John Kettler

Gave the source before. It was the CIA's world class (possibly world's best) HEAT SME, Dr. Joseph Backofen, speaking at The Soviet Threat Technology Conference (U) in 1985 at CIA HQ. The conference was no notes and classified SECRET?NOFORN/WNINTEL/RD. Decoding, SECRET?NO FOREGN NATIONALS/ WARNING INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS/RESTRICTED DATA. The last is a nuclear weapon clearance for things like weapon yields, payload weights, number of warheads, CEP, missile guidance, etc. The Conference covered not only every category of Soviet and Warsaw Pact weaponry for air, land, sea and space, but of what we knew was in the pipeline as well, Soviet and Warsaw Pact espionage successes against the US, how the Soviets established intelligence collection and technology acquisition requirements and more. Also discussed were various incidents involving Soviet use of various types of lasers in-country, at sea and in Afghanistan--everything from harassment to hard kill, even rapid clearance of fields of fire! This was the CIA spilling its guts because, institutionally, it was terrified. Contrast that with this: In my entire 11+ years as a Soviet Threat Analyst, I NEVER saw a single CIA document. Yet at that Conference and several more in succeeding years, the CIA had its SMEs systematically brief us comprehensively on, well, everything--at our clearance level, that is.--for long grueling days on end. Part and parcel of the Conference was the flat out terrifying rundown we got on Soviet ground warfare, especially the whole armor-antiarmor situation. And Dr. Backofen's dazzling and horrifying discussion of Soviet HEAT capabilities, engineering, advanced explosives and more was a key part of that overall portion of the conference. I don't recall that the GRAU number was given for the HEAT shell in question, but I do distinctly recall that it was a shell specifically developed to defeat the canceled T95 MBT. The T95 entered development in 1955, a process that went through 1959, after which the tank was canceled in favor of the M48.. If you look at the T95 Wiki, it specifically refers to its having siliceous core armor. Having read the declassification document for the Abrams, it specifically said the terming "siliceous core armor" was no longer a special program only term. Thus, the T95 design had siliceous core armor (steel/glass/steel sandwich armor array), and so did the original Abrams. Clearly, the GRU, KGB or both found out what the T95 armor scheme was, and the Soviet HEAT design bureaus were tasked to design a HEAT shell to defeat it. That particular problem was gone by the time the shell entered service, but the Americans kept the same basic armor scheme in the many ways revolutionary Abrams, thus inherited the exact same vulnerability the T95 would've had. Unless the Soviets had advance word before the T95 started development, this means the HEAT shell in question started development in the mid-50s. This rules out a GPW period HEAT shell as the threat. This HEAT shell was apparently declared obsolete in the late 1960s, and only obsolete antitank shells were permitted to be exported, to protect Soviet weapon secrets. the Israelis recovered some of these these during the Yom Kippur War but didn't let us know until 1984 when it finally handed some over for analysis and testing. THAT was where the real nightmare began! Hope this gives you some idea what a big deal the Conference was and how staggering the disclosures were. This was where I learned of the dizzying array of Soviet laser guided munitions, where I learned of Soviet multi-mode sensor fuzed submunitions, of MRL fired antitank drones that had drone flight leaders (talked to the other missiles and dynamically assigned them targets) automatically replaced if shot down, thermobaric weapons and more. Simply put, the very high leverage combat weapon types the West counted on to stop the Soviet tank horde the Red Army already had or would have shortly, along with capabilities we didn't have. Their lead in armor protection was so great that only the Hellfire and Maverick were judged capable of a kill frontally. Everything else, from LAW through Dragon through TOW was obsolete from the front. that included the much vaunted 105 mm DU round. We, though, were highly vulnerable. The sources were as official as it gets, and the Conference was held under the aegis of the prestigious AIAA (American Institute of Aviation and Astronautics. Regards, John Kettler

"The target is always the mind of the enemy commander." I trust the above quote but can't find the author. Regards, John Kettler

B-40 rocket from RPG-2? If not, what and where? Regards, John Kettler

Russian motorcycle unit TO&E. Note extensive mortar discussion. http://theminiaturespage.com/boards/msg.mv?id=514401 Various motorcycle configurations for mortars. The parent site, russianiron, is enormous. http://www.russianiron.com/eafranke_ural/Part XVII Motorcycle-Mounted Mortars.pdf Regards, John Kettler

There's a FB group that specializes in colorizing WW II imagery, and this is simply fantastic because not only do we have the pics but specific dates and locations, too, at least, for the German MG photo set. One such pic is below. https://www.facebook.com/worldwarincolor/ Regards, John Kettler

