Simon Fox

Oops! Sorry Steve. As your post didn't actually give the plane I thought you were still referring to the Stuka. Should have read Lee's post as well. Anyway he is dreaming if he thinks the Germans can realistically expect air support. There are plenty of allied accounts of it: mainly because in was so unusual it was worth commenting on .

"Uh, if you were a Sherman tank commander, what would you do?" Sherman commander: 'Boy, we sure are glad we got air today. We have marked the target.' Pilot: 'Roger that. We have spotted the armour concentration, should have you out of trouble soon.' BOOM! he he

"Cool plane though " Excuse me for dissenting but the reputation of this plane rests largely on the exploits of one pilot:Rudel. By all accounts other pilots hated flying the thing: it was slow, unstable to fly, vulnerable to ground fire and a sitting duck to fighters. The personal accounts of many German ground attack pilots show that what they yearned for was a copy of the Shturmovik which made a real impression on them. My opinion based on that of many of those who flew it, the Stuka G was crap.

I am glad that Doug and Pixman have voiced their criticisms. Sure many of their errors can be ascribed to "unlearning" old habits but I think that some plain common sense and most of all PATIENCE would have made the most difference. Fionn may have made a big error with his fast vs hunt order but what the hell was he doing charging that Sherman with a Puma that was already causing Martin plenty of grief. Especially as he had the infantry and PzIV to deal with it. Lucky for him Martin was equally silly and got greedy once he cooked the Puma and tried to bag the PzIV. Boy was that dumb! The Sherman in the N didn't have to do anything for the rest of the scenario if he could get it in a safe spot. By it's mere presence it could both modify and delay Fionn's attack. It is interesting to read the swings of fortune in the AARs. A few turns back I would have sworn Fionn had no chance after Martin got his armour and came off fairly well from the arty (rightly so IMO). I better stop here otherwise I'll be earning the diatribe nome de plume. Of course if we had our hands on the game we might not be so vociferous in our criticism of others as we would be making our own mistakes and a bit of jealousy might be creeping in there too

Well, if we are going to start throwing Sun Tzu around.. 'the practical value of history is to throw the film of the past through the material projector of the present on to the screen of the future'. Liddell Hart "...the way that the wish has fathered the thought throughout the course of warfare, and led to endless futilities, is apt to seem the most extraordinary of military phenomena" Liddell Hart

"I don't care how good it is, just as long as it's not Micros***"

I also have very much enjoyed reading the AARs (and also AARs in general I might add) though they are a somewhat vicarious way to enjoy a game. I addition to letting you see CM in action and learn a few pointers the easy way (through others' mistakes ) they give an insight into how others might approach a problem differently to yourself. But most importantly of all they let you see how Martin and Fionn think through the game and you might come up against them someday. Which gives you something of an advantage hehe. Like when you play Fionn you just know that if he is defending he will attempt a counterattack in the middle of your preparatory barrage and when you play Martin he will defend each position to the end- no retreat! What was that- mean? Whaddaya mean, mean? Just because I was cackling with glee

Gee, von Diatribe strikes again, he can't even make a joke without it becoming a diatribe!

"But as Martin's Turn 20 AAR shows, disengaging can be tricky work." Actually I think that the AAR shows that disengaging TOO LATE without making any provision/planning for it or arranging for suitable/sufficient supporting fire for it or providing smoke or arty to cover it makes it tricky work. I agree with Pixman, from the very outset Martin declared his intention to delay and then retreat but his dispositions didn't really allow sufficient mutual support. By the way has Martin got any arty left?

dano, It may be that I was exaggerating a little with my use of the word "never" perhaps I should have used seldom instead. It's just that I have read many accounts of vets bemoaning that they never got the 76mm guns and had to make do with the 75mm. The data you present does indicate a substantial flow of the 76 armed version into the ETO but doesn't indicate its distribution between units or the relative priorities for issue. "At the end of the critique, Patton asked if there were any questions. And I asked him why the armored divisions got the first crack at the new equipment, why didn’t we get some? He asked me what I thought? I said we should have gotten some of the new tanks like the armored divisions were getting. He paused and said, "Politics, son. Politics." It was a good answer."

I actually find the British designations (2pdr, 6pdr, 17pdr) intensely annoying when it comes to this sort of discussion. While I have a fair idea as to where they fall in the scheme of things I would be interested in knowing what the characteristics of these guns are when expressed in the standard nomenclature (ie 75mmL40). I am sure that someone can satisfy my curiosity.

