Andreas

Additionally on the 'not enough tanks' issue - in autumn 1944 the Germans assembled a large number of tank formations in Hungary and they acted extremely successfully - but there was not enough infantry to exploit the mobile formations' successes. What the Germans were really lacking was infantry, in terms of combat arms. In particular infantry with some tactical and operational movement capacity at higher than slog speed, but in reality any infantry would have done, as long as it could defend itself successfully against tanks. But the total neglect of their infantry arm did a lot to finish them.

Further to what Greg was saying: FMSO - Soviet Military Deception As can be seen from this, it appears that it was less a matter of not having enough tanks for the Germans, more one of not using those present correctly. But as Stefan once pointed out - thanks to von Mellenthin we all know that L'vov was lost because 8.PD took a wrong turn when committed...

The armor wsa moved north just in time for the Soviets to launch their attack against AGNU and knock them back too. Lack of armor was a problem for the Germans, after Kursk, on any and every front. </font>

Steve I am not sure if the Germans would not have been able to equally draw on the whole manpower pool. Specialised formations were supplied through specialised depots, not the general ones. E.g. Beobachtungsersatzabteilung 6 in Lemgo served at least three Beobachtungsabteilungen (6, 26 and 30 are the ones I know of), and was part of a larger artillery depot. I presume the same would apply to pioneers etc. who would go through special branch depots. The system broke down after summer 1944 that is correct, but until then it managed reasonably well. It is a common misperception that most/all replacements went to new formations, while the formations in the line were bled dry. This is not correct - by summer 1944 the German infantry formations in the east were at full, or over-strength, on the reduced tables following the 1942 revisions. The net increase in troops in the east in early 1944 is quite remarkable, and a significant comeback from the nadir of winter 42/43. Achieved by disbanding a lot of formations, and e.g. assembling them in Korpsabteilungen. At the same time as the system was building up the strength in the west. Where it failed was under the simultaneous hits in the east and the west in summer 1944. But then again - I am 120% certain that the UK or US system would also have failed in providing 1.2m replacements in the space of three months, regardless of the depth of the pool. IOW - faced with the same strain, they would also have broken. They would not have been able to drain the pool quickly enough to cope with this. The German system managed to bounce back one last time in late 1944, but it could never make good the bloodletting of the summer.

Stefan Later in the war a lot of soldiers were drafted into the Waffen-SS. Wittmann and Barkmann however were volunteers from before the war.

Steve - as RMC points out, this is really not correct. The German system was almost certainly superior to the US system, and quite comparable from my reading to the British system, since both were based on a column replacement (called 'Draft' in British, and 'Marschbatallion' in German lingo). Under this replacements were grouped together under the command of an officer, and would be fed into a division as a unit. Sometimes several hundred men in one go. Also, the ideal German solution was to have a Feldersatzbatallion (Field training battalion) present in a division, which would allow new arrivals with no combat experience to be trained in the combat area before sending them to the line units - this deteriorated very quickly after 1941, but as soon as possible attempts were made to revive them in a period of calm. I am not sure your view of bleeding them dry and then taking them out is correct for non-armoured units. It is my understanding that infantry divisions stayed in the line, or in the immediate rear, whereever possible, and were rebuilt there. Armoured formations are a different matter, and since they should not stay in the line anyway, this makes sense. The German system had drawbacks, such as the regional association of the depot battalions whence reinforcements were received. This meant that e.g. AG North received more replacements than other Army Groups, because it was based on units from East Prussia primarily. So the distribution of replacements was not according to needs as much. But I am certain that a study of replacement systems would find the ideal German system to be better than the Allied ones, and the real system still better than the US system and on a par with the British.

I have a discussion on this topic ongoing on the AHF here. In the time 6 June to 8 July 12 SS lost 84 tanks as total write offs (TWOs). In the time to 3rd July it claimed 144. So even if we accept these claims as kills and add a few to cover the time out to 8th July, the kill ratio is going to be less than 2:1: This is excluding the kills by the Tigers of 101 schwere SS Panzer.

Armour was shifted into AGC from AGNU, but it arrived too late to stop the breakthrough. It arrived in time to slow the Red Army down though, and eventually contributed to stopping it on the Vistula.

Well, apparently not the same, since 12th SS was not wiped out anywhere, except in Dramameier's tearful eulogy to it, if we are to believe Reynolds.

