Tero

Unlike the wife the tripod allows itself to be manhandeled into the position when you feel the urgent need to use it ? Apart from the "Bren tripod in-out" debate this thread seems to be very much about terminology and doctrinal issues. (How it is rendered in CMBO does not really seem to be an issue, just an excuse. ) From where I sit it seems this is a case of technical characteristics of the weapon vs the doctrinal deployement of it. Some people seem to take offence when other people think it should be grouped up with the MG-42 (which was either a LMG or a HMG depending on its place in the organization) and not with BAR (an automatic rifle). Some people seem to think a LMG needs to be belt fed to be one, others seem to think it was the doctrinal use of the weapon determines its role in the organization no matter what the mechanical characteristics. I belong conditionally to the latter school of thought. My frame of reference has conditioned me to call magazine fed, rifle caliber SAW's as automatic rifles while doctrinally they have been regarded and used as LMG's. Given that I would have to call both the Bren and the BAR automatic rifles. Both were SAW's. From what I have read the British army regarded the Bren as a LMG, doctrinally while the US Army regarded the BAR as an automatic rifle, doctrinally. Mind you, there was no belt fed LMG in the British army at the time while the US Army had the M1917/19(?) LMG. Pretty much the only army to deploy a belt fed SAW during WWII was the German army with its MG34/42 family. This should also be taken into account. [ April 18, 2002, 03:50 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

I tried a three pronged attack and almost got it working. Unfortunately there were two 105mm how's foiling my attack in the center (one got nailed, one nailed my Stug and stopped my infantry for 10+ turns) and my arty got delayed for like 10 turns before it started ~3 turns before the scen ended. IMO with a few more minutes in the clock the scen would be more manageable for the Axis player. He starts out with the flags in the hands of the Allies and if he is to take them he must either risk attack from the flanks or get stuck in the flanks while clearing them. I got almost to the bluff to the right of the flags and I almost got to take the Allied flank and rear. But then I ran out of time as a head long dash was right out of the question.

First: HAIL TO THE VICTORS !!! No revards for second place. Damn ! Originally posted by Treeburst155: # Economy_Of_Force - medians [ Allied 77.5, Axis 22.5 ] Just to clear this: Are you using medians or averages ? Juha_A 70 (-5.936), Ari 30 (5.936) Topi 81 (3.130), Fate 19 (-3.130) Heibis 83 (4.624), vskalex 17 (-4.624) Tuomas 74 (-3.130), Jarmo 26 (3.130) Sesam 91 (8.987), Dragoon19 (-9.110) DrAlimantado 83 (4.624), Ugbash 17 (-4.624) tero 66 (-5.936), Torbhen 26 (-5.936) Juha_K 77 (-0.492), Kingfish 23 (0.492) S_Fredrikson 47 (-15.860), Cogust 46 (12.7245) PasiN 53 (-14.610), Pixie 47 (12.255) Ali 78 (0.492), J_Porta 22 (-0.492) Mattias 92 (9.390), Romeoman 8 (-9.610) Hmmmmmm..... I and Thorben BOTH lost this one ? 2-1, the game ended in a tie with both sides losing. Also, it seems in this one the score in our game did not even out at 100 as the rest seem to. We seem to be missing 8 pts from the full score. How does that affect the final score ? [ April 17, 2002, 10:15 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

Originally posted by Cogust: Seems like Tero has written all five of them... Every point counts.

Just a quick remark, I'll respond to the other points ASAP Originally posted by Brian: Anybody care to hazard a guess as to what the Vickers gunners had to do to prepare their belts of non-distintegrating canvas belts for firing? I know. The überFinnish Maxim-gunners preferred domestic metallic non-disintegrating belts over the Russian/Soviet canvas belts for that reason (as well as jams/stoppages were less likely to happen with the metal belt than with the canves belt). You could use captured canvas belts as is but normally the gunners would transfer the ammo from the captured belts to their own belts. I wonder if that Red Army Maxim canvas belt vs Finnish army Maxim metal belt thing will be modelled in CMBB......

