Bocage:Normandy

[dieseltaylor]

In the thread on Immobilisations I mentioned that I thought that the bocage had been poorly represented by BF, first in CMBO, and then in CMAK. The reason being that after a certain date in 1944 all Allied tanks can go through bocage/tall hedges with ease [20 seconds for a Honey] but German tanks cannot negotiate them at all.

This seems slightly illogical as though underpowered a Tiger might be expected to be able to damage a bank quite badly by ramming or indeed clamber over provided it did not mind its belly being open. Of course as almost all the time the Germans were defending, and secondly recovering a heavy tank would be difficult and better avoided means BF's decision to ban German tanks from traversing bocage/tall hedges has some substance.

The drawback probably being the wholesale use by designers of impassable bocage over maps set in Normandy. Fortunately nowdays designers are cleverer and representing bocage types of terrain

The relevance to the Immobilisation thread being that I think the Cuilin plow is overstated and that charging banks with metal prongs on the front can be dangerous to a tanks health - not to mention the crew.

Steve has asserted that I am being overly down on the value of the plow and in his 25 years of active WW2 reading he does not agree with my assertion. My take is that all the plow variants did exist and were effective on some bocage hedgerows. However in view of the many months spent bottled up in Normandy the Press and Generals played up the effectiveness for civilian war morale purposes.

Having spent many decades pasing through France, and southern Devon, which have similar field systems I am familiar with the very impressive and massive nature of a lot of the hedgerows. The idea that a light tank such as the Honey could bull its way through these substantial barriers is hogwash - and the same applies to Shermans.

I am pleased to learn that In Normandy BF will be doing a superior job on the bocage.

How effective was the plow?

According to most US texts very much so however Zaloga's masterly article reveals a bit more about the weapon:

http://www.ospreypublishing.com/articles/world_war_2/normandy_legends/

Normandy legends: the Culin hedgerow cutter

July 1, 2001 12:00 AM Popular histories of modern wars inevitably simplify events and create myths and legends. The campaign in Normandy has created more than most, especially in view of the numerous television documentaries on this theme. For example, it is difficult to find an account of the breakout from Normandy that does not include reference to the Culin hedgerow cutter. My own recent account Campaign 88: Operation Cobra 1944 mentions it, of course. Another recent study calls it a myth. So it is worth taking a more detailed look to see how big a role it actually played in the battle.

A significant tactical dilemma facing the US Army in Normandy was the local terrain, called bocage in French. Bocage refers to farmland separated by thick coastal hedgerows. These hedgerows are denser, thicker, and higher in Normandy than elsewhere along the French coast or in the British countryside on the opposite side of the Channel. From a military perspective, they were ideal for defence, since they broke up the local terrain into small fields edged by natural earthen obstacles. They provide real defence in depth, extending dozens of miles beyond the coast. The bocage undermined the US Army's advantages in armour and firepower, and the hedgerows gave the German defenders natural shelter from attack. This type of terrain most adversely affected the US sector of the Normandy beach-head. While some British units to the immediate east of the American sector were also located in bocage country, the area south of Caen where most of the British offensives took place was a more conventional form of terrain with, relatively open, rolling fields.

The bocage presented a substantial obstacle to tanks. While it was certainly possible for tanks to charge the hedgerows and push over the top, this exposed their thin belly armour to German anti-tank weapons. Some hedges were so entangled with foliage and small trees that a tank could become trapped if attempting to push through, or could shed a track, effectively immobilising it.

One of the central aims of Operation Cobra in July 1944 was to break out of the bocage country into the open countryside south of St. Lo where the heavily mechanised US Army could exploit its advantages. A variety of schemes were tried to deal with the hedgerows. Combat engineer units had been advocating the use of tank dozers to breach them. These were ordinary M4 medium tanks fitted with a special hydraulically operated M1 bulldozer blade. Originally developed in 1943, there were few in Normandy in July 1944. Experiments made clear that the dozer blades could work, but some hedges were so thick that satchel charges were needed to blow a clean gap. In July, the US First Army placed an urgent request for supply of 278 blades with an aim to providing at least one dozer per tank platoon. In fact, by the time of Operation Cobra on 25 July, there were only about 40 in service.

