Andreas

While I have a lot of time for Colonel Frieser (who is not a mere member of the MGFA but the head of the WW2 section, and author of the formidable 'Blitzkrieg-Legende' which is now available in English at the USNI), I don't agree with this reduction, and I can only hope that it is due to journalistic license with a more comprehensive analysis of what Col. Frieser originally wrote. It is quite clear that material superiority by itself did not help battlefield success. Col. Frieser has demonstrated that himself in his analysis of Fall Gelb in 'Blitzkrieg Legende'. Other examples of this abound, e.g. in Africa 1940 (UK/Italy), or Barbarossa. The contribution of high command in Soviet successes after 1943 is clearly immense, and very commendable. The organisation of strategic offensive operations throughout the summer of 1944 shows that quite clearly. All the best Andreas

As additional information - the 3 TWOs of Prokhorovka include only LSSAH and DR divisions of II.SS-PzKp. SS-T was not involved directly in Prokhorovka according to Töppel. What all this has to do with plunder is beyond me. All the best Andreas

Up to you to bring the discussion back on topic instead of complaining. Since the great work of Roman Töpppel 'Kursk - Mythen und Legenden einer Schlacht' (MSc thesis at Dresden University, available only in German directly from the author) the total German losses are known with some certainty for Prokhorovka, and with lesser but reasonable certainty for the Soviets. I believe I have previously quoted this on this forum. Suffice to say they were nowhere near 400 for the Germans and probably also much less for the Soviets at Prokhorovka. In fact, they were nowhere near 400 for the total German offensive phase. TWOs (total write offs) for the Germans at Prokhorovka were 3 (three - not a typo). For the Soviets TWOs are estimated ca. 200. TWOs for the German offensive phase are 248 German (150 tanks and 11 Stug in AG South, where Prokhorovka was fought), 1,749 Soviet. For the whole eastern front July and August TWOs number 1,331 German, 8,125 Soviet. So not only did Prokhorovka not happen as Paul Schmidt, aka Carell and Rotmistrov tell us (wow, there's a surprise), in fact the epic battle of Kursk that broke the German back in the east was nothing of the sort. What the German tanks were lost to is not possible to say from the records used, which are AG level. I suggest that is another research project that someone can get a first degree on. Do a search so that when you come to have a discussion about Kursk, you are at least prepared. * All the best Andreas * In fairness, I did not post it in this much detail before.

Krautman said the Germans 'did want to conquer' - that is what I reacted to. I think a war of plunder is a better way to describe it than a war of conquest, for reasons outlined above. I fully agree with you that finding a single term is probably not possible. At the same time, journalists (maybe particularly so in German) seem to feel the need to go for either 'Eroberungsfeldzug', 'Angriffskrieg', or maybe more often now 'Raubzug'. None of which is an adequate description. That goes without saying. That was done with tongue firmly in cheek, just to put on the record that your assumption was wrong. I think so, based on Krautman's questioning of the term 'plunder'. I get at least antsy (to use a JonS term) when the whole sordid undertaking is dressed up nicely by using kind language, even unintentionally, as Krautman has done. Maybe, but less words, even if less accurate, have a tendency to win out over more, when it comes to describe things and events. Call it a linguistic version of Ockhjam's Razor. Why not?

Or, we could just leave off trying to see whether anyone here is a Nazi apologist trying to soften what historically occurred, and think about better terms for the murderous, genocidal wars of aggression and plunder waged by Germany within Europe without using so many words. All the best Andreas

con·quer P Pronunciation Key (kngkr) v. con·quered, con·quer·ing, con·quers v. tr. 1. To defeat or subdue by force, especially by force of arms. 2. To gain or secure control of by or as if by force of arms: scientists battling to conquer disease; a singer who conquered the operatic world. 3. To overcome or surmount by physical, mental, or moral force: I finally conquered my fear of heights. See Synonyms at defeat. Russophile seems to be disassociating the act of conquest (technically, taking control by force) from the (in the case of the Germans in the USSR) associated acts of genocide, plunder, and germanicization. Perhaps his definition of conquest includes more than just taking control by force. All the best Andreas

It's in the game. Both things, Soviets getting better, Germans getting worse. All the best Andreas

I think that 'war of conquest' makes the whole thing sound to grand, as if it had something noble to it. Fact is that plunder played a major role (at all levels, from supplying the Wehrmacht up), and the ultimate aim (ethnic cleansing and re-population) were different from a conquest in that there was no aim of conquering the people, but only the land. In the same way that plunder is inadequate, since it does not capture the aim of not just stealing and then leaving, but stealing, killing, and staying. I prefer it though because it has nothing noble about it, and I think that is more fitting. My guess is the original German was 'Raubzug'? All the best Andreas

I think 'plunder' describes it quite well. Also check some of the detail in the plan here. All the best Andreas

Wymen, shmymen. Does it have sharks with friggin' laserbeams on their heads? All the best Andreas

