Andreas

I added a new page for Cory Runyan's scenarios (four of them). The descriptions are not corrected yet, but I will try and do that over the next few days. Suffice to say they are all large CMBB scenarios. If you have more of his scenarios, please email them to me. I have also added three CMBO/CMAK conversions made from my old CMBO scenarios '49th Recce', 'Maltot', and 'Le Plessis Grimoult' by Kingfish. Remember that the screenshots have no relation to the battle. They are just there to tart the pages up. Enjoy! All the best Andreas

I added a new page for Cory Runyan's scenarios (four of them). The descriptions are not corrected yet, but I will try and do that over the next few days. Suffice to say they are all large CMBB scenarios. I have also added three CMBO/CMAK conversions made from my old CMBO scenarios '49th Recce', 'Maltot', and 'Le Plessis Grimoult' by Kingfish. Remember that the screenshots have no relation to the battle. They are just there to tart the pages up. Enjoy! All the best Andreas

You can read numbers in German, I guess. This should set you up for the OOB in case you need that. 100. Jaeger @ LdW All the best Andreas

There was a site, but it is gone. I don't think you can find the ratings now, but maybe try Google cache. All the best Andreas

Don't know what a typical Red Army nurse looks like, but I would not make any judgement based on either Lyuda or indeed that footage. YMMV. All the best Andreas

I know. All the best Andreas

I don't know which picture there was to get. You linked a discussion that lacked a serious analysis of Bacque's claims. I provided such an analysis, to give you (and other readers) the opportunity to make up their mind. If I think that what you linked is "rightwingholocaustdenialilovethebrownshirtswithmoustacheandblackshinybootsgermanspeakingwe gotogetussomelebensraum-propaganda", you'll notice, don't worry. Where's the problem? All the best Andreas

