John Kettler

Sigh. Wrote the wrong country. The Marines savaged Saddam's tank force in Kuwait, not Iraq. Sorry about that! Regards, John Kettler

The_Capt, Much appreciate the links. For the sake of clarity, would like to remind the readers that the vulnerabilities identified by Major General Gorman, by the Defense Science Board and the CIA were all tied to existing fielded US weaponry then, NOT to the products of the billions and billions poured into the get well program weaponry. M1A1HAs rushed from Europe to were the state of the art US tanks in terms of armor, sensors and firepower, and Saddam's best tanks were, at best, ex-Soviet second tier vs them--if that. In the CMCW timeframe, though, the armor-antiarmor shoe is very much on the other foot, and I've sought to educate people on that score. Am in no way disputing the effectiveness of our veritable super weapons in the Gulf War and did note that at knife fight ranges, the Marines absolutely savaged Saddam's tank force in Iraq using a mixed force of M60A1s, M60A3s and a smaller portion of M1s. Shall leave it to others to put in RISE, +, etc. Have not given up on trying to run down that PT-76 HEAT round, but even if I do, I seriously doubt I'll be able to produce the live fire imagery vs the original Abrams armor array. Never saw or heard anything ref the JNA flying bombs. As far as mustard gas, far worse would've been Tabun or Sarin, both invented by the Germans. Regards, John Kettler

Based on a number of translated Russian comments I've seen, this is considered by Soviet veterans of the Afghanistan War to be the most accurate Russian film depiction of the war ever. It's 1988, and a VDV regiment is trying to extricate itself from Afghanistan. Somehow, the film manages to distill an entire war down to roughly 2 1/4 hours. It's nasty, brutal, vicious, confusing, definitely not for people with weak stomachs, but it's an immersive experience which includes so many facets of the war, yet never straining to do so. It's unfortunately the Russian is translated, so much of what the Afghanis say has to be figured out from expressions, body language and behavior. The Aghanis are not ciphers, but rather are families caught in a whole series of plights, including their own internal forever war, if you will. The main war is a horror for both sides, and the Soviet Union, in its familiar form, is disintegrating while the troops are out of country. The young and ambitious contrast strongly with the long-suffering and battle weary old hands. Injury and death are everywhere and spare no one. Weaponry overall seems a great fit for the period, and in some cases is applied lavishly. Don't know how this is handled in CMA, but the VDV guys, some minimally attired, are atop their AFVs, not in them. The AFVs are period correct, and there's a mod I never saw before in the intel reporting coming from Afghanistan. Believe there are lots of gaming possibilities here in the film. Regards, John Kettler

There is an extremely small, but nevertheless real and vulnerable vision optic for the T-90 driver. Am unsure whether it's a periscope or direct optic, such as a vision block, but either way, it's a vulnerable point on the tank. If that spot happens to take a 25 mm Bushmaster subcaliber DU APDS penetrator through it, the odds are quite high it will kill the tank or at least the crew from pyrophoric, heat and pressure effects. DU pyrophoric effects behind armor. Watch the 2 minite mark or so and imagine much the same happening inside the tank, albeit on a smaller scale because of the greatly reduced amount of DU involved. Accompanying the pyrotechnics is an abrupt spike in temperature and pressure, made worse because the Russian tanks even today routinely fight buttoned, meaning there's no real way for that pressure and heat to vent. Imagine this is happening inside the T-90. See sequence beginning 0:32. Given what I'm seeing in the various live fire clips, a dead tank, as opposed to blown up tank, seems to be a good outcome. To me, something like this would definitely get the job done, but so might a 25 mm HEI-T shell, because its got a kill radius of 5 meters vs infantry. if that hits the optic and detonates immediately, or worse, slightly later, imagine what a hand grenade equivalent would do to the interior of the tank and crew. The chance of that kind of hit on a buttoned T-90 is low, but nevertheless real and finite. And firing a burst increase the chance of such a hit. Regards, John Kettler

