The Canadians in Normandy

[Michael Dorosh]

The question of the performance of the Canadians in Normandy has been a fasicnating one, and a controversial one, ever since 1944. I think official investigations into some of the costlier episodes such as Operation Spring were gaining interest, in Parliament if not yet in the historical community, even before the end of the war.

What is the general take of the board at large on the performance of Canadian units in Normandy? I'll put forth the argument that they performed exceptionally well and were probably the best troops the Allies had in the theatre between June and August 1944. As we all know, they were the only troops to meet their D-Day objectives, and helped smash some pretty tough German formations - the inexperienced but fanatic 12th SS among them.

Is that an accurate assessment?

[JonS]

Tell me something ... why is your assesment above remarkably different to your assessment of the Canucks in the SC thread? :confused:

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by JonS:

Tell me something ... why is your assesment above remarkably different to your assessment of the Canucks in the SC thread? :confused:

An attempt to generate quality discussion. You're familiar with the concept of Devil's Advocate, I trust. I am genuinely interested in the subject and hope to see some decent responses. My friend Russ had some thought provoking analyses, I would like to see what others have to offer on the subject. That includes you, if you are so inclined.

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

... That includes you, if you are so inclined.

In sum: The Allies were good enough.

Some aspects were superior (e.g. artillery, air support, engineering support), some aspects were inferior (e.g. minor unit weapons, some AFVs), some were on a par (e.g. the men, be it soldiers or leaders).

I, you, or anyone, could give specific cases contrary to any of the examples I have stated as my general opinion above. However, I believe the general cases still hold.

As does the sum.

Regards

JonS

Edit: to seek a clarification.

Michael "...the concept of Devil's Advocate..."

I'm familiar with the concept, but just to be clear here, does that mean that you don't agree with your own position as stated in the first post?

[ May 08, 2002, 10:54 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Andrew H.]

Well, the Canadians had conducted a previous amphibious invasion of France, so they had an unfair advantage vis a vis the other Allies...

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Andrew Hedges:

Well, the Canadians had conducted a previous amphibious invasion of France, so they had an unfair advantage vis a vis the other Allies...

When was that? They conducted a raid on Dieppe in August 1942 that bore little resemblance to the Normandy invasion, and an aborted commando raid at Hardelot with portions of a single infantry battalion. They never launched any invasions as far as I know.

They did land in Sicily in 1943, however, though the landings were largely unopposed. But then again, so did the British and Americans - and the Americans ran into real trouble on their beach. AND, the same formation that landed in Sicily - 1 US Inf Div - was used again on D-Day in Normandy. I would suggest the Americans had far more experience as far as invasions went.

But of course, I suspect you are merely being a cheeky monkey....

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by JonS:

Edit: to seek a clarification.

Michael "...the concept of Devil's Advocate..."

I'm familiar with the concept, but just to be clear here, does that mean that you don't agree with your own position as stated in the first post?

Does it matter in order to discuss this? It's quite possible I didn't agree with my own posts in the SC forum and believe what I posted here. If you read the post, you will see I said "I'll put forth the argument", not "I believe."

My personal feelings shouldn't have anything to do with a discussion based on historical analysis...should they?

[The_Capt]

Oh for the love of ....

OK I am not going to rise to this and try and take this as some form of a peacemaking gesture on your part Michael.

So I will now extend an olive branch of my own.

I agree that there definitely were problems at higher levels of command (Say Div and higher once everybody got on the ground). Best laid plans did fall short particularly around Caen fromwhat I can see so far.

Even Blackburn alludes to this in that in England the Infantry and Arty seldom trained together. This spells a shortfall in all arms integration.

I think at the Bde and Bn level the troops performed well.

I posted some facts in the SC thread before it got shut down but the bottom line is the Brit Canadian Front had more and the best the Germans could throw into the fight.

One example is armour..600 around Caen with all of the avail Tigers and a good many Panthers. 110 facing the Americans. 14 German Divs facing 14 Brit and Canadian Divs versus 19 American facing 9 German (and some of these of questionable value)

Our Bns suffered the highest losses of any contingent in the Campaign (176 percent in the line units) the Logistics guys had to invent a new catagory "double intense" to describe the fighting around Cean and the closure of Falaise.