Another approach was conceived by tankers of the 747th Tank Battalion, attached to the 29th Division. In conjunction with Lt. Col. Robert Ploger's 121st Engineer Combat Battalion, the tankers experimented with combined engineer-tank tactics to create breaches in the hedge wide enough for a tank to pass through. During an attack on 24 June, the engineers placed a pair of 24 lb charges eight feet apart at the base of the hedge. The tactics worked, but the engineers decided that a charge double the size was really needed. Ploger began a more careful study of the problem. A tank company, penetrating one and a half miles through bocage country, would on average encounter 34 separate hedgerows. This would require 17 tons of explosive per company or about 60 tons per battalion. This was clearly beyond the resources of any engineer battalion.

After bloody experience in bocage fighting, the 29th Division commander, Maj. Gen. Charles Gebhardt, ordered the creation of a special training area near Couvains prior to a planned assault towards St. Lo on 11 July 1944. The M4 medium tanks and infantry squads practised a variety of new tactics to fight in the hedgerows, leading to the slogan 'One Squad, one tank, one field'. Ploger and the tankers continued to experiment with explosive breaching, and found that a much smaller charge could be used if it could be buried deep within the base of the hedge. However, digging holes in the hedge while under fire was both time-consuming and dangerous. One of the tankers came up with the idea of fitting a pair of timber prongs on the front of each tank, called a 'Salad Fork'. When a breach in the bocage was needed, a tank would charge across the field and embed the prongs in the base of the hedge. When the tank backed out, it would pull out the timber prong, leaving small tunnels. The engineers pre-packaged 15 lb of explosive in the fibre-board containers used to transport 105 mm artillery ammunition. Two of these improvised demolition charges could create a gap wide enough for a tank and the accompanying infantry. The small tracked M29 Weasel utility vehicles would follow the tank-engineer team, bringing along extra explosive. As only 53 tanks were available for the 11 July assault, they were concentrated in the sectors of the 116th Regiment. These new tactics and training paid off, and the 116th Regiment succeeded in rupturing the German lines far more effectively than in the past. These tactics were copied by other units, including the 703rd Tank Battalion attached to the 4th Infantry Division. There are records that indicate that other tank units in the neighboring V Corps fielded 'brush cutters' on their tanks in July, but details are lacking.

The 11 July 1944 attack by the 747th Tank Battalion disclosed problems with the 'Salad Forks'. The timbers were often bent or wrenched off the tanks during the violent collision with the hedge. On a more positive note, it was found that in some cases, the impact of the Salad Fork alone could breach a hedge. This led Lt. Charles Green to devise a more durable 'tank bumper' or 'Green Dozer' made out of railroad tracks. These were welded to the tanks of the 747th Tank Battalion in mid-July for the upcoming offensive.

Curiously enough, a very similar device was dreamed up almost simultaneously by the 2nd Armored Division. It is possible that they were aware of the experiments by the 747th Tank Battalion, as these had been demonstrated to a number of officers. The division's cavalry unit, the 102nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, had been discussing ways to cut through the hedges. Sgt. Curtis G. Culin devised a set of prongs not very different from Green's Tank Bumper, and supervised the construction of a prototype using salvaged German tank obstacles. Tests with the device proved very successful, and it was dubbed the Rhinoceros. It received many other names including the Culin cutter, hedgerow prongs, hedgerow cutters, and various combinations of these. Tanks fitted with the device were dubbed Rhino tanks. What separated Culin's device from other similar schemes was a bit of luck. On 14 July, the First Army commander, Gen. Omar Bradley visited the 2nd Armored Division prior to Operation Cobra. Bradley had seen an earlier demonstration of the Salad Fork, but was more impressed by the Culin Rhino since it didn't require explosives. He ordered the First Army Ordnance Section to begin construction of as many of these devices on an emergency basis.