A classic still ruefully mentioned in the Pentagon. The F-16 was intended to be the West's MiG-21 equivalent, a real dogfighter. By the time the Air Force got through with it weight and cost were through the roof, and I believe they even configured it to carry a tac nuke. Am pretty convinced the Army and Air Force, not sure about the Navy, could blow any weight budget even if given Unobtainium (optimal military use nonexistent metal that's cheap, easily worked, super tough when hit and weighs next to nothing)! Also, it's hard to make general on a program that isn't big, impressive, massively budgeted and can be structured to require parts from all or most of the states, thus ensuring support from Congress. We used to envy the Russians and their ability to produce potent hardware that worked under terrible conditions and do so relatively cheaply and in quantity--quickly. Regards, John Kettler P.S. People with either military or defense contractor backgrounds don't watch this or process it the way non-defense types do. For us, such throwaway expressions as "Close enough for government work" have deep levels of meaning, having seen the mentality expressed. Dad used to work at LTV Electrosystems (E Systems these days), and one of the firm's business lines was refurbishing old military aircraft, complete with wiring harnesses. The firm was so successful in imbuing the workers with a saving a handful of rivets mindset that hundreds of wiring harnesses were made, say, a foot too short and were therefore useless! Years of development produced the DIVADS which malfunctioned and pointed its twin 40s straight at the reviewing stand (along with being hopelessly bad despite a wealth of proven components) and my personal favorite the Phalanx test in which it shot an inbound bomb full of holes (was told by someone who saw the firing test film you could see daylight through it), but the bomb came boring in, hit the barge and, I believe, sank it. The only good news is that enough sanity had prevailed that the firing was done remotely and enthusiastic brass (civilian and military) visitors who would otherwise have been aboard had been talked out of it. Pentagon Wars is a comedy to be sure, but a black one based on real truth behind US defense procurement. Time for one more anecdote. My first boss at Hughes, John Green, used to work at Naval Weapons Center China Lake, home of the Eye series weapons (Snakeye retarded bombs, for one). Along comes a firepower demonstration, in which meticulous planning provides a fail safe in case the bombs don't hit and detonate on target. Got to have impressive explosions on the targets, right? The plane rolls in smartly, aims and drops the bombs, but the explosions are overeager and occur before the bombs hit! The guy with the backup plan had somehow managed to press the button and blown up the target array before the bombs arrived.

While reading Poliakov's fascinating wartime book White Mammoths (KV-1s in winter ops), I found a Sovfoto pic which I think is showing a KV-1 fitted with what the Germans called Ostkette (Eastern Track) and the US called track extenders or duckbill connectors (got blistered by brother George (ex-Bradleys) for calling them grousers). Could be misinterpreting what I'm seeing, put photo research I did shows this configuration is not the standard OEM track. Obviously, this isn't a pressing matter for CMx2 now, but may be useful later as the game steps backwards in time. Regards, John Kettler

