Henri

There are too many questions in your post for me to reply (at least not today). But just let me point out that the Western view of the Soviet WW2 is still much influenced by the Cold War, where it was politically expedient to depict the soviets as incompetent robots who only knew how to win by human wave attacks. Just a couple of corrections. Even today, people who point this out are liable to be labeled as commie-lovers by diehard cold warriors (yes, it has happened to me). If the Soviets were so incompetent, it would be hard to understand how they won the two most decisive battles of WW2 (Stalingrad and Kursk) with forces that were about equal in numbers to those of the Germans (about 1 milion men inthe case of Stalingrad). Soviet military doctrine was much influenced by Lobashevsky's theories of maneuver warfare, but in early WW2 they were generally unable to put them into effect due to the earlier purges of some 40,000 Soviet officers. This theory included deep penetrations hundreds of miles behind enemy lines which were being carried out to a limited extent as early as 1941. The Germans did not lose 2 million men (which was the size of the German army that invaded the USSR), but some 13 million men, most of whom were lost on the Eastern Front. Official Soviet numbers were never published as far as I know, but are generally estimated at some 20 million (which probably includes a lot of civilians). The Soviet soldiers before Barbarossa were not ordered not to shoot back but to avoid provoking the Germans into a shooting war. Stalin apparently did not believe that the Germans would attack Russia in 1941, and when they did, he compounded the disaster by ordering not to give any ground.He eventually realized his mistake and eventually left the military decisions to his generals. Despite the purges, some of the most competent generals of WW2 were Soviets. Zhukov was in a class by himself on the Soviet side, but there were other excellent officers. Henri

Good point. It has become the habit of some on this forum to characterize those who support mneuver warfare as some kind of wild-eyed maniacs who understand nothing about warfare, neglecting the fact that maneuver theory is the official doctrine of the US Army and of the US Marine Corps. It is even clearer in the case of the USMC, since whole sections of the doctrine in MCDP-1 are lifted directly from Lind's book. MCDP1 like the Army manuals is also available on the web for free, so there is no excuse for not reading it. So I would launch the following challenge to those who characterize themselves as attritionists and who oppose maneuver warfare: please read MDCP-1, then please tell us exactly which parts of the doctrine you think are wrong. I can't speak for anyone else, but as far as I am concerned, this is EXACTLY what I support as maneuver warfare, nothing more and nothing less. So never mind the straw men about maneuverists claiming that one should never attack or never defend, or about when to stop dancing and start hitting, or requesting examples of when the theory is wrong, and let us have the specifics of exactly where and why you think the doctrine of the USMC as described in MCDP-1 is unrealistic and stupid. Chapter and verse. It's time to stop dancing around and time to start hitting. Henri

"Tanks Tactics 1941-45", by Kenneth Macksey explains British tank tactics with illustrations and a few AARs. Henri

But you can do that with the existing versions. In Quick Battles, I typically choose a veteran infantry company and most of the rest regular, including an extra regular infanty platoo if I have enough points. As long as you buy them separately, you can mix as much as you want. What you could not do (and probably still can't) is to buy a Company of infantry and then throw out a platoon and replace it with another one. But if you buy platoons separately, they could be of any kind (of course you pay slightly more for buying them separately). Henri

Thanks for the interesting links, Blackhorse. An interesting paragraph with respect to planning (chapter 8 of FM100-5 relevant to the question of the ability of sub-units to adapt is the following: MISSION Commanders pass to their subordinates a clear statement of what is to be done and for what purpose. Different combinations of offensive and defensive operations allow subordinate commanders freedom of action. Whenever possible, commanders assign subordinates a force-oriented objective and a zone with few restrictive measures. Henri [This message has been edited by Henri (edited 02-08-2001).]

