Bobbaro

Actually I was lying when I said I was defending; Rob was wrong and made abundantly aware he was wrong. I was comending him for his apology, and noting there have been some around here without that grace. I feel rather certain he is not even aware that the AAR, Alpha exists. It is not uncommon for the newlywed to demonstrate overweaning enthusiasm and to be forgiven for it after properly being patted on the back and having their clumsiness gently corrected. Afterall, he is one of us, not one of THEM, whoever they are. Oh, and the observation that Rob was offering his information as fact rather than opinion is exactly correct. My misrepresentatin was perhaps a misguided effort to ease his offence in others eyes. I'd rather a fellow feel his chastisement offered by a warmely welcoming brotherhood, who want him to grow into his role, than an object for stomping because he screwed up. I would also like to gently suggest for all of us, that naive offences be treated as outlined, rather than as an opportunity to feel the swell of rightousness at someone else's expense. I much prefer the simple corrective posts such as Moon and others offered. Strike at the offence not the person and with kindness and support. Save the ammo for the game. [This message has been edited by Bobbaro (edited 06-10-2000).]

As far as I was concerned, after the first 30 minutes, the original content of the movie was largely exhausted and reverted to Hollywood cliches and SOPs: the appeal to the undescerning by the unknowing. So stunning was that first period that those who noticed tended to forgive the remainder and those who did not fell prey to cheering the local team. No other movie has depicted the horror of battle in its immediate impact on the human body and spirt for such a prolonged period of time with such vivid show all detail. One may forget the nationalities involved and join at one with suffering humanity. As far as the propaganda aspect, it is sadly par for the course, and again an internationally shared propensity. It is one that also shows up on the battlefield for a variety of causes. Where movies depict this aspect of the battlefield attitude, they may be inappropiately blamed for being jingoistic themselves. Where they fail to open the cracks in this facade and where they indeed throw in blankets to hide the humanity of the otherside, they indeed are blameworthy. Finally, jingoism sells. Where the local market is relatively small one has to consider other markets. That probably makes for better films. But, where the local market is large, one may recover the investment and indeed exceed it. Where that is wildly successful flawed films are much easier to make without adverse financial results. And then their repetation is such that they make additional money in other markets where the audiences may be suckered in.

Note that Rob commendably appologised. It may be that putting ones boot on his neck in that abject position is not exactly gentlemanly. Personally I consider his participation as a fresh, full member stands as a fine example of how all members should behave; he freely offered his opinion and took proper action when confronted with a convincing post to the contrary of his. That is not always the case, that members pay any attention to contrary posts; other than to blindly float freely far above the good earth, their foundations neatly removed from beneath them and unknowingly continue to fercely crow upon their proudly unsupported fallicies. Now, I my self may have responded by creating the equivalent of one mighty symbolic smilie, stoutly defending the undefensible, simply because it was more fun than waiting quietly the few short days remaining until we begin that ultimate objective for which the memebers now so variedly mark time in anticipation thereof.

Yeah, you tell 'em Rob, personally I kept a count down sheet marking off the dwindling hash marks with each of your efforts. Notice I am not completing this with a smilie. For the explanition read my address to Peng on another recient thread.

Mr. Peng, cutting through, (ie, not reading your rebuttal {is a rebutt of the same sense of meaning as a retread?}) the pointed deliberate and noisy refusal to utilize the smilie is the equivalent of converting each and every epistle posted by you without them into an embodiment of the thing, which you so concertedly attempt to discredit, as though confidance in the efficacy of the item itself, the smilie, conveying its intended definition is lacking and requires the whole of the statement. That all of your posts, regardless of length, are essentally each one, one big smilie and can be abbreviated by the use of the simpler symbol is self evident. Such is the strength of that function that every time I see a posting consisting of a smile, it is though the author has appropriated, stolen, or plagerized one of your longer efforts. I must confess that at times you so sublimely exercise the art of the inflation of the smilie that it would require some combination of them to justly translate it into its more essential form. To our gentle readers: take care that the temptation of exorcism does not place one into such contact with the exorcised as to embrase the evil object itself. As the cattleman wars against the woolies, he grows at first accostomed to their sight, then he begins to appreciate the differences among them and finds himself assigning each one in a hiarchial scheme. It is not long after this that some are regarded accordingly as possessing more merit than others. It is but then a short step that he finds one the most attractive of the lot and finds himself becoming jealous of rivals to himself, whether they arise or not. If he loses sight of his beauty he becomes anxious. If he comes near her he loses composure. If he stands by her he loses decor. And finally he cares little whether there were witnesses or not. Peng, we all have been witnesses. Deny it or not, we know your true affections.