Oops! Meant to write, but didn't, that in World War II it took an average of 17 shots to hit a fully exposed medium tank at 1000 meters, vs 1-2 for an M60A1 circa 1977. Presume the firing tank was a 75 mm Sherman. Regards, John Kettler

Megalon Jones, The ammo types you listed all fly more slowly by far than HVAPFSDS and therefore have looping trajectories compared to the KE forming your baseline. In turn, this increases the likelihood of top hits. Would say that these days, HESH/HEP would be the lest penetrating--for multiple reasons. For starters, HESH/HEP, unless vs a very weak target, doesn't penetrate at all. that's not its kill mechanism. Instead, it creates massive spall on the far side of the armor plate struck. How massive? Pie plate size and, say, two inches thick! That piece of armor steel is now tearing through the fighting compartment, demolishing men and equipment throughout, not to mention wiring, hydraulaics and ammo. Have seen a classified pic from the 1967 War in which a T-55 took a turret rear hit from what I recall as 105 mm HESH/HEP. The spall pie plate cored out the large radio and kept going. There was no further coverage of the damage in detail, but that hit would've taken the TC apart and the gunner, too. For openers. But, to my knowledge, HESH/HEP has no such capability vs modern composite armor, because the layers of various materials grossly interfere with the detonation shockwave, preventing the all-important massive spalling. Armor arrays designed to defeat HVAPFSDS KE would not find HESH/HEP much of a challenge. Thus, the last Russian tank I would deem HESH/HEP effective against frontally would be the T-62, for everything after that, from the T-64 onward, has composite armor. HEAT can be very effective, but how effective depends on a) the armor array struck, and the particulars of the HEAT shell used. For example, Russian HEAT is designed to take advantage of impact speed as well as the primary HEAT charge. Recall, too, that an obsolete 76.2 mm Russian HEAT round recovered during the Yom Kippur War was found to be able to frontally penetrate the Gen One Abrams. And while in Desert Storm Saddam's hardened steel KE harmlessly stuck to the sides of Abrams turrets like darts, 125 mm HEAT was no joke. Summing up, in ascending effectiveness there is HESH/HEP, then HEAT, then KE, with pride of place going to the 120 and 125 mm gunned tanks. Regards, John Kettler

IMHO, As it happens, we have a real world example of effects of a 120 mm mortar bomb. It's in the Bydax post on page 2. This thread is replete with pics of artillery damaged or destroyed AFVs, results of live fire, armor penetration studies and modeling, input from several BTDT FS types. The power of even old artillery to wreak havoc on APCs, IFVs, older tanks and even newer models is shocking. Paradoxically, the gee whiz capabilities of really modern tanks also make them more vulnerable to artillery fire than older less sophisticated tanks not having turret roofs festooned with wind sensors, GPS, SATCOM, BLUFOR tracker, an array of radio antennae, optoelectronics, Vehicle Protection Systems and more. I believe this thread is the single best CM Forum resource when it comes to Indirect Fires vs AFVs. Regards, John Kettler

US live fire testing on a combat loaded T-72 found that even our experimental 105 mm DU didn't get the job done at typical combat range in a frontal engagement. No US 105 mm round had adequate performance, and it's a good thing that the ability to upgrade the 105 mm on the Abrams to the 120 was built into the tank from the beginning. It was the 120 and DU combined that made the Abrams the killer it was, in reputation and fact. Regards, John Kettler

stikkypixie, ATGMs need to be gathered to the LOS as early as possible after launch, and it takes a bit of time to do so. This is especially true for early slow MCLOS ATGMs, such as AT-3, which until the SACLOS AT-3C, was MCLOS (fly missile by joystick throughout entire flight. Achieving MCLOS proficiency required thousands of engagements on the simulator, which is why, before the Egyptians attacked the Bar Lev Line by crossing the Suez Canal, the AT-3 simulator vans were right up near the front to keep the operators as proficient as possible. Also, the farther the ATGM is downrange, the smaller the control inputs have to be in order to hit the target. If you watch the below video, especially 3:36 on, you will understand everything I've said and so much more. You can see for yourself how the missile behaves in flight, vulnerabilities, and every model made or in development. Eye-popping stuff! Late model AT-3s can defeat ERA protected heavy armor frontally. Regards, John Kettler

Bil, Was going to express shock that your M150 wasn't K-Killed, but then I remembered that, like the Merkava, the engine is in the front. That, I believe is why your TOW missile packed and very weakly armored M150 wasn't blown to bits. Regards, John Kettler