Debunking of Bacque's nonsense for painfbat. From the AHF p. 65 2. The sole source proffered for this assertion is Bacque's Appendix 2. 3. Appendix 2 contains facsimiles of two Tables, IX and X, taken from the typed manuscript of "Medical History, European Theater of Operations" to be found in the National Archives. I have no question but that the Tables are authentic. They are based on a survey by the U.S. Army Medical Corps in the European Theater in may-June 1945. 4. As indicated in my prior post, the caption to Table IX states that it is a comparison of (a) the number of [hospital] admissions and ( death rates per 1000 per annum for POWs in the ASCZ, with ETO (less UK) Troops [ie essentially US Troops]. Table X is a listing by causes and number of deaths of the "Chief Causes of Death Due to Disease in ABSZ Prisoner of War Enclosure For Six Week Period Ending 15 June 1945". 5.Table IX shows a number of 2,754 POW deaths from disease and a 34.2 death rate per 1000. In light of Table IX's caption, one would think that the 34.2 death rate per 1000 was a per annum rate. The caption says so. [Forum member], however, disputes this and insists that the stated rate was only for the 6 weeks reviewed, which, if true, would elevate the annual death rate to 296.5 per 1000, or 29.65%. ( 52/6 = 8.67 x34.2 = 296.5) BUT: (a) Bracque himself states that the rates per 1000 shown in Table IX are annual and not 6 week rates: [my emphasis]Appendix 2, p.211. ( If the rates shown are on a 6 week basis, then, for example, the POW rate of 5,003 per 1000 for total hospital admissions would be 43,376 per 1000 per annum (52/6 = 8.67 x 5,003 = 43,376), or 43+ admissions for each POW per year, or about 1 every 8-9 days!!! That stikes me as far beyond the stretch of credibility. © Equally incredible would be the resulting death rate for US Troops. If the 3.8 death rate per 1000 shown for US troops excluding battle casualties were computed on a 6 weeks basis, then the total US death rate per annum would be 32.95 per 1000 per annum, or 3.3% - many times higher than the comparable figures supplied in one of David thompson's previous posts. (d) In my own albeit limited [iv'e only been around 75 years] experience, unless specifically otherwise indicated, "rates" when quoted are generally understood to be per annum rates. E.G. "I got a 6% interest rate on my mortgage!" (e) Conclusion: [Forum Member]'s old dog still just wont hunt. 6. One would also think from looking at Table IX that the number of hospital admissions and deaths shown are those which actually took place during the 6 week period in question. That seems to me the fair implication of its caption and the arrangement of of the table that follows. But this would demolish Bacque's assertion of an over 30% POW death rate and so he argues that no, the numbers of hospital admissions and deaths shown are not the numbers actually experienced during the 6 week period, but rather those 6 week numbers projected forward throughout the year. So that, for example, the number of 37,713 POW hospital admissions for injuries shown on Table IX are the projected admissions which would occur for the entire year if one were to apply the shown rate of 468 per thousand per annum to the population of POWs surveyed. 7. By cobbeling up that theory, Bacque can play mathmetical mumbo-jumbo and produce a POW death rate of over 30%. Here's how: Bacque first purports to compute the number of POWs in the study by taking his 37,713 assumed hospital admissions per year and dividing that number by the 468 per thousand annual rate stated in Table IX. This results in a computed POW study population of 80,583. Well OK, but so what? If you consider the 2,868 total number of POW deaths shown on Table IX as a projection for the total deaths for the entire year, then if the population of the study is 80,563 the annual death rate is only 3.56% (2,868/ 80,563 = 0.0356, or 35.6 per 1000, as shown on Table IX.) 8. Ah, but wait! Although according to Bacque the POW hospital admission numbers reflect projections for the entire year, the POW death numbers do not! How so? Well, in effect Bacque maintains that the "annual projected" 2,868 POW death total shown on Table IX is simply phony. He gets there by looking at Table X, which shows a total of 2,304 deaths from disease during the 6 week period from the 12 chief causes listed, and which, if you project them out for a full year, results in a total of 19,968 annual deaths from disease. That of course is much better, because against a study population of 80,563 a total of 19,968 deaths per year gives you an annual death rate of 24.78%. 9. But we are still not quite at the over 30% rate. How to get there? It's simple - dredge up a Table 23 included in a 1969 Article published in the History of Preventative Medicine in Word War II which shows the number of POW deaths from disease during the same 6 weeks as 2,754 which when added to the 114 deaths from injury and battle casualty comes to a total death tole of 2,868. When annualized and applied to a study population base of 80,563 the result is a total death rate of 30.86% (52/6 = 8.67 x 2,868 = 24,866/ 80,563 = .3086) 10. But wait! Table IX shows the same number of POW deaths from disease as does Table 23 from the 1969 Article - doesn't that suggest that all numbers in Table IX are actual numbers experienced for the 6 week period? Of course not, silly! That would mean that Bacque's computation of the size of the POW population underlying the study was all wrong and we couldn't get to our 30% plus death rate. We would be back to that 3.56% rate which, although pretty bad, certainly wouldn't sell any books at all. No, the explanation is simple: It's a case of falsification, suppression of facts, cover up!!! That should surely sell some books! BUT: (a) There is nothing whatsoever in Table IX that suggests that the numbers stated are anything other than those actually experienced during the 6 week period reviewed, and certainly no hint that they might be projected annual totals. If the latter was the case, surely the author would have so indicated. ( If the numbers stated are annual projection of 6 week actuals, then the figures for US Troops simply make no sense. Let's test Bacque's technique for determining the size of the POW population underlying the study(see 7. above) to determine the size of the US Troops in the ETO European Theater of Operations. The US hospital admissions are shown on Table IX for injuries are 31,070; divide that by the 101 rate per thousand per annum shown and the result is a US troop count of 307,624 in the entire ETO in May - June of 1945. I don't know what the exact number actually was, but it was many times the result of applying Bacque's approach. © Let's test it just once more to make sure the first wasn't a fluke. Take the 1,162 total US Troop deaths shown and divide it by the total US Troop death rate of 4.1 per 1000 per year. Here we get an even more lidicrous result of 283, 415 for the US Troop comliment in the ETO. (d) Bacque notices the absurd results produced by application of his methodology to the US TRoop figures, but brushes them away as either statistically unreliable or based on a different survey. And anyway, so what: Appendix 2, at p.211. 11. I find it passing strange for a historian to attack the credibility of the only documentary source he has for the theorem he is proposing, but I suppose there is something to the saying that a drowning man will clutch at a sword. As a lawyer, I've been caught myself a few times in desperation to find an argument to save a hopeless case. But I don't think it says much for the integrity of a historian. 13. It seems tolerably clear to me that both [Forum Member] and James Bacque in their different ways have approached Table IX "bassackwards" in the parlance often employed in this part of the world. If you just hone up and apply Occam's well known razor by simply accepting the Table for what it clearly says it is all internal inconsistencies and contradictions vanish into thin air, and one is still left with a shameful 3.56% annual POW death rate, which the Table itself deplores by pointing out that it is nearly 9 times that of US Troops. The only inconsistency is that the POW population derived by applying the various rates per 1000 per annum to the various numbers given the result in each case hovers around 700,000, and that disagrees with a POW population for the study of 70,000 which appears somewhere in the text of the study (which Bacques fails to set out.) Well, its not too hard for me to imagine a tired typist missing a zero - I made the identical mistake on one of my previous posts, and although I'm a superantiquated two finger hunt and peck typist, I at least like to think that others may also be capable of making mistakes too. 14. But then of course without allegations of a shockingly high death rate, outrageous conduct at the highest levels of government, rampant falsifications, suppression of evidence, coverups - how is a book supposed to sell? 15. The above is BORING beyond belief, and I solemly vow that this is absolutely, definitely, finally, without reservation, cross my heart and hope to die, stick a needle in my eye, my very last post on this topic! (Unless, of course, I am once again overwhelmed by temptation.) Regards, [signed]</font>

