AAR, Friendly Fire, Bogging, C&C

[Sgt Joch]

Here is a summary AAR I found in an official friendly fire investigation report (it's amazing what you can find on the internet). It shows a typical confused small unit action, unfortunately with tragic consequences, which raises several CMSF questions.

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Unclassified Executive Summary

On 23 March 03, 1st Battalion 2nd Marine Regiment was assigned the mission of securing two bridges over the Euphrates River (the southern bridge) and Saddam Canal (the northern bridge) in An Nasirayah. These bridges led to a critical intersection, which was also to be seized.

The Battalion consisted of Team TANK, which lead the way, followed by Team MECH (Bravo Company-task organized as two tank platoons and a mechanized rifle platoon), the Forward Command Post, Alpha Company and Charlie Company.

As this offensive began, Team TANK engaged in protracted combat operations. As a result, they had to break off to refuel in the rear.

After Team TANK withdrew, Team MECH was designated as the lead. Bravo Company's offensive led them across the southern bridge. Bravo Company then maneuvered off the main road, to avoid the threat associated with "Ambush Alley," and into the eastern section of the city where muddy conditions halted their advance (note: two AAVs, two tanks and a Humvee sank in the mud). The Forward Command Post element, in trace of Bravo Company, also got stuck. During this maneuvering, Alpha Company secured the southern bridge and maintained a defensive posture at that location.

As these forces entered the city, their situational awareness became clouded due to deviations from the planned scheme of maneuver, the urban environment, and problematic communication links.

Because of communications problems throughout the Battalion, Charlie Company thought Bravo Company had pushed straight up Ambush Alley, through the city, and seized the northern bridge.

Accordingly, Charlie Company crossed the southern bridge and started to maneuver through Ambush Alley to the northern bridge. In the course of this maneuver, Charlie Company began to take heavy fire. Additionally, unbeknownst to either Charlie Company or Bravo Company, this maneuver put Charlie Company in the lead.

Charlie Company proceeded just north of the northern bridge and seized it. Then, realizing they were in the lead, the Charlie Company Commander called the battalion commander, located with the Forward Command Post, to notify him of their position and that they had taken the objective.

After a brief lull in enemy fire, Charlie Company again began taking heavy enemy fire from artillery, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), mortar and small arms.

At approximately the same time, the Air Officer, located with the Forward Command Post, called Bravo Company Forward Air Controller (FAC), requesting close air support (CAS) to combat the enemy forces attacking their location.

A two-ship formation of A-10 aircraft responded to the call. Based on the information he possessed concerning the scheme of maneuver, the Bravo Company Commander, collocated with the FAC, identified their company as the lead element. Therefore, believing that only enemy forces were ahead, the Bravo company commander cleared the FAC to engage the enemy targets north of the canal.

The A-10s targeted what turned out to be Charlie company ground assets, making multiple passes against them. Eventually, the A-10s were informed to cease fire, which they did.

Eighteen Marines were killed during this engagement. The evidence, primarily witness statements and/or forensic reports, indicates that eight marines were killed due solely to enemy fire. The intensity of the enemy fire, combined with friendly fire, makes it impossible to conclusively determine the exact sequence and sources of fires that killed the other 10 marines.

During this same period, 17 marines were wounded in action; 13 solely by enemy fire and one by distinct rounds of enemy and friendly fire. Three marines, one of which had a prior distinct injury from enemy fire, were simultaneously hit be enemy and friendly fire, the intensity of which makes it impossible to conclusively determine the exact sequence and source of these injuries.

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issues:

1. How will friendly fire incidents be handled in CMSF?. Friendly fire incidents in CM1 were limited, but in Syria 2007, the massive firepower of U.S. forces could lead to some very nasty friendly fire incidents. (The summary is non-commital, but if you read the Charlie Company individual interviews, it's pretty clear the A-10s killed and wounded alot of marines).

2. terrain & bogging: from the above"...into the eastern section of the city where muddy conditions halted their advance (note: two AAVs, two tanks and a Humvee sank in the mud)....". The U.S. invaded Iraq, in what was supposed to be the best season for the attackers and here you have two tanks, tracked vehicles, sinking in the mud, going through a city! What's going to happen to the overweight, wheeled Stryker when it tries to go off-road in rural Syria?

3. command & control. It's pretty clear the battalion and company commanders lost track of friendly forces in the heat of the action, something which happened regularly in WWII and which will no doubt happen often in Syria 2007. (the summary is a bit dry, but in the full report, you find out that the leading company ran into 9 Iraqi T-55s, an event which would tend to rattle most commanders). Other than minimising Borg spotting, adding target memory, playing with command delays and command radius, will CMSF be very different from CMAK? I see Steve alluded to alot of new stuff in this respect in another post.

For those who are interested (or have a lot of time to kill), here is the link to the full report.

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/a-10-friendly-fire_centcom29mar2004.htm

[ October 18, 2005, 02:17 AM: Message edited by: JC_Hare ]

[aka_tom_w]

Thats a LOT to think about.

I am of the opinion that might be sort of hard to simulate in the game, BUT I sure hope they try to pull it off so something like that "might" happen in the game. Units getting lost in the woods in the dark would be an added bonus but if EVERYBODY has GPS technology the whole "getting lost" thing goes RIGHT out the window.

That friendly fire summary was very enlightening.

Thanks

-tom w

[Bil Hardenberger]

Well, this is a timely post... I just posted about this very issue in the "Interesting" thread...

Great stuff.

Bil

[Pete Wenman]

Just reading the full transcript and its interesting reading. Don't want to get political

here but USAF has a track record with this sort of thing.

My point though is how difficult is it to recognise ground targets from the air? The AAV is a fairly distinctive vehicle, and I can't think of much the Iraqi army would have of similar shape or size. If it's that difficult then it needs to be modeled, and again perhaps suggests that the US Forces may have overwhelming firepower, but using it effectivly is not an automatic consequence.

Interesting also that the FAC and Coy Cmdr stated there were no friendly forces ahead of them despite not knowing this was the case. A case of "because I don't know, it must be so". Not getting at the guys on the ground here, rather that this illustrates FOW at its most extreme.

Pete