon level, but were allocated at a battalion or brigade level as the battle situation dictated. Alternatively the Divisional Engineer component was sometimes in the form of 3 independent companies, each being permanently or semi-permanently attached to a brigade in the Division (again as the situation/plan dictated). Therefore, for the purpose of a "standard" CM "British" Infantry Battalion (for non-historical battles) one platoon of engineers per battalion sounds about right. As far as the standard org for a Engineer platoon goes, AFAIK there was no standard, there were many combinations. For example an Engineer platoon/troop may have comprised 4 sections and no flamethrower. IPA

CaSCa, As a rule I think the mixing of Nationalities (US and Commonwealth) was quite rare, and this normally occurred when relieving ground forces linked up with Airborne troops. Operation Market Garden and Operation Varsity are two campaigns where this did happen often. For OMG specifically the 101st and 82nd sectors of the highway. There were numerous instances of US Paratroopers and British Armour working together to keep the highway open. The original Nijmegen Scenario on the CM disc recreates the 82nd river assault to capture the Waal Bridges with British Armour in support. Note: There was an Ambrose bashing thread recently. Ambrose in his book "Band of Brothers" which tells the story of a company of the 101st in WWII. He sites numerous examples of the US Airborne Troopers being rather unimpressed with their British Armoured counter parts to say the least. I'm afraid that "I'd have to fall in with the bashers. IPA

I'm more of a lurker on this board than a active valuable contributor. The reason being right or wrong, I simply don't having the English or awesome debating skills of so many of you out there (the writers on this current thread included). Going against the grain or not, I have to agree with Tris on his main points on this topic. IMHO, Tris simply wants to keep the improvement process going for an already brilliant game. IMHO I've yet to see a baseless unsupported argument from this guy. There really is a problem with front lines in operations, important enough to be raised again. Just as Tris maybe somewhat blunt in his reasoning, sometimes BTS can be equally blunt in the shut down of improvement ideas in the face of logic. IMHO the reasoning behind BTS' refusal to entertain this one may be that it's too much pain to implement, that's their pre-rogative. However, I guess some posters feel that if you keep banging on the door long enough they might come around on this one. BTS don't need to be defended, if you read deeper into the above posts they're not really being attacked in the first place. Backing to lurking. IPA ------------------ "Cry "Havoc!" and let slip the Dogs of War!" -William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar

Those are amazing where can I get em? IPA ------------------ "Cry "Havoc!" and let slip the Dogs of War!" -William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar

Germanboy, Thanks for the reply. Points well made and accepted. All I'm looking for is to add another realism factor into the equation ie pinpointing targets on the ground with smoke, all the drawbacks accepted and factored in. Sorry I didn't read the earlier mails thoroughly enough. As to Arnhem and Operation Market Garden it's my chosen WWII fascination. Bought up just about every source I could find. IMHO the best account of the action at Arnhem itself is "Arnhem 1944 the Airborne Battle" by Martin Middlebrook. Meticulously detailed, a real hour by hour account at platoon level. An alternative to Ryan's overview of OMG would be the book I mentioned "The Devils Birthday" by Geoffrey Powell (He was a 156 Parachute Bn Co Commander at Arnhem). But Ryan's book will always capture the true essence of that tradgedy for me. A good German perspective of OMG is "It Never Snows In September" by R Kershaw (A modern British Para who spent several years on exchange with the German Army). Cheers. Got to hit the sack now. IPA

Germanboy, I'm looking at a copy of "A Brige Too Far" as I write and I can't find the word or similar words to "ineffective" (its propably in your other book). However, we're mixing up to point here, we're not talking about effectiveness (well I'm not). The point being that did ground units such as tanks commonly use smoke to identify targets for air support. In the case of Garden the answer is yes. Elsewhere I don't know. But does it sound logical that that close support coordination between ground forces and air support was uncommon? I don't see how the POW story relates to Air Support. The POW was for spotting of units. This thread is not relate dto the subject of the effectiveness of aircraft spotting. Your point about the British at Arnhem, actually works in reverse. It was an issue of great bitterness amongst many veterans that there was a total lack of air support during the whole operation (I believe if given the choice they would have taken the risk. In fact the non-existant luffwaffe were able to mount several attacks on the Arnhem Bridgehead at Oosterbeek and the Bridge during the battle. Sorry but I'd beg to differ that Ryan's book is the "standard" work of Market Garden. It was written in the 60s and it is accepted that it contains numerous factual errors. It is however the most famous and an absolute classic. My Horrocks quote comes from "The Devil's Birthday" by Geoffrey Powell. IPA