Now some have argued (no names) that the losses were due to "poor performance" I would argue that it probably had more to do with crack SS Divs told to drive the Allies back into the sea on ground of their choosing which had more to do with it.

Now with all of this the Cdn Divs still managed to take Caen and to close their end of the Falaise gap. Some have said that they were too slow..I would argue "as compared to whom?" Unless someone can demonstrate something the planners at the time missed which would have made the whole experience faster we are pretty much left without a benchmark to measure the performance by.

Some argue we should have moved inland faster..problem with that as I see it is that 12 SS Div kinda showed up and ruined that plan. Now these guys were real wing nuts. Hitler youth led by East Front Vets, well equipped and freakin crazy as rats trapped in a ****ter. Couls a more experienced crew have taken them on and gotten to Caen faster..maybe but "so what" the question at hand is whether or not the Canadian could have done better.

Now, despite the heaviest fighting of the Campaign (Some WWI Vets said the battles around Cean were more brutal than what they had seen a Ypres) these inexperienced troops still got the job done. It must have taken some outstanding junior leadership and individual training to accomplish this. Not to mention an incredible sense of duty and discipline.

If I have a critique it would be that Monty pushed us too hard. Why? I know Spring, Goodwood and Atlantic and the follow on Ops were argued by Monty as "holding actions" to keep the Germans pinned down so Cobra wouid succeed but it seems to me we were pushing pretty damn hard to be a holding action.

If that were the plan the presence of 14 Allied Divs would probably been enough and the Americans still could have swept around the flank without such heavy losses. Seems to me that Monty was re-writing history to favour him.

I will post an intersting paper by Terry Copp tomorrow as it is on my work computer it does a pretty good job of showing the Canadian effort in a better light than some have commonly accepted.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by The_Capt:

[QB]I agree that there definitely were problems at higher levels of command (Say Div and higher once everybody got on the ground). Best laid plans did fall short particularly around Caen fromwhat I can see so far.

That kind of depends on what the plans were - I think Montgomery changed his mind on this one after the war - it was clearly a D-Day objective, but then afterwards Caen was described as a holding action. Either way, the Allies performed better than expected - they were planning on reaching the Seine on D+90 when in fact they reached it ahead of schedule. It took them a month to drive on Caen, but once Charnwood was under way, they managed the final push in a day.

Even Blackburn alludes to this in that in England the Infantry and Arty seldom trained together. This spells a shortfall in all arms integration.

I agree, and I also believe a problem was tank-infantry co-ordination, which was also practiced not often.

I think at the Bde and Bn level the troops performed well.

That's a bit of a sweeping generalization, but I suppose it depends on which brigades. The 3rd Div seems to have outperformed the 2nd in this regard (the 2nd had the highest proportion of French regiments, which I wonder whether or not had an impact - not because of language problems, but because of the chronic shortage of Francophone officers and soldiers)).

I posted some facts in the SC thread before it got shut down but the bottom line is the Brit Canadian Front had more and the best the Germans could throw into the fight.

One example is armour..600 around Caen with all of the avail Tigers and a good many Panthers. 110 facing the Americans. 14 German Divs facing 14 Brit and Canadian Divs versus 19 American facing 9 German (and some of these of questionable value)

Is this a cumulative total, or was it taken at one point in time? I don't doubt the numbers, just trying to get an idea of time frame. On 6 June 1944 the Allies had 8 divisions ashore (including airborne), at the end of June there were obviously more, and so on. I suspect some German divs got shifted from the Brit-Canadians against the Americans during the Mortain offensive. Does this also include the troops holed up in the Channel port fortresses - and the US troops masking them?

None of which is really important, it is a fact that the British-Canadians held the lion's share of German divisions opposite. My question is how this relates to the efficiency of the Brit/Canadian Army. They were in static positions - I presume the Americans were mobile and seizing ground (St. Lo etc.). This is to be expected facing fewer/poorer divisions. I know 3 Can Div was basically reduced to patrol actions during the balance of June. Did the enemy conduct any major offensive actions against the Canadians between D+1 and Charnwood? I genuinely don't know.

Our Bns suffered the highest losses of any contingent in the Campaign (176 percent in the line units) the Logistics guys had to invent a new catagory "double intense" to describe the fighting around Cean and the closure of Falaise.

