Bobbaro

Reminds me of stories of whole companies on the firing line lining up on a wandering deer or cow to be chewed out afterwards to the effect that, "Don't ever let that happen again and the worst part about your indicipline was that no one hit the animal." Of course the language was more to the point and pungent. Then those cases where some anus fires a weapon generally into the air expecting the round to impact harmlessly only to read in the paper where some innocent was killed by a bullet from nowhere.

My combat experence in darkness is limited to peace time training long ago, observing reinactment stuff and just wandering around in the dark out in various terrain including open fields bordered with trees and shrubs, thick woods with heavy brush motts, swampy woods, broken woods and gullys, rocky hilly terrain with trees and juniper thickets, well you get the idea. My night training exercises were a compass course and a night firing exercise. Both nights were moonless. Forty meters seemed to be about my limit for seeing figures. In night firing none of the targets were visible to me and likely at about a fifty yard range. Any chance to see anything was spoiled by muzzle flash. One shot and forget seeing. Illumination is such circumstances is essential to aimed or semi aimed fire. You lose enough track of vertical angle to lose a lot of firepower into shorts or the air. On the defense firing stakes would help the other coordinate. I have followed a squad sized body moving tactically on a lane in low moonlight under a broken tree canopy. In the shadows they disappeared. Just 20 yards back I had great difficulty seeing them. Idenity of was impossible. Adding the emotions of battlefield circumstances to such a mix would obviously produce distortions of great magnitude. A very large factor would be training and experience. Units in continueing hard contact usually were badly depleated and if brought up to strength had numerous green replacements. Even in those rare few units that committed to training in night fighting expertise (Wolfhound Div?), a night engagement with out a period of training in reserve to bring replacements up to speed would seem to be compromised. Such organizations faced a widespread high level bias against employing their talents. But, when turned loose their skills reportedly paid off well. I wish their methods were laid out in explicit detail. All that I have read, even by participants were generalities. Stumbling around in dark peacetime tasks provide enough problems to give me confidance in much greater one is war. I just spent some time this past week pullilng porquepine quills out of a imprudant dog that did that number while on a leash. Were it a booby trap the quills in my shoe give ample testimony to my likely battlefield fate. Not only does darkness increase friendly fire incidents, but also accidents of simple innocence and involving ordinance as well. I wonder if we have an example of the AI producing friendly fire from FO's. If so that would be a singular incident of imbalance in targeting for the game engine.

bimp.

Using AT guns without transport in MEs is not gamy, it just looks that way from one point of view. Points of view are very relative. Of course if gamy is defined by view point then to debate about gameness is to debate points of view. That is rather like debating religion. The great thing about points of view is that they can be changed for the convenience of the argument. And how often may one say about argument that winning is not the most important thing, it is all there is in debate. As CM is only relatively realistic, but realism is what we say we seek, then we can have the best of both worlds; that is when it suits, we can declare that guns without transport are gamy but Ironman rules are unrealistic, bending the mind to the accommodating comfort fit for a particular selection for one's own version of reality and its antithesis. It does not appear that there many absolutes in this CM, a worthy approximation of a kind of reality. And rather than insisting that one's individual pursuasion concerning constraints on what BTS has provided to its buying public, it may be profitably suggested what has been said before. players will be happier finding an accomidation before playing. And for those instances where foresight has not found its mark, then tolerance and amusement are the best medicine. Fecies pases, and not always convienently. So clean between the toes and grin. That might also be said about debate.

MadMatt: "DO you really want to play a game where for 10 tunrs in a row you watch a single guy walk around when you could instead be blowing up tanks and stuff?!? ;)" Well, if that single guy or team quietly removes a crew served weapon, or HQ unit from an inconvient location I would not complain too much. Besides, already we do not find any other single aspect of the game forcing us to watch that take place, while all else sits idle. "Not gonna happen my friend." Well, lets not get too set in our ways. the impossible just takes a little longer. At least sometimes. I find a mind set sometimes applied to CM that even does not pay much attention to some of its existing capabilites -- like the one that hardly recognises that it is able to handle scenrios that last more than 30 minutes or take place on other than a small or medium battlefield in CM terms. Such a mind set will not often entertain some possibilites, and justifies it by confining its arguements to 30 minute scenarios on a no larger than medium map and current game engines either existing or under construction. There is no reason that CM can not grow in depth as well as in breadth. Already, the upcoming CMBB is achieving that. This has a practical aspect in terms of what's going to happen or not, sometmes. But it is a small mind that can not be inspired by the breakthrough that CM has achieved and do some specific dreamy wishful thinking. Afterall, without that element CM would not have been created. We do have sharpshooters, we do have FO teams and crews and half squads. Two man outpost- point teams could also be included with this concept at some future point without going too far afield from what we already have. Sure this is already abstracted into the present squad system spotting system to a degree, but greater specificity means greater immersion and tactical interest. A half squad could be halved again for this purpose. With this capability even greater realism could be injected into play. I can't see why MadMatt should be quite so prima facie negagive other than he has already fully expended all his reserve imaginagion on a plate that is already overflowing. Perhaps this ungenerous. It is easy to be that way standing on the sidelines. But, if standing on the sidelines has some built in pitfalls, so does being so immersed in the midst of the fray. I am only speculating not judgeing. I think if I were being harrassed by a mob with the size and variety of the participants of this Forum in addition to whatever else MadMatt has going on, I might tend to close out a certain amount of noise myself.