Originally posted by Brian: Tero, have you ever had to assemble link out of a matter of interest? Luckily the Finnish army does not use disintegrating link that much. Its not a job for the light-hearted or those pressed for time. I have filled a few belts to know what it is like even when you are not in a hurry. Then again one man can fill up the 70-round magazine of the Suomi/PPSh SMG fast enough to rotate 5 magazines so the gunner will not run out of ready magazines.

Originally posted by JonS: I'm dealing with 're-org' at the pn/coy level. If you want to fret about it at a higher level, fine, but you're going to have to find someone else to spar with. Re-orging at any level is serious business. Losing control at any level is also a serious business, especially if it is done as a point of SOP. many of them seem, um, ... typical Tero questions I'm applying patents for them. Bear in mind is that during an assault (as opposed to an attack. I.e., an assault is the last little bit to carry the objective), command tends to devolve downwards rather quickly. Once the objective is taken and is secure, it is in everyones interest that command once more be taken at a higher level. It is the devolving downwards that others have, I think, refered to as 'loss of control.' You seem to have picked up on those words and read too much into them. Being trained as a squad leader I know something about the subject from personal experience. The thing is the British army seems to have worked through the officers. It would appear the regular soldiers were treated as cannon fodder more than anything else. Like the Germans their SOP had its roots in the WWI experiences. Only, they had learned different lessons. The very term "minor tactics" is IMO very indicative how much value was given to the execution of battlefield manouvers. Whereas the Germans had evolved the Stosstruppe tactics into an art form the British held on to the WWI linear tactics. The Stosstruppe tactics require highly skilled leadership and careful coordination. These tactics are also more demanding on the individual soldier. It seems the British leaders did not and/or were indoctrinated not to trust in the regular individual soldiers as much as the Germans trusted their individual soldiers. As an example (and despite what I said in the first para above about not considering higher levels), most accounts I've read regarding the initial Op Overlord assaults - and indeed most of that day - on 6th June in Normandy speak of the helplessness of the higher commanders. They pushed the "GO" button, and after that everything else was up to the lower level commanders. In other words, the higher commanders had 'lost control.' Lower and lower commanders took command of the men near them, in the small geographic areas they found themselves in, and carried the assault were they could, with or - in most cases - without specific direction or control. Until the beaches were secure. This was particularly true at Omaha, but it applies at the other beaches too. Now, that is all well and good - and indeed appropriate - but I hope you'd agree that it makes sense for higher command and direction to be re-enforced at the earliest practical time. Scale that down to the coy/pn level, and you have the rationale for having a defined, planned, standardised, and expected, SOP "re-org." I'm looking at events beyond the landing, when there was more time to do things and the situation was nowhere as chaotic or desperate. During the landing I would expect any army would have done it that way. But beyond it, it was far too rigid and cumbersome (as an SOP) to yield the best results possible. How long do you think it took the Germans to realize there would be a gap between the assault and the follow up and to utilize that gap to the fullest ? And I am amazed the German counter attack was still the bogey man for the British commader after so many years of first hand experience. Before reading the book on the training I would have thought they had learned to counter the German tactics. It took only 2 years for the Red Army to come up with a plan to reduce the effectiveness of the German style counter attack (namely directing massive arty barrages on the flanks and shoulders of the break-in where the counterattack would normally come from). Is it that the Brits had an SOP for something the Germans didn't feel the need for? Great, but so what? Or maybe its that having SOPs is a bad idea? In that case I disagree. The Germans had evolved their tactics and doctrine so that their SOP made it less likely they would need to re-org after an assault in the scale the British apparently had to. My point is that, IMO, re-orging to an SOP after an assault is a good idea. Re-orging to an SOP ? I do agree re-orging is OK and sometimes necessary. But the SOP should have re-org elements in it every step of the way, not just the end. And this is IMO how the Germans had it worked out. PS. I am aware of the book you refer to. Have you read it ? [ April 03, 2002, 01:26 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

Originally posted by Jeff Duquette: [Note: ammunition is not defined…could be additional LMG ammunition, could simply be additional rifle ammunition J.D.] IIRC the ammo was the same for both the rifle and the MG. Carrying loose ammo or in carton boxes (as opposed to having it ready in the MG belts) would enable the ammo to be used either way.