This is true - the old categories had been created during the desert fighting, and the Normandy planners were using those "wastage rates" to base reinforcement rates on. They were mortified at the reality of the situation as the campaign went on.

Now some have argued (no names) that the losses were due to "poor performance" I would argue that it probably had more to do with crack SS Divs told to drive the Allies back into the sea on ground of their choosing which had more to do with it.

Definitely true in the one example I managed to cite - Buron on 7 July 44. HLI suffereed 262 casualties in half a day evicting a battalion of panzergrendiers from the town. Their plan was as well as good as could be expected - prepatory barrage, tank support, including mine-clearing vehicles. It was just a tough nut to crack, against fanatic resistance. Is this indicative of most battalion-size battles in Normandy?

Now with all of this the Cdn Divs still managed to take Caen and to close their end of the Falaise gap. Some have said that they were too slow..I would argue "as compared to whom?" Unless someone can demonstrate something the planners at the time missed which would have made the whole experience faster we are pretty much left without a benchmark to measure the performance by.

In addition to the tank figures quoted above, most historians miss the fact the Germans had scads of anti-tank guns and hand held anti-tank weaponry - also of great use in the close in terrain of Normandy, and of more use to the defender than an attacker.

Some argue we should have moved inland faster..problem with that as I see it is that 12 SS Div kinda showed up and ruined that plan. Now these guys were real wing nuts. Hitler youth led by East Front Vets, well equipped and freakin crazy as rats trapped in a ****ter. Couls a more experienced crew have taken them on and gotten to Caen faster..maybe but "so what" the question at hand is whether or not the Canadian could have done better.

I would agree...so if we leave aside the question of experience, we are left with - training and leadership. Yes? Just want to frame any follow up discussion on this point. To clarify - the question of whether the Canadians could have advanced on Caen more quickly was dependent on training and leadership. Any other factors? Equipment? Morale? Or are these relevant to the question?

Now, despite the heaviest fighting of the Campaign (Some WWI Vets said the battles around Cean were more brutal than what they had seen a Ypres) these inexperienced troops still got the job done. It must have taken some outstanding junior leadership and individual training to accomplish this. Not to mention an incredible sense of duty and discipline.

Yes, but that wasn't lacking among many of the soldiers in Normandy. It seems a bit beside the point - leadership and individual training is obviously important, as are duty and discipline - but if a well trained battalion attacks up the wrong hill, say, what good would that training have done?

One of my favourite quotes comes from a Dieppe vet - they trained him for two years; on August 19 he jumped off his landing craft, fired one or two mortar bombs on Blue Beach, and was seriously wounded, all in the space of a few minutes. His two years of training amounted to that few minutes on the beach. He was captured a few hours later and his war was over.

Did the Canadians perform "well" at Dieppe? The German commander praised individual Canadians and said they fought well - where they were able to. German bunkers bore multiple bullet holes - the Canadian troops had aggressively fought back. But overall, the Canadians did not achieve any of their objectives and suffered fifty percent casualties.

So operationally, they performed poorly, but on the individual, platoon, even company level, they performed well. It really is a matter of perspective; I guess I am trying to examine Normandy from that higher perspective. You do mention it above but it seemed a bit of a generalization, and I think this is truly the meat of this question.

If I have a critique it would be that Monty pushed us too hard. Why? I know Spring, Goodwood and Atlantic and the follow on Ops were argued by Monty as "holding actions" to keep the Germans pinned down so Cobra wouid succeed but it seems to me we were pushing pretty damn hard to be a holding action.

If that were the plan the presence of 14 Allied Divs would probably been enough and the Americans still could have swept around the flank without such heavy losses. Seems to me that Monty was re-writing history to favour him.

Interesting, I have no opinion one way or another - but we are missing the one level I think is most interesting - Canadian operational command - ie the brigade, division and corps commanders and how they operated. I think this is the level I was really referring to with my question. I don't doubt individual riflemen served with distinction, as they did in all the armies in Normandy, and I can go either way on Montgomery - the truth is so far buried in accusations from both sides that it isn't of much interest to me - unless you think it is crucial to the question of how the Canadians performed in Normandy, in which case I am willing to listen further.