Found something in Haupt 'Army Group North'. Basically a restatement of what Carell has written (railed in as first regiment of 81.ID (Major-General Schopper), detrained at Toropets and Andreapol, immediately sent north without winter clothing and equipment), and my guess is that it is based on the same sources. He states that the KG of IR 189 consisted of the regiment under Colonel Hohmeyer (who was posthumously promoted to Major General), II./AR181 under Lt.Col. Proske (MIA), and 3./Pi-Btl. 181. 40 men of II./AR 181 returned, and 1,100 KIA including Colonel Hohmeyer were found later in a forest near Okhvat. All the best Andreas

Okay, I did some more research. Sources used are Leeb 'Notes and Situation Assessments from two World Wars' (in German), and Erickson, 'Road to Stalingrad', as well as Ziemke, 'Moscow to Stalingrad'. Nothing specific about IR 189. Especially the lack of info in Leeb is depressing. IR189 was not the only regiment destroyed there, another was IR 416 from 123. ID, and IR 418 was heavily damaged (or the other way round), at least according to von Leeb's notes, which end with his resignation on Jan. 17. IR 189 is only ever referred to as 1/3 of 81. ID. It was probably railed into the sector on or just after 29 December. Then it went off the train at Andreapol, and to all intents and purposes just vanished into thin air without even figuring in the narrative of the AG commander (who concerned himself down to regimental level). Quite depressing. I can at this stage only recommend getting a hold of the relevant pages of II.AK and 16. Armee, as well as AG N war diaries. All the best Andreas

They were cheap, and maybe of higher utility than Moisin Nagant rifles. All the best Andreas

I checked the BA-MA website. The diary of II. AK may not help them, if that was the command under which 81. ID worked. They need the diary of whoever was in command of the Toropets sector. Short bit on the larger battle Maps - Alex, the webmaster here maybe helpful, he is certainly always very willing to provide info to me when I ask him about obscure engagements. I recommend Google search for "Toropets January 1942", that will give a lot of hits. There is also an article on RAS, VIZH Issue 1, 1988. All the best Andreas

Towed AT guns. That was what the TD regiments consisted of throughout the war. The SPG formations were AFAICR not called tank destroyer, but assault gun. All the best Andreas

Interesting story. I'll have a dig through my sources, but I can not imagine to find much on it there. If the survivor was in 3rd company, that would have been 1st battalion (3./IR189 = I./IR189). The German Corps war diary maybe in existence at the BA-MA, the war diary of the regiment certainly not, and the war diary of the division probably won't mention what happened to IR189 since it was not with them at the time. All the best Andreas

IR 189 was fighting as an independent KG with II./AR 181 in the Dubno-Toropets sector of AG Centre. The rest of the division was near Staraja Russa in the AG North sector. IR 189 was destroyed there in Jan 1942, and not reformed until 1943. All the best Andreas

Below the info on ammunition load from Lexikon der Wehrmacht: Translating the relevant bits: Until 1941 every rifleman had to carry one loading strip (5 rounds?) of SmK or SmK(h) (=tungsten core) ammunition out of the 45 rounds they had on the man. After 1941 the SmK was pooled with the machine guns. For the squad lMG, at least 50 rounds out of 2,500 (2%) were SmK or SmK(h). These were in a dedicated belt-drum. This means that tactically, when the squad encountered light AFVs, they could switch the ammo to all SmK, assuring that if the rounds lay on target, they would achieve multiple penetrations. So basically, all MG 34/42, including squad lMG should have the SmK rounds in the game. SmK - penetrates 10mm at 100m SmK(h) - penetrates 14mm at 100m Primary use against armoured firing slits of bunkers, fired by machine guns. Below production numbers for the first quarter 1939 from Lexikon der Wehrmacht: 471.136.995 s.S.-Geschoß 48.550.065 S.m.K.-Geschoß (8%) 40.213.000 S.m.K.-Leuchtspurgeschoß (Tracer)(6.6%) 36.991.000 l.S.-Geschoß 4.051.000 l.S.-Leuchtspur-Geschoß 7.112.500 S.m.K.(H)-Geschoß (1.2%) 608.054.560 Gesamt In total just under 16% of the rifle ammunition produced in the first quarter 1939 was SmK in its variants. Further info here: http://www.waffeninfo.net/mun_8x57_02.php Although I have serious doubts about the 20mm penetration claimed for SmK(h) at 500m. All the best Andreas [ April 06, 2006, 05:24 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