Have read accounts about the, ahem, giant darts and wish someone had a pic, for that would be something. Believe the darts were monkey model hardened steel and nothing with tungsten carbide, let alone DU. Incidentally, per Vaeriy Fofanov's site, the Soviets got their DU into the field in 1989, a year before we did. The so-called 120 mm fired Silver Bullet grossly overmatched anything Saddam had. Am somewhat doubtful of the three miles cited, because that's 4,8 kms, and the longest range tank kill ever (tank vs. tank) was a Challenger 1 at 5.1 kms. That said, I've read no detailed analysis of the engagements at 73 Easting, absolutely nothing rising to the level of battlefield engagement reconstruction. From what I can tell, though, the US Army has it analyzed to a fare thee well and fully computerized for use in training. No, I'm not kidding about heart attacks. One of the programs I worked was AMRAAM, and the proposal creation was months of all-out effort and madness. We got the five linear feet of proposal out (we won), but right after that the program manager had a massive heart attack and was out for four months. A guy who looked like Santa Claus died from UC in that same hyper stress period. My own father, working in another branch of Hughes, was put through so much stress and insanity on one of his programs that he had a massive heart attack and wound up having emergency quad bypass surgery. At Rockwell, I was such a wreck from dealing with a crazy project leader and impossible deadlines he artificially created (to feel alive) that, all told, was out on sick leave for four months before resigning. Military aerospace ate people alive. Am perfectly in agreement with you regarding exploitable Soviet vulnerabilities outside of the DF antitank environment, but that was the key to holding on long enough for deep strike weapons and such to do their job, but we didn't really have anything with real reach until the Army fielded ATACMs. Steel Rain MLRS really doesn't have the capabilities of, say, Smerch armed with smart SFF submunitions, and my recollection is that we were largely outranged in tube artillery, too. Laser guided munitions were widely proliferated in the Red Army, too. The very high leverage systems we were counting on to offset Red superiority in numbers were already fielded, in quantity, by a foe whose forces considerably already outnumbered us. Hope that sooner rather than later I get to DL CMCW and see how the in-game battlefield dynamics work myself. Back when I was able to play CMBS, I did see T-90s stop the first shots from M1A2SEPV3s, only to die instantly from the follow-up shots. From what I know of the T-64 series armor protection, shrugging off frontal hits in the CMCW timeframe seems eminently reasonable, but flank and rear shots will just gobble them up. Regards, John Kettler

Combatintman, The real point of what I was saying is stated here: https://www.usmcmuseum.com/blog/the-m60s-last-hurrah The M1IP would see deployment during the US-led coalition to Saudi Arabia and Operation Desert Shield in 1990. However, fearing the Iraqis had modern Soviet ammunition for their T-72’s, many units had their M1IP’s (and even M1A1’s) replaced with Depleted Uranium reinforced M1A1HA’s right before Operation Desert Storm was launched. Between what's said in the above and in the link below, it's important and fair to note The Marines inflicted wholesale devastation (claims of nine DOZEN destroyed Iraqi tanks, a mixed bag of T-55, Type 59 and smaller amounts of no-ERA T-72s. They did this with just over 200 tanks in a four battalion mix of M60A1, M60A3 and, according to this M1A1 (1 battalion). Therese were spitting range engagements, and if the reports are to be believed, Marine tank casualties amounted to one track damaged M60A3. Have no doubt this was possible, but would note that when the US assesses tank viability, the assessment is computed based on something like a 2000 meter engagement range. https://mwcs.blogspot.com/2020/01/reserve-tanks-in-gulf-war-1990.html Have not dug into the game myself, because, following several DL debacles when the pre-orders became available, I still don't have it and assuredly couldn't play it right now if I did, having been in no shape to play CMx2 anything in over a (groan) year. Thus, other than reading the AARs and watching game videos on YT, I have no direct experience of the game. Did indeed spend years in the "belly of the beast", during which I saw people traumatized by the various threat revelations. I don't use that word "traumatized" lightly. For example, at the Soviet Threat Technology Conference I saw at least one guy collapse and have to be removed (there was speculation at the break it was a heart attack, but no one knew for sure) as well as possibly another, but it was in my peripheral vision and I was hanging on every word from the SME. There were enormous loud simultaneous gasps in the auditorium when various bombshells were dropped. There were plenty of times I was dumbfounded, jaws dropped and momentarily not breathing, because of the shock. When I got back to Rockwell, on my department manager's orders, I wrot,e from very good memory aided by memory training, a SECRET + 40 page summary of the entire conference, by subject area. Thst department manager went from a rosy complexion to to a colorless ghost in terms of his face. He was visibly distraught and was clearly emotionally reeling. Am not saying there is ANY defect in CMCW terminal effects modeling. What I am saying is that the popular perception and what was being said in the defense journals of the time didn't track at all well with what was known within some military and Intelligence circles going back to 1980, but in any event in 1984 following that DSB study. Given what most of the material of the time was saying, it wouldn't be unreasonable to expect that to bleed into not just CMCW, but other games as well. For example, I was thrilled to get my hands on AHs MBT (published 1989), only to discover that it was designed after and while consuming vast amounts of pro-western military-technical hype. In point of fact, when it came to armor-antiarmor modeling, it bore NO relationship to reality whatsoever, so I gave it to my nephews to play with as they liked. Any Abrams in the game was completely invulnerable frontally to 125 mm Soviet tank fire at all ranges, whereas any Abrams could frontally kill the Soviet MBTs, even the best, to whatever max range was. And this was for, as noted, a 1989 game intended to be set in 1987. To be clear, am NOT pushing for ANY change to current CMCW military-technical matters, but have been at pains to show how profound the gap was between perceived situation and what was really the case. How close CMCW comes to depicting our best understanding of that reality seems to be a kind of yardstick through which to evaluate it as a full-blown tactical sim. Your point about BFC not making changes without solid proof of the need for a change makes perfect sense to me. Regards, John Kettler