The best source of supply for the steel prongs was the litter of 'Rommel's Asparagus' along the Normandy beaches. Rommel had ordered the installation of hundreds of steel anti-tank obstructions, and these served as the raw material for the prongs. Between 15 July and 25 July, when Operation Cobra started, over 500 Rhinos were manufactured. This was enough for about 60 per cent of the tanks in First Army taking part in the initial assault. On 22 July, a modified M5A1 light tank was demonstrated to Gen. George S. Patton and a team from the 3rd Armored Division. After the demonstration, the division was ordered to build its own Rhino devices on a crash programme. A workshop was set up in St. Jean de Daye under the supervision of Warrant Officer Douglas, who had been a professional welder in civilian life. Douglas had no plans for the Culin device, and devised a modified version that was distinguished by a pair of triangular plates at either end which he felt would penetrate the hedge better. A total of 57 of these 'Douglas cutters' were attached to tanks of the 3rd Armored Division prior to Cobra. The various types of Rhino devices were all considered top secret, and Bradley ordered that none be used until the main operation began.

The use of the Rhino tanks in Operation Cobra has become something of legend. Nearly all accounts of the campaign mention the devices, even if they mention none of the other innovations introduced during Cobra, such as the new 76 mm gun M4 medium tank, and the new tank-infantry communication aids. One recent study of Cobra, Col. James Carafano's 'After D-Day', goes so far as to label the stories of the Rhino tanks a myth. Certainly, the importance of the Rhino tanks has tended to be exaggerated. It is an appealing tale of ingenuity in the heat of battle. It makes for a good story, particularly in popular histories and in television documentaries. It is far more dramatic, especially on TV, than the technical complexity of tank radios, tactical improvements and other less visual innovations.

Were the Rhino tanks effective? In fact, there is very little evidence. Some tank units that used Rhino devices on the first day of the battle, 25 July, found that they were no panacea. The problem was not so much the Rhinos as the pre-attack bombardment which churned up the pastures, which made it difficult to charge across the fields and build up enough speed to breach the hedgerows. Other units such as the 3rd Armored Division had little luck with the hedge cutters. But they had been added to their tanks at the very last minute with little chance to practice the new tank-infantry tactics. The 3rd Armored Division had far fewer tanks with hedge cutters than the 2nd Armored Division, only about 25 per cent compared to almost 75 per cent. It might have been expected that the 2nd Armored Division, which put up such a sterling performance in Cobra, might have emerged as champions of the device they had helped pioneer. In fact, operational accounts of the 2nd Armored Division in Cobra provide few indications that the devices ever played much of a role. This had more to do with the conduct of the fighting than with any technical virtue or failing of the Rhinos. The preliminary air attack against the Panzer Lehr Division shattered the main force opposing the 2nd Armored Division. As a result, the division aggressively pushed through the German defences. Rather than struggle cross-country through the bocage, the 2nd Armored Division used the country roads wherever possible, avoiding the need to use the Rhinos. Tankers that I have interviewed over the years had mixed feelings about the Rhinos. Some said that the Rhino worked, but that it was hard on the crew. Others said they hardly ever used it, as once the break-through began, the situation was so fluid that it was seldom needed. In contrast, the far less celebrated dozer tanks are often mentioned, since they were useful not only in breaking through the hedgerows, but in repairing the bomb damaged roads. Whether effective or not, the Rhino tanks have become one of the popular legends of the Normandy campaign, and are likely to remain so in spite of debunking by historians.

by Steven Zaloga

Further reading

Katcher, Phillip, Men-At-Arms 70: US Army 1941–45, Osprey, Oxford, 1984

Badsey, Stephen, Campaign 01: Normandy 1944, Osprey, Oxford, 1990

Badsey, Stephen, Campaign 24: Arnhem 1944, Osprey, Oxford, 1993

Henry, Mark, Men-At-Arms 342: US Army in WWII (1), Osprey, Oxford, 2000

Henry, Mark, Men-At-Arms 347: US Army in WWII (2), Osprey, Oxford, 2000

Henry, Mark, Men-At-Arms 350: US Army in WWII (3), Osprey, Oxford, 2001

[mike_the_wino]

With destructable terrain featured in Shock Force I look forward to being able to use cleared bocage by either side.