Another possible thought along the line of the Victory Position for desingers: since VPs represent a sort of magnet for the AI troop movements, it might be interesting to have MPs, Magnet Positions, which are hidden and which carry no win point that count in the score. That way a designer could influence the behavior of the AI without cluttering up the battlefield with excessive VPs. These MPs would tend to hold troops in positions rather than heading off on jaunts towards the VPs. The MPs could also carry varying values for holding. Their influcence would have a range factor so that other troops would not head for them unnecessarily. Alternatively, another way to accomplish the same is to be able to issue unit "stance" conditions which might place them into a position holding stance until suitable triggers had been tripped. Such triggers could be a given number of turns, enemy troops behind them, or having occupied certain VPs or having friendly troops haveing reached designated goals. It is quite a challange for a designer to work the AI into acting within a design concept. With enough design tools in hand the AI could be made to be pretty tricky. Design elements with random capabilities are most helpful in obtaining replay value from a scenario. Already AI placement has random characteristics that can be useful in that regard.

Say here now, Cesspool? The Outhouse stands above that clearly. And being supererior in all respects deserves the respect of superior minds. Let those floating below bumping up againt the flotsamized jetsome linger there at their level. The Outhouse gang is not only superior spatially, they are also superior philosophical and in all other ways. After all Plato wrote here, and munificently provided as sitting philosopher in residence bits and pieces for the edifacation of those below.

Hey Kynge there, when did Mexico leave North America? Of course the definition of Central America is a little arbitrary and in places could be fudged north a bit, but likely not all the way to the Rio Grande. Ol' Santa A. did do it to the pooch, though. He caused more Central North Amercians to run to Texas than all of S. Austin's bragging how wonderful it was to be in a part of Mexico ever did. It just goes to show that fear of a thing can often lead to foolishness that promotes the thing better than all else. Nature and greed hate a vacuum. Punch a hole in the bottle and the whole world gets sucked in. Then later on Ol' Santa A. did it again. The old U. S. of A may have not had much of an army as such in the 1840's, but to tweek the nose of a greedy neighbor of large capabilities was not much different from what happened nearly a hundred years later with simular results. Only by then Sam's greed for land had been slaked. The complications of giving it back would be horrible to comptemplate. The taking of it was bad enough.

I recall reducing one bunker with a flamethrower,and another with a U.S. parachute squad.

Here are some things G. Patton had to say, (from link supplied by rune) Note the 12 to 18 hours advance for attack orders from corps to division. Each echelon down takes a bigger piece of the time pie. Makes you worry about what was left for the guy actually doing the fighting, how much got frittered away above leaveing him not enough. Wuoting: c. Reconnaissance You can never have too much reconnaissance. Use every means available before, during, and after battle. Reports must be facts, not opinions; negative as well as positive. Do not believe intercepts blindly, crosscheck -- sometimes messages are sent out to be intercepted. d. Orders (1) Formal Orders Formal orders will be preceded by letters of instruction and by personal conferences. In this way the whole purpose of the operation will be made clear, together with the mission to be accomplished by each major unit. In this way, if communication breaks down during combat, each commander can and must so act as to attain the general objective. The order itself will be short, accompanied by a sketch -- it tells WHAT to do, not HOW. It is really a memorandum and an assumption of responsibility by the issuing commander. (2) Fragmentary orders After the initial order, you will seldom get another formal order, but you will get many fragmentary orders in writing, or orally, by phone or personally. Take down all oral orders and repeat them back. Have your juniors do the same to you. Keep a diary with all orders and messages and the resulting action pasted in it in sequence. Keep your own orders short, get them out in time, issue them personally by voice when you can. In battle it is always easier for the senior officer to go up than it is for the junior to come back for the issuance of orders. A division should have twelve hours, and better, eighteen hours, between the physical receipt of the order at Division Headquarters and the time it is to be executed. (3) Warning Orders Warning orders are vital and must be issued in time. This requirement applies not only to combat units, but also to the Surgeon, the Signal Officer, the Quartermaster, the Ordnance Officer, and the Engineer Officer who must get warning orders promptly. They, too, have plans to make and units to move. If they do not function, you do not fight.

By the way, I made fair in both games for the attacker, I gave him extra turns, at about 10 or 15 more for each play. I hate it when the scenario ends before a battlefield decision is reached. I accept stalemate as a battlefield decision as it appeared in the second scenario. I was surprised at the size of the victory. I did know he had lost so many. With 2 halftracks still going I kept wondering why he did not just load up and move on to the VLs. I had next to nothing nearby. He did not know that though. Heh. good old FOW. It seems to work both ways.

