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Everything posted by Grisha
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Good CM2 source material found in book
Grisha replied to gunnergoz's topic in Combat Mission Archive #3 (2001)
If you like Loza's two books, then make sure to read Valera's recent interview with Loza at his russian site ------------------ Best regards, Greg Leon Guerrero -
One thing CM2 should really strive for in representing the Russian front is trenches. This was a constant in defensive positions throughout the entire war in Russia. I hope it's in the works. ------------------ Best regards, Greg Leon Guerrero
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Any Russians/Soviets know cryllic lettering?
Grisha replied to Tiger's topic in Combat Mission Archive #3 (2001)
Perchpole, Big Boo Boo, dude. 'Rodina' is the nominative for 'Motherland'. 'Rodinu' is the accusative case for 'Rodina', and when used with the preposition 'za', or 'for', in this context, means 'For the Motherland'. ------------------ Best regards, Greg Leon Guerrero -
Any Russians/Soviets know cryllic lettering?
Grisha replied to Tiger's topic in Combat Mission Archive #3 (2001)
Well, in English letters what you have put down is: Timoshenko Molotov roainch! Suvorov STDPINETS Not sure what the third and last words are, but am suspicious that third word is an attempt at 'rodinu!', which is better said as 'za rodinu!' In Cryllic, it would look like this (In IE, click View/Encoding/More/Cyrillic(Windows) to see text below in cyrillic) çà ðîäèíó! ------------------ Best regards, Greg Leon Guerrero [This message has been edited by Grisha (edited 03-06-2001).] -
Anyone here heard of www.belleandblade.com?
Grisha replied to Guy w/gun's topic in Combat Mission Archive #3 (2001)
Yup. Just bought an 'Il-2 Sturmovik' T-Shirt from them. ------------------ Best regards, Greg Leon Guerrero -
4 legged mosters in CM (?)
Grisha replied to Shadow 1st Hussars's topic in Combat Mission Archive #3 (2001)
Nevermind, all's well with the link. ------------------ Best regards, Greg Leon Guerrero [This message has been edited by Grisha (edited 02-21-2001).] -
What AFV are you looking forward to in CM2?
Grisha replied to Cybeq's topic in Combat Mission Archive #3 (2001)
I'm looking forward to using T-34s throughout the timeframe, but also have a weakness for ISU-152s. ------------------ Best regards, Greg Leon Guerrero -
How about 'Russian Front'? ------------------ Best regards, Greg Leon Guerrero
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I just want to thank you all for being such sports about these ongoing discussions about the Russian front. A lot of views and perceptions has popped up in these threads that have been good food for thought concerning that conflict. I know we've all had to rethink some of our perceptions regarding the Russian front, myself included, and I think that's a good thing. So, please take this moment to pat yourselves on the back, and go ahead and get another beer outta the fridge Besides, when all's said and done, BTS are going to make one helluva game on the Russian front ------------------ Best regards, Greg Leon Guerrero
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BTS: Soviet advantage in night operations for CM2
Grisha replied to Grisha's topic in Combat Mission Archive #3 (2001)
Freak, I see your point, and I'm not sure what to do about it either. The usage of varying experience levels seems like an elegant solution, but it may not be encompassing enough given the nature of the conflict being simulated. Maybe an elegant solution would be to also give the Soviets more commanders with Stealth ability than the Germans, on average. But first, I guess there needs to be a judgement on whether the Soviet did have better stealth ability as a whole. In hindsight, I think I jumped the gun on this issue, since the engine may be able to handle such an ability w/o modifications. jgdpzr, Regarding armor I was thinking that a possible solution would be to tweak the CM engine, so that Soviet tanks are grouped into tank platoons much like infantry platoons with a tank platoon HQ. This would definitely limit Soviet armor capabilities, since they would need to clumped together to be command effective. Maybe, from 1944 on this restriction could be lifted since radios were much more prevalent in Soviet tank units. ------------------ Best regards, Greg Leon Guerrero -
BTS: Soviet advantage in night operations for CM2
Grisha replied to Grisha's topic in Combat Mission Archive #3 (2001)
As far as games go, Avalon Hill's card game version of Squad Leader, Up Front!, gives the Russians the best infiltration skills of the group. ------------------ Best regards, Greg Leon Guerrero -
BTS: Soviet advantage in night operations for CM2
Grisha replied to Grisha's topic in Combat Mission Archive #3 (2001)
You're right, Terence, I don't really explain why the Soviets were any better. I could say that being forced to conduct night operations from early on, combined with their emerging skill at maskirovka resulted in an advantage, but that really is nothing but conjecture. I guess I'll just leave it for BTS to decide. I should say most of my knowledge of the Russian front is primarily from Soviet sources, though I have read a few German memoirs, like Guderian's. What I have read has generally alluded to a Soviet advantage at night, something that was swiftly rectified at dawn, I might add ------------------ Best regards, Greg Leon Guerrero -
BTS: Soviet advantage in night operations for CM2
Grisha replied to Grisha's topic in Combat Mission Archive #3 (2001)
Here's a list of some reasons why the Soviets were better at night operations than Germans:<UL TYPE=SQUARE><LI> Forced to conduct operations at night from the beginning due to overwhelming German airpower.<LI> Soviets commenced many attacks at night, launched forward detachments mostly at night, conducted troop reconnaissance usually at night.<LI> At Stalingrad, ground gained by the Germans in the day was retaken by the Soviets at night. I know this isn't much of a list. There's also a pdf file, TheSicilianCampaign, at this site that jasper posted, containing a translated Soviet article on night operations. Of course, all things being equal, the Soviets preferred to do most major operations during daylight. It's just that since things weren't very equal for about half of the war, the Soviets tended to use night as an equalizer for various things. Honest, this wasn't a troll. I sincerely thought this aspect of Soviet operations was well known. Sorry if I ruffled any feathers. ------------------ Best regards, Greg Leon Guerrero [This message has been edited by Grisha (edited 02-13-2001).] -