If that's not the case, this game will suck.

[Battlefront.com]

Three quick points to mention when viewing CM: Normandy to CMx1:

1. We have destructible terrain now, so we can simulate explicate holes knocked into hedgerows. And those spots can be less abstractly simulated respective to terrain and speed conditions than could be in CMx1.

2. We are planning on directly simulating the cutters on tanks, therefore if you have 2 out of 5 tanks with cutters only the 2 with cutters are worth a damned. Lose them and that's that.

3. Because of the above we can better simulate affects of failing to breach a hedgerow, such as bogging/immobilization and vehicle damage.

In short, the system we'll have for CM: Normandy won't be anything like what we had in CMBO. Not even close.

Steve

[mike_the_wino]

Hell yeah! That's what I am talking about!

[Battlefront.com]

dieseltaylor,

Steve has asserted that I am being overly down on the value of the plow and in his 25 years of active WW2 reading he does not agree with my assertion.

Nope, and I still don't Nothing in what you quoted above is different than my understanding of how effective they were. They were not a "panacea", but rather an important tool which could, under the correct circumstances, be extremely beneficial.

I also agree with Zaloga (who I've actually met in person, BTW) that the reports back from vets is mixed. My experience with vet interviews, especially ones done decades after combat, is that they often tend to be at odds with each other. Since polar opposites can't both be correct about the same thing in the same situation, the truth must lie somewhere in the middle. There's a great book called the Bloody Brotherhood, or somefink like that, which is just interviews. On one page you'll see two different vets with long combat experiences coming to exactly the opposite conclusions about the same thing. Sometimes it's hard to say why they are so far apart, but often it comes down to different experiences. But anyway, I digress

For sure CMBO's treatment of Hedgerows was extremely simplistic and overly generous. We knew that at the time. The same will not be true for CM: Normandy. My objection to Dieseltaylor's initial position is that it's too extreme against the cutters. And I stand by that opinion.

Steve

[Sgt Joch]

Now that the "bogging/immobilisation discussion thread" is bogging down...I look forward to the upcoming "effectiveness of Bocage Cutter thread"...

[akd]

Three quick points to mention when viewing CM: Normandy to CMx1:

1. We have destructible terrain now, so we can simulate explicate holes knocked into hedgerows. And those spots can be less abstractly simulated respective to terrain and speed conditions than could be in CMx1.

2. We are planning on directly simulating the cutters on tanks, therefore if you have 2 out of 5 tanks with cutters only the 2 with cutters are worth a damned. Lose them and that's that.

3. Because of the above we can better simulate affects of failing to breach a hedgerow, such as bogging/immobilization and vehicle damage.

In short, the system we'll have for CM: Normandy won't be anything like what we had in CMBO. Not even close.

Steve

Still trying to find hedgerow demo times for you Steve...

[JonS]

...are likely to remain so in spite of debunking by historians.

The thing is, he doesn't really debunk their effectiveness. He does indicate that they were used less than popularly believed (due to the unexpected collapse of Lehr, etc, etc), but that says nothing about how well they worked when used in the role they were inteded for.

Busting the Bocage (esp the chapter 'The Solution' which quotes a report descibing the cutters as "highly successful"), which I'd rate over an Osprey book (or an article trying to sell Osprey books) any day of the week.

There were multiple solutions to breaching the bocage, some more successful than others. DT seems to be lumping them altogether in the "unsuccessful" pile.

[Battlefront.com]

AKD,

Thanks!! BTW, a couple of weeks ago I dug out and reread my copy of "Tactics Of The Norman Hedgerows (June-August 1944)", which I think is the one you were citing from in previous threads? Good stuff in there.