If this behavour was an intentional bit of programing set to happen only occasionally or rarely representing a guy freezing up under the stress of the situation, OK. But, if this is unintentional in design, it needs to be fixed. As the forthcoming patch is supposed to make targeting "slightly" more sticky, maybe it already has been. I am not sure slightly is enough in a case like this.

I have a feeling that ammo resupply in a longer scenario would be a good thing to have. I can see where a in 30 minute job it would be difficult to justify. But it does not take a whole lot for some fellows to run back and haul up some bandoliers and a few granades at least on defense. A little tougher on offence. In a longer scenario a jeep load of goodies would sure enable the attacker to consoidate his winnings. I suppose that could be broken up into two stages via an operation. Probably a coding nightmare or at least time consuming and perhaps inappropriate at this stage. A dug in bunch expecting trouble would certainly have more than their carry around allotment if at all possible. I would like to see it go in. It would add another interesting element. If the front was too hot, then obviously a resupply effort would go wanting for folks willing to expose their electronic asses to a very likely demise. On the other hand though,----- another opportunity for a hero.

This is absolutely injurous to the ribs, lungs, eyes, ears, nose and throat and all body parts that come in contact with the floor!

But, does the spotting engine actually differintuate between a sky backdrop and earth-trees-buildings for spotting determinations? Sometimes not only does spotting seem instantaneous, but also the resulting fire. Yes that sometimes happens in reality, but not always. Of course one has to remember in battle folks tend to have their fingers on the trigger. But, don't we sometimes stop to think, "If I don't shoot, maybe he won't shoot back."? Todays account and movie of a Sherman banging into a Stugg and being able to react so well as to shoot it, and two others seems a bit more than can be expected from some very surprised and physicaly shaken GIs. Oh well, aren't we demanding? It was still rather neat.

There have already been simular observations on targeting and buttoned AFVs seeming overly responsive. I believe that these issues have been addressed via changes in the game disk and in a patch available simultaneous with the shipping date. As to the matter of how the turns are being handled, I think you will grow to forget your initial reaction. In a way it is a tribute to the game system in that you feel the immedicy of the real time play in a turn based game. The turns are very distinct and countable. Most importantly you have the time to make each of your orders a based on a well considered decision and not a desparate click as the battle gets away from you. It is the order of execution that is different, otherwise still done in turns with simultaneous execution. One thing, in comparison to SP, CM puts a stop to very unrealistic tactical and gamey tricks SP allows in that turn based system common to games using it, the vast majority.

There were preparations for a counter attack on the invasion. There were problems with getting it underway. Hitler belived (and he was not alone) that the invasion would come further north where the channel was narrower. It took him forever to loose the mobile forces in place for that contingency. Then, Allied airpower and the French Resistance had nearly isolated the beachheads by destroying transportation facillities. Finally Allied airsuperiority made daytime travel unusually hazzardous. The plan was there, it just was not executed as intended.