Assuming they've already printed a good number of these, what else did you suspect they would answer? All the best Andreas

To elaborate on that post (the missus was getting in the way of me posting), this means that the MG34/42 was not firing rifle ammo, it was firing armour piercing ammunition designed in WW I, and its performance in CM is basically correct, although I won't vouch for performance at range, since I have not tested it. This armour piercing ammo could, according to the sources I have seen, penetrate 12 (or 13) mm at 100m, presumably at a 90 degree angle off the vertical. This was the reason why the Panzer I was designed with 13mm armour alround, because the designers presumed that Germany's future enemies would field infantry weapons and ammo capable of penetrating 12mm, just like the German army did. Unless shown wrong by a quote, I presume that what BFC meant when they talked about repeated hits, was repeated penetrations. After all, one 7.92mm round penetrating won't make much of a difference unless it is a lucky hit. That story changes if a few dozen penetrate. Moral of the story - I think Jason is certainly wrong in his analysis why and probably wrong in his follow-on charge that the anti-armour performance of German MG ammo is overmodeled. For players - keep HTs well away from German machine guns, and light armour with less than 13mm at least 100-200m away, preferably more, even if you know that no ranged AT weapons are available. Regarding universal carriers and their ability to stand up to SmK - there is a nice combat account of a counterattack by 3rd division on the Dunkerque approaches in 1940. Monty ordered an attack to be conducted, using Brens like tanks. It was a shambles - nobody had told them that German machine guns would penetrate Bren armour, and they found out the hard way. You can check that one in the divisional history 'The Iron Division'. All the best Andreas

13 (some sources say 14) mm was considered SmK safe. Anything below could be penetrated, depending on range. I have posted SmK use figures for a specific engagement elsewhere in the forum. It was not rare - in the specific engagement for which I have the data, 8% of the 7.92mm ammo fired by an infantry division in 1941 in Russia was SmK. All the best Andreas [ April 06, 2006, 02:55 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

Dandelion's post really made an impression on you, eh? As for not knowing what to do when breaking through, I am not really aware of any situation where the German forces in Normandy achieved what seems to be called 'operational freedom', i.e. the ability to frolick about the enemy's rear at leisure. The break-ins were tactical in nature, never really beyond the first line of defence. As Kingfish and Jason indicate, the unwillingness of the western allied forces to be terribly impressed by the swagger of the Auftragstaktik-driven Übersoldiers of the Wehrmacht then had something to do with none of them getting further. Plus, there just was not a lot of space there to work with. All the best Andreas

Sure its not the other way round? All the best Andreas

Not online because it is still on the drawing board. I need to make it into a battle, following the re-supply issues that the playtesting brought up. I'll probably release the op map as a stand-alone. All the best Andreas

5th Glosters go East is now available for stand-alone download from I wish it was der Kessel - link in my sig. If whoever created A Canadian Confrontation agrees, I'll put that one up too. All the best Andreas

You've got mail. All the best Andreas

Link in my sig. CMAK 5th Glosters go East - Gurra's CMAK conversion of my CMBO battle. British Recce advancing during the 'Swan' across northern France CMBB RAS Turning East - Soviet armoured attack to cut off German retreat. Small-medium, snow, 50+ turns. CMBB - Under Development Road to Odessa - 3x60+ CMBB operation, huge. Romanians attack fortified Soviet position outside Odessa 1941 Road to Koltov - Medium battle, 2-player only! sort-of ME in western Ukraine, 1944. Poking South - Small battle. German forward detachment in Ukraine, 1941 The Other Side of Tigers - 1943, German attack, small battle. Inherit the Black Earth - 60+ large/huge armoured Soviet attack in Ukraine 1943. Map design by Bigduke - even if you don't like my scenarios, get the map, it is gorgeous. Enjoy Andreas [ April 11, 2006, 12:49 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]