Arras Counter Attack

[Horncastle]

Just a quicky, just reading the Royal Tank Regiment Journal and theres a small article on the above, where the 4th and 7th RTR led a counter attack into the German flank. Then goes onto say the result of this was Von Rundstedt calling a halt to the push to Dunkirk allowing the escape.

I always thought that it was Hitler and Goering who orchastrated the halt? Im not a grog though so wonder what you people make of the whole thing.

Cheers

[MikeT]

If memory is right Goering wanted his Stukas to finish the British forces. He insisted to Hitler who issued the orders. Big mistake for the Germans, great mistake for the Brits.

MikeT

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Horncastle:

Just a quicky, just reading the Royal Tank Regiment Journal and theres a small article on the above, where the 4th and 7th RTR led a counter attack into the German flank. Then goes onto say the result of this was Von Rundstedt calling a halt to the push to Dunkirk allowing the escape.

I always thought that it was Hitler and Goering who orchastrated the halt? Im not a grog though so wonder what you people make of the whole thing.

Cheers

I can check Cooper tonight to see what he has to say, but understand that what the Germans were doing - deep penetrations - was something relatively new in warfare (though maybe Sherman would have understood? EDIT not the concept so much as the scale of the penetrations ) Contrary to popular belief, a lot of German commanders were extremely skittish during the French campaign and had no idea that what they were trying to do would actually work. There were some intense debates on how to run the entire campaign among OKH, OKW, and the commanders on the ground. Sometimes the only thing scarier than the prospect of defeat is an unexpected wild success.

The Germans had great reason to be scared - it was a pretty big gamble. Shortages of ammunition and motor transport were very apparent and the window the Germans had to accomplish their goal - defeating a numerically superior enemy - was a narrow one.

[ October 14, 2003, 12:34 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Andreas]

von Rundstedt either suggested or agreed the halt. Hitler supported that. Halder and somebody else important (head of OKH) was against it.

There were sound reasons for the decision to stop attacking with panzer forces (infantry attacked all along) - which when looked at with 20/20 hindsight are of course all wrong.

1) The British were not going anywhere, and their bridgehead (really encirclement) had no operational depth. It is often overlooked that Dynamo was a bit of a long shot.

2) The German Panzertruppen were needed against the French troops on the left flank, which were pretty much unbroken. Any tanks lost in reducing Dunkerque would be missing afterwards during the battle for France. Giving them a chance to R&R ensured they were available.

3) The terrain was not quite that good for tank use, so infantry was better in any way.

4) There was a belief that the air over the bridgehead was controlled by the Germans. A massive effort by the RAF at least contested it so much that the evacuation could happen.

Overall, while we can say very easily today that it looks like a desastrous decision, I think any suggestion that Hitler interfered to let the BEF escape (for whatever reason) is a bit far-fetched. They just got it wrong this time, but not just Hitler, also the local commander did.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Halder and somebody else important (head of OKH)...

Would that be von Brauchitsch?

Michael

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael Emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

Halder and somebody else important (head of OKH)...

Would that be von Brauchitsch?

Michael </font>

[JasonC]

The Arras counterattack failed. So did another by De Gaulle. Both had some initial success but could not sustain or exploit the initial break in. Which was quite a common outcome with armor attacks. The French had tried smaller scale counterattacks, including use of armor and some with division strength combined arms, which lacked even the initial success of Arras and De Gaulle's.

Right after the Meuse crossings the French threw in 3 successive armor counterattacks within 48 hours. These were battalion to regiment scale affairs. It was mostly just German infantry across the river already that stopped them, though one hit armor and didn't do any better. Combined arms coordination was primitive in these attempts. But in addition, German infantry just didn't break or run. They held the covered areas and called for artillery fire while direct fire gun fronts formed up behind.

Farther north, the French light mech divisions fought a running battle in which they counterattacked locally. They fared poorly in armor vs armor engagements. The small scale ones weren't great, but the larger ones were disasters. The bigger the armor units engaged the larger the German edge. Their tanks excelled in the "soft systems" - radios, visibility, optics, larger turrets and crews, sustained cross country mobility, rate of fire. As well as combined arms, training, and tactical coordination.

The French were occasionally still able to stop them using gun fronts of their own, even after their armor was spent. But not everywhere, and the Germans just shifted to the successful sectors and bypassed the holdouts.