The satisfaction of writing a post here is not the pain in the knuckles length and the roar of keyboard punching in my ears, but responses of considered commentary, criticism, suggested alternatives and correction. If I listen only to my own line of proposals I don't learn a damn thing. Thanx guys. Some fine counter points you made there. No arguement. On the Leyte thing, I suppose the main inconvience would have been the destruction of the available support. It could have been made up eventually and some of it almost immediately. Perhaps the landing would have suffered some Guadalcanal like inconviences in material, but the line about of setting the war back significantly does seem overstated. Hell, it was worth saying just to find out someone was awake! The response about Bradly's role is also on the mark. The only "but" I can inject is that these were just larger bites at the enemy than Monty was willing to make at that point. Maybe he was still remembering the Market Garden adventure. Yet, there was no comparasion. Only Monty and Patton came up with a straight to the juggler strategy, unless you count the overly optomistic expectations of both the British and American bomber commands. Somehow this has put me of a mind to think about Anzio. But, that is another matter. Somewhat. I suppose in combat there are nibbles, bites, slices and the ultimate stroke. The latter so much dreamed and promised and so seldom delivered. When you are chewing on prickly pear, one longs for the ultimate and final slice. By the way, I was a member as Bobb long enough not to get too wrapped up about the Jr. status. The Forum still reads and writes the same. But, thanks for the consideration all the same. [This message has been edited by Bobbaro (edited 06-08-2000).] [This message has been edited by Bobbaro (edited 06-08-2000).]

I fiddled with the infantry gun in VOT for maybe 15 minutes placing it behind a house so as to get the maximum field of fire, and still remain out of LOS of enemy tanks and FOs on the hills and ridges. One of the Sherman bastards still got it from a hill. But, not before it did harmful work on a lot of infantry penitrating into the town. It lasted a lot longer than it usually does when placed otherwise. It was pure pleasure to fire it more than a couple or so times. The LOS tool does not seem to be quite perfect. But then maybe I failed to note one blue streak to the guns position.