The_Capt, As you may recall, I was in the Operations Analysis Department of Hughes Missile Systems Group when things started going sideways on the tank-killing front. In rapid order, we went from TOW (5" dia warhead) to ITOW (same but with standoff probe and extended range to 3750 meters) to TOW 2 (6" diameter with extensible probe, concerning which my brother in the 2/11 ACR on Bradley CFVs was told "If you see one of these, then you're going to war.") TOW 2 wasn't just a bigger warhead, but a fundamentally new one, a double trumpet design with DU liners for maximum penetration and destructive effect. TOW 2 saw the debut of dual beacons, one the familiar xenon optical beacon, the other the all new thermal grid, which we referred to as the waffle iron. It emitted in the 8-12 micron band most WX and could be seen through dust, battlefield smoke, and most WX by the also built by Hughes FLIRs in the FCS. The xenon beacon provided backwards compatibility to earlier optical only systems, but with the extended range and massive hitting power. TOW 2A was the response to the ERA curveball, but the inevitable countermeasures led to a shift to the TOW 2 B and its dual SFFs for attack from above in a very low flyover. Though technically a medium antitank weapon because of size, man-portability and tested range (2500 meters), given its ability to kill ANY known tank when designed and do so clear out to 4000 meters, it's fairer to say the Javelin is a lethal cross between the medium and heavy antitank weapon categories. Even the most Product Improved LAW was hopeless, which is why LAW was declared obsolete and replaced with the OTS AT4. The 1984 Defense Science Board (DSB) Summer Study concluded, to the shock and dismay of my bosses, colleagues and self, that only two antitank missiles were still viable in a frontal engagement: Hellfire (which we didn't make) and Maverick (which we did). Remember, we did NOT have that Gorman CIA article at all, so our awareness of our vulnerability on one end and their greatly diminished vulnerability on the other end hit us four years after Major General Gorman laid out the horror story, and we didn't get but the barest info from the DSB 1984 Summer Study. Armed Force Journal International did report the incapability of most of our arsenal, including the new DU 105, vs a (presumably ERA equipped) combat loaded T-72. From where I sit, it seems to me that what Major General Gorman said was the case in 1980 was confirmed in 1984 by the DSB and gone into deeply by the CIA's SMEs at the Soviet Threat Technology Conference in 1985. What we got rid of and what we bought for replacement systems track exactly with the key conclusions of the armor-antiarmor assessments made by the Army and the Intelligence Community. In turn, would argue that the crash replacement of the Gen One 105 mm gunned Abrams tanks (except for the Marines) with V Corps M1HAs before the Hail Mary attack into Iraq was driven by a keen understanding of both the hitting power and hit survival situation for the Gen One Abrams--even with the DU 105 thrown in on the hitting end. Given these, it's reasonable to assert the US was in quite a fix in the CMCW timeframe, and to the extent it doesn't accurately model that grim reality, may I respectfully suggest changes be made to reflect the true situation? On a separate note, have talked before about broadband obscurants. Here is a look at various types of obscurants, including broadband ones, in the context of a range of military actions conducted in various threat environments. One of the CIA docs I saw specifically mentioned broadband obscurants in conjunction with the T-64. A true broadband obscurant works in the visible, IR and radar bands, to include MMW. Think of it as an EM sponge! The Russians used broadband aerially delivered obscurants during the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia to hide what they were doing from our ground and airborne radars. First learned of this from that Hughes colleague I've described who had a CIA sponsor in the OSWR (Office of Scientific and Weapons Research). https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Obscurants+and+electronic+warfare.-a0276353040 Regards, John Kettler