At Arras, the local success was of a predictable and limited kind. Tanks without support got through the thin German front lines, but "stripped". They then faced German reserves in the depth of the position. The Germans built up gun fronts from a handful of 88s and numerous artillery pieces - plain 105s, whole battalions of them - firing direct. (They also had smaller PAK but those weren't terribly effective).

Getting a break in against early war AT defenses was easy. Just put enough tanks on a narrow sector of the front, without telegraphing it way ahead of time, and you will overwhelm the modest local AT weapons and get through the front line. But that was not the hard part.

The hard part was when enemy reserves rushed to the area, arty counter-concentrated by massing fires, stripping infantry and stopping armor that was too light, gun fronts concentrated effective AT strength at the threatened point, etc.

Most of the AT ability of the early war forces wasn't at the front line. The front line had ATRs and tiny PAK, in penny packet numbers. But vanilla artillery pieces were adequate against most early war armor, and were readily available in numbers deeper in the defense zone. Any nearby enemy armor could also race to the scene.

To defeat all of that you needed additional arms, not just the tanks, and you needed attack depth and rapid exploitation. If you look at the 1940-1 German formations that worked, they have far more motorized artillery and infantry with the tanks than anyone else had. They have infantry divisions in deep column right behind the panzers, shouldering into the gap and widdening it on a time scale of hours to a few days.

The Allies did not understand the need for these things at the time. They did not remotely have them at Arras, or in De Gaulle's parallel attempt.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Right after the Meuse crossings the French threw in 3 successive armor counterattacks within 48 hours. These were battalion to regiment scale affairs. It was mostly just German infantry across the river already that stopped them, though one hit armor and didn't do any better. Combined arms coordination was primitive in these attempts. But in addition, German infantry just didn't break or run. They held the covered areas and called for artillery fire while direct fire gun fronts formed up behind.

My beloved GD set the precedent there, methinks...

[Horncastle]

So would you say the Arras counter attack was sufficient enough to cause the Germans to call a halt? Or was it just the whole speed of progress and overstretched line that was ultimately the reason and the counter attack little more than the final nail in the coffin(but there were numerous nails waiting out there)?

[Andreas]

I think it is the latter.

Here is an interesting site I just googled across.

[Los]

I agree with Andreas (am at work or I would be forking over refrences right now). The Arras counterattack had little bearing on German decisions on how to handle Dunkirk.

Los

BTW didn't someone make an early war total conversion for CM once? I'd love to get my hands on that. I have the pacific TC and it's a great thing...

[ October 15, 2003, 09:24 AM: Message edited by: Los ]

[JasonC]

I don't think any of the counterattacks had anything to do with the halt decision. They just thought that part of the enemy army was basically beaten anyway, and there was little point in wearing out their armor in frontal assaults against it. That could be left to firepower arms - artillery mostly, also air, supporting vanilla infantry.

They did not see the situation there as urgent. They did not expect anything to get off over open beaches. The performance by Fighter Command and by the small boat flotillas just surprised everybody, including the Brits incidentally. In retrospect pushing harder with the armor, particular just after the pocket formed, probably would have cut in half the numbers that got away. But that was not at all obvious at the time.

Meanwhile the tanks would refit for the subsequent fight in the south against the rest of the French army. Which they proceeded to do, quite successfully. It is not like any of it was actually a German defeat. "Wars are not won by evacuations".

[Tommy Atkins]

Originally posted by JasonC:

They did not see the situation there as urgent. They did not expect anything to get off over open beaches. The performance by Fighter Command and by the small boat flotillas just surprised everybody, including the Brits incidentally.

This was certainly the case. My grandfather, then a 19 year-old bombardier in the Royal Artillery, took part in the rearguard action on the Dunkirk perimeter. The BEF was in near-chaotic retreat, having abandoned most of its heavy equipment, Dunkirk itself was well alight, and he didn’t expect to see England again. From the German perspective they must have looked thoroughly beaten.

The German let-up (he would definitely take issue with the term “halt”) offered some of the rearguard the chance to fall back to the beaches. In his unit, one gun crew in three was ordered to hold the line, so lots were drawn amongst the men. My grandfather was one of the lucky ones: every man that stayed behind was either killed or spent the next 5 years as a POW. By the time he reached the Mole, the Germans were already through his unit’s positions and on their way to the beaches.

On the plus side, though, my grandfather came off on a Thames steamer and managed to get a hot shower and a bunk to sleep on during the crossing, so arrived on the south coast pretty refreshed compared to most of the PBI. He didn’t even get his boots wet, but then he always has seemed to manage to land on his feet!

[Michael Dorosh]

Well don't bloody stop there! What did he do for the rest of the war?