One of the most important tasks of an effective general is to select an effective staff, command its loyalty, and see that it operates efficiently. Another is to listen, or at least give appropriate attention to the input of his staff and his subordinants. Then there is the need to be acutely aware of the prevailing conditions of battle which only sometimes sinks home by personal observation. Both Patton and Montgomery failed in having political horse sense. They played too much to the gallery instead of giving due regard to the men who asses were ultimately in the political sling, if things went wrong. Their generalship was sufficiently competent to keep their jobs militarily, and their play to the galleries helped them overcome any distaste their military and political bosses may have had to their posturing. Probably any number of guys participating here on the Forum could provide as good a mix of decisions as these two men provided. But the professional qualities they acquired over years of study and experence made their decisions work, You or I most likely could dream up a Market Garden or at least recognise it as a possible coup, when broached by some subordinant, but leading the performance is a very heavy task in leadership and command. That the project came as close as it did to success is quite a measure of the competence, that went into it. That it failed is an object lesson in the dangers of impetuosity and plans laid in such a hurry, and with perhaps a bit of ego riding in the saddle rather than a more considered approach. When the time came both Patton and Montgomery did a decient job of flanking the Bulge. Patton in his anticipation and preparation for the need got a lot of deserved credit. But had he been caught flat footed the result is likely to have been much the same, just a little later. Monty's role was just as efficient, though again his mouth got ahead of his performance. While a single thrust can sometimes penitrate directly to a critically sensitive objective, it also can cause every resource that an apprehrensive enemy can muster to be delivered against it. Monty shared with Patton the strong desire to command a single thrust against the enemy. Eisenhower vascillated between his eventual broad front strategy and the single thrust demands of his two primadonas. Perhaps that is understandable. The slow safety of one and the attractive speed and devastating potiential of the other would vie for support. Monty seems to have had the best of the arguement on his army group being closer to the political objective. He held a level of command better suited to lead such an endevor than Patton. Bradly not Patton held the reins opposite Montgomery and had more resources. However, Patton's 3rd Army and Dever's 6th Army group were adjacent and working a thrust so that using Patton would have involved some heavy reorganization on this the longer route. I can't imagine Patton being able to act alone with Third Army by itself. But it was the place to hit the Germans where they were thinnest. The more rugged terrain may well have nulified that advantage. The campaigns that did take place there showed a much recovered German capability and what ever weakness there was, was compensated by the strength of being on the defensive. SHAEF certainly had its hands full in mullilng over the attractions and dangers. Probably logistics were the straw that screwed any chance of running amuck on a single thrust. A single thrust would have depended on being launched before the German forces could have sufficiently recovered to threaten the effort. The period of abject German weakness passed quickly as the Allies hit the tattered end of its streched logistical tail. The rapid progress of the advance to Germany had not been anticipated with providing adequate resources to support that, and a major attack into the heart of Germany. Had it been planned, it is doubtful that the goods could have been delivered in time anyway. At the point in time when the greatest chance for success was possible, Market Garden was supported and launched in spite of all obsticles. That it had insufficient impetus to succeed had to be a strong lesson for SHAEF. All the arguements about this or that detail being overlooked and that it would have succeeded just if -- is beside the point. Virtually any attack has to be strong enough to overcome unexpected adverse details. Otherwise the margin for success is too narrow, and a commander is depending on luck as the arbiter of success. This may well serve in desparate situations. (eg. the Japanese effort at Leyte Gulf, though a failure it could have succeeded in prolonging the war and was on the verge). A gamble will also safely serve against a weak enemy, though one's own capabilities are thin. It seems to me to be a weakness in the Market Garden strategy, that the Allies did not seem to have the resources to really exploit Market Garden had it succeeded. It was safe to risk, but it was likely only a piecemeal step to victory as were many other subsequent operations. Perhaps at