New FCS video

[hellfish]

Still kinda hokey, but you gotta like the production values.

http://video.boeing.com:8080/asx_external/events/vanguards_103106.asx

[birdstrike]

Fine, when are they releasing the demo?

But it's interesting how they seem to focus alot on urban combat. Wonder what they'll do with their little R2D2s if some day a old soviet-style massed-army threat reenters the stage.

[Imperial Grunt]

I dont think that is the threat...massed mechanized armies will be dead before the Army (or Marines) get there, courtesy of the US Airforce and Navy, and allied aircraft.

My biggest take away from the video (besides the one of how does the Army pay for such things) are:

1) The Army wants to go back to fighting the conventional mechanized battle that it has gotten very good at, but does not exist currently.

2) The Army is still fascinated with mech assets that can be flown in en mass and rapidly deploy. The Stryker brigades are meant to do that, but cannot. How a even heavier FCS will drive out the ramp of a C-17 and go directly into battle is beyond me.

3) Future technology is going to make US forces more and more lethal...forcing our enemies to get more and more unconventional.

[Nidan1]

Watch this video and then go read the Operation Al Fajr material in the other thread, and know that human nature and prejudice, as well as inter service rivalry will negate the advantages of firepower and technology even on the modern battlefield.

Until we can completely replace humans in combat, none of this fancy stuff will achieve its full potential, and then it wont matter because people will no longer be killing people.

[Imperial Grunt]

Well, I would not go far. While the Op Al Fajr AAR did highlight alot of problems and event the report had some bias (it was written by a civilian for the Army), the fact is that both the Marines and Army forces involved performed very well, and supported on another.

There is definetly some comm equipment, etc..that should be univeral between the Army and the Marines (about time).

The part about the 2-7 Cav company commanders being disappointed that the Marines could not "keep up" and all the other stuff the author had to say was not really explained. The simple answer is that both 2-2 Infantry and 2-7 Cav were entirely mounted on M-1A2 tanks and Bradely fighting vehicles and they were spearheading the attack and not conducting a deliberate clearing operation. I am not sure how the Marines could have kept up with the armor and still clear every structure as they went. The planners should have anticipated that.

But as a Marine, I think it is about time that the Marines and Army "play better" with each other. Both services have complentary capabilities and there are things that each can learn from one another. Army mechanized forces might not be hot on light infantry tactics and skills, but when it comes to mechanized warfare, get out of their way.

Back in the day when I was a lieutenant in command of 2nd platoon, K 3/5, my company went to NTC for 30 days to augment the OPFOR against a brigade of 1st ID. It was a great training experience and my platoon did great, but witnessing a mech brigade on the move made me realize that nothing on earth could stop such a force, once it got going. It was truly an impressive amount of combat power, and real ammo was not even being used.

One good thing out of OIF/OEF is that the Army and Marines (and the other services) have cooperated together as a team better than ever. I hope this mutual respect continues, especially when this is all over and the inevitable draw-down and budget cuts occur.

More and more human controlled robots will make their way onto the battlefield, but the problem with automated platforms, such as the UCAV, is that they cannot think for themselves. They just carry out there programming. So unless total annihilation is the objective of a military operation, I think humans will always be involved.

Semper Fi, Nidan.

[Nidan1]

Semper Fi,

What disturbed me Imperial Grunt, was not so much the incompatibility of the comm equipment, but something that the contributers alluded to about how the Marines let the Army heavy mech equipment sit idle while they assaulted fortified urban positions using nothing but young Marines and guts.

While I can understand how that could happen, it seems to me that a lot of that gung ho attitude should have been replaced by more common sense in the years since I was in the Corps. I am sure that the Marines and the Army units worked together quite well, and that was stated in the narrative. To have supporting arms that can negate the advantage of a strong fortified defensive position and not use them borders on incompetence. I really did not get the vibe of bias from that report, and even though it was written by an Army writer, I thought it was quite even handed.

I would hope that by 2006 the Corps would set aside some of its rougher thought processes and at least understand why they might need armored ambulances for Gods sake. I'll bet that was something they never even considered when planning the Fallujah operation, it must have been something the Army Mech units would ahve taken for granted. I can see why they were apalled seeing wounded Marines being evac'd in HumVees.

Our country needs its fighting forces to be able to cooperate and compliment each other. If anything good comes out of this current situation maybe that will be the result.

[Imperial Grunt]

Those are good points, but I don't think that it is as simple as the Army company commander made it sound in his quote and their was no Marine reply. So it is hard to say.

If I had a Marine down that needed to be CASEVACed ASAP, and an Army ambulance was idling nearby, of course I would use (more than likely my 1st Sgt or CoGySgt would have taken care of it and informed me later). To not do so would be a betrayel to my wounded Marine, something not to be taken lightly.

With all the friction of a multi-battalion level urban assault going on, even the most simple of coordination can be very difficult, especially with less than ideal radio comms. And the geometry of turning the Army company in a new direction (where are their fires going now?) to link up with the Marines might have been more of a problem to work out than getting the Marine on a HMMWV right now. Who knows.

I seriously doubt the Marines looked at the Army ambulance and said "no way, I am not riding around in that thing!".

During OIF1, all the Marine WIAs my company CASEVACed were picked up by Army Blackhawk MEDEVAC birds, and they were fantastic.

But there is alot of room for improvement and working together by both sides. Having different capability sets, cultures, etc..is a great thing in my opinion. Its what makes a Marine a Marine, a Ranger and Ranger, etc...But we have to be able to move, shoot, and communicate as a joint team, from the fireteam level to the Joint Command level.

Marine and Army officers and SNCOs should be trained on each other's infantry organization and the pros/cons of how they each operate. Even in the Army there is a different culture in a light infantry battalion than in an armored battalion. Commanders should be aware on how to best capitalize on every capability.

The main vibe of bias I picked up was the author's explanination of Fallujah 1. There was alot left out about how the battle developed (Gen's Mattis and Conway wanted more time to plan an assault and get more forces for it, as well as to set up the IO campaign.) The Marine battalions were decisively engaged, and taking casualties, but they were killing insurgents at the rapid rate, far from being "held back." Mattis and Conway also told higher that if you order us in now, do not stop us when the destruction begins....but this is exactly what happened. 1st MarDiv did not halt its own operation, it was told to stop so that Fallujah was not gutted and a humanitarian crisis develop, which no one in theatre was ready to deal with.

I was there so I have a strong opinion about Fallujah.