I just finished a 500 pt defense against the AI in a QB. Earlier I did one but scared by all the talk, used the handicap to cut back the attack a small percent. Was a hell of a fight but in spite of heavy loses came out with a major victory. You want to scare yourself take only infantry units. He got a Tiger and a half track. I think a human would have used them better. They were bad enough anyway. I fairly roasted the cat with two flamethrowers at once, emptying one on it and two shots from the other. That was one hot cat. BUT it did not kill him. Did make him back off to cool a bit. By the time play finished I had close assaulted it with four squads. #3 immobilized and #4 caused him to abandon. A half track abandoned on the last turn when I surrounded it with two squads and a flamethrower. The plan was to advance 3 squads on the right into woods in front of the VL. It was in a strategic location for ambushing armor so I provided it with flamethrowers protected by one squad. I put one platoon in the center, a weak force but in a good position. I used my two wire setups between a house with one squad and some woods on its immediate flank. The front was hidden by a slight rise and more woods. The other squads were arranged to the rear and rear flank hidden. Two 81mm spotters rounded out the mix. The attack was a two pronger with the Tiger giving support from the center. The strong force on the right took on the bulk of his infantry and the guys on the center took on the attack from the left with a few more moving with the Tiger. Mortar fire took out the wind out of the sails of the enemy with the tank. More of it helped on the right side. I had to suffer some Tiger blow on the right while repulsing a strong attack there. The attack on the left took longer to develop. I suppose the AI was spending time on the undefended VL on the far flank. I am glad it did not concentrate all of it on that side. Making the story short, the infantry attack was contained with a lot of exciting defensive work, bless the wire. The Tiger pushed towards the high point VL and got a warm welcome. The halftrack came down the road on that side and declined to test the ambush waiting there. And so it went. With the Cat gone I started reinforcing the single platoon with the guys on the right and soon routed out that bunch. Tonight, I did a minimum scale defense and thought for sure I was being beaten. Plan went like this. Sharp shooter in house on left. Platoon with machinegun at road Y intersection with church and 2 buildings just right of center. I took the force that the computer provided and it included an 81 spotter, 75mm antitank gun, an 81 and the sniper with a road block and a daisy chain. Blocking the road to the front and daisy chaining at the intersection using woods as and extension of the blocking plan, I set up a sort of reverse slope defense with the buildings, woods, mines and roadblock providing a substitute for the slope. The gun was set to cover flanks protected by the squads with the machine gun and various barriers. It worked, but not withouta great deal of sweat from this player and blood from his troopers. The gun after a long defense from infantry attacks got what it was waiting for, the meanest of the armor on the field a Mark iv. That left 3 halftracks. The spotter got one of them. The worst moment came when one of the squads got hosed by a flamethrower. It broke and ran. As the time began to run long things mostly came to a standstill. I think a human player at this point might have managed a better result for the enemy. But apparently his morale was way down. The enemy spotter picked up my mortar on the right and expended most of a huge load of rounds on him. He just hunkered down in his foxhole and withstood the whole bunch. The game ended in a stalemate, but I was awarded a major victory. 87 to 13. I totally eliminated several squads, as they were ambushed. The machine gun finally got wiped out by a halftrack near the end. It had been the main source of enemy squad elimination. The gun fell to a halftrack. I lost 24 casualties out of 60 starters. The AI lost 93 out of 109. I had 36 kicking at the end and he had 16, only one of whom did not get captured at quitting time. I suppose vehicles left for the general surrender are destroyed by their crews before they leave.

Are asylums in Europe safer than those in the States?

From the George Patton link supplied by rune. These are instructions from G. Patton to his Third Army. Did he expect enough White Phosphorus to be supplied to his army and distributed in sufficient quantity to make his wishes reality? And should we not see at least a little made available ------------? Quote: Tank attacks can be stopped by artillery concentrations of white phosphorus and high explosives. immediately take under fire enemy anti-tank guns, and either reduce them or blind them with smoke or WHITE PHOSPHORUS. When tanks use smoke or WHITE PHOSPHOURS against infantry, tanks, or anti-tank guns, they should continue to fire into the smoke with high explosive or with machine guns if they are within range in order to prevent enemy movement. Tanks should remember that anti-tank guns are not armored and are therefore susceptible to effective results from high explosive and WHITE PHOSPHORUS. In tank versus tank duels, the first round should be armor piercing. If this fails, the second round MUST be WHITE PHOSPHORUS and short so as to give our tank a chance to maneuver, because by keeping it's gun laid on the smoke, it has a better chance of getting in the second telling shot than has the enemy, who when he emerges from the smoke does not know the location of our vehicle. They(tanks) should fire at these targets(suspicious locations)with high explosive or with WHITE PHOSPHORUS, because if the enemy receives such fire, he will consider himself discovered and reply at a range so great as to render him ineffective. ------------------------- ANOTHER QUOTE OF SOME INTEREST --hasty attacks are not coordinated attacks. "Haste makes waste". NOTE on ABOVE: it is my opinion designers too often short change the alotted turns=time for scenarios.(recon by fire) [This message has been edited by Bobbaro (edited 11-14-2000).]