The International Army Games 2021 offer a generally great opportunity to watch Russia's latest hardware (and older weaponry) live fire, see special units demo capabilities and so forth, but unfortunately, rather than being able to watch the proceedings, hear the weapons fire and the engines of the AFVs and helos, there's a very loud Russian announcer drowning most of the desired audio and with no compensation in terms of subtitles. Even so, the range of weaponry being shown and the many videos provided makes at least some of the frustration and chewed on nerves bearable. Some things I noticed are that the BMD-3, like the T-62 of youre, elevates the gun to reload. Also, the Cobra special tank-killing armored car uses a ripple two approach to firing the Kornet-E, likely as a way of getting through APS. In the sequence I saw, the first shot hit, and the second hit, despite the tank being completely enshrouded in smoke to such an extent it would've covered as much as three thanks end to end. Yet the missile went right in and unambiguously also hit the target. But Kornet-E can fail, too. The firing whose sequence begins at 16:54 resulted in an outright miss as the missile appeared to be having guidance issues close to the target, evidenced by considerable course wobble in a previously very stable trajectory. Miss distance was about a tank length in front of the rear tank, but the possibility exists that the target was the near tank and that the missile went high and overflew it slightly. Worthy of note is the low level of overhead fire protection afforded the Kornet-E tubes on the BMP-2 fitted with 2 x twin Kornet-E launchers. Regards, John Kettler

LukeFF, You know and I know you're trying to bait me into responding in such a way that Steve comes down on me for violating his direct request regarding posting about certain matters. Not happening! If people want to know anything regarding any of the topics being brought up ref me I'm not allowed to discuss, PM me. All, Now, how about we discuss the CIA intel docs I posted instead of trying to run me through an OT and verboten minefield? Notice no one's uttered a peep concerning them and their various confirmations of point after point I made earlier but no one wanted to accept from me. Did any of you bother to read what I had to dig hard for in the CIA FOIA Reading Room? Regards, John Kettler

chuckdyke, What a tremendous movie, war movie and, simply, immersion in a reality I've never really seen depicted! Tried watching your latest years ago, but there wasn't anything watchable then. BTW, that smaller tank in the first AFV scene with the T-34/76 was a T-26. Regards, John Kettler

Am watching the movie and go curious about Finnish military rations. This is a great thread, and from it, I learned unknown Soldier is based on a real Finnish Infnatry Regiment's experiences. https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=88833 Regards, John Kettler

Thanks! Shall have a look. Don't know how many of the historic AFVs the Finns have are runners, but they sure do have some treasures in their collections. Regards, John Kettler

chuckdyke, Am well aware of this. To my knowledge, the T-34/85 didn't enter combat until Operation Bagration. Have watched lots of Russian war movies and series, and seldom have I seen a real T-34/76. Even when I have, it's usually been a later model (M43)--in an Early GPW battle. Regards, John Kettler

https://ru.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Милюков,_Александр_Иванович According to the notes in the comments, this was actually a fight against a Panther, not a Tiger 1, and was at Kursk. This is an intimate look at tank warfare at the lowest level, and it demonstrates very well the effective use of maskirovka, maneuver and terrain, as well as limitations posed by having only minor gun depression capability. Russian with English subtitles. Res not the best, but where else are you going to get such an up close look, inside and out of a T-34/85? Though tank duels were rare, I have read such accounts from Red Army GPW veterans, though more often vs the SturmArt/Ferdinand AKA StuG. Some of the things you see the Russians doing here, the German AFVs did. Regards, John Kettler

