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F_Paulus

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  1. That's a great example, Enoch. It sounds like they were training for close combat situations in order to avoid the sort of friendly fire we've been talking about. Just because they're close enough to kill with the bayonet doesn't guarantee they'll recognize friendlies from foes in the darkness, but the chances of making that mistake are drastically minimized during a planned attack. I still wonder if it weren't easier for friendly fire to occur, even in the broad daylight, in the jungles of southeast Asia than in the farm country of western Europe. It seems like the terrain differences between the two are profound. Paulus
  2. That last example reminds me of something that happened during the battle I was talking about in my opening post for this thread. During one instance of friendly fire, I had sent a platoon of guys to rush the hill in the center of the map. The American force there was very diminished, and it seemed like a "gimme". I had moved another platoon up to give covering fire to the platoon that was taking the hill. As soon as platoon #1 reached the hill where the remaining Americans were, platoon #2 (the covering platoon) opened up on some of the friendly squads on the hill! This wasn't a situation where platoon #2 didn't know that platoon #1 would be out there. Then again, perhaps the idea there would be that platoon #2 had a hard time telling the difference between friendly and enemy figures on the hill. If anything, perhaps platoon #2 should have stopped firing when platoon #1 actually reached the hill itself. Binkie's example seems to violate one of the more important "rules" that BTS has emphasized about squad targetting. Regardless of whether it is day or night, if a more threatening enemy is right in front of you bearing down fast on your position, you would target them FIRST before targetting other imaginary or real enemies further away. Does anyone know if this phenomenon of getting "spooked" in CM is influenced by the experience of the squad? For instance, do veteran or crack squads spook less? Paulus
  3. ICM: I grew up around farmland, and I understand what you're talking about. Depending on the phase of the moon, etc, you can see pretty far. However, even in the best of conditions what is usually the clearest are large objects like trees, buildings, etc. at distances beyond 100 yards or so. On my uncle's farm, though, if there had been a squad of guys running along his hedgerow at 200-300 yards there's no way, even with a full moon, that I could tell who they were. I could probably tell that there was movement unless they were a SEAL team, but I know I wouldn't know who was there. One of the things I brought up to this other guy last night was that most of these platoon commanders were probably not using radios to communicate moment by moment movements, especially during the heat of battle. It seems reasonable to me, that given the general state of confusion during any battle, that there may be some friendly fire. I was perplexed, though, that an entire platoon a couple of hundred meters off the flank of another friendly, in cover, would get slaughtered the way they did by friendly fire. Babra, Jason C and Doug Beman all bring up some interesting examples. JasonC: I'd like to read some of the sources you've found regarding the night actions in Italy, etc. If you have a source on that, I would appreciate it. This is a great discussion. Thanks for the replies. Paulus
  4. I was finally able to get the search function to work for the forum, but was still unable to find a detailed discussion on this topic. A friend and I were playing a night mission about a week ago. During the mission, I was playing as the attacking Germans and my friend the defending Americans. The scenario, by the way, is called 'Bruyeres'. During the battle, on several occasions, my own troops fired on friendly squads when those squads ran into the field of fire, and on one occasion a whole platoon was cut to ribbons. It surprised me at the time because on one occasion the platoon that was fired upon by friendlies was firing from a flank position (not running into the field of fire). At some points in the battle, there seemed to be more friendly fire going on from my troops than otherwise. I was talking to someone else about this scenario, and they said they thought that that was completely bogus. My question to the forum is: was this bogus? I'm sure that BTS used historical references when they coded this "feature" into night combat (i.e.-night time battle confusion, fatigue, friendly fire, etc.). Does anyone know of any historical references for this subject? I'd also like to know your opinion as to whether this sounds realistic or not. I don't doubt that BTS has good reasons for coding it this way, I just have no personal knowledge to use to defend it. I'm sorry if this topic has come up before. If you know of other threads one can go to to read a discussion about it, please post the url. Thanks, Paulus
  5. Wow, someone needs to take the patience pill. I waited over a month (possibly six weeks?) to get my copy last year. I think they sold out at least twice. But trust me, it was worth the wait. For such a small development house (that happens to have produced a very superior product), I actually thought the response time was pretty good. That's my 2 cents, anyway. Paulus
  6. Does anyone know of any Churchill winter mods? I've looked through some of the best mod sites that I can find (CMHQ, Tom's site, Combat Missions, etc.), and I cannot find a Churchill winter mod anywhere. I'm also looking for Cromwell winter mods, if there are any available. If you happen to know of any, I would appreciate it! ----------- Paulus
  7. Thank you for all of the advice, comrades! Last night I was playing a LAN game with a friend and for the first time in my CMBO career, achieved an effective hull down stance! I couldn't believe it when I used the LOS tool to target the enemy AFV and saw the (hull down) notification. Unfortunately, they used smoke and escaped certain KO. Hull down is certainly tricky and is very context sensitive. You're always hull down in relation to another object in the game, so the advice regarding the (non)achievement of hull down status when no enemy target is available should be observed. Thanks again! Paulus [ 08-12-2001: Message edited by: F_Paulus ] [ 08-12-2001: Message edited by: F_Paulus ]
  8. I wasn't able to use the search function to find advice on this, so forgive me if this topic has been brought up ad nauseum. I'm having difficulty getting my AFVs into a "hull down" config. I've tried everything the manual suggests, but I'm wondering if there is a trick to this. I have never seen the words "hull down" appear when I am targetting an enemy when I think that my tank is hull down relative to target. It looks like I should be, but apparently I'm not. Does anyone have any advice? Thanks, Rob
  9. The StuH42 is a fantastic weapon for urban warfare. The blast value for the HE rounds alone are worth the price of admission. The 10.5cm gun on this puppy is very handy when used as a support weapon. When used in that role, though, I keep the StuH away from the cutting edge of the front lines, because it is vulnerable to infantry AT weapons like the PIAT or bazooka. I've never found the StuG to be a terribly effective AT weapon, simply because the armor is rather thin. Plus, you need at least three to be effective, so that they can cover one another on the advance. As a defensive weapon against infantry, similar to the StuH42, they can be very effective. I've never found targetting to be a problem. In fact, depending on the crew, my StuG have been "trigger happy", and that is the death knell (for the German crew) when used against late war Shermans. ------------ Paulus
  10. Capt- I was allowing for the full 90 secs of exposure to MG fire. I ran another test, though, with the proper defilade to allow 30-40 secs of exposure to MG fire. The pillboxes were set up on opposite sides of the clear zone. I'm now averaging 39% casualty rate, with only 3 effective units reaching the flag zone. On average, six of the '44 Veteran Rifle Co. squads panic (usually as an entire platoon) as soon as they enter the clear zone. Please do send me your .cmb file (to: robf@mindspring.com). I'm sure that what this test really proves is that mileage may vary. I'm also interested to see how the modifications to CM2 will effect these results. F_Paulus
  11. Capt- I don't doubt your word about the test that you ran. If this has been a problem with CM:BO, I'm sure that it still exists. However, when I set up precisely the same scenario that you did with the two pillboxes, and a '44 Rifle Co., I'm consistently coming up with over 50% casualty rates. The men are running to the flag between the two MG nests. In fact, most of the squads, if not all, are panicking before the 90 seconds are up. This is a veteran group of units. If they didn't panic and run off of the map, the casualty rates would probably be higher...possibly 60-70%, which sounds fairly realistic for 90 seconds of consistent MG fire. I must be missing something concerning the parameters you were using, because I can't duplicate your results. Again, I don't doubt your results. F_Paulus
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