To answer your question, I read that at some point in Africa, the British had an agreement with the Germans that there would be no hostilities after dark.This was to avoid the hassle of patrols bumping into each other in the pitch dark desert night. At one point, a new British officer on his way to his unit captured a German truck and was proud to display it upon his arrival. His horrified superiors immediately sent it back to the Germans with profuse apologies. Unfortunately I don't remember the source for this anecdote. Henri

I can't believe anyone would actually write such an arrogant and condescending statement in a discussion. I refuse to discuss with anyone who admits that his obejctive is trying to prove that I am an ignoramus. But just for good measure, here is a quote from a military expert about civilians and military theory. "But why all this from a civilian instead of a professional soldier?In fact the entire movement for military reform is driven mainly by civilian intellectuals, not military officers, - a notable exception being retired Air Force Colonel John Boyd. When you think about it, this is not surprising. We have never institutionalized a system that encourages innovative ideas or criticism from subordinates. Proposing significant change is frequently viewed as criticism of superiors, since they are responsible for the way things are, and borders on disloyalty if not insubordination. So it is not surprising that the movement for reform comes from outside the military establishment." Colonel John C. Studt, USMC, in the forward to Lind's "Maneuver Warfare handbook". Goodbye... Henri A dierrhea of words usually indicates constipation of the mind (can't remember whosaid it, but I wish it were me...) [This message has been edited by Henri (edited 02-07-2001).]

Leonhard wrote a 40-page chapter on an analysis of the Gulf War where he describes where maneuver theory was used and where it wasn't. I was requested by Spook to summarize Leonhard's criticisms of the US planning and execution in that war. I did so. I was not asked to give an account of what they did right, but of the alleged deficiencies, and that is what I did. Leonhard never claimed that maneuver warfare was not used at all in the Gulf War, and that mistaken impression probably comes from my trying to summarize 40 pages in one page and arguing against people who have not read Leonhard's book.I apologize for not being able to give the same information in one page that Leonhard gave in 40 pages Henri

LOL, you have answered your own question The answer is in Manstein's book "Lost Victories". Andplease don't ask me to summarize it. I did that for Leonhard's analysis of the Gulf War over the weekend and am now embroiled in defending his point of view against ScoutPL I am no more interested in refighting the battle of Kursk than in refighting the Gulf War... Henri

The Israeli Army The issues raised in Leonhard's analysis of Operation Desert Storm are not about who has the largest penis: they are about how the US misapplied its own warfighting theory in that particular conflict,with the hope that this anmalysis will help prevent failures in the future. Henri [This message has been edited by Henri (edited 02-06-2001).]

Leonhard states that he carried out extensive interviews with participants and tht the deficiencies were extensive if not universal. He explicitely mentions battalion and brigade commanders, so it is safe to conclude that at least some of the commanders at that level agreed with him about the top-down comman structure (but who knows, some might have liked that...). Knowing the military and the politics, it is probably safe to say that there are also some who disagree with him, in particular those who wrote the TRADOC document... Some might reply to Leonhard "how can you argue with success?", and he makes it clear that he does not; his worry is that if the Iraki army (or some other army in the future) with more command initiative had exploited the inflexible attack of Desert Storm by for instance attacking at the junctures ofthe moving forces, it could have turned into a disaster or at least resulted in heavy casualties for the US. I think that the most telling part of the analysis is pointing out that although the Republican Guard was wrongly identified as the center of gravity (key vulnerability) of the Irakis, they were not destroyed, but the Irakis collapsed anyway, so the center of gravity had to be somewhere else. For a totally top-down army like that of the Irakis, it was clearly the command and control system which was destroyed early in the battle, thus leaving the commanders without orders and totally paralyzing the whole army. This was not exactly Sun Tzu's ideal winning of a battle without fighting, but it was as close as one can get in modern warfare... Although Leonhard doesn't go this far, one could say that Desert Storm was won as a battle of maneuver by accident! One shudders at what could have happened if the Iraki Army had been trained and organized along the lines of say, the Israeli Army... Henri

