Simon Fox

Hehe, that's why I haven't inundated you with emails today. Yea, I think my main point was that it's hard to dissect out all the different factors involved ie an army with a good tactical doctrine which generally encourages initiative vs one with a flawed tactical doctrine which is a bit neutral on initiative (discourage would be too harsh). But then I'm too much of an overblown wind bag to put things so succinctly

I went back to this thread expecting some resolution only find it was hijacked by some micromanagement obsessives Back to the main point! Maybe I have the rationale for the hunt command wrong but I would think the crew should be at least as aware as when they are Moving. I mean, they are looking for the enemy and if spotting is less efficient then the benefits of using hunt are reduced. Why is it faster than Move? I can see the rationale for keeping the interface uncluttered but why not change the speed (I actually always thought they were the same) Does it really have to be different? As it is you would seriously reconsider not using hunt if you thought it would reduce your spotting.

An interesting discussion which deserves my input My viewpoint is slightly different from those offered so far and this is principally because I like to put these opinions into their context. I agree with Steve that the perception that German troops generally displayed a greater willingness to act on their own initiative is far too commonly observed by numerous authors for it to be untrue. (However, I strongly object to him lumping "Commonwealth" all in together, though I recognise he probably meant Brits and Canadians ) Even so I suspect this superiority has been overemphasised somewhat, some of the reasons for which have already been alluded to. Consider the context: (1) The framework within which junior leaders operated (ie SOP) was excellent for the Germans but flawed for the Allies. Therefore in order to adopt a better SOP allied junior leaders had to break out from their SOP on their own initiative. This was far more initiative than was called for from German junior leaders because they already had a decent framework. (2) I think it is reasonable to state that the allied troops which landed in Normandy were overtrained (certainly the Brits) and this training employed flawed/inappropriate approaches which were thus deeply ingrained. I would suggest also that overtraining would likely suppress initiative (especially if it wasn't encouraged) and induce a reliance upon procedure which would make it much harder to break out of. (3) There is no substitute for experience. The allied units in Normandy were largely inexperienced and those with experience had gained it in an entirely different theatre and its effect was somewhat diluted as a consequence. In contrast many German units were highly experienced and if not were leavened with a strong cadre of experienced NCOs and officers. (4) The onus was for the allies to do the attacking. This was in one of the most favourable defensive terrains in the ETO. It was also in the face of an enemy with significantly more infantry firepower and mortars which was critical in the bocage terrain. British training emphasised cooperation between arms (believe it or not!) and heavy reliance upon armour and arty support of infantry. But this was badly exposed in the bocage since the former were too vulnerable and the limited observation hampered the latter. Even so the Germans hardly performed outstandingly when on the attack in the same country. It is hardly suprising in these circumstances allied units and leaders took some time to come to grips with their jobs which were tactically more complex than those facing the Germans. This learning process being non-uniform resulted in the patchy performance of allied units especially as new units "entered the fray". On the whole I think it would be fair to say that generally US units adapted more quickly than British but it is a generalisation. IMO this can be ascribed to several factors: Brits were less likely to promote junior officers from experienced NCOs, the attrition rate for junior leaders were very high and their manpower situation was critical. On the whole I think this issue of differences in military cultures vis a vis initiative is overemphasised (though real) and the characterisation of the Germans as 'empowered' and filled with zeal to employ their own initiative is as unpalatable and ridiculous as that of them as automatons. Equally reversing the characterisation to see the allies as automatons is also ridiculous. None of my reading suggests that junior British leaders down to NCO level were not generally "in the picture" or that battle plans were excessively rigid, though I am sure there are plenty of exceptions. The assessment of the Brits taken from German accounts of their SOP is of no value in this respect. I mean how the hell does 'Klaus' know whether the British platoon has gone to ground and lost the initiative because their officer has bought it or because he and his mates are hosing them down with 3 or 4 MG42 whose firepower they cannot hope to match and probably can't even locate. Enough blather...