JonS,

The thing is, he doesn't really debunk their effectiveness. He does indicate that they were used less than popularly believed (due to the unexpected collapse of Lehr, etc, etc), but that says nothing about how well they worked when used in the role they were inteded for.

Correct. For example, the mention of units which didn't use them (in the above quotes) were quickly followed by qualifications of "didn't have many" or "got them just before the breakout" or "didn't need them because the resistance collapsed". If you don't need to use a tool, then you don't use it. If you don't use it, you may have a different opinion of it vs. someone who did need it and did use it.

Busting the Bocage (esp the chapter 'The Solution' which quotes a report descibing the cutters as "highly successful"), which I'd rate over an Osprey book (or an article trying to sell Osprey books) any day of the week.

I also treat "myth busting" books with a bit of skepticism when they appear to contradict decades of official military and 3rd party historical study by thousands of qualified historians. Sure, it could be that the new guy on the job spots something that all the others didn't, but often times the new guy is wrong and/or trying to make a name for himself via controversy. Agreeing with 60 years of historical study doesn't tend to get you controversy

There were multiple solutions to breaching the bocage, some more successful than others. DT seems to be lumping them altogether in the "unsuccessful" pile.

Correct. For example, look at the passage DT bolded towards the top of the Zaloga passage. That's about the problems/dangers that hedgerows presented tanks WITHOUT any sort of device. In other words, bocage was tough stuff and frustrated the unprepared Allied combined arms forces. If anybody disagrees with that statement, he's in the wrong Forum (actually, wrong universe ). So I don't know why that passage, in particular, should be highlighted. Seems to me that's drawing our attention to something not very interesting since it's highly unlikely anybody here doesn't already know, and believe, this already.

Steve

[dieseltaylor]

For example, look at the passage DT bolded towards the top of the Zaloga passage. That's about the problems/dangers that hedgerows presented tanks WITHOUT any sort of device. In other words, bocage was tough stuff and frustrated the unprepared Allied combined arms forces. If anybody disagrees with that statement, he's in the wrong Forum (actually, wrong universe ). So I don't know why that passage, in particular, should be highlighted. Seems to me that's drawing our attention to something not very interesting since it's highly unlikely anybody here doesn't already know, and believe, this already.

Merely pointing out that tanks, at the risk of bogging and immobilsation COULD negotiate some bocage hedges. This has some relevance to CMAK in that pre- July '44 neither side is allowed to use this in game as all movement is forbidden through tall hedge/bocage. Rather more elegant would have been to put a 50% bogging on it or use the mine formula. But hey thats gone now ... : )

For CMx2 Normandy it is pointing out that it is dangerous terrain pre-cutter but is a tactical option. And yes I get the answer .....

3. Because of the above we can better simulate affects of failing to breach a hedgerow, such as bogging/immobilization and vehicle damage.

[rune]

Ummm there are no bocages in CMAK.

Rune

[dieseltaylor]

If you prefer Rune I will call them tall hedges which Allied armour can travel through post July 1944 but German armour can never travel through. This is very similar in effect to the way CMBO [Normandy] treated bocage.

I do find it easier to call them bocage. Incidentally if one wished to be picky! I wonder how many Italian battles featured plow equipped tanks.? Has anyone got photos or unit histories showing a widespread - or indeed any deployment.?

I think BF left them in for those players likely to recreate Normandy battles.

[Battlefront.com]

Dieseltaylor,

I think BF left them in for those players likely to recreate Normandy battles.

Actually, I think we left it in by complete accident and some 6 years later we're finding out about it We purposefully avoided doing things to screw up the Italian Campaign simulation to appease people that wanted to redo CMBO battles. For example, there are no King Tigers present, nor a bunch of other stuff as well.

The "tall hedges" in CMAK should not allow any special behavior for Allied vehicles because in the Italian Campaign the Allied vehicles didn't have any special ability to breach them.