It is risky to try to summarize a 40-page appendix with a few out-of-context lines, but at the risk of oversimplification, here it is. Leonhard is a military officer who was in the Gulf War. First let me say that Leonhard states that many examples of maneuver warfare were used in the Gulf War, -the threatened Marine invasion that never materialized but that kept 6 Iraki divisions busy to counter it, the feint into the teeth of the main Iraki line that turned into a success when the line turned out to be much weaker than expected, the destruction of the command and control capacity of the Iraki army and so on. Here are some quotes that point out the deficiencies; I hope that they give a flavor of what Leonhard feels are the deficiencies. Interested readers should read the whole thing for themselves, since compression by a factor of about 100 is conducive to loss of information... "The thesis of this appendix is quite simply that the US Army which led the coalition forces to success was not a good army. It was merely a better army than its opponent." "The prevailing theory was that the center of gravity of the Iraki regime was the Republican Guard Corps. Hence the destruction of the Corps would result in the paralysis of Hussein's forces... maneuver theory insists that the enemy's center of gravity is his critical vulnerability, that aspect of which will paralyze or disrupt his forces." (The Republican Guard was not destroyed...). "The defeat of the Iraki forces through disruption occured as a result of the interdiction of their supply lines by air and neutralization of their command-and-control systems." "Another deviation from maneuver warfare theory was the preoccupation with mass rather than momentum or force, a mistake that General Schwartzkopf gradually realized and corrected". "Operation Desert Storm was strictly controlled from the top down...I have maintained previously that this type of command-push is not necessarily a violation of maneuver theory...." "It is the opposite of what our current and developing doctrine says we so...The break between our written doctrine and our practice has never been more clearly demonstrated than in Operation Desert Storm, despite the politically safe statements that our doctrine has been vindicated". "Our highly centralized approach to the War worked because the enemy's command system was also highly centralized, even more so than ours." "...our operational plan made no provision for a decisive follow-up..." "TRADOC's official interpretation of Operation Desert Storm included the observation that the US Army is moving ever closer to mission tactics and missionorders. In fact, just the reverse is true...My battalion and brigade commanders both noted after the war that they had no tactical decisions to make..." Other considerations such as the confusion among fire support networks aswell as detailed discussions of teh above issues can be found in this 40-page appendix. Henri

In fact, neither Leonhard (The Art of Maneuver) nor Lind (Maneuver Warfare Handbook) give a definition of maneuver warfare. The US Marine Corps MCDP1 "Warfighting gives the following definition: Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. This definition needs of course to be understood in context, and MCDP1 has 113 pages.Clearly this definition implicitely refers to the Boyd cycle. Spook: As I said, I only glanced at the chapter in Leonhard where he discusses the Gulf War, but I'll have a look tonight and see if I can summarize what he said. About attrition, here is what MCDP1 says on p. 81: ...In fact, maneuver warfare often involves extremely high attrition of selected enemy forces where we have focused combat power against critical enemy weakness. Nonetheless, the aim of such attrition is not merely to reduce incrementally the enemy’s physical strength. Rather, it is to contribute to the enemy’s systemic disruption. The greatest effect of firepower is generally not physical de-struction— the cumulative effects of which are felt only slowly—but the disruption it causes... Henri [This message has been edited by Henri (edited 02-05-2001).]

I appreciate the attempt to clarify the difference between attrition and maneuver. You are free to define words any way you want, but I would like to point out that Leonhard would strongly disagree with you definition of maneuver warfare: in his book (The Art of Maneuver), while agreeing that the US Army has made significant progress towards adopting Maneuver Warfare, he roundly criticizes as a major step backward the emphasis on the idea of the "single decisive battle". But as the Queen of Hearts said to Alice, "Words mean just what I want them to mean, no more and no less!" Henri