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh: Isn't that what the Germans called augtragtaktik - the very essence of their military thinking at all levels, where commanders were given freedom by their superiors to perform whatever deeds they saw necessary to accomplish the mission? Mission-oriented command rather than micro-management? Perhaps I'm misreading you - you mention neighbouring company COs so maybe you're not saying what I think you're saying... Mission-oriented command is indeed what I mean. But the Germans micro-managed in the micro level during combat whereas the British unit commanders seem to have lost control (like John D said) and with it the cohesion when the battle started. But I think this was a fault of the British Army as an organization, not because the officers and men were inept. The Germans did regard the British quite high as adversaries after all. Compared to the Finnish army the German army would (and could) detail whole units rather than proceed with the plan with a force that was basically a mob in their eyes. (The Germans did remark they had seen more organized armies in defeat than the Finnish army was in advance ) And the Germans did try to maintain cohesion at a "manageable" level. This is IMO BTW why they were so big on nominating Kampfgruppes and other formal ad-hoc command structures. A typical Finnish attack (also defence) would go ahead with squads from different companies (even different regiments at times) fighting side by side for days on the most senior officer's on site say so rather than having a higer echelon commander planning and deliberately ordering it (which is basically how the Germans did it). A Finnish company commander could wind up having no subunits to command or conversely having a total of (say) two companies worth of units (or men) under his command. By the same token an überFinnish squad cut off from the proper command unit in the heat of the battle would latch on to any command unit in the area on its own rather than start searching for the parent command unit. This is why sometimes even an artillery FO could sometimes wind up commanding scattered infantry units.

Originally posted by JonS: They should have. I think you may be misunderstanding the usage of the word. In Brit usage it is an SOP that deals with reorganising consituent units (unmingling sections etc); * organising the position you have just taken for defence, * calling back units and/or men who have exploited too far, * calling up units/men that have lagged behind, * redistributing ammo, * taking care of wounded, * handling POWs, * policing up captured weapons and equipment, and * preparing to move on if required to. All this is good and proper. However (from what I have read) the prevailing, most important reason given for the British army reorganization after such a charge/assault was to be able to fight back German counter attacks. An interesting point is that * calling back units and/or men who have exploited too far. How much further ahead did the Germans plan their attacks than the British did, if they did ? How was the individual attack integrated into the master plan in the respective armies ? If the Germans didn't bother with, or plan for, all that after an attack I would be very surprised. Indeed. But if you look at the basic training of the British and the German infantry you will find that whereas in the British infantry the officer was the most trained element (in terms of combat tactics and doctrine) in the organization in the German army the entire organization was trained. Much has been said about the regimental tradition in the Commonwealth armies. To my knowledge the training in the German army was much more uniform and standardized than it was in the British army. In case you have not read Military Training in the British army 1940-44 (or something to that effect) I must recommend it strongly. It makes surprising and harrowing reading. It does not mean 're-organising' in terms of; * changing the axis of advance, * changing the objective, * changing unit affiliations, * changing unit attachments, * issuing new orders, etc. This is what I meant by the Germans were more cohesive in their planning than the British were. They did not wish to wind up in a situation where they would have been forced to reorganize after an assault. They tried to keep their plan focused on the mission and to maintain cohesion within the parameters of the mission. Having to reorganize in the middle of the mission was not what they planned for. If you take a generic assault on an enemy position and then compare the British SOP and the German SOP you will find that the German army unit will spend less time than the British army unit reorganizing once the objective is taken. The example of the German army operating with Finnish units I gave does pertain to atypic terrain with which the German army was not familiar with at the time. But the German army units did advance slower than the Finnish army in these conditions. The reason for this was the Germans operated more systematically and the unit commanders did not want to lose contact with their subunits. Also, they feared outrunning their fire support elements. Extrapolating from this I think it is safe to say that even in a more familiar setting the German army units will strive to maintain cohesion so that when the objective is taken the minimum of time will be lost reorganizing, be it to take on a counter attack or a push forward.