Did he know "Gun Buster"?

[Tommy Atkins]

Of course – I think he inspired most of the books.

Like Austin he was a Territorial when war broke out, but I’ve no idea which unit he was in (I’m not even sure what type of gun he served). He’s never talked about the war a great deal, and I’ve never felt comfortable interrogating him for all the groggy details (much as I’d like to know). I know he was in Burma some time after that and wasn’t demobbed until ’46. All in all a pretty rotten way to spend your youth, I’d say.

It rather puts things in perspective knowing that your birth hinged on the drawing of lots in a French field!

[Los]

Through free association this thread brings to mind a film I acqiured not too long ago called "Stukas" (Ger:1941). It's German language only w/ Czech subtitles, and follows a Stuka squadron through the French Campaign in 1940. It's a propoganda film but being made right after thr campaign with all the real kit and it's pretty interesting. Some miniatures and modles but lots of live footage and real equipment too: In particular French tanks, guns, and uniforms. Lots of coverage of the breakthrough at Sedan. Some neat closeups of 4 and 8 wheeled panzerspahwagens. And of course if you're a stuka fan.....

Sidebar at the same time I also aquired a 1950's german movie called "Die Grune Tuefel von Monte Cassino" which covers a company of German paras fighting around the Abbey with a side plot of trying to convince the occupants of the abbey to leave before the allies bomb. It's no "Battleground" but lot's of good footage nevertheless. German language only.

Los

[PJungnitsch]

I thought this was quite interesting. This web page holds that the 'miracle of Dunkirk' was mostly due to an unusual weather pattern, that grounded the Luftwaffe but yet kept the Channel calm enough for the evacuation. Any truth to that?

[JasonC]

The guys who got shot up on the boats would probably take exception to the notion that the Luftwaffe was grounded by bad weather. Scores of light craft were lost. Also, Fighter Command shot down well over 100 aircraft over the beaches. The Luftwaffe was certainly there. They were not able to operate with impunity due to British fighter cover, but they were able to operate, and that cover was an on and off thing (because of range, short loiter times, etc).

It just did not remotely stop the evacuation. There were more boats than planes...

[Trommelfeuer]

My grandfather was with the 3rd Waffen-SS "Totenkopf" division in the "Frankreichfeldzug".

The following is out of his memories which he gave to me (I'm really sorry for my bad english):

He was the "Gewehrführer" of the first (of two) heavy machinegun groups of the "Divisonsbegleitschutz".

The "Totenkopf" was on the march when on 21.5.1940 a large-scale tank-counterattack near Arras took place. Wave after wave of allied tanks attacked the columns.

Panzerjäger bring their 3,7cm AT-guns into positions and open fire on the allied tanks.

Horrified the Panzerjäger realize that their 3,7 cm grenades do only ricochet from the tanks.

Even the order to fire at the tanks at close ranges doesn't bring any success.

Now the tanks are very near and drive over the guns and crews.

Meanwhile a 10,5 cm field battery has been unloaded into position on the open street and joins the firefight.

Here the disadvantage of the (tchechische) "Kastenlafette" becomes clear.

On the open street the rams cannot be steadied, and the guns find no fixed fire-positions, with every shot they make a big "jump" backwards.

Parallel to the "forward-march" street of the "Totenkopf" advances the 7th Panzerdivision under the comand of Erwin Rommel.

Rommel realizes our critical situation and orders an "Acht-Acht" AA-battery to help in the crisis-zone.

Under the command of Rommel the AA-battery takes up the fight with the tanks and in a few minutes some enemy tanks are already burning.

The enemy tank commanders, who had stood in their open hatches, now close them and button-up, and when the first Stukas attack, they try to get away in a "zick-Zack" (?) route.

There had been 60 french and 74 english tanks in this attack....

Regards, Trommelfeuer.

P.S. Could anyone help me in translating the following from german to english, please ?

Der Marsch führte über Mastricht und Cambrai, kleine Geplänkel konnten den Vormarsch nicht aufhalten.

Am 21.5. wird die Division beim Vormarsch nach Norden im Raum Arras von einer Panzerarmada angegriffen.

Panzerwelle auf Panzerwelle rollt auf die im Marsch befindlichen Divisionsteile zu.

Die Panzerjägerabteilung geht in Stellung und nimmt den Abwehrkampf auf.

Mit Entsetzen müssen sie feststellen daß die 3,7 cm Geschosse wirkungslos abprallen.