best it would have grabbed a toehold. To an extent it did that anyway, but without anywhere near the potential inconvience to the Germans that holding a bridgehead would have had. Without Antwerp both sides were likely to have petered out along some line of advance and become stalemated, Germans mustering forces to contain the thrust as logistical shortages slowed progress. Admittedly they were better off stopping Market Garden on the south side of the river. With both sides capable of eventually building up to a difficult to answer and dangerous single thrust, it became a risky situation to launch such a thrust, more so for the Germans. Who ever moved first risked his flanks to his opponent's reserve capability. The logistical situation seems to have really been the general in charge. It was possible to support some grinding action along the existing front, but that was difficult enough as it was. I think what both Patton and Montgomery were asking, was for politicians to support an all out effort that would rob either Briton or the US of a primary role in defeating Germany (supposing it would work) and face what that would do to concerted cooperation if it should fail or to post war relations if it should succeed. One war had already been won at the expense of the following peace. Allied cooperation was far more important longterm than fast results, if indeed fast results were the outcome. Comparing Patton and Montgomery, they seem to have been rather alike. Both very competent in their profession, and both capable of impetousity, even in command as well as tongue. I am reminded of Lee biting off more than his army could chew at Gettisburg. Their competence was demonstrated over the long haul when faced with a strong enemy. They took the necessary bites to eat into his defences and upset the integrety of his position. Both successfully pursued the enemy when he was broken, Montgomery pushing the bulk before him and Patton in openfield running. While both men were capable of creating their own difficulties with their mouths, their example was too much for the press, many of their would be historians and their partisan public, who seem to vie for the honor of emulation and contest for having the biggest mouth. They both were dangerous to the German army; the Germans knew it and so respected them. Bradley also a capable and professional general, did not seem to generate strategies as such. He seemed more to take the front as it was and eat away at it being able to recognise an opportunity and move on it occasionally, Faliase not withstanding. Cobra seems just a larger bite, a part of the strategy that was inherent in the Overlord planning. In audicity there is not much evidence that Bradley compared to either of the two rivals. His leaving Falise to Montgomery, when he likely could have mounted some kind of a greater supporting action seems pedestrian in the extreme. If he feared clashing with friendly forces, he could have cut deeper ahead of the retreating Germans complicating their escape if not exactly totally forestalling it. Bradley seems to have been as prone to a kind of deliberate inerta as Monty critics accuse him of being. Stripping away the noise of the crowd, the arm chair generals, and to a large the said generals themselves, they did play their roles and did not blow the responsibility to conduct their armies successfully in victory inspite of all the friction. At least when a Brition pauses at the wrong time, he takes tea and accomplishes something. What is it that an American does? Scratch his ass? From first hand experence at that fine art I can confess its satisfactions, but own up that at least tea has awakening properties and may carry a little nutrition in sugar and creame. It is perhaps the lot of the military mind, which never suffers defeat, to appear so slow and painfully deliberate, foregoing all fantastic oportunities and risks, that only the great generals, being willing to take a risk, so suffer. These matters have been debated throughly by various people far more qualified than I to the point of exhaustion. Suffice it to say that anyone, who holds snap, jingoistic judgements, obviouly has not got very far in studying the matter, if any at all. I can only pose my impressions with a great deal of doubt in their validity. There are others who are far more able to say just where and how our subject generals were competent, and otherwise, and why. All these generals had their good days and bad ones. I have not seen a one of them who was beyond criticism. I look at myself in the performance of my own tasks and a lot of other folks I know in theirs and pause from time to time that we had as good as we had all around. Having found myself in a spot or two as circumstances brought me, I can look back and wish I had done some things differently; yet, all and all those matters were resolved on the positive side due somewhat to my decisions, due to the good offices of others, and some just plain damned good luck, so that all the obsticles were not enough to sink the operation.

