Quick question on the 3" mortar

[Michael Emrys]

I'm thinking of doing a QB based around a British inf co and thought it might be cool to add a 3" or two to the force mix, but I am dubious about that being historically valid. I know that they belonged to a mortar section in the heavy weapons company of the battalion, right? So in battle, were they kept together under the control of the section or were they ever parcelled out to individual rifle companies? If the latter, would they have been distributed singly, in pairs, or what?

Michael D.? Brian? Anybody?

Michael

[ June 09, 2002, 11:51 AM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[Michael Dorosh]

I suspect the 6 gun battery remained with Support Company, but I am far from expert on the inner workings of the battalion heavy weapons.

It is possible that in the "usual" attack plan - two companies up, two back - that two or three tubes might be designated to each of the lead companies. I'd be interested in the answer to this one as well; I have no idea if they had "on call" abilities, or if the mortars would be assigned directly to company headquarters.

I get the feeling that radio communications in CW infantry battalions were not that reliable, which might have affected the flexibility of this kind of thing.

[Andreas]

I am not an expert either, but I doubt they were used like that. Not mobile enough on foot, and too vulnerable in the carrier. Regarding comms - up to the company start line, you would presumably have wire leading to the battery. Beyond that, I would suspect that you either use runners or short range radio (if present).

I think the value of the 3" mortar as the only immediate artillery for the battalion, with very high response time, would make a Battalion CO hesitant to parcel it out. Never mind that weight of fire is dispersed.

Also, a battalion frontage in an attack is usually quite narrow, meaning that comms and range should not be a big problem.

Then again, I am the last person who should be allowed to talk about infantry tactics...

[Michael Emrys]

Thanks to you both. So far, you are confirming what I suspected, but the floor is still open for discussion. So anybody feel free to join in.

I'm also pretty well settled on adding some Churchills in support, but I could use some input on what would be the expected minimum numbers normally commited together into battle.

Michael

[CMplayer]

One thing you could do is just invent a cover story for the mortar(s). For example, the company in your scenario is in battalion reserve but the battalion has very suddenly found itself being overrun. So put the Battalion HQ on the map and park some 3"ers nearby. Have some jeeps and carriers around. Nothing strange about that. This is just an example, I'm sure people could come up with others. Sometimes men and equipment just get lost. If things heated up enough before they could get back to where they're supposed to be they'd join the fight I suppose. (and I should know because I've seen a lot of war movies)

[Andreas]

Minimum would normally be a platoon of three, mefinks. Maximum - probably up to a Squadron per company (5 platoons of each 3 75mm tanks, and Coy HQ with one 75mm and 2 Churchill VIII close-support tanks).

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Minimum would normally be a platoon of three, mefinks. Maximum - probably up to a Squadron per company (5 platoons of each 3 75mm tanks, and Coy HQ with one 75mm and 2 Churchill VIII close-support tanks).

AHEM - Troop....

[Andreas]

Oh bugger. Well, at least I got the Squadron right.

Reading too much Eastern stuff at the moment. Why can't they use decent terms like the Pommies do in the translations?

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by CMplayer:

One thing you could do is just invent a cover story for the mortar(s). For example, the company in your scenario is in battalion reserve but the battalion has very suddenly found itself being overrun. So put the Battalion HQ on the map and park some 3"ers nearby. Have some jeeps and carriers around. Nothing strange about that. This is just an example, I'm sure people could come up with others. Sometimes men and equipment just get lost. If things heated up enough before they could get back to where they're supposed to be they'd join the fight I suppose. (and I should know because I've seen a lot of war movies)

Interesting and highly imaginative. Not exactly what I had in mind at the moment as I want my guys to be on the offensive, but I'll keep this scenario in mind for future reference.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Minimum would normally be a platoon of three, mefinks. Maximum - probably up to a Squadron per company (5 platoons of each 3 75mm tanks, and Coy HQ with one 75mm and 2 Churchill VIII close-support tanks).