Well Reisberg is a pretty ahistorical scenario. More reasonable would be to take away one of the US platoons and give them 2 more FO units with a lot more ammo plus some big stuff and some tacair for good measure. Then at the first sign of resistance they can plaster the place for 10-15 turns and then roll up to accept the surrender of whatevers left.

I wasn't actually referring to the Brigades which I think were a Corps or Army resource but to the Abteilung which were divisional I think, don't have the refs with me now. A lot of authors have commented on German infantry reliance on assault guns when attacking so I don't think you can equate them with IG functionally.

Yea, the 2pdr HE might have been nice but what they really needed was better cooperation between their armour and arty. You could try pinging away at a dug in 88 1/2 a km away with 2pdr HE or you could call in a battery of 25pdrs on it

My 'bonus' comment was principally directed at the original intended application for this design. Sure, I agree their actual role became more AT. But organisationally and operationally they weren't efficiently employed in this role as they could have been. A point which was clear to Guderian who tried desperately to get them under his control. It's an organisational point that might not be clear at CMs scale but which results in divisional AT and artillery units both being equipped with AT weapons thereby diluting the ability for direct HE fire support. As others have pointed out on this thread the turretless AFV is very vulnerable to infantry assault so it's OK in defense but not so good in attack. The Shermans advantage was it's flexibility as an essentially infantry support tank with a moderate AT capability which was able to deal with most German AFVs (there weren't that many Tigers and Panthers). This is what people are finding (apparently to their suprise), of course it would be nice if it were a bit more survivable That extra MG and the benefits of the turret can be seen in the infantry support role which is why the German employment of turretless vehicles in that role has often been seen as a mistake. My comment about artillery was an organisational one not what type of troops were manning them I agree that's largely irrelevant. The idea being that the Sturmartillerie which was supposed to support infantry assaults should not have been employed in the AT role which was really the role of the Panzerjager units when the. Would you swap a StuG for a StuH in CE or LD?

That whole business with that guy they captured who shows up the next day in a different uniform and unit was just SO contrived and weak.

I agree with Mike, the 17pdr definitely was supplied with HE, though by all accounts in the Firefly it was generally stowed in the old co-drivers position (only 4 crew) and a little inaccessible. This is because of the way Firefly's were employed ie mainly to engage tanks and SPs.

I was interested to read this thread and see all the different backgrounds. I didn't get a lot of chance to talk to my grandfathers about their WW2 experiences since they were in the UK and I was in Aussie and I had never visited there since my interest changed from ancient to modern military history. My maternal grandfather was in the RAF as groundcrew (maintenance) in a big bomber base somewhere in the UK. He hated the war and didn't talk about it much. I think he felt that all those guys who lost their lives bombing German cities were an unnecessary waste. When people discuss 'Bomber' Harris and the German civilian victims of his policies they tend to forget that the very large number of RAF aircrew lost were also victims of his idiocy. My paternal grandfather is more interesting. He was in the 79th armoured division (Hobarts' Funnies) and landed on D+1 or 2 I think. Though he was in the div HQ unit he drove the div Intelligence officer around in a jeep. They went all over the place (since the 79th supplied supporting armour to many operations) and though generally reluctant to talk had some hair raising stories of being behind enemy lines especially in the fluid situation following the Normandy breakout. He got pretty good at turning that jeep around fast. I find it a little hard to recall all the details but he had a couple of stories about being caught in traffic jams, in German convoys! He also told the tale of being directly behind the leading troop of Shermans on a side road when the first 3 (of 4) were knocked out by one fairly close range shot from a Tiger. He said himself and the 4th tank made record speed in reverse that day.

Are you sure that order is right Fionn? I was expecting hunt to make the crew hyper-aware so surely it should go between move and stationary? If it doesn't what's the rationale?