Steve, Yes, the unit was one of the independant tank Btn attached to inf. div. so they would have had a mixture of Shermans with 75s or 105s. My understanding is that such units never saw the 76 or Jumbos for that matter A point I might add that scenario designers should take note of- if they weren't from an armoured division you can forget the 76s and Jumbos

I had actually thought about this one before as I had read something about it too (but not the same story as jim's). I hadn't bothered to bring it up as I thought it was interesting but fairly unusual. All these quotes relate to the 712th Tank Btn but are from different individuals This is in combat: "Thursday I was one of the fellows who had to go out for indirect firing. The weather was really swell, and it was not bad out there at all. We slept in tents and only fired in the night. Fred Hostler and I were on at two in the morning. We fired eight rounds for a certain range, and then eight more for a different one." This shows that there was training in it even in the US: "They sent us to Fort Jackson, South Carolina, and we took a lot of indirect gunfire down there, by reading the compass on the tank and the aiming stake and a map, and I believe we stayed there till, I don't remember what day it was, if it was in February, when we left there and got on a train and went to Boston, Massachusetts." More on combat: "We were in a farmhouse outside of a town on the other side of Metz, doing indirect firing. So every once in a while they sent somebody up with one officer, we had to register the guns, just to see where you’re shooting." I have also read an account of another tank unit being trained by an artillery officer in indirect firing and how they found the skill useful but I can't recall where that one was. So it was probably a bit more common than you think Steve but seemingly of limited tactical impact. Might be more appropriate to the Sherman 105 "assault gun". Mind you if you had the skill and you had located an AT gun and didn't want to engage it directly.....

Good point Rick. Nicer to think that we have been refining ideas by kicking them around. I was thinking that I was just being bloody minded and argumentative

Here are my flippant remarks on the prisoner issue. Well it would be pretty easy to handle in a Pacific theatre game after early 1942 nether side were interested in prisoners or becoming one. I am not so sure about the Marines but I know that by the end of 1942 the only difference between the Japs and the Aussies was that the Japs bayoneted the enemy wounded while the Aussies shot them (much more humane don't you think?). I know that there won't be a "CM in the jungle", though it should be more simple to write: don't need multiplayer or PBEM, solitaire play only, AI only needs to reflect Japanese doctrine and behaviour Mike D (D=diatribe perhaps?), Shame on you Mike, you should have remembered that Fionn was a recent perpetrator of diatribes in other threads about forums. He is still very sensitive, poor chap and must have forgotten the general tone around here. I recommend that in future if you even remotely think your diatribe might offend him you liberally sprinkle it with these. Fionn, Your principle mistake was in stating in your AAR that by assembling the prisoners at the same point as your reorganisation of your units they might be protected from Martin's arty. All I can say to that is "fat chance" FFE! and next time keep it to yourself and no one will be the wiser In general (ie not specific to the current game) for all the whingeing about prisoners impacting on the availability of frontline troops I am sure that those troops would rather be escorting those prisoners to the rear than being shot at by them Disclaimer: this post was composed with tongue firmly planted in cheek (lucky I didn't have to speak throughout) it has been carefully edited to ensure that only the most wimpy/boneless individual could take offense or most illiterate individual could misconstrue its intent. So if you fall into either of these groups B## #$! now that was offensive

Steve, I sincerely hope the US M15 (37mm+twin 50cal) and M16 (quad 50cal) are going to be in to even things up for the allies in the "Ground Support" stakes. CoolcolJ, I kind of think the timing of the BoB was a little before any jets could possibly have had an impact (just a bit!). Also the economics of jet production and resources required may have precluded the Germans from producing sufficient jets to have a real impact. The Brits also had an early jet engine design and pretty much ignored it like the Germans so any speculation about the 'what ifs' of German jet production work both ways.

"I fell silly making AAA vehicles for the Allies. All they are going to do is shoot up ground targets" Steve, By all accounts they proved to be very effective in this role especially in the Ardennes where they were instrumental in preventing quite a few artillery units from being overrun.

Cruelty-cruelty is starting a new thread with lots of juicy info on your article and as the reader reads on towards the end and the inevitable url directing him to said article, what does he get-"real soon" Now that is real mean!