I'm thinking of going with the pair of VIIIs, but would they be deployed separate from the rest of the squadron or at least its HQ?

Michael

[ June 09, 2002, 02:08 PM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

[KNac]

As far as I know usually were used as support fire (indirect role) as batteries. As Andreas said, they were the single organic artillery they had, and they weren't a worth used as sections (too much dispersion, not much ammo and very few "power").

Same as Germans with the organic battery of 81mm (or the two 120mm mortars) later in the war (before 43).

As for comunication, in the original OBBs (at least for Germans) I think each coy have one radio man (I suppose short range), I should see it but I think it's ok. But real strengh never is equal to original OOBs, as you know.

[Doodlebug]

I've just finished reading a book "Tank Tracks" about the 9th Btn.RTR., a Churchill equipped unit, used during the campaign of '44/'45 in support of a number of differing infantry divisions. It is clear from there that although the regiment was attached to an infantry brigade within the infantry division for the duration of an operation squadrons or troops were often committed to action independently depending on the scale of the action. The tactic seems to be to get a given infantry unit onto it's objective and then withdraw into a counter attack role. If troops were committed to action it was under the command of the troop commander a role which is not reproduced in the game. To use two or three Churchills without the squadron HQ being present is entirely plausible.

[Michael Dorosh]

I concur with the other statements re: independent commitment of tank troops. Remembering that a troop of 4 or 5 could be reduced to 2 or 3 tanks before the battle even starts due to mechanical failure, mines on the approach to the start line, previous combat losses, etc. Two to three tanks would not be an unusual amount of support.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

I'm thinking of doing a QB based around a British inf co and thought it might be cool to add a 3" or two to the force mix, but I am dubious about that being historically valid. I know that they belonged to a mortar section in the heavy weapons company of the battalion, right? So in battle, were they kept together under the control of the section or were they ever parcelled out to individual rifle companies? If the latter, would they have been distributed singly, in pairs, or what?

Michael D.? Brian? Anybody?

Michael

I would say off the top of my head that it was resonable to operate the 3-in mortar platoon decentralised into sections (2 tubes and one mobile fire controller). Unfortunately, though, I can at the moment find absolutely no documentary evidence for such a practice. All I can say is it's the way it was done when I was in the TA, from 1978; battlegroup (battalion) commanders had the option of running their mortars "centralized" or "Decentralized" -- one was advised for attack, the other for defence, and I can never remember which way round it was. A 2-tube section is enough to do useful damage, according to one of the PRO reports I seem to recall reading (anyone want to know the ranging procedure for 3-inch mortars? ) This makes sense, as it is the number of bombs falling, not the number of tubes firing, that does the damage, and mortars have a very high rapid rate of fire.

Certainly the Germans used to decentralize mortars in this way in defence, and the Americans did in offence; I doubt the Brits were much different in practice. Support weapons in British organisations tend to "float" up or down an organisational level quite often; 2-in mortars from the platoons might be centralised with some Brens to form a "pepper-pot" under the CSM, and I believe that PIATS are formally issued to the company, not to the platoons.

As with so many things in the British Army (which only really discovered the word "doctrine" in about 1984), a lot probably depended on the personal preference of the CO.

All the best,

John.

[Durbish]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

As with so many things in the British Army (which only really discovered the word "doctrine" in about 1984), a lot probably depended on the personal preference of the CO.

All the best,

John.

Huh??? I am confused. Hasn't the british army allways been stereotyped as traditional, conservative, "by the book", etc. I assumed this meant strict training with everything regimented.

Or am I completely off the mark here with individual regiments having their own tradition and doctrine?

[Michael Dorosh]

I believe the Canadian Army is still in search of that all-elusive "doctrine"....

[Michael Emrys]

Okay, what I decided to do in the present instance is to go with the mortars off-board and use an FO. I also have a 25pdr. FO.