The British phased out the 6pdr on their tanks and replaced it with the 75mm in order to standardize tank ammunition since they also had lots of Shermans and to a lesser extent because of the better HE performance. There was a lot of resistance to this process in British units and it was slow since by that stage the 6pdr was almost exclusively using the sabot ammunition (scenario designers take note) which was a much better anti-armour option than the 75mm with standard AP. Anybody know if the 17pdr used a sabot round and how common it was.

First, I did not intend to start a debate about ethics, not interested unless provoked. I was glad that Steve included it in his assessment as many people don't which is problematic IMO. My comment as quoted by Berl was my take on Steve's high rating for Hausser and Rommel in this category which I considered generous. If you read Steve's wide definition of the ethical category you will see that it is multifaceted and IMO to just look good in one aspect doesn't fufill the requirements. IMO Mark IV's choice of Paulus as an highly ethical German commander is way off the mark (he he). Simplistically one could compare his situation to Percivals but it is a far more complex question than that and the options facing Paulus are somewhat more complex and varied than Percival. Furthermore I would think that Percival has been rehabilitated somewhat in recent years and the principal criticism of him was not so much that he surrendered but that he got himself into a position where he had to. In fact all the comparisons that Major Tom uses are spurious since they are not in the same context at all. Indeed the principal involved is one of degrees rather than absolutes. Inflicting immeasurable suffering and unnecessary death upon your own men by holding out far beyond the point when justifiable even in purely military terms and additionally in so doing ensuring that they had little chance of surviving a harsh captivity might be your idea of sound ethical conduct but it isn't mine. Furthermore as I clearly pointed out Paulus's 'surrender' was essentially an empty gesture as by that time he had few troops under his direct control. A read of a biography of Paulus or a good book on Stalingrad should give you the measure of the man, demonstrate his moral dilemma and his failure to come to grips with it. Berl, I don't know if your native language is English (apologies if it isn't) but how you interpret my statement (which you quote) as being equivalent to stating that they were all 'unethical' is beyond my comprehension. As for belittling my well considered opinions which are based on widespread reading of accounts from guys who were there and serious biographical research by glib references to "living rooms" and "experience not theory". Well that's a pretty weak approach to arguing a case, a rational consideration of the circumstances and context of a decision would be better received. To restate and make myself abundantly clear which seems necessary: 1. Lets stick to the ethical question in the overall context. 2. I did not say the majority of German commanders were unethical. 3. By the time Paulus surrendered he didn't have much left to surrender (his command post was surrounded) most of his troops had either (a) ignored his previous no-surrender orders or ( were out of contact. Furthermore IIRC he refused to order the northern pocket to surrender anyway.

Paulus, don't get me going about that second rater, a very good staff officer but a dud commander, I would rate Paulus (he was no 'von') as a disgrace ethically. For a start his 'surrender' at Stalingrad was basically a fait accompli as the Russians were basically at his command post and large numbers of his troops had already taken their own initiative to do so. By his indecision and prevarication over the issues of breaking out and surrendering at different timepoints he condemned the vast bulk of his army. By hanging on long beyond the point at which his army was actually tying down substantial Russian forces which could be employed elsewhere (and was therefore militarily useful) he condemned the majority of them to death in captivity. Why? Because though Russian captivity was certainly harsh the survival statistics for those captured at Stalingrad are not the same as those captured elsewhere. This is because starvation and disease had set in to such an extent that those troops had no inherent physical reserves to allow them to survive the initial period of captivity. Furthermore following the rejection of their surrender ultimatums the Russians expected few prisoners and did not make any provision for the numbers they did get. These factors are directly attributable to Paulus and not out of his control. I recommend you read Joachim Weider's Stalingrad:memories and reassessments for an accounting of Paulus's actions, he is not particularly enamoured with Manstein in this regard either though he is not as critical of Paulus as some other authors.