So I would appreciate CMAK not being brought into this discussion at all because it's not relevant. If you like, consider the ability for Allied vehicles to coast through tall hedges in CMAK a bug which nobody cared to mention until now

Steve

[Battlefront.com]

Dieseeltaylor,

Merely pointing out that tanks, at the risk of bogging and immobilsation COULD negotiate some bocage hedges. This has some relevance to CMAK in that pre- July '44 neither side is allowed to use this in game as all movement is forbidden through tall hedge/bocage. Rather more elegant would have been to put a 50% bogging on it or use the mine formula. But hey thats gone now ... : )

A number of "possible" things are supported in CM games when the possibility of success is so low that we feel, practically speaking, it is better to leave it out entirely. The primary reason for that is anything we directly support needs to be tested and validated. Since we always have an overly full plate in front of us, spending precious time working on a feature that is so likely useless in game terms doesn't appeal to us. Better to just avoid it completely so it doesn't become a distraction. Another example of this would be purposefully setting fire to things. Possible, theoretically useful, not something which was done in any tactically meaningful way.

Now things are a bit different. We have deformable terrain which means we have more control over variables. If we have more control over variables then the results are easier to achieve and easier to predict. They are also easier to communicate to the end user without special interface.

Steve

[dieseltaylor]

I was going to do a lengthy piece on Doubler not mentioning the shortcomings of the cutter but as time passes and I have better things to do ....

However just to stir up something that should be in CMX1 forum was what if the British had the bocage to contend with - is it possible any of these already existing might have been useful:

The majority of the designs were modified forms of the Churchill tank or the Sherman tank. Both were available in large numbers. The Churchill had good (though slow) cross-country performance, heavy armour, and a roomy interior. The Sherman's mechanical reliability was valued.

Among the many specialist vehicles and their attachments were:

• Crocodile - A Churchill tank modified by the fitting of a flame-thrower in place of the hull machine gun. An armoured trailer, towed behind the tank, carried 400 Imperial gallons (1,800 litres) of fuel. The flamethrower had a range of over 120 yards (110 m). It excelled at clearing bunkers and it was a strong psychological weapon (see Flame tank).
  
• AVRE - Armoured Vehicle, Royal Engineers was a Churchill tank adapted to attack German defensive fortifications. The crew included two Royal Engineers who could easily leave and enter the tank through its side hatches. The AVRE had the main gun replaced by a Petard Spigot Mortar. This fired a forty pound (18 kg) HE-filled projectile (nicknamed the Flying Dustbin) 150 yards (137 m). The "Dustbin" could destroy concrete obstacles such as roadblocks and bunkers. This weapon was unusual in that it had to be reloaded externally - by opening a hatch and sliding a round into the mortar tube from the hull. AVREs were also used to carry and operate equipment such as:
  • Bobbin - A reel of 10-foot (3.0 m) wide canvas cloth reinforced with steel poles carried in front of the tank and unrolled onto the ground to form a "path", so that following vehicles (and itself) would not sink into the soft ground of the beaches during the amphibious landing.
    
  • Fascine - A bundle of wooden poles or rough brushwood lashed together with wires carried in front of the tank that could be released to fill a ditch or form a step. Metal pipes in the center of the fascine allowed water to flow through.
    
  • Small Box Girder was an assault bridge that was carried in front of the tank and could be dropped to span a 30-foot (9.1 m) gap in 30 seconds.
    
  • Bullshorn Plough. A mine plough intended to excavate the ground in front of the tank, to expose and make harmless any land mines.
    
  • Double Onion two large demolition charges on a metal frame that could be placed against a concrete wall and then detonated from a safe distance. It was the successor to the single charge device Carrot.

• ARK - Armoured Ramp Carrier was a Churchill tank without a turret that had extendable ramps at each end; other vehicles could drive up ramps and over the vehicle to scale obstacles.
  
• Crab - A modified Sherman tank equipped with a mine flail, a rotating cylinder of weighted chains that exploded mines in the path of the tank.
  