Very interesting topic. One angle that does not seem to have been covered is walking fire vs fire base/squad rush tactics. IMO this is a very relevant factor when looking at the "bayonet" charge and how it was effected and how effective it was. Also, what has to be considered is the goal of the charge in relation to the master plan. It would seem the bayonet charge was often considered to be the culmination of the British infantry attack whereas it was not necessarily the culmination of a German attack. ... but it does seem to me that a full-blooded bayonet charge implies a (perhaps momentary) loss of control that is not necessarily needed if one prefers to fight by grenading What is meant by loss of control ? Apart from the Japanese the only instances I can think of when a charges like that were made were in (tactically) desperate situations. Also quite often they were made with relatively poorly trained troops or by well trained troops facing infavourable numerical odds. This loss of control shows in British infantry tactics in the strong emphasis put on re-organising immediately after an assault. It may be that a "grenade-school" assault may not have to surrender control to the same extent. Does anyone have access to WW2-era German infantry tactics documents that indicate whether or not this post-assault reorganisation was emphasised to the same extent? German troops operating alongside Finnish troops were reported to having maintained their cohesion more than the Finnish troops. The junior leaders excerted more direct control over their units than their Finnish counterparts. I can not imagine a German Company commander reporting his subunits being "in the general area performing unspecified attack operations under adhoc command of any number of my neighbouring Company CO('s)" and not have his arse kicked for not knowing the specifics. The Finnish assault tactics were modelled to a large degree after the WWI German tactics and adapted to suit the local conditions and forces. In WWII the assaults and follow up operations were often made with mixed forces. It was thought more expedient and prudent to follow any lead and worry about the higher level cohesion later than waste time reorganizing and lose both the momentum and the initiative. This was partly facilitated by the Finnish reservist army and the call up system where units were formed from men from the same region. To try to answer your guestion: the Germans were more cohesive in their planning than the British were. They did not wish to wind up in a situation where they would have been forced to reorganize after an assault. They tried to keep their plan focused on the mission and to maintain cohesion within the parameters of the mission. Having to reorganize in the middle of the mission was not what they planned for.

Originally posted by aka_tom_w: Appletalk is not more 'taxing' on any network I.T. network guys ALWAYS say "oh that Apppletalk is so "chatty" Nonsense. Seems you have never had to deal with the problems. Problems arising from Mac's crashing in the middle of a session freezing the server at the same time. are a bitch Or sticky networking due to this "chatter". A chatty protocol (Appletalk and Novell IPX/SPX) eats away bandwidth at a rate that is both surprising and annoying. What drives me up the wall is the tendency of Mac operators booting the NT server first when there is trouble (ie a Mac crashes or a session freezes). Uncleanly terminated Mac sessions hanging in the server can cause a lot of problems.

Originally posted by Lurker: No disrespect intended. I have a professional interest in this issue. Just to reality check your reality check... I've been running my Mac network with TCP/IP for about a year now. I see you are a Mac consultant. Good. I'm fairly certain that any Mac that will run OS 9 or OS X can handle TCP/IP networking. Native OS9.x can not use TCP/IP to run the network resource mounts. Sure, you can make the connections but if you disable the Appletalk you are not able to connect to them. When you lose the zones you lose the mounts and and with them the resources. You can not mount resources from NT/W2K servers to Mac's unless you have Macservices (ie Appletalk) installed. This is why I hear you need a special software if you want to lose Appletalk. We have been looking for such a software. What are you using ? Any network guru who says that you need to move to an NT based solution because of the Appletalk networking protocall is not well versed with the Mac. You better contact CreoScitex and Heidelberg then. Their CTP solutions (which are based heavily on networks) are using NT/W2K servers with Mac clients. They say NT/W2K's are more efficient in handling the large files than a native Mac system ... But in any case, to get back to the subject of Combat Mission... Back to scheduled programming....

Reality check: at least the printing and graphics industry is starting to use NT servers instead Mac servers as file servers. Also, Appletalk being slower and more taxing on the network loadwise than pure TCP/IP things look grim for the Mac in that department too. OSX may be an improvement but lets face it, it is not spreading fast as there is practically no software available for it yet. 9.x will be the norm for a year or two yet. Even more if the software conversions start dragging far behind the OSX.

Rounds out !!! The game against Thorben played out (making it 5/5). I'll have the rest of my AAR's written up by the end of next week.