I absolutely agree with the last statement (being a former chess player), but I don't understnd the other paragraph.It seems to me that a player who has almost no understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the units but a good understanding of tactics (let's say Alexander the Great popped out of the past) has practically no chance to win against an opponent who doesn't have a very good grasp of tactics, but who knows for instance that a Hetzer has a paper-thin side, a kick-ass cannon and a front armor invincible against all but the most deadly guns, and so on. That's why I put knowledge of the units'capabilities at the top of the list. Of course this understanding includes not only what the units ARE, but also what they can DO. And indeed, as you say, understanding how all this fit in together (and being able to do it, which is an art) is what makes a REALLY good player. Henri

True, Steve, but a small quibble. The first thing that the Allies did was to destroy the communications capabilities of the Iraki army, thus making it practically impossible to transmit orders to units, who were left to fend off on their own without any guidance.From this point on, the resuot was inevitable.This is pure maneuver warfare, in the sense of the indirect approach: destroy the enemy's communications thus paralyzing their military. But I do agree that after that the battles still had to be faught, although against an enemy who was blindfolded. As an aside, it is interesting to note that the book by Leonhard has a whole chapter on the Gulf War, where despite the success, he levels some serious criticism of the way in which the war was fought (and I confess tht I haven't read that chapter...) Henri

In fact Saddam has gone to great lengths to let it be known that his idol is Stalin. Henri

Although I prefer WEGO games to RTS, let us give Talonsoft a break. Their forum is to discuss their upcoming game, and not to feed speculation that their game is going to be inferior to CM or some other game. Is it going to help wargaming to go to their forum and prevent discourse by bringing up Talonsoft's shortcomings and touting CM's superiority to a game that is not finished? I don't think so. If someone came to this forum and started to bitch about some peripheral queston about BTS's past or any such thing, they would rightfully be told to can it and to go away. If the game is good, it will be competition for CM; if not, people will not buy it. In both cases, it will raise public consciousnous about wargaming. Henri

What is the single most important factor tht counts for winning games in CM? Among all the debates on maneuver vs attrition, discussions on armor thickness and hardness and other all-important question, somthing is often overlooked. In my experience, the most important factor for victory is knowledge about the capabilities of one's and the enemy's weapons.I have to admit that this is personally my main weakness and the main cause of my numerous defeats (hey I gotta find a reason ) If you have never sent a STUH2 after a Sherman only to realize that it is an infantry assault weapon, or tried to fire your attached mortars at a hidden enemy positon only to find out that only FO's can do that, or sent a Stuart to knock out a Hetzer from the front, or maneuvered a German Rifle Company into a close combat fight against an enemy armed with submachineguns only to get wiped out, or done the opposite, engage in a long-range firefight with submachinegun infantry, then welcome to the club. Or maybe you preserved your Hetzer for the endgame battle agsint infantry only to find out that although it has HE, a Hetzer is practically useless agsinst infantry. I believe tht BY FAR the most important factor in a CM battle is a detailed knowledge of your units as well as the enemy's. There is no point in doing fancy maneuvers to get a 2:1 superiority against the enemy's rifle infantry if you have to engage them at long range with submachine guns. Two-to-one odds or not, your infantry will be massacred.Just try running a fast-moving Puma around a Sherman in the open in order to try to get a side or rear shot and see your Puma go up in smoke as you learn that the Tiger's slow turret rotation is not the Sherman's. Sure all the information is there in the game, you only have to select a unit and press return to see all the details. But the art of war is how you fit in all that knowledge TOGETHER. I have noticed that the very best players know the strengths and weakenesses of every unit in the game to an incredible level. They know that a Sherman Firefly can take out a Tiger from the front with the first shot, whereas a standard Sherman will bounce shot after shot off the armor,barring a lucky hit.They know that an 81 mm FO can not only direct area fire onto an unseen enemy, but that they get twice as many mortar rounds as an 81 mm mortar on the ground.They know that a Hellcat can shoot a helluva lot faster than a Panther, but that it is dead if it is hit by the Panther, so if they bring a pair of Hellcats against a Panther, they have a high probability of killing the Panther and a better than even chance of not losing one Hellcat. Pitting strength against weakness is not only bringing more units to bear on weak enemy areas, it also means to bring the APPROPRIAYE weapons to bear under the most advantageous conditions. If I had to make a list of factors in decreasing importance for winning in CM, here is how it would go: 1. Knowing your units. 2. Knowing your enemy's units 3. Understanding the effects of terrain 4. Luck 5. Understanding tactics and strategy. The last 3 are practically useless without the first two. I guess that's why I lose most of my games... henri