My understanding is that the whole cadre of 12th SS was experienced, but I stand to be corrected on that as well. I am aware of the fact that some junior officers in Canadian formations had been to Africa and Italy (for a limited time, inlcuding Simonds), but I am reasonably certain that they still had nowhere near the amount of junior or senior leaders with combat experience that the Germans could field. Especially if you calculate it in man-years, instead of doing a head count.

Just short of 20,000 I believe. Depends on how you count them. Probably need to add to that personnel posted to Strafbatallionen who then got killed on Himmelfahrtskommandos (lit: 'Ascension Missions')

Well, you have drawn out just the things I was focussing on as well. FWIW, I also do think that Wilbeck's kill ratios are upper envelope stuff.

To get back on topic... I think this is overstating the case somewhat. 12th SS-HJ was built around a cadre of experienced officers and NCOs from 1st LSSAH. Combine this with fanaticism of a fully indoctrinated youth (18 year olds in 1944 would have been 9 year olds when Hitler took power, giving them exposure to 9 years of the racist Übermensch rubbish that passed for education in Germany during the time; and I seriously doubt there were any 16-year old privates in the division in Normandy, although I stand to be corrected on this) and a long training period, and you should get a fairly effective formation, especially considering that it was overstrength, and lavishly equipped. The Canadians on the other hand did not benefit from having a set of experienced junior and senior leaders, while in the case of the US I can not comment on whether 1st ID suffered from too much exposure to combat, in the way some people suspect the UK 50th and 7th Armoured did.

Got a source? </font>

You can read this thread for further info. On the 3" mortar, I do believe the correct number is not 42, but 54 (6 per bn x 3 bn x3 rgts), which is quite shocking, considering they were British. But what do I know? Ask John. All the best Andreas

Not flukey - just good shooting. Targetting the turret ring was SOP for German light ATG and tank gun crews when faced with heavy tanks where they could not defeat the armour. I suspect that other nations'armies cottoned on to this as well.

I do not think that view is correct, since it presumes that the Allies knew of the disagreement between German commanders. Did they? If you get the opportunity in war to take out an enemy army HQ, I would think that anyone would jump at it, regardless of short-/long-term considerations. That it was there, and the Allies knew where 'there' was strikes me as the most likely reason for the attack.

Ah well. I just have to send you another game which will not end in your favour then.

Are those 426 runners? Also, while there may have been tank parity, the allies could also field hundreds of AT guns, each of which was capable of dealing with any German tank, including Tigers.

Yes, a lot, thanks very much! BTW - you were the one who got me to shell out the ridiculous amount of money I bought the 32MB for.

Geyr von Schweppenburg survived the attack and lived to old age, 92. He died in 1974. Generals.dk

Thanks a lot again for all the advice, and thanks for the kind words DB. It appears that the 8500 is no longer on sale. Since it is unclear if the 9000 could do the job on the current game, and the Mac situation in general is totally up in the air following the Intel announcement, I guess I will just get myself the processor upgrade, stick with the 7200, and spend the money saved on French red with a view to produce my own display of psychedelic colours in my head. Unfortunately I am thoroughly unclear about the CMx2 situation, and at this stage I just want to get a machine that does the job with CMBB/AK for the foreseeable future - I worry about CMx2 when we come closer to it. All the best Andreas

All things considered, things went extremely well for the Germans in Normandy. The Germans managed to hold on so long because the defense multiplied the superior aspects of their weapons (range and hitting power) nicely, while avoiding the problems (immobility of tank guns, lack of infantry to take and hold ground, exposure of large formations in the open where they fall victim to artillery). It also allowed them to deny the Allies the knowledge of their exact positions, and avoided things like Panthers being shot up like ducks in a row, because of having to expose their thin side armour. As happened at Norrey, and again to Wittmann and his Tigers at Cintheaux. Had they attacked with all those nice Panzers it would have been over that much quicker.

It depends on which nation you are looking at, andd during which time period. Germany early war: Regiment includes: 1x AT gun company (37/50mm, ISTR 12 guns) 1x regimental gun company (6x 75mm 2x 150mm) 3x infantry battalion includes 3x rifle company 1x heavy company includes 3x sMG platoon 1x mortar platoon US late war: Regiment includes 1x Cannon company (6x 105mm) 3x Infantry battalion includes 3x Rifle company 1x support company (HMG, AT, Mortars) Commonwealth 1944 NWE Brigade includes 3x Rifle Battalion includes 4x Rifle Company 1x Support Company includes 6x 3"mortar 6x 6-pdr ATG 1x Carrier platoon 1x Wasp FT platoon Not a lot of time now, so there will be lots of errors in detail, but you should get the picture.

I second that.