Lethaface, In order for us to follow what you're saying about BMP crew casualties to small arms while reloading, it would be helpful if you specified the BMP ATGM configuration, such as AT-3 on rail, AT-4 on turret roof, etc. The reason for this request is that crew exposure while reloading can be brief and minor or more protracted and major. For example, reloading an AT-3 on the rail is accomplished from inside the turret by sliding the missile onto the rail, attaching the leads and unfolding the fins, all done through a small hatch. In order to reload a turret top launcher, a crewman must wrestle a much heavier ATGM (inside its tube) out through a roof hatch and expose something like half of his body in order to load the launcher. I don't have comparisons handy for reload times, though. Regards, John Kettler

Always happy to help, and I'm glad you found my input informative. In my 11+ years as a Soviet Threat Analyst, I worked on a host of programs directly relevant to CMCW (among them TOW, Maverick and GBU-15 cruciform wing) and had the military capabilities of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact as my beat, if you will. Small arms-ASAT and beam weapons! Have been sounding off on painful realities of the Cold War for nearly two decades, I believe. Searching my posts will turn up tons of material I may've written up on the CM Forums one or more times before--back when my memory was far better than now. Regards, John Kettler

Something I'd like to mention before I stop my headlong read and comment on the fly cycle for the night is that ref SPI's Firefight, which was supposed to portray the lethality of modern weapons, SPI cheated! The map was a part of Ft. Leavenworth but made TOW friendly by removing guidance wire breaking brush, guidance shorting water features and, I believe, telephone poles and lines, too (bad for helo fired TOW). Naturally, the effect was to greatly increase lethality over what it should've been. Had the game and played it intensively. It was the board game bloodbath equivalent of CMBS when I first tried it out. It certainly drove home the whole "What can be seen can be hit..." message. It was, though, one of my wargames that taught me many useful things and helped me become a Soviet Threat Analyst. Regards, John Kettler

akd, These old friend graphs neatly reinforce the conclusions from both dueling models and historical experience. The first to shoot generally wins the duel--something like 80% Of course, it's really the first to shoot accurately! Some digging online will produce the original properly captioned SECRET level charts done by General Gorman in a CIA doc in which he compares weapon accuracy for US vs Russian. This was also the doc showing that at 1000 meters, it took 17 shots to get a hit on a fully exposed medium tank and that an M60A1 had a high probability with one shot and a near certainty with two shots. Regards, John Kettler

Wow! A Cav troop with 2 x dedicated 155 howitzer batteries formerly making up the heavy side of WWII US DIVARTY--plus 4.2" mortars, then a third 155 battery with DPICM (how many volleys?). Simply astounding Indirect firepower + a brace of voracious omnivorous AH-1s! Your tracks may be eggshells, but they're tied to a hardware store's worth of hammers, to steal JasonC's Marder characterization. On a separate note, it's a pleasure and great education to read yet another of your Beta AARs, despite again being left feeling like the village idiot of warfare. The rigor and depth of your analysis is simply beyond what my still mauled brain can do, and I love all your great quotes. If you served, I hope you at least made LT COL, and if you didn't serve, then would argue we're much the worse for the lack of your formidable military mind. Regards, John Kettler

Believe the program was called TOWCAP. Remember reading about it in ARMOR magazine. It's chief purpose was to protect against airburst fire. Army testing found early versions greatly increased TOW crew survivability, which is why the initial field expedient was made a production item. It may look stupid, but in the days before the M901 Hammerhead was fielded, it was a big deal that helped preserve the hardest hitting and longest range DF antitank weapon the US Army ground forces had. Regards, John Kettler

MBT was so wildly out of touch with reality that even LSD couldn't be used to explain it. For example, a T-80 engaging a Gen One Abrams couldn't penetrate it frontally from one hex range. The reality was that a PT-76 could reliably kill one from effective 76 mm engagement range because the original Abrams armor design was siliceous core steel sandwich just like that on the aborted T95 program (beaten out by the M48 series). This was practically heart attack inducing when the CIA's top HEAT guy, Dr. Joseph Backofen, the dean of HEAT history, design and effects, briefed us at the SECRET and change (no notes or handouts) first CIA Soviet Threat Technology Conference in 1985. The munition was first recovered during the Yom Kippur War by Israel but not provided to the US until 1984 (great ally, right?), despite having been declared obsolete sometime in the late 1960s, thus allowing its export. As if that wasn't bad enough, the US found that traditional static penetration testing of cannon launched HEAT understated performance as much as 40% when dynamic testing (realistic impact velocities) was used. This was because these Russian warheads were specifically designed to take advantage of that kinetic impetus. Regards, John Kettler