• DD tank - from "Duplex Drive", an amphibious Sherman or Valentine tank able to swim ashore after being launched from a landing craft several miles from the beach. They were intended to give support to the first waves of infantry that attacked the beaches. The Valentine version was used only for training.
  
• BARV - Beach Armoured Recovery Vehicle. A Sherman M4A2 tank which had been waterproofed and had the turret replaced by a tall armoured superstructure. Able to operate in 9 foot (2.7 m) deep water, the BARV was intended to remove vehicles that had become broken-down or swamped in the surf and were blocking access to the beaches. They were also used to re-float small landing craft that had become stuck on the beach. Strictly speaking, Sherman BARV's were not 'Funnies' as they were developed and operated by the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, not the 79th Armoured Division.
  
• LVT "Buffalo" - British version of the American LVT4: an armoured amphibious landing vehicle.
  
• Armoured Bulldozer - A conventional Caterpillar D8 bulldozer fitted with armour to protect the driver and the engine. Their job was to clear the invasion beaches of obstacles and to make roads accessible by clearing rubble and filling in bomb craters. Conversions were carried out by a Caterpillar importer Jack Olding & Company Ltd of Hatfield.

• Centaur Bulldozer, a Cromwell tank with the turret removed and fitted with a simple, winch operated, bulldozer blade. These were produced because of a need for a well-armoured, obstacle clearing vehicle that, unlike a conventional bulldozer, would also be fast enough to keep up with tank formations. They were not used on D-Day but were issued to the 79th Armoured Division in Belgium during the latter part of 1944.
  
• Canal Defence Light This was a powerful carbon-arc searchlight carried on several types of tank inside a modified turret. The name of the device was deliberately inaccurate in order to help keep it secret - its true purpose was to blind the defenders during a night attack and so help obscure attacking forces. An ingenious optical design allowed the light to flood out of a comparatively small slit in the armour, minimising the chance of damage by enemy fire. This was not used on D-Day, but was used during the attack on the Geilenkirchen salient to create indirect artificial daylight

http://www.war44.com/forum/allied-motorised-weapons/187-hobarts-funnies.html

for a bit more detail and a picture of the plough which is missing from the Wikipedia article first quoted. Note the assertion that the Crocodile burst would last for ten minutes and the range. How wide are bocage fields? : )

And lobbed AVRe charges, and the pronged vehicles ...

[akd]

I was going to do a lengthy piece on Doubler not mentioning the shortcomings of the cutter but as time passes and I have better things to do ....

However just to stir up something that should be in CMX1 forum was what if the British had the bocage to contend with - is it possible any of these already existing might have been useful:

http://www.war44.com/forum/allied-motorised-weapons/187-hobarts-funnies.html

for a bit more detail and a picture of the plough which is missing from the Wikipedia article first quoted. Note the assertion that the Crocodile burst would last for ten minutes and the range. How wide are bocage fields? : )

And lobbed AVRe charges, and the pronged vehicles ...

The dozer tanks were considered invaluable from the very beginning of the campaign in Normandy, both for their traditional uses and for their utility in breaching bocage hedgerows. Problem is there were only handfuls of these specialized vehicles (only 5 in a US Armored Division, I believe) and the request to have more of the blades manufactured and shipped overseas would take many months to fulfill. The hedgerow cutters were not an innovation for creating a way to breach hedgerows, but an innovation in how to do so in a way that was cheap, made use of materials on hand and could equip enough tanks (hundreds) in a short enough period time (days to weeks) to play a role in a strategic breakout offensive.

[Battlefront.com]

Correct, it was an expedient. The dozer tanks were definitely the way to go, however their numbers were small and field made versions weren't up to the task. It's not surprising since anybody who has seen a dozer blade knows how much precision work is involved. It could be reproduced in the field only in very small numbers. Faster than getting blades from the US, but definitely not fast enough or plentiful enough to make a difference.

Then again, perhaps the dozer tank capabilities was also a PR trick

Steve