Dear cousin across the pond, M. Bates. First of all A. Murphy was a Texan. That is sufficient. Incidental information: He was the most decorated US soldier of WWII, including the Congressional Medal of Honor. You may be already knowledgeable about these details as well as other accomplishments of this gentleman and just teasing a bit. On the otherhand I am sure U.K. and the Commonwealth produced its share of fellows, who performed rather well under the circumstances. One thing that I feel as an absence, is a shortage of iterature over here giving frontline detailed accounts of those long suffering and brave men's performances in the first person, or even very much as historical accounts. One interesting read I have was by a U.S. Citizen, who volunteered into British service and gave his story of service with a Gurka outfit. But, the vast majority of books are of American origin about American participation. The shortage of translations from tounges other than English are more understandable in the book trade, but English language works puzzle me a bit. It seems to me that the market here would support it. I think I have seen more German first person accounts than English or Commonwealth. We read stuff here from such members as tss of the Winter War which are just about totally inaccessable in English, as least in common channels as far as I am aware. Stories that cross national boundries like this are additionally revealing because of fresh eyes seeing and reporting on what is old hat to the nationals involved. I have another book that details U.S. service by a German national whose Nazi hating parents immagrated. The author as a youngster witnessed the work of the SS recruiter and makes very understandable the appeal of the imgages and trappings of military elitism with its common man social culture to a youth for whom politics and affairs yet to have any meaning. I don't know the appropriate expression for that place and time, but it would translate,"How cool! I can't wait until I am old enough." Ironically, he later participated in active service against his former countrymen. I have heard of Americans, who found themselves in Germany with dual citizenship and conscripted by law or circumstances into German service. Once caught up like that, it becomes a matter of survival.

Tris, I am curious about the period you had your military experience. Mine was about '61. There have been great changes in the way things are done over the years, especially in the last few years. We had a small share of harassing leadership; next to nothing in fact. Nothing like the Marines of the day got. ScoutPL did not see much in the way of Marine training culture showing up in the Army, or that was the impression I got. LOS indicates that he believes that shock treatment is appropriate for weeding out mentalities obviously too tender for the battlefield, which has some obvious merit. Perhaps it even sometimes works. More likely it will, if part of a consistent program of training. My treatment was largely of the kind you reported, except often probably more on the slack side. I did witness competent leadership and a little of the other. I suspect that since (at least in my swatch of experience) that the Marine DI approach did not become an Army institution as it was in the Marines and when encountered was more likely something individual and more likely to be resented as personal. Marines expect it. If they don't I can't imagine what planet they lived on. Marine theory has been different from the Army's. I am not telling you anything you don't know. Anyway, where it is an individual decision or practice to use this approach in some isolation from the general rule, it much less likely to achieve much more than reveal the most conspicuous emotional weakness in recruits. Perhaps worth it for that. Saves a lot of time and expense. Not very kind though. Why can't such be found and dismissed through screening in the first place? Probably impossible, but due to organizational defects rather than absolutely. If your noisy NCO emptying the bus had been a part of a complete planned recruit training experience it may have made more sense to you. As it was, in isolation acting alone, his effort was wasted. Like all things military, a team approach is necessary for results. Had you experienced a concerted program designed to weed out problems and totally reorient the recruit's entire mentality from civilian to military and military Marine style as the Marines do consistently, then that one guy hollering would smear out in memory into a general impression. The Army taught me its program and drilled me to accomplish it. The Marines attempt and pretty damn well succeed in *remaking* their recruits. I have grown more tolerant of a lot of what I once regarded as beside the point military foolish traditional practices. They do have necessary function, sometimes functions that the book rationale misses entirely. For example saluting: I originally felt that it was a ridiculous non functional eye candy for officer's deficient self confidence. I grew less critical and put it to mindless tradition. But, now I see it as a practice of positive feedback to officers that a soldier recognizes them as such and are ready to act in their role as subordinates. That is important as a minimal sign to an officer that his communications will be heard. And if discipline has not broken down entirely that he can expect a reasonable effort at obedience. That seems to me to be enough. That relationship is critical both on the battlefield and behind it. I was told that it was a formal greeting. Somehow that seemed to belie the fact that officers did not offer to initiate such a greeting, but when did initiate a correspondence, it was more like, "Hey soldier?" come here. A wonderful Korean War period story about that was told to me by a guy who witnessed it. Sloppy Joe missed his opportunity to salute a Lt. and was called for it. Ordered to give one hundred salutes, he wagged, his arm weary. There was another witness. A General. He in turn stepped up after number 100 was finished and addressed the Lt. He said that is was well that he had taken the initiative to correct the private. But now it was his duty as a saluted officer to return all the salutes as regulations required. The Marine approach is a studied one much refined in practice and applied across the board. If a recruit is singled out, it is generally the recruit who stood into the limelight. This institution is designed to place all these guys into the same cramped comfortable boat and weld them into a team by shared and overcome hardships ready to charge hell with a thimbleful of water. While America won't tolerate efforts at truly realistic training as too risky to a soldier's health and loves to punish some DI who has the misfortune of having some trainee fall out and die. we end up saving a few training casualties for the return of having many more die on the battlefield not as prepared as they might be. The Marines program has suffered weakening, but not as much as the Army's. The Army's approach has always been different. But never so different than now. It is becoming so questionable as to wonder if it is not being designed to charge a Girl Scout riot reading pages from their Consideration Of Others field manual, COO. Yes a bit of poetic license, but with very large grain of truth apparently. Our military has received 3rd, class treatment before, but never has it been so insidiously invaded within. But don't believe it. We have that advice from very high governmental officials. Our Captains are surely resigning simply because of a needed bolstering of internal communications telling them how nice they are. A study should solve the problem.

