Additional material on FAE and thermobaric weapons

[John Kettler]

A most interesting discussion of FAE employment by the Russians in Grozny during the year 2000.

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/fuelair/fuelair.htm

Regards,

John Kettler

[Other Means]

Combine these with a smaller version of the M31 GMLRS and you've got a hell of a weapons system.

[John Kettler]

Other Means,

Concur. Sure wouldn't want to be on the receiving end! OTOH, if in the primary zone, it'd be over before you knew what hit you.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Battlefront.com]

I stumbled upon the Leavenworth documents a couple of years back. There are a number of rather interesting ones to look at. What was interesting was to see how different OIF 1 turned out to be compared to the Russian experience in both battles for Grozny.

The thing that I noted the MOST about the thermobaric AARs was how far less effective they are in real battle conditions than they are on paper. I think it was the document John linked to that basically concluded that they were not that much more effective, and in some cases less effective, than regular HE or HEAT rounds. Certainly on paper this is not the case, but the physics of the surrounding air are so specific for thermobaric that optimal conditions are harder to find, or so it seems, in the real world.

Steve

[John Kettler]

Steve,

Would imagine any significant amount of wind would be bad news for a weapon of that type, whereas still air would be great.

As for the difference between Russian performance in

Grozny 1 and ours in OIF, I'd say the differences lay in troop quality (in aggregate, conscript Russians vs. veteran or better U.S.; even elite SpetsNaz troops were misused); incredibly better maintenance and logistics for the U.S., this despite clear problems which surfaced; a well thought out U.S. battle plan and the needed political will on our side to execute it; vastly superior U.S. tactics, coupled with far more survivable armor operating in an integrated manner with other arms, and for the U.S., a far worse motivated foe, generally speaking, than the ferocious Chechens the Russians faced.

In fairness to the Russians, though, I think that a better comparison would be Russians at Grozny vs. U.S. at Fallujah or similar, not the race across Iraq. I'd argue, too, that the U.S. airpower was far more capable and powerful in Iraq than was the Russian in Grozny. Certainly, there were no BACKFIRE or BLACKJACK orbiting with a load of GLONASS guided bombs!

Regards,

John Kettler

[John Kettler]

Left out a very important point I meant to make originally--U.S. noncoms. They're what makes the U.S. Army the professional force that it is, and full acknowledgment was made of this in the second part of the BoB gathering on C-SPAN in which the modern guys from the same unit were talking about fighting in Iraq. Time and again, from officers and enlisted alike, it all came down to the sergeants. "Trust your sergeant, ask your sergeant" were key phrases invoked time and again. The absence of real noncoms showed up big time when the Russians went into Grozny and was bloodily paid for as units milled around under fire, momentum was lost, decisions weren't made timely, and things fell apart at the very levels where they had to work, be it chow, ammo, or combat guidance in the thick of it.

Hearkening back to Fallujah, one of the 101st guys was wounded in Iraq and hurried out of Walter Reed to home in order to clear beds for the 1000+ wounded in Fallujah. His wife volunteered to learn to change his dressings and such, so this could be done.

Regards,

John Kettler

[Battlefront.com]

Good point about the noncoms. Those guys are the ones responsible for fixing all the problems officers create. Since officers universally create problems the quality of a nation's noncoms is extremely important. My memory of the Grozny reports showed that once the Russian troops found themselves in a pickle they pretty much didn't know what to do. Command and Control was pretty much neither, and that is a very bad place to be when you're being ambushed by a far better motivated and capable force (as the Chechins certainly were at the time).

Like I said earlier... I think the Russians would have been soundly thumpped because of the Chechins and the environment no matter what. However, if the senior officers had gone into Grozny with a far better plan they could have avoided having both their head and shoulders on a plate instead of just their head.

Steve

[John Kettler]

Steve,

Splendidly (and devastatingly) put!

Regards,

John Kettler