Germanboy, I'm not qualified to comment on the ETO as a whole, but I am not aware of an account of the breakout of Guards Arm'd Div at the start of Garden that states that their air support was ineffective (Whether the plan or the ground forces themselves were effective is another matter). If I'm wrong please direct me to the source and I'll beat a hasty retreat. As I recall an RAF forward controller unit was attached to the Irish Guards to call in the Air Support. To aid in the location of enemy positions, purple smoke was fired from British tanks to mark them. From accounts I've read it seems the air support was pretty successful after the initial breakout set backs. As Horrocks later wrote "it was a perfect example of coordination between the RAF and the Army". However, I think that whether or not the use of smoke was effective is besides the point, whether it was commonly used and is realistic to simulate is. Can someone advise, please. The ineffectiveness, inaccuracy or even failure of air support to arrive could be modelled in. IPA "START THE PURPLE!" (Michael Caine as Lt Col JOE Vandeleur 3rd Bn Irish Guards.

Dr Brian, Regarding accuracy. You're right. Ambrose did mention this in the acknowledgements section of his book "Band of Brothers". He expressed some regrets at not having circulated the draft to the participants before hand and did admit that the changes and corrections that Major Howard wanted him to make were right. However, as Ambrose puts it "although it was their story, it was my book". As you stated it is a good read and from the other independent accounts that I've read, I've been unable able to spot any glaring conflicts in the sequence of events. I guess you'd have to had been there. IPA

Fubart, I found "Pegasus Bridge" to be an excellent account of "Ham and Jam". It's based largely on extensive interviews Ambrose conducted with Major Howard and other members of the Ox and Bucks who participated in that action. I was very sad to hear of his passing. A true heroe. You might also want to try "Pegasus Bridge/Merville Battery" by Carl Shilleto. It's actually a very detailed battlefield guide, but also provides very good accounts of the assaults on Pegasus Bridge and the Merville Battery, many aerial recon photographs and situation maps. Here's also a very good "Ham and Jam" Site http://www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~njmckay/.htm I'm with you on the great admiration for unsupported infantry operations. IPA PS. The are two more Pegasus Bridge scenarios at the ASL maps for CM site, which cover the next few hours on D-Day after the initial capture- http://w1.312.telia.com/~u31213280/index.htm There's also a great assault on the Merville Battery Scenario at CMHQ (a few months old).

Sounding like a broken record here, but try this one. http://www.britwar.co.uk/lists/index.htm Cheers IPA

Hans, This is probably not exactly what you were looking for, but check out the site. There's a wealth of info on detailed German OOBs for many division type variants and dates. ARTILLERY RGT. (PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION) 1943-1945 Composition, · HQ Coy. with 3 attached towed 20mm/37mm AA guns and infantry detachment for local defence. · 1 Battalion of 150mm towed howitzers, comprising of 1 HQ Plt. with 3 towed 20mm/37mm guns, FOO in PzIII, 3 Batteries each of 4 towed 150mm Howitzers subject to availability. Often 1 Bty. was replaced with 4 towed 105mm K7 cannons for counter battery fire. · 1 Battalion of towed 105mm Howitzers, comprising of 1 HQ Plt. (as above) and 2 Batteries of towed 105mm Howitzers. · 1 Armoured Battalion comprising of 1 HQ Plt, (as above but with SPAA mounted on halftracks), 1 Bty. of 6 SP 150mm howitzers and 2 Btys. of SP 105mm Howitzers. http://www.britwar.co.uk/lists/index.htm IPA