Scout, I have no first hand knowledge, and just got the impression from hearing conversations from interested parties concerning terminology. Perhaps too many of these people got their picture drawn in Hollywood despite any military experience they had. From what you say, Hollywood may very well be in a better position for making impressions than present training is capable of being, even for those who served. About the Campaign hats, yes, your right about their antiquity and Army history. However, I never saw them used or even appear during my brief real world contact covering 60 to 66. Neither did I see any evidence via media, books or report during the Korean war period. My sergeants wore the Tideway type hats. My treatment as a recruit was not so much tender as it was sort of indifferent. I was not in for my military edification, but merely to do my duty and go on with my life. However, having watched WWII roll by with plenty of relatives involved and sweated out my brother's potential to go to Korea, rather than remain stateside as he did, along with a goodly general interest in and appreciation for things military. I felt that my training was fairly slack. Some things were done fairly well, but a lot of time seemed spent perfunctorily. The old Korean war vets that formed a lot of the cadre seemed to be just going along to get along, seeing that the recruits did well enough to keep them from criticism. Likely, doing a job until retirement. They were good guys. We got a tear or two coming out of basic as we gave old Sgt Cadle, who ran our platoon, a fifth of whisky as a going away present. We got some training in the techniques and equipment of war and some physical hardening, (not enough)and next to nothing in preparing us for anything approaching the mental load. The same was generally true in Advanced Infantry training. Much less physical and no more mental. Mostly familiarization with weapons of various sorts. Had I not been in the reserves, I would have gone on to something more in detail in some assignment no doubt. I would have recognized the tools and at least remember that I had heard something of the techniques. But to employ them effectively would have been something else. In reserves the weekends were next to nothing except gaining the sense of belonging to a group, but only the two weeks summer camps saw anything else. We were readied somewhat to begin learning a trade but in a frighteningly laid back manner. After Viet Nam heated up, talking with people who had gone back in seemed to speak of a much more purposeful kind of training. From what you say about training now, it appears my experience may have been "rigorous" in comparison. I fear neither a concerned President nor gung ho Secty, of Defense or better directed congressional expenditure of funds can repair the institutional damage. A gut cutting war and acres of unnecessary blood is the only thing capable of bringing back reality. There is something about body bags that speak loudly. Even then I fear that those responsible will not be held accountable in any way. Worse, I fear that even a kind retirement and pat on the back will not move them out. I fear that these people are so far removed from the actuality and even really caring, that all that will be done is a cover up and another classic example of scapegoating. Scapegoating is a very old military tradition. The words of your post are tragically repetitive of others I have read concerning present training and affairs. I probably should have addressed you in private as this sheds no light on Pillar's quest. But, seeing persons with mistaken notions of at least what rudimentary individual military preparedness is made of helped set me off as it is something I see as a wide spread problem. David Hackworth penned a not so hypothetical tale of a mother forcing the Army to slack off her son's rugged training through a congressman. Then he pictured the greater anger she exhibited at the inadequate training her son got, that caused his death in combat.