EDIT - I agree with your assertion Monty was rewriting history to suit him, as I mention above. I don't mean to dismiss your analysis here - I am just not familiar enough with the issues. I do think the question of what Simonds and the div commanders did is crucial to the question. Naturally, they did what Monty wanted, so I can see a case being made (if this is what you are trying to do) that Montgomery's decisions hamstrung the Canadians. That seems reasonable based on what your presented so far.

I will post an intersting paper by Terry Copp tomorrow as it is on my work computer it does a pretty good job of showing the Canadian effort in a better light than some have commonly accepted.

Much better analysis, Warren, thanks for taking the time to post it. I look forward to Copp's comments. My friend Russ may have some comments for this thread as well.

[ May 09, 2002, 12:18 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Gyrene]

By The Capt: Now with all of this the Cdn Divs still managed to take Caen and to close their end of the Falaise gap. Some have said that they were too slow..I would argue "as compared to whom?" Unless someone can demonstrate something the planners at the time missed which would have made the whole experience faster we are pretty much left without a benchmark to measure the performance by.

&

By Mike Dorosh:None of which is really important, it is a fact that the British-Canadians held the lion's share of German divisions opposite. My question is how this relates to the efficiency of the Brit/Canadian Army. They were in static positions - I presume the Americans were mobile and seizing ground (St. Lo etc.). This is to be expected facing fewer/poorer divisions. I know 3 Can Div was basically reduced to patrol actions during the balance of June. Did the enemy conduct any major offensive actions against the Canadians between D+1 and Charnwood? I genuinely don't know.

The Canadians could and probably very well did outperform the American army units at Normandy.

Outright aggressiveness was not an American Army trait outside of Airborne & Ranger units and in fact cost an Army General his job in the Pacific where his units were not keeping up with USMC formations.

They got the job done, don't get me wrong, but it often failed to exploit it's own momentum (i.e. Anzio)

Did the Canadians perform better than US units? Propably, but in the end it's moot, as the result was the same through-out the entire Alled line.

Gyrene

[zukkov]

i haven't read any accounts of the canadians at war per se', but wasn't it rommel(or some other famous german general) who said "give me canadian troops and american equipment", or words to that effect. that must mean he respected the canadian forces a great deal...

[The_Capt]

OK fellas,

Here is the link to Terry Copps paper.

http://www.wlu.ca/~wwwmsds/341coppnormandyattrition.htm

I found it a very interesting read.

I think we can agree that at the Tactical level these troops on the whole performed well..but as Michael did state..it really means nothing if they are sent up the wrong hill.

So I thik we can narrow the question down to "How was the Canadian performace Operational Level in Normandy?"

To this question..I will need to think and probably take another trip to the library. My gut feel is that this is the bone of controvesy BUT in the end one has to demonstrate how it could have been done better. Failure to demonstrate this leave any judgment a purly subjective exercise without anything to compare the actual action too.

[ May 09, 2002, 09:24 AM: Message edited by: The_Capt ]

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by The_Capt:

OK fellas,

Here is the link to Terry Copps paper.

http://www.wlu.ca/~wwwmsds/341coppnormandyattrition.htm

I found it a very interesting read.

[snips]

Indeed, but I was a little mystified by the statement "Attacks on fortified villages, such as those around Caen, ought to have been carried out by battle groups built around tanks or self-propelled assault guns. Unfortunately, the Allies did not possess such armor and what’s more the Allied battle doctrine reflected that reality."

The Allies did possess armour formations -- the independent tank brigades -- whose role was to support the infantry divisions. Armoured divisions could and did form brigade groups (Pip Roberts made 11th Armoured fight like this) and in Guards Armoured at least integration eventually went down to Squadron/Company teams. I have never heard anyone previously suggest that lack of armour was a problem in 21st Army Group; I have on the other hand heard it said that the units used in e.g. Goodwood were too armour-heavy.

Originally posted by The_Capt:

So I thik we can narrow the question down to "How was the Canadian performace Operational Level in Normandy?"

Depending on where you draw the line between "operational" and "tactical", that might not leave a great deal to chew on. The handling of a division is still pretty clearly "tactics"; I suppose you might count a Corps as "operations", although Jorrocks said that the Corps is the highest formation to fight the tactical battle.