BTS: Soviet advantage in night operations for CM2
Grisha replied to Grisha's topic in Combat Mission Archive #3 (2001)
Terence, I didn't think someone would call me on this one. I thought this fact was so well known that it didn't need verification. Well, let me dig up my references, and I'll get back to you. ------------------ Best regards, Greg Leon Guerrero -
machineman, First, thanks for the discussion. Regarding carelessness or linearity in tactical maneuvering, that sort of thing did occur throughout the war, but was not so common from 1944, on. But you are right, it did not ever go away. I should point out that the Soviets were very adamant about keeping casualties down almost from the beginning of the war, it's just that it took a while for experience to settle in with all those inexperienced or unskilled officers. By 1944, such wanton usage could have severe consequences. Even the hero of Prokhorovka, General Rotmistrov, was relieved of command in 1944 for his excessive losses during campaigning(he wasn't shot,or anything, just reassigned to a noncombat post). Incidently, guess who was in command of the assault of Seelow Heights? Zhukov There is a story that Zhukov never let minefields stop his advance. He would just order his lower echelon commanders to continue the advance - threaten them into submission, really. His reasoning was that the time it would take them to halt the advance to clear them would result in the same number of casualties as just flat out running through them. He may have been right, but what a man! My god Herr Oberst I agree Werth's War in Russia is an excellent book for getting a feel for what it was like to be Russian during that time. It is one of my favorite books. ------------------ Best regards, Greg Leon Guerrero
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Which mistakes are you referring to that the Soviets were continuously repeating? One difficulty the Red Army had till the end of the war was in the initial phases of a breakthrough assault. Apparently, there were more than a few occasions where the breakthrough forces were unable to open a gap through which the mobile groups could advance into. Thus, assests from the mobile group were used to assist in forcing that gap. Also, some commanders, like Zhukov, were accustomed to sending in wave attacks when things got difficult. However, you would rarely have seen Rokossovsky, Cherniakhovsky, or Vatutin commit such a wasteful action, and besides linear frontal attacks were discouraged with great emphasis in the combat regulation. On the other hand, Soviet forces were masters of intelligence gathering from a tactical to an operational level, as well as the art of masking their force redeployments and deceiving the enemy. I seriously doubt anyone, including the USA could've matched them in those last two capabilities during WWII. And as the Germans grimly proved, excellence in pure combat ability or equipment alone does not make a winning army. ------------------ Best regards, Greg Leon Guerrero
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Interesting post, kipanderson. I have Dupuy's book, Numbers, Predictions, and War, as well, but never thought to plug in the more recent figures coming out on the Russian front. In know the Vistula-Oder operation doesn't fit into your equation as it occurred in 1945, but I believe it surpassed even the excellence of Bagration. Hm, maybe I should apply QJM to this operation... ------------------ Best regards, Greg Leon Guerrero
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Jeff H, The way I look at the weather excuse is like this: if winter comes and your army makes no provisions for it, then is it the weather's fault, or the army's? I doubt the Germans suddenly forgot that winter follows fall follows summer. Unfortunately, they assumed that the Russian campaign would be over in three months, tops. If any one service can be made the scapegoat of this snafu, it would be German operational intelligence. ------------------ Best regards, Greg Leon Guerrero [This message has been edited by Grisha (edited 02-12-2001).]
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CM2 topic: turret speeds & the T-34
Grisha replied to Grisha's topic in Combat Mission Archive #2 (2000)
Jeff, When German generals report Soviet numbers as 10:1 in superiority they aren't far off in many cases. But why is that? Well, let me ask you, in 1941, or 1942 were there occasions where German attacks were at 10:1 odds? I think you'll have to say that, yes, such German numerical superiority did happen at specific, focused points and times. How did they do that? Just because the Germans encountered such Soviet odds does not prove that the Soviets had 10:1 odds overall. In fact, Glantz & House's book, When Titans Clashed, contains overall combatant strengths between the Soviets, their allies, and the Germans with their allies. This information shows that the Soviets didn't possess 2:1 odds overall until late '43, and 3:1 odds overall until late '44(And, incidently, the Germans possessed 1.9:1 odds overall against the Soviets in Nov 1941, from an intial German numerical superiority of 1.4:1 in June 1941). I'll post passage from another of Glantz' books, Soviet Military Intelligence in War, but before I do let me explain its context. This passage has to do with the Vistula-Oder operation in January 1945, which commenced from three bridgeheads which had been gained in the summer offensives of 1944. In October, the Soviets began planning razvedka and maskirovka(intelligence/reconnaissance, and deception, respectively) operations for their big push from this area in January. The effects these extensive plans had on the actual offensive were amazing, to say the least, as German intelligence was totally unaware of any buildup in the area, So, yes, German generals are correct in saying that they encountered 10:1 odds against the Soviets, but it was usually the result of them being operationally 'faked out', because the Soviets had no where near enough men to have that kind of overall force ratio. So from 1944 to 1945, the Germans were getting 'faked out' a lot by the Soviets And, no, I'm not pissed you kicked my ass in that night scenario ------------------ Best regards, Greg Leon Guerrero [This message has been edited by Grisha (edited 02-12-2001).]