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP00-01872R001001550001-3.pdf Soviet Tank Programs, (now sanitized) dated December 1984 looks at the T-64, T-72 and T-80 in light of available information at the TOP SECRET level. It goes into the programs, the manufacturing base, armor, gun performance, sensors and other matters. For modern Soviet tanks at this time, the above survey is a great one stop shop. US Intelligence And Soviet Armor https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000624298.pdf This originally appeared as a 1980 article by US Army Major General Paul F. Gorman in the CIA classified Journal Studies In Intelligence. Some of you may recognize the hit probability plots and such as, in sanitized form, old friends from the early 1980s US FMs. This is a must read for the CMCW players, and the crux of the discussion starts on Page 13. He meticulously lays out chapter and verse what the real armor-antiarmor situation was then. It conclusively shows the Soviets had an enormous set of military technical advantages over US in the period on both ends of the equation, and you can see for yourselves how dire that situation was, both in our poor survivability against their weapons and the ineffectiveness of our weapons against their tanks. Even the new DU round was no panacea, nor were claims that NATO ATGMs canceled Russian tank advantages. Those who rejected one shocking truth after another because it came from me, who had no Classified documents as proof, can now figure out how to deal with the same kinds of informations from a real high ranking military pro (MAJ GEN Gorman was one of the key people in revolutionizing Army training for war at TRADOC), who has a wealth of Classified material to back him, writing in a respected Classified intelligence journal. Regards, John Kettler

This meaty video by Matsimus goes into great detail about the T-64 and, as noted ref above film, does NOT get into the T-64B at all. Regards, John Kettler

Here is the next video in the How To Fight series, and it's about defeating the T-64 and T-72. This has terrible video quality in places, and generally bad at best, but the audio is fine. This thing is so old there's no mention of the T-64B at all. Nor is there so much as a still, let alone film, of the T-64. Obviously, the keyframe does not show either a T-64 or T-72. Regards, John Kettler

The_Capt, Thanks for your calming words, understanding my very real limitations here and for reassuring the troops that BFC isn't going to rush out and make changes on the strength of just what I've said. All I've ever sought to do in my 21 years on the Forums is to have the games correctly model battlefield realities and to give the players the ability to do in-game what their real life counterparts could and did do in battle. Regards, John Kettler

Rice, In this case, for sure, "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence." Have many times told you, in great detail, why I have almost nothing to show for my 11+ years as a Soviet Threat Analyst, including telling you that my official HR slot at Hughes was not the same as my job description. Likewise, my HR slot on entry at Rockwell International NAAO, MTS 1 (Member of the Technical Staff 1), was not my functional job description, which was to have been Soviet Strategic Analyst--before some internal reorg screwed up everything planned both by me and my interviewing boss. By the time I left Rockwell, I was MTS II (MTS III promotable). Even were I to produce resumes from my military aerospace days, I have every confidence you'd reject them out of hand as fabrications. Also, since I'm no masochist, what possible value would there be in telling people all sorts of controversial Cold War military intelligence things, over a period of two decades, and often being attacked as a result? Please tell me what I've gained as a result of what you clearly believe to be fronting by me. Regards, John Kettler

Rooks and Kings, Every last one of those was written over two decades after I left military aerospace. Novel intel collection techniques were discovered or invented and used operationally, techniques you'd consider impossible and insane even to contemplate. If you PM me, I'll be happy to provide some examples, but this isn't the place or the time. Don't wish to annoy Steve and/or get this thread locked! Let me help you with my employment history. Hughes Aircraft Company Missile Systems Group February 14, 1978-September 12, 1984, followed by Rockwell International North American Aviation Operations (later renamed North American Aerospace Operations) September 24-June 20, 1989. In those time periods I was continuously employed in the Operations Analysis Department of each firm. As for the highlighted item. Thanks for pointing it out. Should've read 1984, so fixed it! Don't know anything about making a post private. What I worked on is ancient history or was never built. Even the CIA only put a 20 year stricture on highly classified super sensitive stuff. The Soviet Threat Technology Conference was in 1985, 36 years ago. Xorg_Xalargsky, Tried to find parallel work in such areas as competitor intelligence and such, but got nowhere. After winding up in the Washington, D.C. area, I also went after jobs at defense think tanks, only to find that the lack of a doctorate, former high rank/government position or both left me in a no win situation. The closest thing I've come to my old job was in doing Primary Research for the Empowerment Project's "The Panama Deception". Please PM me after you've read the item your showed the link for. Regards, John Kettler

