US 57mm AT gun crews fighting as infantrymen

[CMplayer]

Apropos old thorny debates, I just came across this interesting quote from a WWII memoir while looking for info on 57mm AT gun ammo:

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>The Anti-Tank Platoon was being utilized as a fourth Rifle Platoon although we were half the size. We had eight or nine men in each of three squads and a Platoon Sgt and a Platoon Officer. The three drivers were back with the vehicles and the 57mm AT gun which we never used during my time on the line. In the attack on Herrlisheim, we were coming up from the south and appeared to be on the right flank. Small arms fire, rifle and machine gun fire, began to increase as did the mortar and artillery in a scattered fashion. The terrain was flat but gently sloping to the left. Beyond on the left was lowland, crossed by ditches and small canals. We came under some rifle fire from the right and took shelter in a washout, three or four feet deep We began returning fire to the east. <hr></blockquote>

Here's the link to the whole article.

[Jeff Duquette]

Nice article...thnx for the link.

[Jeff Duquette]

Interesting that there is a picture of what apparently is a member of 17th Armored Infantry Battalion, 12th Armored Division, wearing camouflage fatigues ala the USMC’s Pacific Theatre Garb. I had thought ETO issue of camouflage fatigues had been limited to 2nd AD.

[Kanonier Reichmann]

My..... what a big weapon he has!

Regards

Jim R.

[mensch]

GPIG, ugly weapon a million working pieces and heavy... on this point I agree to the MG units not allowed to run. the tripod is almost as heavy.

btw I hated my training on that thing. I would give my left arm not to be a GPIG gunner.

[Louie the Toad]

Dear CM Player,

After reading some and skimming some of the article, which I plan to go back and enjoy more fully later, I occured to me that this is a perfect argument for using all kinds of remnant troops for all kinds of duties in CM.

Use 'em all Toad

[Slapdragon]

European theater Engineers were issued camos from the same manufacture consignments as the USMC, and like the tungsten rounds, engineer stocks were raided by supply sergeants in several units. Still, they were by no means common, and in some areas (3rd Army) it was a worse offense to wear camo than to loot.

As for using troops in different capacities, there is a big difference between forming a new platoon and retasking a bunch of cannon boys, and in creating an ad hoc unit in a very short time There are several instances of units retasking themselves in the heat of the moement, the 761st Tank Battalion at Merville Sur Vic for example changed a AT gun ambush with tank crews of destroyed tanks, destroying the AT guns and taking the town. But these are so rare as to be legends, at least in the time span of an engagement.

More common is the type of retasking found in the mentioned article, or what happened at Bulge, where lots of people get rifles shoved into their hands and assigned units, becoming in essence green infantry.

[Jeff Duquette]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>European theater Engineers were issued camos<hr></blockquote>

Osprey indicates camo fatigues in ETO were limited to combat engineers in the 2nd AD. One of the armored Infantry Battalions of 2nd AD was also apparently issued camo fatigues. I am curious as to what your sources indicate regarding other units being issued camo.

[Michael Dorosh]

The Canadian Army disbanded artillery units in favour of converting them in infantry - one entire regiment was so converted in Italy (1st Light Ack Ack), and individual remusters were common.

But taking subunits as small as a battery or platoon was not common. And it should be noted that such retasking was not done in an hour. ie - if a gun crew loses its gun, it can not be "retasked" as infantry - that is certainly not what the article is implying.

Great pic for a uniform grog, and the opening quote was also excellent, thanks. It just isn't evidence - if anyone is trying to do that - that gun crews can be used effectively as infantry in the course of a CM game.

[CMplayer]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

such retasking was not done in an hour. ie - if a gun crew loses its gun, it can not be "retasked" as infantry - that is certainly not what the article is implying.

<hr></blockquote>

I agree. In game terms what I might take this article as supporting is stuff like this: Suppose you have three 57mm AT guns in a position somewhere, and one of them gets knocked out. That crew could be expected to help provide perimeter security for the rest of the platoon after that. So I would play it that way, rather than just running them off the board. (perhaps they ought to have better small arms as well, but I realize that ain't gonna happen, because of the misuse it could lead to)

[ 11-27-2001: Message edited by: CMplayer ]</p>

[JasonC]

No, it was not ad hoc or a result of gun losses. It was systematic in the US armor divisions. The armored infantry TOE had 57mm ATGs attached to each company. They were found to be less than useful, since the ever-present hordes of counterattacking monster panzer fleets the brass had feared when the army organization was originally designed, failed to materialize.