Are you talking about Flavion here? In which case I do not agree with this description of the battle based on what I have read. All the best Andreas

Steve I do not think that 'acceptable losses' is 'another factor'. It is key to the debate that is being had, in my view. Nobody doubts that the US can win the wars it has chosen to fight. They could win them by sending grunts out with no vehicles at all, armed with nothing but slings and arrows (as long as they keep all the comms and the heavy weaponry in the back). It'll be bloody, but they'll win it. That is not the point. I do not think anyone would seriously suggest that without the Abrams/Bradley team, the US would have 'lost' the war in Iraq. The key point in the current combat environment is whether the trade-off of armour against mobility*, which is all about acceptable losses in my view, is correct. Another closely-related debate then is whether the trade-off of armour vs. boots on the ground is correct - IOW is it correct to emphasise force protection at the expense of getting the job done? More brutally put - if being well protected means that the task is less well executed, maybe it is better to accept higher losses as a consequence of lower protection in order to achieve the final goal quicker/at all. All the best Andreas *I think the trade-off against situational awareness is a bit more artificial - for the money to procure Strykers one could presumably digitalise a lot of Bradleys to give them the same situational awareness?

The theory is being tested right now. It would appear that for some situations, it can. For others it can not. But the concept that is behind this is as sound today as it was back in Sun Tzu's day. The force that can maneuver better will likely win, even if inferior in some ways. The Germans proved that in 1940 and, tactically at least, all the way up until the end of the war.</font>

And an excellent book if I may add. Mies </font>

Instead of Club Med, we now get Club Seal. I think that rocks, and so do any number of mentally brutalised Doom players. All the best Andreas

Time for that thread again... All the best Andreas

Send me an email you Wiesel. If Ninja's had email accounts, they would check them. That would be sweet, and by sweet I mean totally cool. All the best Andreas

True. I was just thinking about guns, since they can do some things that mortars can't when firing over open sights. I agree to some extent - leaving out medium artillery was a shame. I really don't see much of a need for the 15cm class, and none for anything above that (even though at Uman the Germans used 21cm mortars in direct fire against the Soviet remnants). I am still unconvinced about the value of including direct-fire rockets (especially since early war against lightly armoured vehicles we would be talking primarily about the 82mm Katyusha), other than that it looks impressive. All the accounts about them that I have read say that they were not seen as a great danger, after the initial shock wore off. Too inaccurate and not lethal enough I guess. All the best Andreas

Good luck. To put this in context, Martin is the president of BFC, and Charles the programmer of CM. Sergei is a Finn, and therefore not relevant. All the best Andreas

I guess that Beevor looked at the pictures of these things, saw the tracks, concluded that they were SP, and wrote it in his book. I would replace 'Perhaps' with 'It is unfortunately about as likely as the sky caving in that' All the best Andreas

From all my readings of Soviet officer memoirs it is quite apparent that both 122mm and 152mm guns (more the former, since these were divisional guns) were used to fire over open sights. Defensively the guns were to be placed in such a way that they could fire over open sights to defend the battery position, and offensively they would be used to support attacks by smashing German fortifications. 203mm I can believe in exceptional situations like city fights (think of Aachen where the US Army brought SP 155mm forward to deal with German defenses), but not really regularly. Far too valuable for that I would have thought. BFC made a decision not to include heavy artillery above the standard medium divisional gun. Unfortunately for the Soviets that means the 76mm, since the 122mm was their heavy gun. Regimental artillery is included on both sides, but again the Soviets get the short end of the stick, since they do not have an equivalent to the 15cm sIG33 on the regimental level. Both sides do have heavy AT, and medium AA as on-board pieces, as the upper envelope of what is modelled. Regarding Katyushas firing directly at attacking armour - I have a hard time imagining that this would do real damage. It may still leave an attacking tank formation in disarray in the real world by smashing vision blocks and removing antennas, but these things are unfortunately not modeled in CMx1 games. Maybe the odd mobility kill. Shrug - would not be high on my list of 'stuff I think is crucial'. I'd rather have seen the 10cm K18, SP 88mm HTs, or Soviet tanks being able to tow guns, but I am weird that way. All the best Andreas

Bah, I would never have contributed to that thread had you not failed in your duty to send me my turns then. BTW - I do not think that JonS is a particularly happy camper in that contraption you sent me for testing. I think the flower of German manhood has already been ground to squishy bits under the tracks of my tank armada, and the remaining debris of said manhood will shortly follow. All the best Andreas

Except for the south. But I have heard it will rise again. All the best Andreas

Not sure if this was posted before: www.9thrtr.com Contains the war diary of 9th RTR (a Churchill unit) from June 44 to June 45 with maps, the full text of the book 'Tank Tracks' by Peter Beale, and numerous other goodies. Nice scenarion material in there. All the best Andreas

err... I thought you owed me a turn...