Regarding the tanks, I decided to use a troop of three 75mm-armed VIIs supported by a pair of VIIIs. All of which may be a bit much for a company sized battle, but it is an assault scenario, so I'm hoping the defense has cooked up something good. And part of the reason for it was that I wanted to see how the VIIIs perform in action. Lovely map, BTW. Should be interesting.

Michael

[Ozzy]

Originally posted by KNac:

As far as I know usually were used as support fire (indirect role) as batteries. As Andreas said, they were the single organic artillery they had, and they weren't a worth used as sections (too much dispersion, not much ammo and very few "power").

Same as Germans with the organic battery of 81mm (or the two 120mm mortars) later in the war (before 43).

That is my observation as well, especially for ammo stockpiling reasons. For effective battlefield fire they would need more ammo than the crew could carry.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

I believe the Canadian Army is still in search of that all-elusive "doctrine"....

I am having visions of a Canadian general pinning a photocopied sign on the phone poles in Toronto.

'Missing: 'Doctrine'. Answers to the name of 'Doctrine'. Friendly little chap. Was waylaid by Corporal Dorosh the other day. If found, do not feed, but call 0800-whatareweonabout immediately. Flight in a Chipmunk as reward.'

[Michael Emrys]

You left out the photos on milk cartons, videos of sobbing parents on tv, etc.

Michael

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Durbish:

[snips]

Huh??? I am confused. Hasn't the british army allways been stereotyped as traditional, conservative, "by the book", etc. I assumed this meant strict training with everything regimented.

"Traditional" and "conservative" are certainly true, but neither of them necessarily imply "by-the-book". Several authors mention the fine old British Army tradition of arguing with orders, and it was the Duke of Wellington himself who bemoaned the fact that his officers only ever read orders as one would read a novel, for amusement, and not as a guide to their own conduct.

Originally posted by Durbish:

Or am I completely off the mark here with individual regiments having their own tradition and doctrine?

Certainly regiments each have their own tradition. Take my own old regiment, the Queen's, now amalgamated into the Princess of Wales' Royal Regiment; the fact that the date when I marched (after 19 years out of practice) behind the standard of the Regimental Association was the Glorious 1st of June this year is not entirely unconnected with the regimnetal tradition that the loyal toast is drunk sitting down.

As to having our own doctrine -- well, it was a habit in HQ company always to go right flanking in section attacks, so as not to waste time on that tedious terrain appreciation stuff; in the terrain we trained in, there was always enough cover for a competent section to pepper-pot round either way. But the rifle companies probably did things their own way...

All the best,

John.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

...it was the Duke of Wellington himself who bemoaned the fact that his officers only ever read orders as one would read a novel, for amusement, and not as a guide to their own conduct.

LOL!!!

Michael

[Durbish]

Thanks John.

Love the colourful quotes

[Brian]

Others have already answered most of the points raised but I'll add my oar to the mix as well.

Yes, you could add your 3in Mortars to the company. While battalion commanders would be loath to dilute their firepower, allowing "penny-packetism" to creap in, they would upon occasion allow a section of mortars (two tubes) or even the whole platoon (six-eight tubes) to be assigned to individual companies. However, you'd more than likely have seen them utilised, off-map, rather than necessarily right up the front there.

As to "regimented" and "by-the-book", the British Army had that reputation, founded perhaps upon peacetime training but usually in wartime, it became very flexible and willing to accept alternative ideas on how to actually conduct its operations.

Drawing the other concurrent thread together on Commandos, at the raid on Vaagso, one of the Commando troops had purloined for themselves a 3in mortar and ammunition from somewhere and carried it into battle ashore. There are many pictures of its being used at maximum elevation, which must have made it interesting to watch - you wouldn't have wanted a breath of wind to deflect the rounds.

There are numerous other examples of how, with experience, the British Army became more flexible than its reputation. The key there is, of course, experience. When they first embarked on the war or came ashore in Normandy, it was obviously sadly lacking and the PBI paid for their commander's inexperience.

John, BTW, where's my turn?