Gentlemen of the Military, LOS, Scout et al, I find in this discussion, sometimes cussion, a wonderful exposition. Overlooking the frustration and induced irritation, It is one that is so material to our national security, exemplifying so much of what I have been observing in the information available addressing the apparent and convincingly alarming realities that cut through the self serving pap, that reassure our citizenry that all is better than well, furnished by politicians in and out of the military. The rot so prevalent that is apparently at the top and consequently instilled into the doctrine and culture lower down is aided and abetted in national policy that is sometimes temporary, (at least 8 to 12 years depending on election results, maybe) and also at least semipermanent. The temporary has foreseeable remedy, but the fact that GENERATIONS, of Americans are piling up who have no direct military experience on a broad front via a draft and universal military training, is scary. The appreciation of the military necessities is dying out in the general population. It is only a very small minority who get direct education. One result is a misapprehension of what is involved in so called brutish training conducted by a martinet cadre of officers and NCOs. They do not comprehend that the toughest training possible is inadequate to completely prepare the soldier for what he faces. Even being given such training does not guarantee that an individual can develop an understanding of the ultimate assistance such sweat gives over giving blood. Our friend here does give evidence, that if he experienced a touch of that training and did not come off better for it, there could have been a defiency of leadership that failed to create the necessary warrior spirit and understanding. If we teach our troops that they are failures, they will certainly learn that lesson. The notion of do as I command, worm, or suffer the consequences does happen. I saw very little of it long ago. When it did happen it was not truly malicious but stupid, playing with men as toys for amusement and not trainees, totally unprofessional. I considered my training on the verge of Viet Nam at the time as too soft, it was Army as you Marines might suspect. One thing that Tris has touched upon in his reading and has caught his attention is that bookbound doctrinaire rigidity can be very dangerous. But is also to be appreciated that all officers can not be geniuses. We require too many of them to not have a big share of those, who either operate by the book or not at all. When the book is pretty good at least covering past experience (generally that is exceptional for an approved system)its application by the ordinary officer forms a good basis for reasonable success. That men will die who would have fared better with better leadership is just a fact of the human condition. We should be grateful for the common run of officers who give it their best. There are many other factors that costs lives and objectives that often loom loftier than a good common run of the mill officer. It sure beats the hell out of the alternative -- which is all too possible. Tris, I would recommend the books by Col. David Hackworth for a good and insightful read. If Scout and LOS have not read any by this author, I would be most surprised. His is not an academic take at all; he has seen it all from the bloodiest to the Pentagon. What a grand thing this forum is to bring together both the washed and the unwashed for an opportunity to mentor a little understanding into all of us who need it. LOS, it is a tempting observation that the military should learn a lesson and bring all of its units and doctrine up to the capability of our OPFOR. You have pointed out that the fluid nature of assignments and the distraction of -- shall we say -- simimilitary deployments works strongly against training up to capability. But, if we went at least for a majority of OPFOR capable units, it would surely require some humdinger support. Making it "book" would kill it, given Zero Defect etc. Our military difficulties are merely a repeat of a historical pattern. Until the shooting gets in heavy earnest, the military starves, stagnates runs off in skew directions and wilts. Except for a precious few who remain to seed the next need. What if we found a war and they weren't there? The ScoutPLs are now resigning in what amounts to droves in the scale of necessary military personnel retention. It is scary. Gentlemen, we can not fault Tris for not haveing an inquiring mind. It is the stuff that is necessary to bring the civillian voter up to snuff. Tris, our military is being gutted to the future unnecessary loss of lives on the perception that trainees ought to not be mentally stressed or physically trained under conditions so tame as to absolutely preclude any chance of injury. You do not save lives in battle that way. In fact the little blood lost in tough training is more than compensated in battlefield experence. But - - - tough training that isolates the individual and does not include the trainers and the rest of the team is destructive. The Marines have made a fetish of the team and leading from the front. They frown on officers and NCOs who do not meet this standard. The fact of the success of this is reflected in the replacement of "basic training" with Boot Camp in the vocabulary of the Army and in its imatation of the Marine campaign hat (parden me, covers) for their training personnel as well and now using the term Drill Instructors. [This message has been edited by Bobbaro (edited 11-12-2000).]

Thinking further on the proposed Withdraw and Reateat changes, I suspect that a counter arguement can be made that the present withdraw command is based on giving the player a singular ability to act in place of the AI for instanious decision on the part of the squad leader with no delay from higher HQ. It also is the closest the game comes to giving the benifit of player selected SOP. That is, if a player desires his unit to act as though it is under a SOP command to pull out of contact as rapidly as possible after making it, then the present Withdraw command approaches it. There is a lot of conceptual ground to cover here in making any changes. Accepting one has implications that go beyond the simple issue that it addresses. Giving Steve and Charles credit: it is easy to sit on the sidelines on my part of the bench and have an opinion of how the game should be run. If you keep the entirety in mind as they have to do, simple suggestions are not maybe so simple as they seem.

Hummmm, maybe have units in panic dropping morters, machine guns, and bazookas; and having broken units dropping all weapons. I am not too sure the latter is best without some toning down either in the move from panic to broken or in only losing some rifles - firepower. Maybe go automatically to low ammo. Panic is a rather drastic state and broken damned sure drastic and is now perhaps too easily fixed. There are degrees of panic and right now broken is more like extreme panic rather than broken. Broken troops perhaps should be more difficult to fix than they are now.

Futhermore, I find much merit in the observations here of the opportunity to make the great game even greater. A fine discussion.