Notice: this thread is a 'release date' free zone I was so impressed with Steve's contribution to the "SS-commanders" thread that I thought it deserved one of its own. One not limited to that pretty sorry bunch and not overtaken by a bizarre (though amusing and good natured) interarm rivalry and general name calling. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>The problem with discussing good "commanders" is that there are three traits that make up each. Now, to the degree that they possess all three is the degree I rank them. But any STRONG showing in so much as one trait makes me tip my hat with some degree of respect. They are: 1. Military Leadership (in the sense of tactics, logistics, and overall sense of military situations). This can be subdivided into Tactical and Strategic if you like. 2. Motivational Leadership (in the sense of getting men to perform up to standards ABOVE normal military training under the most difficult circumstances). 3. Ethical Leadership (doing the "right" thing for either the men under him, for his country, or "greater society") There are VERY few commanders that have high marks in all three. I would say that Hauser scores very well in all three. Someone like Rommel or Patton scores HUGELY the second and third, but only decently in the first. Eicke can only claim good marks in the second, very low in the first and NEGATIVE in the last. There are also two German Generals I can think of that surrendered major cities intact (Paris and Rome) instead of raising them to the ground as ordered. Their military careers were admirable, but not spectacular. However, they each made at least one decision that the world should forever be grateful to them for making.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I think 1 definitely needs to be divided into 1A Tactical and 1B Strategic as too many generals were brilliant in one and mediocre in the other. For example Rommel 1A brilliant and 1B dud, though I definitely wouldn't score him highly for 3 either. Conversely Monty would get 1A adequate and 1B good, though he would score very highly in 2 and 3. Talking generally (no pun intended) I would also say that command at different levels (division, corps, army) requires different levels of each so it becomes more complex. As for German WWII commanders very few of them would rate very highly in 3. Joachim Wieder makes the point in his book about the ethical vacuum that existed with some force and eloquence coming from a guy who was captured at Stalingrad. One German commander I would rate very highly in all three would be Frido von Senger und Etterlin. [This message has been edited by Simon Fox (edited 01-19-2000).]

guachi Your assessment pretty much matches the opinion of those who served in Shermans which I have gleaned from reading numerous accounts. Allied tank crews felt they were more than a match for the MkIV and StuG. Interestingly the Panther doesn't seem to be held in quite the same fear that one would expect especially in close terrain, not quite sure why. The big nasty was the Tiger. If you read Tout's account of the fighting around St Aignan the sense of elation when they knock out 3 Tigers without losing any of their own is palpable and indicative of their knowledge that they had probably saved themselves 12 of their own tanks. Of course every Brit tank troop had a Tiger antidote (a Firefly) while the poor Yanks had none. On the subject of the anti-infantry capability of the StuG the comments on this thread are very interesting. Doctrinally the StuG was a mobile infantry support weapon which was operated by the artillery arm. Thus it was intended for direct fire support of infantry assaults and therefore the delivery of HE. It's AT capability was something of a bonus. As such it was probably a failure in its intended role. The absence of a suitable infantry support tank with a turret mounted gun with a good HE capability has been identified by a number of historians as a significant failing in Guderians' prewar organisation of German armoured forces. Of course later in the war with Germany largely on the defensive the StuG came into its own as an AT weapon. However, this effectiveness was diluted somewhat as it continued to be operated by the artillery arm and not under the organistaion of the Panzertruppe. If you think the Sherman has a good HE capability I can't wait to get my hands on the Sherman 105 'assault gun' variant which were highly valued by the units employing them but never around in sufficient numbers.

"No to mine clearing "funnies". There is a big, long thread about this some time ago." What no Sherman Crab (this is a flail tank not a roller tank), no Churchill AVRE?, no Churchill Crocodile?, no Valentine Bridging tanks . Hey these are neat toys. What about the Kangaroo APC? "The vehicles were mostly only used during the early days of D-Day." My grandfather was in the 79th division so I guess he must have had a pretty easy time of it after the "early days of D-day"...NOT. Anyway I don't expect too much change in CM1 at this stage but if you do north africa etc for CM3 the issue of mines will need some more attention and plenty of discussion! yippee!