Armored infantry was essentially always working with tank support, and the tanks were more effective than the 57mm. On the attack, they were cumbersome and got in the way. But the US armored division, with only a 3-3 armor to infantry battalion mix, was distinctly short of rifle manpower, and thus staying power in heavy action.

As early as the Cobra breakout, armored formations were reacting to these obvious practicalities by abandoning their 57mm ATGs (turning them over to infantry units), and using the extra personnel as riflemen. There was a "lessons learned" report on the subject in August, from the Brittany campaign.

Note that infantry formations also had 57mm ATGs in their TOEs, 3 per battalion and 9 more per regiment, making 54 per infantry division all told. But they didn't have as many effective AT weapons, in the form of tanks. And initially, they didn't have the issue of an inadequate infantry to armor TOE ratio, like the armor divisions. They also were on the tactical defensive more often than armored divisions (though it still was not common).

As a result, they tended to keep their 57mms. But once the replacement crisis hit in the fall, many of them also canabilized their ATG platoons. Not as thoroughly as the armored divisions did, however. They were more likely to disband the platoons entirely and feed the individual men into the line companies as replacements.

In CM terms, these would show up simply as deviations from the TOE, with extra platoons in armored infantry formations, and units closer to full strength in infantry formations. Their guns wouldn't even be on the field. It is not a matter of the gun crews fighting as infantry in the same engagement, but of more infantry and fewer towed guns than the TOEs had.

Of course, weapons platoons (mortars and MG gunners) also fought with their side arms if closely attacked, as did rear area troops in the case of breakthroughs, etc. The latter case is easily addressed by scenario designers adding "extra" green infantry platoons to this or that fight, to represent service troops.

I hope this helps.

[ 11-27-2001: Message edited by: JasonC ]</p>

[Splinty]

It's my belief that in a tight situation an officer or NCO would gather up any armed men he could,whether they be cooks,mechanics,AT crews or whatever. No I'm not basing this on historical references or documented facts of WWII,but on the fact that I was an infantry NCO for 10 years and that's what I would have done in a tight spot if that's what it took to hold our position. When it comes down to it ALL soldiers are riflemen,that's as true for the U.S. Army as it is for the Marine Corps or any other military organization.

[Michael Dorosh]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Splinty:

When it comes down to it ALL soldiers are riflemen,that's as true for the U.S. Army as it is for the Marine Corps or any other military organization.<hr></blockquote>

That's bull****, sadly. How well would your cooks and clerks have actually done in a firefight? More importantly, how much fieldcraft was taught to rear echelon troops in WW II - the subject at hand?

By November 1944, even men designated as riflemen in the Canadian Army (and probably the German, British and US Armies to a lesser degree) were not 100 percent riflemen - many so called infantry trained men showed up in line units never having thrown a grenade or fired an LMG, with no idea of field craft. This was infantrymen, mind. Do you really think clerks, cooks, and cannoneers would have been more highly trained than that?

[Slapdragon]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Splinty:

It's my belief that in a tight situation an officer or NCO would gather up any armed men he could,whether they be cooks,mechanics,AT crews or whatever. No I'm not basing this on historical references or documented facts of WWII,but on the fact that I was an infantry NCO for 10 years and that's what I would have done in a tight spot if that's what it took to hold our position. When it comes down to it ALL soldiers are riflemen,that's as true for the U.S. Army as it is for the Marine Corps or any other military organization.<hr></blockquote>

Sure, but when the going gets that rough, and the cooks got handed rifles and shoved out into the snow (lots of this happened at Bulge) the green infantry dies in droves. A new infantry transfer, according to the postwar study "Army Manpower Organization" suffered casualties at five times the rate of his stateside train and team integrated compatriot. Even a trained replacement droped into an organization ldied at three times the rate. This was a major failing of the US system, and was seen in the Commonwealth also.

[Louie the Toad]

I like CM Player's thinking. With regard to CM and in actual fighting as the article describes. There is unit esprit de corps and cohesion. There is even a national esprit de corps. If someone is unhorsed, degunned or otherwise inactive he doesnt leave his buddies and take off for the rear. He carries ammo, becomes a runner, a lookout, a picket, helps the medics. At least he does...

in this Toad's Army.

[Splinty]

"By November 1944, even men designated as riflemen in the Canadian Army (and probably the German, British and US Armies to a lesser degree) were not 100 percent riflemen - many so called infantry trained men showed up in line units never having thrown a grenade or fired an LMG, with no idea of field craft. This was infantrymen, mind. Do you really think clerks, cooks, and cannoneers would have been more highly trained than that?"

Posted by Micheal Dorosh.