Have read that after the Wall came down, western military types got to walk the ground through which the Russian horde was to come charging into the FRG, only to discover the shocking ground truth that what we took as gospel ref mass armor transit feasibility was in fact NOT feasible because the ground simply did not allow it! What had been clear invasion routes during the GPW became increasingly harder to find as the years wore on. The relentless urbanization of the FRG created a de facto deep defense with villages and towns now so close together they were mutually supporting interlocking ATGM firing locations. One A.V. Tonkikh, writing in his important work Overcoming Antitank Defense, described both the problems this posed to mass armor use and of how it would keep worsening over time. And as bad as that was, even worse would be the deployment of FASCAM type weaponry into the mix, not only causing all sorts of offensive-disrupting delays and wonderful targets consisting of huge traffic jams, but exposing vulnerable supply and repair vehicles to deadly fires not requiring observation to be lethal. Such capabilities from numerous US and NATO MRLs in particular were the nightmare of even the mighty OMG. Regards, John Kettler

Many thanks for this! Here's a gem of military understatement from that review. 5.8.3 Coaxial Machine Gun Trigger Switch It was discovered that on a few M6OA1. RISE Passive tanks that inadequate insulation between the trigger switch contacts was permitting the main gun or coaxial machinegun to fire without the trigger being depressed. Exciting, right? In other news, have run down the designator for the Passive version sensor of the M60A1 RISE--AN/VSG-2. An image I located revealed unambiguously it's a thermal sight, and that same NARA image of a color slide says it operates in the Far IR. At least we can rule out Starlight Scope image intensifier gear. What's shocking is how much the tank cost in FY79 dollars, almost 1.3 MILLION, of which some $230,000 or so was just the cost of the thermal sights! Regards, John Kettler

What I know for sure is that it was an SPI game and that founder Jim Dunnigan wrote that pithy rejoinder. Believe the game may've been WURZBURG, for I distinctly recall there was a flap after the city fathers discovered their beloved city was going to be bought in. Certainly, the response from Dunnigan to the depictic a tac nuke question was emphatic and definitely thought-provoking, but not as much as the revaltion of a REAL Soviet war plan after the Berlin Wall came down which revealed they would use 200 tac nukes to reach the Channel in TWO weeks. A terrifying read! International Defense Review once published a German military analysis of what a single aptly named MIRVED SS-18/SATAN ICBM could do to Germany. Bye bye Deutschland! https://xenagoguevicene.wordpress.com/2018/09/16/wwiii-plan-soviet-army-planned-to-use-200-tactical-nukes-to-capture-western-europe-in-2-weeks-with-invasion-by-conventional-forces-by-zachary-keck-national-interest-16-sept-2018/ Regards, John Kettler

Oops! Listed the wrong AT-3 variant. The correct designator is AT-3C for the SACLOS version. It entered service in 1969-1970. Tried to fix my mistake but waited too long. http://www.military-today.com/missiles/malyutka.htm Regards, John Kettler

DPICM was clearly a Russian concern, for we saw the deployment of elastomeric turret roof protection (to stop the DPICM from detonating as HEAT, instead of relatively harmless HE frag) and also turret roof ERA to defeat an array of threats. As for TRPs, the screening ACRs know the ground intimately and have their TRPs long since worked out. Brother George was a Scout (successively, Bradley CFV gunner, commander and platoon sergeant) in the 2/11 ACR and used to send me sketches of the East German Border guards, towers, anti-escape measures, etc. He never talked about attacking but of bleeding Ivan white by delay from successive positions with longest LOS firing positions to maximize attrition from TOW. DPICM is bad enough. Part of my motivation in military aerospace was the knowledge I had family and family friends in harm's way if the weapons I worked on didn't work properly. Be grateful Bil didn't have FASCAM, too! Regards, John Kettler

Let me start by saying I've neither played with or played the game yet, despite having pre-ordered it. Ran into DL issues several times and then got massively sidetracked by life. Doctrinally, the 115 mm armed T-62s would engage in solo fights vs tanks out to 1500 meters, use platoon volley out to 2000 and company volleys out to 2500 meters. 125 mm armed T-64s/72s/80s could go 2000 meters individually, 2500 for platoon volley and 3000 for company volley. MIssile armed versions could reach out to 4000 meters using the AT-8. Regards, John Kettler

The_Capt, Am greatly relieved to know the masters of REC (Radio Electronic Combat) actually have it in the game. Bet that would've made Bil's life a lot harder, for the Americans are critically dependent on responsive timely fires. The Russians should have at least a few TRPs, too. Not like they didn't have time to analyze the terrain long before the war broke out and figure out how to support their advance by using them! Regards, John Kettler