Very important comment. As a matter of fact, this is precisely the reason why the Soviets were for the most part unable to practice maneuver warfare early in the war. Stalin's purges of 40,000 officers made it impossible to use Lobachevsky's theories efficiently until later in the war after the officer corps got some experience under their belt. The Marine Corps warmaking manual rightfully stresses the need for proper training in order to apply the concepts of maneuver warfare. You have to learn how to walk before you can learn how to dance Henri

Just a comment in passing here. Much has been made by proponents of attrition warfare of Sun Tzu's statement to the effect that the ideal military victory is one that is won without having to engage the enemy. This and other statements by maneuverists has been used to give the impression that proponents of maneuver warfare claim that concentration of force against the enemy should always be avoided. One could go on and on about this misconception, but let me only point out that the bulk of Sun Tzu's book deals with how to use one's army in combat in such a way as to bring about victory. What modern military theory has added to Sun Tzu's ideas are refinements such as recon-pull and mission-oriented orders. Maneuverists and attritionists both believe in pitting strength against weakness, so there is no difference there. As for Napoleon, his losing "the war" had little to do with maneuver warfare versus attrition: he lost the Battle of Waterloo because Grouchy elected to follow the letter of Napoleon's orders instead of doing the obvious which was to go to where the cannon sounds were, and he lost the war in Russia because the Russians outmaneuvered him by retreating behind Moscow and leaving his army nothing to conquer.How this is supposed to prove that attrition warfare is superior to maneuver warfare is beyond me. Henri

Well, I think I exposed my POV pretty much in the old thread on maneuver warfare I started some months ago and which has just been revived with some interesting discussions and the same flame wars. I am happy to see someone here who has received recent training at the staff level giving his point of view, and I am happy to see that the Canadian army has apparently adopted maneuver warfare as an important concept. I partially agree with your evaluation of CM as not fully allowing maneuver warfare due mostly to its flag-oriented scenarios, and this was the main reason for my being roasted on this forum some four months ago. I would qualify that by saying that CM does not ENCOURAGE maneuver warfare, but it does allow it occasionally. Although I am an unconditional proponent of maneuver warfare, I usually find myself fighting attrition battles, although one could argue that is more a reflection on my warfighting ability than on the character of the game... Henri

That is really a very good question, because it is both depending on how you look at it, but it is an extremely complex case -too complex to be pigeonholed. It was attrition warfare in the sense that the purpose was to wear down Germany's war-making capability (at least until the bombing was shifted to civilian targets). It was attrition warfare also if you consider that in total war, the enemy's whole country is the target to be destroyed. It was maneuver warfare in the sense of the indirect approach because it consisted of attempting to prevent Germany's armies from fighting by means of destroying their source of supplies (factories making the supplies). Of course if one restricts the definition of maneuver warfare to movement (which IMHO would be wrong), then it was not maneuver warfare, because the targets wer predictable from day to day.OTOH one could argue that it WAS maneuver warfare in teh sense of the Boyd cycle, because the objective was to reduce the ability of the German army to react. We can see from this example that except where a single battle determined the outcome of the war (such as Cannae), it doesn't make much sense to ask if a war was won or not by maneuver warfare or by attrition warfare. The difficulty of defining maneuver warfare should not be under-estimated: it is not for nothing that neither Lind nor Leonhard give a definition of maneuver warfare in thier book on the subject. However the Marine Corps manual does give a definition. Henri

If you give a embark/debark command, it will do it at the end of the movement of the vehicle. So you can give a debark command, and when the vehicle reaches its destination before the end of the move, the infantry will debark and go where they were ordered to. Henri