I didn't say they'd be good at it, I was only saying that in a tight spot a leader uses every available man and weapon to fill the holes in the line.

[ 11-27-2001: Message edited by: Splinty ]</p>

[Michael Dorosh]

<blockquote>quote:</font><hr>Originally posted by Patrik:

So what you are saying is that the cook is just as good (or better if he joind the army in say 42 or 43) traied then a new recruit.<hr></blockquote>

Trai(n)ed (sic) as what?

Cooks didn't receive infantry training; nor did clerks, truck drivers, artillerymen or engineers. It wasn't their job. In 1944, it became the job of a growing minority of them, and they weren't prepared for it.

"Every man is a rifleman" is a myth; I'm not even sure it holds true for the Marines, though they would like to think so - it most certainly did NOT hold true for most armies in the Second World War, especially the industrialized western armies which had an enormous tail to tooth ratio. By 44-45, even infantrymen were not really trained as riflemen, as all the armies scraped the bottom of the manpower barrel.

You can even look at the garrison troops Canada sent to Hong Kong as another example of poorly trained infantrymen - that was in December 1941. I am sure there are British and US examples.

If the infantry were not being trained properly, I tend to doubt that cooks, laundrymen, water treatment engineers, saddle tree makers or any of the other 10,000 categories of tradesmen received any kind of infantry training.

Most Canadian infantry battalions mobilized and moved overseas as units, with no individual training of any kind; they learned infantry tactics and individual skills as formed units. Infantry basic training centres only sprang up later in the war.

What that means to CM is questionable - infantry companies remained a part of F Echelon (continuing the Commonwealth example) while cooks, storesmen, etc., remained in A or B Echelon - 1 or 2 miles from the fighting.

There are few recorded instances of A and B Echelon troops taking an active part in combat - anyone with specific examples is invited to post them, they would be interesting reading.

At the company level, storesmen, drivers, batmen etc., may indeed have been trained infantrymen, and probably were - but these are distinct from the tradesmen at battalion HQ or in Support Company of an infantry battalion.

[ 11-27-2001: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]</p>

[JasonC]

16-18th December 1944, 5th Panzer Army sector

C-109 FA at Bucholz held off VG at close range. Aided by 1 M16 50 cal HT. Over 100 German KIA. (There was a similar incident the same day at Welchenhausen in a neighboring sector).

Weiler successfully defended by 2 infantry platoons, 1 ATG platoon, and 1 mortar platoon. When the ATGs and mortars were out of ammo, their crews fought as riflemen.

B-109 FA at Reuler defended by D company MG platoon and "a provisional rifle company hastily assembled from men on pass in Clerf (Clervaux)"

102 men from a regimental HQ company defended Clervaux chateau all night against German tanks and Panzergrenadiers, and delayed the infantry well into the next morning.

A cannon company KOs 4 panzers while the accompanying German infantry is kept at bay by "a scratch platoon of less than fifty men collected from the regimental headquarters and Ouren," (Ouren being the location of the regiment HQ) supporting the gunners as riflemen.

C-229 FA stops tanks by direct fire, accompanying AA (50 cals and 40mm) stop the infantry.

Wiltz was defended by 11 Shermans (5 of them 105s, the others there only because they were under repair), 6 76mm towed ATGs, a few cavalry M-8s, and a few 40mm and quad 50 AA, plus a battalion of 600 engineers "operating sawmills and rock crushers, working on roads" plus a scratch battalion of HQ troops, "bandsmen, telephone linemen, and paymasters". One platoon was the band fighting as riflemen.

687th FA also fought at direct fire ranges and pulled out successfully afterward.

So did B battery, 58th AFA (Priests), acting as a rear guard for its battalion, "with cannoneers and drivers the only rifle protection".

TF Booth was formed from the headquarters company of 52nd AIB (with their halftracks) and with supporting armor consisting of a platoon of Hellcats and a platoon of Stuarts. This created an additional company team out of CCR, 9th armored, because all the Shermans and line infantry were already engaged.

The initial roadblock at Mageret was manned by a small force from the 158th engineer battalion "plus a few service troops from CCR".

If these actions had not been fought, 2nd Panzer and Panzer Lehr would have reached Bastogne ahead of the 101st Airborne. The above actions bought the time for Team Cherry to arrive at Longvilly, and Team Cherry bought an additional day for the 101st to deploy in an arc east of Bastogne.

In addition, it should be remembered that the opponents, in the German infantry, were hardly 5 year veterans with lots of "fieldcraft". In fact, many of the men were recent transfers from Luftwaffe ground units or the German navy, and many of the rest were about 16 years old.