"a horrid and depressing place" I am with you there Fionn, I don't know how you do it. I used to work in a hospital and we all use to say: this would be a great place to work if it weren't for all these sick people! The only way I would be practicing medicine would in sports medicine! Marko, your deep and abiding cynicism shows you are well equipped for the world. In my experience it's kids that have the most impact on my gaming (ie no bloody money!). Anyway there is always the computer at work: "Have to work a bit late tonight"

"In WW II low-level indirect fire like this would have been handled more often (and more effectively, I think) by company mortars. So plunging, indirect MG fire is unlikely to be included in CM (though I've taken note of it for possiblefuture inclusion)." As you say Steve this may not be so relevant for the scope of CM1 but you should certainly think of it for CM3 as early war British and Commonwealth forces had organic machine gun battalions. In histories of these units you can often read descriptions of indirect "shoots" as preliminary "bombardments" to assaults (along with arty and mortars) also in defence there are descriptions of possible enemy assembly/concentration areas out of LOS being registered for interdiction by indirect fire. If you want any more info I can dig it out.

In the campaign game laying small bridges across small rivers should certainly be within the time frame especially with mobile bridging equipment and could be a good focus for a campaign game. As for clearing minefields it should certainly be possible to both remove and place mines in the campaign game and possibly even in a scenario. I am specifically thinking of boobytrapped buildings and roadblocks consisting of a small number of mines. In the current scenario if Martin had a few mines to place in those forest roads then Fionn would be stuffed if he couldn't clear them. From my reading this was a very common practice. Also you would have to allow mine clearing during a scenario if dozer or flail tanks were available and these weren't exactly rare, the Brits had a whole division of specialised armour. I am sure this won't be in but I reckon it should be if the specialised armour is in and I don't know how you can manage mines in the campaign game but I hope it has been worked out. Steve?

I find Steve's arguments pretty reasonable. Yes, unlimited ammo is globally unrealistic. But in the context of the game? Probably not IMO. While we can all discuss features in isolation and I have pushed a few ideas myself I have generally been content to accept that BTS need to be stubborn about what goes in. What might seem a minor but critical change from your view (especially if you have a bee in your bonnet about it!) in isolation is from their perspective an incremental but significant increase in complexity. It is all about prioritising. BTW from all stories I have read about the way they loaded their tanks up I would guess that in reality they had a fair bit more than the official load. This applies to situations where ammo was plentiful of course.

Well I ride a bicycle in Australia and most of my way to work is cycleways so I have a nice relaxing ride and definitely no snow or ice he he. Here people got so pissed off with mobile phones it is illegal to use them while driving in most places and anybody seen using one gets an earful of abuse. Like motorbikes we are vulnerable and every now and again I get knocked off, as you usually see it coming I always try and land on the bonnet. I just got myself a nice new bike courtesy of some moron. As for close misses I am very adept with my bike pump and a few bashes on the duco and they soon give you a bit of room he he. Thankfully we only have normal off road vehicles not those huge things but then as they say "everything is bigger in the US" (everything visible that is ). I often wonder about that inverse relationship hypothesis they say it about dogs too?

Actually I think all beta testers should be made to submit AARs just to make them earn what is after all a privilege

I wonder if perhaps it could be related to unit experience/quality, ie as a general rule the greener the unit the further out they engage at. Simulating the superior fire discipline of experienced/well-trained units. Steve?

Gee Martin, no-one wants to talk to you anymore is that because they think your victory is assured or because they think you are a lost cause? Anyway though I am sure the gameplay is way ahead of the AARs but I have one thing to say to you: if your troops are hiding and not spotted for goodness sake wait until they are sitting in your lap before you open up on them! Good WWII fire discipline was to open up at 50-100m. Its no good wasting ammo (which you are short of) by harrassing/attriting them at longer ranges.