Steve has 3969.

I am reminded when I first saw a HE shell explode, the flash, the short, ugly black spurts of smoke running together almost instantly into a great puff, and before it started drifting a little came that sensation that no movie sound system conveys, that whole system shock, along with a doom of sound that speakers fail to duplicate, a sound with the balls of a bull elephant stomping the earth beside your prone ear. All of this at a decient and safe distance. What must it be to be near cowering in a foxhole or hugging the earth?

The original post having been very nicely and adequately addressed, I think it a fine opportunity to remind ourselves of just how competently the general did conduct his armies. That is not to suggest that he did everything to utmost perfection, but those who positivily wallow in the concept that this guy was an absolute stick in the shingle, and an insufferable person to boot, probably hold those notions in support of something else than historical objectivity. I offer the following observations as a strictly personal view. I just finished reading the MacArthur biography, The American Caesar, and came away from that with a more favorable impression of him than previously, without having to repeal many of my complaints. We do all so cherish our complaints, don't we? Nurished by our compliants we do grow tall in our own view. I would hope a simularly enlightening bio on Monty exists. I doubt that cheap shots and blind hero worship could be thereby ended; but, it is nice to think that a source of authoritative information gethered in one place, would be there to assist an open mind. Getting at Monty from a remote position gets a little difficult due to reports that he virtually walked on water, or that he would have lost the war had he not been blocked by American-Anglo opposition, and all points of view in between. Partisanship based on a variety of motivations creates a fog of such thickness that the poor man just disappears underneath the cloud. The British and Commonwealth contribution to the Normandy Campaign was rather more than substantial. That they faced the heavier porportion of the German forces with an army whose human resources had just been about used up is too often conviently overlooked. Yet, on more than one occasion all out efforts were made to take Caen and bring the advance up to schedule at a heavy cost in blood and equipment. Perhaps Montgomery detractors would rather have had those heavy German units shifted to add to those forces facing the American army. Their own already sufficiently difficult and bloody struggle would have been even worse. The criticism could have easily been reversed with Caen falling a little faster and the breakout on the American end of the battle foiled. What if there had not been room to debark and deploy the third army? The happy convienence there would have been that Montygomery was still in command and still available for blame. It seems to me that affairs at Normandy went better than planning anticipated, though that planning failed in detail here and there as it faced an enemy whose job it was to NOT cooperate with the allied plan. The plan though thwarted in detail, was inadvertantly enabled to succeed beyond all dreams. When we say what Monty did with his forces and what the Americans did with theirs, we forget that that the Americans WERE part of Monty's forces; he commanded them too. But he did so with such lightness and respect, that the efforts on the British side have often been seen as separate. The notion that Monty sat doing nothing with with the British-Commonwelth army just does not wash. Their effort was measured in a lot of blood. It appears he did all he might dare do considering his resources. All the devisive controversy that washed up on shore had its roots in national cheerleading, misperceptions, loose mouths, egotism, personalities, a little pig headness, and differing styles of leadership. If one must complain, there is enough blame to go around to cover all the participants, so that making onesided blasts leaves the argument limping and stumbling. This situation was typical within and among all armies across the board. From the national intraservice difficulties to the international. It was simply the human condition made manifest. Some of the most gratifying reading I have found was in the accounts of contacts made at the sharp end as the various combat elements found themselves fighting along side their allies, sometimes intermingled as necessity assigned one to the others command structure. Most of the contriversy occurred where a greater leasure allowed luxuries. Monty's personality put off even a bunch of his own countrymen, but the complaints come from outside his British armies. During the Bulge episode a selected characterization of his entry into American Corps HQs "like Christ clensing the Temple" overlooks the very sympethetic and supportive role that he did play. I doubt that the occasional impatience or differences of concept between him and his American subordanants exceeded those in any other command. If they were inclined to think him a son of a bitch, the difference was in that he was a British son of a bitch, a sentiment which Eisenhour had so perceptively seen as paticularly inappropriate and destructive in North African allied operations. Monty's tidy battlefield propensities sit right along with SHAEF's broad front policy. No plan could have been more audacious than Market Garden. He and Patton vied with one another in desiring the ball for a drive to the goal. They competed for the fuel to attack on their respective ends of the front. Seldom is mentioned the real culprit in the fuel shortage, General Lee, the American in charge of the logistical tail, who squandered precious transportation assets in moving his HQ to Paris against orders and with no consequences from the Supreme Commander. There was pleanty of gas, it just was sitting on the beaches. None to few men in any nation's ranks achieved the status that the principal generals had at that stage of the war by being incompetent idiots. The sword of summery relief had and would continue to weed out the incompetants along with some who prematurely and unfairly judged. Guys like Monty had been tested and found sterling. None of them shown with totally unblimished lights. There is nothing that makes a general shine so well as an enemy who plays to his strengths and leaves his weaknesses untested. And conversly an enemy that can find a crack the armor of the best of generals can make him look rather weak. Monty succeeded better than even he expecetd in drawing German strength to the British wing of the invasion, so his hopes of advance expressed too optimistically for the opposition they faced made him look a little foolish. I can think that the touch of a Mountbatten would have had a greater reception; though there there are a thousand might have beens for all the Allies, who is to say more could have been accomplished? Well, perhaps with all the bigmouths around maybe I should not ask a question like that. There is a lot more to the unfortunant contriversy and I leave it to others to comment upon. Monty certainly did not help the situation at times and often neither did others. It had many and deep roots including relationships in WWI and before. Perhaps, I am too much like Will Rogers in never (well, seldom) meeting a guy I did'nt like. I can think of some who really had a number of bastardly traits, but who still have enriched my little journey. [This message has been edited by Bobbaro (edited 06-07-2000).] [This message has been edited by Bobbaro (edited 06-07-2000).]

I have experenced some difficulty with Ambush markers as they seem to get ignored. Especially the bunkers. Could it be that they get spotted and fired on so they go ahead to defend themselves? Placed in woods I hope them to be hidden, but that may not be the case. I do not understand some of the limits on the distance for setting an ambush marker. That is not to question the rationale, but to simply say I don't understand. In another thread or two a call for standing orders was made. I have felt a wish for that as well, in this area and others. Basically, I do not care for work arounds; they may help, but they make a little break in the spell cast in "reality" and usually don't really work as well as an intentional provision in the system. Oh, what a tangled web to weave in recreating electronic reality.