Selbst der Befehl die Panzer auf kürzeste Entfernung abzuschiessen bringt keinen Erfolg. Die Panzer sind jetzt nahe heran und überrollen Geschütze und Mannschaften.

Inzwischen hat eine 10,5 cm Feldbatterie auf freier Straße abgeprotzt und den Feuerkampf aufgenommen.

Hier zeigt sich der Nachteil einer Kastenlafette.

Auf der Staße findet der Sporn keinen Halt und die Geschütze lassen sich nicht "festschiessen", sie machen bei jedem Schuss einen großen Sprung zurück.

Parallel zur Marschstraße der "Totenkopf" marschiert die 7. Panzerdivison unter ihrem Kommandeur Erwin Rommel.

Rommel erkennt die krisenhafte Entwicklung bei uns und beordert sofort eine "Acht-Acht" Flakbatterie an den Krisenherd.

Unter Rommels Leitung nimmt die Flakbatterie den Kampf mit den Panzern auf und in wenigen Minuten stehen schon einige Feindpanzer in Brand.

Die gegnerischen Panzerkommandeure, die bislang in den Panzern frei in ihren Luken standen klappen nun die Luken zu, und als dann noch die ersten Stukas angreifen, versuchen die Panzer im Zickzack-Kurs zu entkommen. Die Zahl der angreifenden Panzer belief sich auf 74 englische und 60 französiche.

Rommels Einsatz der "Acht-Acht" Flak zur Panzerbekämpfung hat Maßstaäbe für die spätere Verwendung der Flak im Erdkampf gesetzt, und uns hat er gelobt, weil unsere Gewehrgruppe sofort die MG Nahsicherung der Flakbatterie übernommen hatte.

Der Marsch Richtung "Bethune" wird fortgesetzt und die mit englischen Militärfahrzeugen übersäte Straße muss wieder und wieder freigeräumt werden, bevor es weitergehen kann.

Wir sind immer wieder erstaunt über die Güte und Reichhaltigkeit der englischen Ausrüstung. Am 24.5 wird der "Lys" und der " La Bassé-Kanal" im Sturm überschritten und es werden drei Brückenköpfe gebildet.

Hitlers Haltebefehl zwingt zur Einstellung der Angriffshandlungen und der Aufgabe der Brückenköpfe.

Von allen Stäben scharf kritisiert gab er den Engländern erneut Gelegenheit, sich festzusetzen und diese Kolonialprofis haben diese Chance auch mit allen Mitteln genutzt.

Das Kanalgelände ist eben wie ein Brett und wird von Entwässerungskanälen durchzogen. Einzelgehöfte, von dichten Hecken umgeben beherrschen das Landschaftsbild und das Grundwasser lauert nur einen Spatenstich unter dem Boden.

Dieses deckungsarme Gelände wurde von Militärprofis beherrscht die teilweise eine 25-jährige Militärdienstzeit aufweisen konnten, durch den unsinnigen Haltebefehl konnten sie alle Schikanen der Verteidigung nutzten.

So hatten sie beispielsweise Schiess-Scharten in die Hecken geschnitten und die MGs 2 Meter zurückgezogen, dadurch war es uns unmöglich die Feuerstellungen zu erkennen, weil der Geschossknall verzerrt wurde und das Mündungsfeuer nicht erkennbar war.

Ähnlich gingen sie mit den Leichtgeschützen vor. In den obersten Stockwerken öffnete man die Fenster und Zwischentüren, zog die Geschütze in den hintersten Raum zurück und eröffnete von hier aus den Feuerkampf, und wir konnten nur raten woher der Beschuss kam.

Am 26.5. griffen wir erneut an, nur diesmal unter erheblich schwereren Bediengungen, nicht in der Verfolgung eines geschlagenen Gegners sondern im Angriff auf ausgebaute Stellungen, die noch zusätzlich durch einen Kanal geschützt wurden.

Eine kleine persönliche Episode nebenbei:

Als Übergangsstelle bot sich die Möglcihkeit, 2 Kähne im Kanal zusammenzuschieben und diese mit Behelfsmitteln zu verbinden.

Also, die 2 S.M.G. zur Sicherung der Übergangsstelle in Stellung gebracht, Infanteriesicherung links und rechts, und die zwei Gewehrführer machen sich zum rüberschwimmen fertig.

Lappe links, ich rechts, Lappe ist der bessere Schwimmer und ist als erster am Kahn oben.

Ich habe gerade das Deck erreicht als Lappe aus der vorderen Wohnluke stürzt und schreit: "Da sind noch Tommys drin!"