Lots of interest in arty here and I have a few more questions to throw in myself though I would also be interested in the answer to Paul. I presume they have smoke but haven't used it, I love smoke "The thinking commanders best weapon" I have read it called. Smoke the reverse slope you make when you haven't got a reverse slope...boy, I could go on. Apart than that my questions are: 1) How much flexibility is there in the arty controls? For example if you don't have much ammo can you fire harrassing artillery rather than an all tubes barrage. I am especially thinking of mortars here. A quick "stonk" with a few rounds could be devastating in the right spot, but still preserve ammo. So how is the duration of fire determined. Fionn has defined his ammo stocks in terms of minutes, is that the smallest increment? 2)I seem to recall reading something somewhere (can't for the life remember where) about the nebelwerfer blast being less effective than normal arty (assuming equal shell size). Something about the height of the main shrapnel zone or some such jargon. So it was deadly against upright troops but not so bad against prone or dug in troops. Have you read anything of that nature or am I full of it. Since you like my Aussie stories Steve (not Ozzie by the way, which is the name of a dumb ostrich puppet on TV) here's an arty one from Peter Brune's "The Spell Broken: exploding the myth of Japanese invincibility" which I am currently reading. During the operation against Buna (New Guinea) a 25 pdr was hauled through the jungle and sited quite close to the frontlines (about 1km). In addition to its normal role this gun, which was known as Carson's gun after the Sgt in charge, actually engaged in sniping at the Japanese: "The deadly accuracy of the laying gave the OPO (observation post officer) the power of life and death over any individual Jap seen in the target area. Lt T.J (Tom) Handran-Smith, the OPO would sometimes nominate his targets....Handran-Smith spied a Japanese giving orders to a couple of his men. The officer or NCO stopped momentarily in a short shallow tranch...This trench had been accurately registered...Said the OPO, "I nominate that bloke for the next round". Orders were quickly passed the the gun; all eyes were on the Jap. When the 25-pdr fired, the Jap appeared to sense that the round was meant for him. He jumped up on to the parapet with the idea of making a dash... The onlookers assert that the shell hit him in the middle of the stomach. At all events, he disappeared in instant disintegration" 3)So when CM3 comes along (Med and Balkans etc) I DEMAND that special 25-pdr sniper teams (25pdr sniper crew + FO) are included for Aussie artillery. This is in the tradition of me finding an unusual anecdote and turning it into a theatre wide reality ie captured fausts or 4.2" mortars.

There you go Fionn- there are no loopholes, these guys have thought of most things especially with cunning and evil individuals such as yourself in mind

Sorry that should be principles- which I have occasionally been accused of lacking! Given the effectiveness of the mortar barrage (unobserved? or preregistered?) in the south would Martin have been better served by employing some 105mm in the forest in closer coordination with his ambushes ie ambush the lead units and plaster the traffic jam. Would it have made much difference if he had used 80mm in the town instead of the heavy stuff. Given all those reinforcments he has got it he really ended up with more than enough to assault the town-hindsight is a wonderful thing

Firstly Steve you should know by now that I am very serious in all my posts (not an ounce of humour) and your flippant sarcasm has hurt me deeply boo hoo ;( Secondly I don't doubt that it was realistic, I just think it was mean, nasty and not conducive to maintaining the confidence of the men in their commander. No doubt he hurt Fionn but if his forest ambushes had been a bit stronger he could possibly have caused the same or more damage but had an opportunity to save the units to fight again and again etc. For example in the north the HQ/bazooka team combination was effective but were lost in close infantry combat (for which neither are suited) an additional squad and maybe a MG would have been beneficial. Conversely in the south Martin was very lucky (IMO) because his bazooka team and arty did well but the infantry could really have benefitted from a HQ unit. I know that he had to juggle the conflicting priorities and the restrictions of the setup rules. I am not saying that these would have worked better as I don't know the game but I am wondering what either of you think in retrospect. It appears that the basic principals emerging here are the importance of C & C and that team weapons are best employed with infantry support/protection.

Martin should have ordered his tank crews to raid those farm buildings for a few bedsheets, then he might have a few more Shermans left

Martin, Why did you allow units of your delaying force to be overrun rather than withdrawing them under control. Would you deploy any differently in the east with the benefit of experience. I think that the men in your delaying force (any that survive that is) would be justified in thinking you had a little concern for them. I think that they might not fight so hard for you again!

Fionn, Stop trolling around these threads your place is your own thread and writing AAR's. Now get back to work, we know from reliable sources that you are dragging your feet!