Yeah, "Steve and Charles here are a few million dollars. Let us come in and make it possible for you to really do wargames with no finicial worries. And we can invest in success. Of course we will own 51% of the business, but you will continue just like you have with out the worries --- (Ha Ha, and next year your contract runs out, and we will boot out your ass and sell to the mass market suckers out there a version they can play without regard to so many inconvient constraints and lots more spectacular visuals, nevermind their historical aspects --- oh, and don't forget to put in the no competition clause.)"

I would expect that the quality of training in the SS units would be influenced first by the inherent concepts inspiring their creation. Then I would suspect that a lot of individual variation of training emphasis would occur depending on leadership and circumstances. So one could not make a blanket and expect it cover all. Even in conventional military units there were variations in training due to some of the same causes. I recall reading of some Divisons in the US army recieving much better training than others because they lucked out and drew a commander, who had a much better concept of real combat vs the book and who had the energy and leadership to see to that quality training quality was conducted. I seem to remember of a couple of divisions whose commander emphasised night attack training which saved many live in later operations through surprise and and other advantages that soldiers so prepaired could achieve. Dupuy in his book setting forth a mathmatical approach to measuring military effectiveness, Understanding War, points out that the 89 division achieved outstanding results and attributed it to leadership particularly in traning. On the other hand some were short changed as their trained personnel were taken off to form other units and replaced with recruits. Others were rushed to combat too hurridly for proper training to take place. The characterization quoted by tss rings very true to me in this context. It need not necessarily be expected to cover the whole SS experence.