Rein iss Wasser und weg ist er.

Das Gewehr 1 ist feuerbereit und will die Bordwand durchlöchern. Ich bin an Bord geblieben und warte ab. Vorne rührt sich nichts, also gehe ich zum Lukenrand und schreie nach unten: "Händs up und kommt rut!"

Keine Reaktion, Lappe ist inzwischen wieder an Bord und beschliesst nochmal runter zu gehen. Vorsichtig pirscht er sich ran und mit einem Satz ist er unten. Nichts geschieht, plötzlich ein brüllendes Gelächter und Lappe winkt, ich solle näher kommen.

Unten angekommen stehen wir uns im Halbdunkel in einem großen Wandspiegel, als Spiegelbild, gegenüber.

Die Anspannung und das Halbdunkel haben so irritiert, daß Lappe sich selbst als Tommy gesehen hat.

Ein befreiendes Lachen ist die Folge und die Behelfsbrücke wird erfolgreich beendet.

...Der Schandfleck der "Totenkopf"...

Am 26.5. geht auch die 4. Kompanie, I. Batallion, 2. Regiment unter der Führung von Obersturmführer Fritz Knöchlein über den Kanal. Bei "Le Paradis" stößt er auf härtesten Widerstand. 100 Mann des britischen Royal Norfolk Regiments weisen seine Angriffe ab. Viermal greift er an und wird abgewiesen. Seine Kompanie verliert 17 Gefallene und 52 Verwundete. Beim 5. Angriff kapituliert der Gegner. Knöchlein ist rasend vor Wut. Ein Teil der Verwundeten zeigen Verletzungen auf, die auf "Dum Dum" Geschosse schliessen lassen.

Es war militärisch geübtes Recht, wer mit "Dum Dum" Geschossen angetroffen wird, wird sofort erschossen, hier war es aber unbewiesen.

Knöchlein hat sich über jedes geübte Kriegsrecht hinweggesetzt und und die Gefangenen vor die Maschinengewehre führen und erschiessen lassen.

Seine Tat löste ein empörtes Entsetzen aus und die Reaktionen reichten von Versetzungsanträgen zu anderen Einheiten bis zu Duell-Forderungen.

Eine Tatsache bleibt, der Ehrenschild der SS Totenkopfdivision wurde auf ewig befleckt und gab den Kritikern der Waffen SS Gelegenheit, die Truppe als "Führerhörig" und "Fanatisch" darzustellen. Knöchlein wurde nach dem Krieg von den Engländern zum Tode verurteilt und gehenkt...

Unerbittlich sind die Verfolgungsgefechte, der Panzereinsatz wird durch das Poldergelände immer schwieriger und der Engländer setzt seine besten Einheiten als Nachhut ein und opfert sie.

Am 27./28.5. erreicht die Totenkopf "Bailleul" und hier kommt der endgültige Haltebefehl.

Die Engländer fliehen in Richtung Kanalküste und Kanalhäfen, und jetzt glaubt Göring an seine Chance und verspricht Hitler die Engländer mit seiner Luftwaffe matt zu setzen.

Die "Leibstandarte" hatte die Küste erreicht und war im Begriff Dünkirchen zu nehmen und den Alliierten den Weg zur Küste zu versperren, sie musste ihr Vorgehen jedoch aufgeben und wurde zurückgezogen.

In den Augen Hitlers sind die Engländer geschlagen, an der Küste festgenagelt, und seine schnellen Truppen stehen für den Stoß auf Paris zur Verfügung.

Die Fehleinschätzung: "Görings Luftwaffe könne die Kapitulation des englischen Expeditionskorps herbeiführen" ermöglicht die Flucht und das "Wunder von Dünkirchen".

300.000 gut ausgebildete Soldaten können entkommen.

Sie ließen alles zurück, Waffen, Panzer, Fahrzeug und Gerät, aber das Wichtigste, ihr militärisches Können bleibt unbeschadet und in wenigen Monaten standen bereits neue Einheiten.

Das Beispiel Dünkirchen hat gezeigt, daß eine Luftwaffe ohne Zusammenwirkung mit Bodentruppen keine Kriege entscheiden kann.

Man kann als Erklärungsversuch nur anmerken, daß der Generalstab, von der Schnelligkeit der Geschehnisse überrascht, die sich bietenden Möglichkeiten nicht erkannte und dementsprechend nicht nutzen konnte.

[ October 24, 2003, 07:11 PM: Message edited by: Trommelfeuer ]