Not really. The Soviet sources are quoted verbatim and at least the sections concerning USSR vs Finland are filled with all kinds of factual errors which would have been easily checked if some sort of cross referensing with Finnish sources had been done. If you look very carefully the book rides on Glantz's name. There is precious little (none?) actual text by him in the book. From what I recall none of it was actual research he had done for this particular book. That does not mean I think all his other works are PoS.

Originally posted by Stacheldraht: When Titans Clashed is clear and concise most of the time, considering the enormity of the topic. Glantz details the current state of access to Soviet archives and relies on these extensively, if his massive endnote section is any indication. Please take a look at the list of actual sources used in When Titans Clashed (I tried WTC for short but that does not really work ). In this particular book the predominant sources are Soviet era histories, not primary source archives. There are several glaring factual mistakes at least concerning USSR vs Finland. I have seen reviews that say the book brings the Soviet POV to the western reader and it does just that, unabridged, unedited, warts and all. I have not had time to read other books by Glantz but this particular book does not epitomize scholarly study and source critique. IMO it is just a compillation of Soviet histories on the subject and should be treated as such. [ March 03, 2002, 12:17 AM: Message edited by: tero ]

There are CMBO's on sale at the bookstore in Jumbo (a shopping center near Helsinki). I wonder, are the any plans to distribute CMBB through conventional channels ?

Originally posted by Andreas: tero - since you fired one, could the gun do indirect fire? If so, at what ranges? Conceivably it could in theory fire indirect fire (like any gun). The problem is the elevation allowed by the mount. A howitzer it was not. I could envision it could do indirect fire at 2-4 km's (can't remember the listed max range) for it.

Originally posted by rune: The Russian 45mm is over rated by Jason. The Russians hated the gun and there was problems with the ammo into 1943. But only when it comes to AT capabilities. As a infantry support gun the HE performance was excellent. It was called the Whip by the Finnish troops and it was one of the most feared and respected weapons in the field. Sorry, but the 45mm was not all that impressive. My favorite quote was the 45mm had as much effect on their panzers as their panzers had on the t34. Should tell you how low opinion on both sides of the war on the 45mm. While I do agree the AT performance (even with properly manufactured ammo) was not up to specs beyond 1942 the gun remained in service as a close support weapon for the infantry. The high MV and better than decent HE performance coupled with decent field manageability made it ideal for the task (hell, I operated one in 1986 and it was in the Finnish arsenal until the early 90's).

Originally posted by JonS: Why would the Russians use an imperial measurement :confused: You should look up the Imperial Russian measurements, not the Anglo-American imperial measurements. Also, I thought the British gun was developed around the weight of shot, rather than a specific calibre? Both the British and the Imperial Russian field arty was based for a large part on modified naval models. For example most AT and tank guns started out by being developed and modified from naval guns. The Red Army did surprisingly little modifications to the Imperial Russian line of development when it comes to artillery. Old models were produced as is or modernized without the lineage being discontinued.

Originally posted by Warmaker: Hmm, that 150mm shouldn't be that accurate. This doesn't happen consistently over many games does it? The 150's are of a lower velocity and aren't accurate. At least, not for me That is always the case: the opponent gets the Daniel Boone variety gunners why friendly gunners cant hit worth a damn. Drawing your attention to the überChurchill CS-models and the überSherman 105 I'd say there seems to be indications there is a discrepency between the HE and the AP (HEAT) ammo performance in the bigbore guns.

From way down town - bump

Originally posted by dima: Some resistance (partisans) units can be considered Elite. There are many books on the topic (mostly never translated in english )which describe many of the raids having as high as 1:10 losses ratio. Even there there seems to be much variation. At least the units facing Finns were operated from across the front line (from the Red Army side that is ) and almost completely comprised of members of the Communist party rather than trained military personel. Their elan was immaculate but they did commit some horrendous acts of war crimes against the civilian population. And if cornered by regular troops pursuing them they would suffer high casualties and more often than not the unit would be virtually annihilated. However, from what I have read, the LRRP type units running purely military missions operated by the Red Army were quite proficient and would IMO qualify for the Elite status. This seems BTW to be universally true to all armies. The military units detailed with gathering information behind the enemy lines are made out of the crem de la crem of the respective armies. BTW, Hi Mom ! Hi dad. SEND MORE MONEY

SOP's spell national characteristics (alternate spelling sometimes used is national bonuses) ....