Yup, this has been one of the wiser threads. Lots of points to set the old neurons sparking. A normal newspaper article, flawed and unflawed, not too unlike its readers, both first hand and otherwise- and the ripples back and forth across the pond has brought forth a lot of apt observations. I am not too sure which of movie making's two prime objectives comes first, entertainment or money making. Seems like that stick has two ends of which the absence of either one uncreates the stick. This animal is biped and locomotion is lost in the absence of either one. In an upcoming movie yet to be filmed to be entitled The Windtalkers the story's script set in Saipan calls for a GI to kill a poisonous snake. That snakes did not exist on that island does not even occur to the writer, for whom the issues of entertainment are prime. Everyone "knows" that movie snakes are all poisonous. Hell, the same is true of a huge porportion of the population concerning real snakes. It remains to be seen whether that movie indiscretion can be altered in this case. If the director likes it, it will stay. Movie induced fear sells. I was pleased to see the Allen Eckhart reference. His books impressed me to no end. To have history presented in the manner he does it is probably the best possible way to introduce that kind of informantion. It runs the way a grognard would demand of Hollywood. It intertains and appears to maintain a fidelity to the facts in a way that even formal histories might do well to emulate. I think his presentation imbeds into it the human nature of the all the participants in such a way, that makes it unnecessary to have to explicitly draw conclusions about their nature for the reader. The Indians and the Europeans, immigrant and locally born, are just laid out as the record has it, and the record seems plain enough. One puts down a Eckhart book, feeling that these were familiar people, capable of all the stupid, predudicial behaviour and thinking as well as that of the practical, mundane day to day life sustaining acitvities, and on occasion nobility that one finds going on presently. This is the way history is for the historian as one extracts from the primary and often tedious, mouldy, and difficult sources, those glimmers and insights into the past that build a comprehensive vision of what was, without the tedium of the search and without the cloak of deadly boring text and uninspired classwork. Praise be to those few, those blessed ect. who make the story come alive for the rest of us in or out of a class. By the way, on the Patriot movie, the makers did have the grace to change the names of the historical characters to a sort of parapharase version in recognition that their product was not history. There is no Tarleton in the movie. His character goes by another name which only evokes an impression of the orignal - for those who know enough to notice. One thing I have never understood is why most of the story tellers, Hollywood or otherwise, fail to comprehend that the factual story was generally and often more entertaining than their altered product when messing around with the historical. In answer to my own question, I can see the constraints of time and the medium and the mispercecption that their audience was incapable a better intellectual response than low level reflexes. We all know that even educated and well read people are capable of responding to Hollywood's appeal to less than the most sophisticated in humanity through our own personal experences. We find ourselves as succeptable to the primative appeal, as does the cat's wandering attention, instantly fixed by the flutter of a feather. I suppose in the art of the movie no less than music and literature, cliches reign. It is the nature of man himself. I find it difficult to distinguish much difference in so much of it, classical or otherwise, as motiefs are borrowed, stolen or anyhow repeated. Given the clumsiness of most of us in the performing skills, we just cannot let go of our fascination with that which we do not possess, that a lot of well performed drivel is deemed wonderful - for a while. Buying the sizzle not the steak. I think nothing serves any better than Monty, although others serve as well, to shine light on that facet of human nature that rallys each to his own self, family, clan, village, flag, etc. He has struck as bright a spark from the flint as any steel ever has. Both in the record of the time and in the secondary evolutions, this guy has elicited such a **** storm of ego and counter ego that one hardly trusts any account in trying to get close to the reality. He has served not only as a great study in military leadership, but also as a great opportunity to watch human nature at work in those who worked with him, and later those who expressed their opionion about his role in the war. It seems to me that those at the poles in the matter are the least supportable. Leadership comes in many forms. Often the occasion more than the man determines which kind it the best. Poor humanity does well to embrase all who better their lot. This regardless of the fact that a particular hero may have his imperfections. I am one American, who is grateful for Monte, that he was there, an effective allied general to do that job. Was there better? There usually always is, as well as a far numerically superior worse. The same could be said about others in that war. Partisanship here only obscures the necessary understanding. Is a hero ever as great as potrayed - just ask a hero. We all have assholes. It is part of our nature. When you especially need one, and it performs well, and you think about it; you almost can feel an affection for the old fellow. It gains a nobility through an effectiveness that often fails other parts, which may have substitutes or backups. And though it may occasionally offend, we do value it. Which puts me in mind of the perpetrator of another thread of current interest on the Forum. It is not only the impact of the media, electronic, auditory, and printed that often impairs the learning process, there is the diploma; it also can distort by conveying authenticity undeserved. I am mindful of a HISTORY teacher, who was visiting with her class at the local National Museum of the Pacific War (a facillity of the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, but the only one in the U.S. so devoted) --- anyway, the teacher made reference to World War Eleven (II). I am sure she did manage to convey to her students in the course of her work valuable information. However, one begins to understand the very high mountain of attainment it is, to have to raise each individual human born on this earth from primative one celled organism to civilized, informed citizenship, a struggle his ancestors and parent generation, dead and still present, have yet to perfect, though they have been at it for thousands of years. What a task, to recreate in one individual in one lifetime, the accumulated civilization of multitudes over eons. That it fails is not the wonder, but that it has any success at all; even if it were in only one case.

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Stupid things happen when one writes in a condition of heavy post bed time traumatic eyelid condition. Of course replys don't appear injected inbetween older items, but always at the current end. (slapping my own face) So much for appearing in context. Wiped this one out. It did not make sense here. [This message has been edited by Bobbaro (edited 06-06-2000).]

In a scenario with a lot of vehicles and soft-slick ground it could happen quite a bit. And just one time in a critical situation could be just one time too often.

Yeah, Stuka even my PIII 500 has slowed some. The VOT Allies attacking me have used smoke fairly effectively smoking my LOS when the Panther comes in. Knock a Sherman or two on the knoggin and here comes the smoke. Forces me to either push through it or evade it. Actually I have found my VOT German 81's damned near useless. They don't want to accept the Company Commander's targets, though they are in his line of sight and if they have line of sight they will pick their own whether I point out anther in their LOS. And the preregistered target is often ignored as well. Being in command and control by the old man seems to make them onery. And they are worse without. Their smoke is so pitifully supplied that you are lucky to get one good positioning out of the total. I sure hope design your own will allow defenders a healther supply on defense.