Rice, Showed you an award I got while working at Rockwell and W-2s for almost every year I was there. Had NO Unclassified docs to show you in terms of work product, for as I said, everything I did was at least SECRET--because it was sourced from SECRET or higher intelligence documents. Have gone into great detail about what I did, who I worked with, of whom my briefing audiences consisted and more. I gave you considerable details on what I learned at the Soviet Threat Technology Conference at CIA HQ and held under the auspices of the AIAA (American Institute of Aviation and Astronautics). And that PRIDE Award, as far as my contribution to that ABM program, was precisely for defining and analyzing the Soviet ballistic missile threats and secondarily for figuring out how to install the system in standard Navy vertical launchers. Where I did have Unclassified documents to present (from my work as a Soviet Threat Analyst at Hughes Missile Systems Group), I did so, showing you work I myself did on two identified programs. I also provided you with my start doc and one of my promotion docs. On the laser decoy program, I evaluated the laser-guided missile threat to US armor. In the ASSAULT BREAKER case, the task was to evaluate Soviet and Warsaw Pact follow-on forces in terms of specific target arrays and their vulnerabilities to use as ways of determining weapon system effectiveness for a variety of potential smart submunition payloads. In both cases, if you look at the charts and text, it is immediately apparent that the subject matter explicitly deals with Soviet threats. The bibliography I provided clearly shows multiple publications specifically referring to Soviet Army matters. Don't know why you're so incredibly resistant to accepting that I was a professional military intelligence analyst, a well-respected Soviet Threat Analyst for 11+ years. Is it because accepting that I was those things means that my statements about intelligence matters carry a weight they otherwise wouldn't in your eyes and that you now have to deal with the possibility, even likelihood, that the armor-antiarmor situation during the Cold War was as I described it; that there was indeed an obsolete (in the Red Army, therefore exportable)) HEAT round which could frontally penetrate a Gen One Abrams because its armor array was vulnerable to a HEAT shell designed to pierce the canceled T95 and its steel-glass-steel sandwich armor AKA siliceous core armor, which is what the Gen One Abrams had? Would also point out that I not only named the CIA SME who told us about the dire armor-antiarmor situation, but the Abrams penetrating PT-76 HEAT round. You also were provided with a wealth of material showing that CIA HEAT SME Joseph Backofen was real and not just an expert on shaped charges but was also a co-inventor of specialized shaped charges that were patented. Much of what we were told about about the armor-antiarmor situation, Soviet lead in explosives and other related matters subsequently was reported in Soviet Military Power. Have searched in vain for the relevant parts of the 1986 issue, where I believe the revelations of the 1985 conference were discussed. While I can, at some point, produce declassified SECRET articles with charts, tables, histograms, etc., from the CIA FOIA Reading Room and elsewhere showing how dire the armor-antarmor situation was, I still won't be able to provide you with direct proof I was a Soviet Threat Analyst, for I simply can't show you what I do not have and would not have been allowed to keep. Believe or disbelieve the things I've said about Threat matters, but please stop attacking me over proof of my creds. Have given you all I have. Regards, John Kettler

SergeantSqook, Mysteriously seems to, ahem, coincide with my posting the best available proof I could provide. Regards, John Kettler

You are absolutely right. Am so used to typing Iraq and not typing Iran that despite knowing it was Iran, out came Iraq. The Chieftains were bought under the Shah of Iran, who was quite the purchaser of sophisticated powerful weaponry. Regards, John Kettler P.S. Thanks to you, was able to fix the typo in time.