One hopes that planning has included the possibility of withdrawal under the protection of supporting fires. Where an advanced unit has expended all of its attacking potential, ie. ammo, its only utility is to be withdrawn to at least preserve it for credit appropriate to being able to fight another day. To do otherwise, even to save only one individual, is a GAMEY form of play in which the scenario at hand and playing it is the the only issue in consideration. Contradictorily, I find merit in some who have written in favor of approaches that have been labeled as gamey. CM is after all not *just* a game, but *inherently* a game, which has inescapably unrealistic dimensions and elements by virtue of which one can not escape playing in the gamey manner. Saying it differently, when we play we play gameyily as inescapably as those who play in cesspools inescapably play in, with and of their environment of domestic waste. And gladly. It is our choice. We revel in the fact that our cesspool smells better than anyone else's and justifiably so. Some of us try to not see the brown floaters drifting by and manage fairly well, as they are deceptively few and have a decent distance between. I find support enough for both those who would concede to incontrovertible fact that CM is a game, and revel in utilizing all its elements in competition with the AI, hotseat, or PBEM, and those who through self restraint would endeavor to attempt to the limits of the game engine to force play as close to *reality* as possible. While the former approach is rather a plain and simple matter of playing CM "as is" for the sake of play and enjoyment, the latter approach is a little more complex. I see it as influenced by a pair of motivations. The first is that best observed in our professional military members. This game in its excellent and unexcelled approach to being *the* realistic computer simulation of combat of its class, raises to a grand level the professional's enthusiastic and justified partisanship for play that is not finally play at all, but a rehearsal for combat -- a combat in which real lives and national interests are at stake in which getting it right is of more than passing and entertaining interest. That element alone, neglecting natural ego related issues, is enough to heat up discussions of differing views. The other aspect is the motivation of the historical buff, who either wants to relive history or at least adhere to the historically correct motif. It is a matter largely of immersion of the reliving mind into a game which is the best there is at assisting the imagination into believing itself *really* there. As we take our imperfectly informed minds into this fray we strain at pushing as closely into being there as possible. We employ our intellect and historical resources as far as energy and capability permits toward that goal, never mind the temptation to shortcuts that permit the comfortable illusion of arrival that demands a vigorous and sometimes emotional defense against all comers. That these differing attitudes and motivations should come in as many mixes as we have members participating here is not surprising. That we should employ all the fire and emotion as we do to satisfy our personal needs is right in line with the very human qualities that dispute over territory, culture, economic advantage, and just plain, cussed, human and ornery love of disputation we see in hot and cold wars and rivalries. The unrelenting diversity of all the combinations and permutations of our differing strains of approach to CM, even within the same individuals, perhaps within a single typed paragraph, guarantees all the elation, frustration, misunderstanding, anger and fine comradeship to be found in this and probably other forums. If I have any point to make out of this diatribe, it is that there is enough validity and error to go cover any need here, and a little understanding of the firm ground that stands under each of the outlined directions of approach to the game can make each of us a little richer in adding to our own sense of value, those of others. Realizing that each one has its imperfections and finally that the game itself being just that, a game, can only approach perfection for the for those who simplify their demands to enjoying a game. What a tribute, that CM tempts so many others to find cause in it to go for the illusion of reality and historical representation. Enjoy.

Two books to consider, from J.B. Lippencott Co., The Battle of the Huertgen Forest by Charles McDonald; and Forest in Hell by Paul Boesch, Lib. of Con. Cat. card No. 85-70436. The latter book is just the kind of first person book that personifies the generalities that are found in more comprehensive works. As it appears that it was published more or less by the author himself, it is likely difficult to get. McDonald does cite it and quote from it in his The Battle of the Huertgen Forest. McDonald was critical of higher command for what I would call a lack focus concerning objectives, circumstances, and conducting disruptive micromanagement of the conduct of the battle in that these remotely placed commanders on numerous occasions drew lines on their maps, tasked regiments and battalions to multiple simultaneous objectives, and set attack schedules totally out of touch with the realities of the situation. These commanders did so with impunity. The commanders at corps, army and army group level were the main cause of incalculable suffering to little purpose. What responsibility went higher is a little less clear to me, but carelessness was the order of the day. In defense it might be said that these people were entirely unprepared to find themselves sitting on the frontier of Germany at that early a date, (September was when it started)victory disease was rampant among their staffs, confusion was likely great, and logistical problems loomed as a high priority item, higher the further back structures got. A flank attack out of the forest was the only operational concern that started the whole thing in the first place and only late in the process did an inkling that the Rhoer River dams were important occur. It seems that closing to the Rhine had been left to shift for it self in all the planning. This should have a concern at Supreme H.Q. Yeah, there were generalized plans, but apparently they had not been brought down to the detailed sort of planning appropriate to actually conducting the campaign as had been done for Normandy. Given how the Germans actually had it in their power to stop the invasion had the deception plan not worked and that Allied Supreme H.Q. had an appreciation of that very possible scenario makes the concentration on Normandy to the exclusion of all else understandable. Perhaps another separate H.Q. planning task force would have helped solve that lack. Sometime down the line the importance of the dams sank in and thus began the attack on Schmidt, but with the same mishandling as before. It was not until the 2nd Infantry Div. was launched on its attack at the dams in December that a rational approach appeared. Then it was by far too late. What would have happened to the German forces being gathered for the Bulge attack had the dams been taken in October and the Rhoer been crossed in that month or November? Likely the whole lot would have been forced into piecemeal commitment in an unfavorable series of stopgap measures before they were ready, getting whittled down while in a general retreat. [This message has been edited by Bobbaro (edited 11-11-2000).]

Scout, your points on your namesakes are of course well based. How does setting up point elements square in your thinking with much of what is done with what folks around here call "scouts"? One problem which has been discussed in other threads and which you allude to is the problem with the player obtaining "radio" intell from each and every element he has on the field. Without getting into that issue itself, you are recommending, at least for yourself, a restraint of sorts to eliminate the gamey intrusion this represents and the temptations of exploiting it by using "scouting". Another example of this sort of restraining is utilizing only very low level and very high level views in play. Planning can be sometimes thought of as a necessary evil. Very necessary. Evil because too often the assumptions upon which planning is based fall too far short of the current situation, whether due to misinformation, misinterpretation, poor communications, impossibility of update maintenance or just plain stupidity and incompetence. Necessary, because at a minimum planning enables an organized force to hang on to at least a thread of organization that enables the force to continue to work together as necessity requires replanning on the fly. Static forces sometimes have trouble keeping up with the current situation, and moving forces obviously have a much harder time of it. At least one unit has some idea of what its neighboring units intend to do and furnishes some kind of a line upon which to expect them to be if not the exact position at a particular time- due to knowing a plan. If you do not have a plan then improvisation has no starting point and all is confusion. School Solutions are equally capable of taking or saving lives. The problem is when they are ignored; and, when they are blindly followed. Especially for green troopers, the School Solution is the best that can be done for getting started on a foot with a any hope for attaining an objective and with minimizing casualties. Every new war provides causes for cursing the Old Solution and creating a bloodied, New Veteran's Solution. Yet, a close inspection often reveals hiding underneath, most of the elements of the old reborn in an altered form, like a uniform tailored for the new recruit. A huge failure of the Japanese forces in WWII was the extreme reluctance they had to deviate from a plan once drawn and committed. This can happen on a smaller scale as individuals cling to their talent for learning a plan, ignoring the reality flowing about them. The best plans contain elements of built in flexibility for obvious contingencies. But, nothing can take the place on the spot responsiveness in the face of the unforeseen. So, while one may not really scout out the CM battlefield with proper patrolling etc., there is a comfort is using adequate outposting and point elements as one moves into the zone of any thing is possible. In moving infantry forward in bounds, I like to run a smaller element forward first, using larger elements in overwatch and in readiness for reinforcing the point or covering its withdrawal. Call it scouting if you will, I just think of it as forward security. It does not always work, but that is battle. It seems to me to work more often than not. But this is not a hard and fast rule for every move. Often, I move two squads forwards in cover that has been cleared for nearby threats. Hitting an outpost squad or confronting a clearing ahead is then done with sufficient authority to make a good showing against the enemy. Your V formation I believe. Otherwise, I tend to send over a point element with overwatch if possible. Where it is not possible it, is a good idea to arrive at the end of the turn to enable the players's assistance in simulating a "standing order" response, to wit, get the hell out of there as indicated. Looking forward to seeing your "Advance to Contact" tutorial. I thought your attack was splendid.

I suppose terminology is a good part of the differences that appear here. The differences among intelligence gathering, reconnaissance, scouting, patrolling, using point units while maneuvering larger units, and setting outposts each qualifies for a different understanding. There is the also the technique of recon by fire and recon by deliberate exposure to draw fire. We don't always call each function by the correct name as we engage in our discussions. It seems to me that reconnaissance during a tactical engagement is generally confined to running point during advances and other movements and to using outposts during the defense. That is not to say that it is not appropriate for a commander/player to check out questionable situations on the fly. You read about it a lot in combat accounts where the situation is dicey. An attack may be approached with a certain caution, when a commander is properly left to manage the details himself in the absence of adequate intelligence or when the situation is so fluid as to justify such caution. Given that the quality of intelligence is lacking enough of the time, caution is always advisable providing one has the luxury of taking a little more time. But, there are numerous accounts of companies being sent on to another objective when their original is taken, sometimes several in succession. Perhaps the first one did receive adequate treatment in preparing for the attack; but, moving on the those others had to be a lot more hairy. Incidental to such experiences is what the front line commander thinks of his boss,who likely is rather more comfortably situated and certainly much less subject to taking fire personally as a result of his sometimes, uh, impulsive decisions. I would hate like hell to venture out on the basis of a hunch or a scrap of sketchy, uncorroborated intel. But it was done. "There are no enemy in those woods. Just move on up there and you can make bivouac there so you won't have so far to go when you continue your attack tomorrow." If the commander is lucky when he gets there and there are indeed no enemy, he is even more lucky if tomorrows attack is not ordered to proceed immediately regardless of the condition of his men. Many of the more spectacular achievements of forward encounters with finding out where the enemy is, happens by someone getting lost or finding that a once secure route is not no longer secure. My father-in-law once related a "lets get the hell out of here" experience when he was driver for an officer of the 2nd Div. during the Bulge. They drove out into an intersection and paused. A glance up the intersecting road revealed a panzer in wait. The decision was easy and obviously timely as well. You do hear of jeeps getting into such scrapes and escaping due to their maneuverability and speed. They make for interesting stories. Do rolling stories gather moss? At least some of the time. The ones that don't make it seem to most often appear in accounts where the aftermath is sadly encountered and incidentally mentioned. I have no idea of the proportions of success vs. failure.