Incidentally, another Canadian contribution that is seldom mentioned was the attachment of CANLOAN officers to British units in 21st Army Group, to make up for the shortage of trained British junior officers. I understand that they suffered an extremely high rate of casualties, possibly even more than junior officers usually do. As a curiosity, I believe that one of the officer casualties at the Villers-Bocage battle on 13th June (with 1/5th Queen's, I think?) had the serial number CAN001.

All the best,

John.

[Michael Dorosh]

However, any serious study of D-Day will echo what the Canadian artillery officer who served with 21 Army Group’s Operational Research section wrote in June 1944. Major John Fairlie noted that none of the elaborate methods of bombardment of the defences destroyed any significant part of the Atlantic Wall. The defences in the Canadian sector, wrote Fairlie, were overcome by "D.D. (Duplex Drive) tank, engineer and infantry assault."

Indeed, there was little indication that the massive fire power directed at the Juno beach area had any significant neutralizing effect. "The defences," Fairlie concluded, "were substantially intact when the infantry touched down and the enemy was able to deliver lethal fire in great quantity against our troops." The evidence from the British and American beaches leads to a similar conclusion.

This always makes me wonder about the people who claim Dieppe was a necessary precursor for invasion in Normandy - that the Dieppe Raid taught the Allies this crucial lesson in pre-invasion firepower without which D-Day would have failed...

I can't help but remain curious what a battalion-by-battalion survey would tell us about the performance of the Canadians in Normandy, on a purely tactical level - or for that matter of the British and US Armies as well - and its ultimate relevance to the question of operational command we have agreed is most relevant to the question of performance of the Canadian Army as a whole.

We are all familiar with the horror stories of battalions performing poorly, I still would like to know just how many of them performed up to expectations - or for that matter, what the expectations of them really were in any given situation. I don't imagine such a study exists, and I think the consensus here would be that it didn't matter - the Allies got there in the end.

I still think it would be a component of an analysis of operational decisions made by the bde, div and corps commanders - they could only work with what they had.

Is such an analysis even possible? Does it already exist somewhere? It would seem we would have to be mind readers to understand what was expected of x battalion on y day in the majority of situations. There are other evidenciary bits in the record - the firings of some battalion COs, for example, but how much weight can one place on those firings? Were they due to some fault in Simond's temperment, or was there justification based on the performance of those battalions? Were they simple personality clashes? The question of firing 3 Can Div's commander was neatly avoided when he was wounded in a friendly fire incident.

[Michael Dorosh]

CANLOAN 001 was Major Donald M. Findlay, ED, of the 1/6 Queen's.

In addition to casualties, CANLOAN officers also won an inordinate amount of bravery decorations. 623 officers served in infantry units in NWE and Italy, 75 percent were killed or wounded, and 100 were decorated with bravery awards (including French and US medals).

He commanded a company, and oddly enough two of his platoon commanders were also CANLOAN.

Findlay survived the war.

[ May 09, 2002, 11:42 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[jmac]

from everything i've read and WWII is all i read the Canadians were one of the toughest.

[Dirtweasle]

Michael - I just cuaght a few minutes of a documentry on TV last night which described the Canadians fighting in Italy (Anzio area?)doing some raids and so forth. Were these the same troops that fought in Normandy? They seemed like some serious fighters...

[Pzman]

From what I have read, three books about Canadian forces in Normandy, and other areas, such as the Rhineland, they did very well, considering the man power shortages they faced. By the time they had broken out from Caen, they were using, get this, cooks as replacements. The counter attacks by the 12th SS Panzer Division where the main reason they ended up with so many losses. Interviews with Germans stated many times that the SS men, after a few weeks, saw the Canadians as very good opponents. Most of the problems they faced were mistakes at Division or Army level. The training programs of Canadian troops during WWII was one of the best. Whether this is true or not, I don't know.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Dirtweasle:

Michael - I just cuaght a few minutes of a documentry on TV last night which described the Canadians fighting in Italy (Anzio area?)doing some raids and so forth. Were these the same troops that fought in Normandy? They seemed like some serious fighters...

That would be the First Special Service Force, who fought in the Anzio beachhead. They were half Canadian and half American, though they were equipped and uniformed by the US Army (Canadian members were paid by the Canadian government, IIRC). They were man for man the best combat unit in the world, trained in amphibious operations, parachute landings, ski-ing and mountain climbing, as well as familar with all German and Japanese infantry weapons.

They were a luxury, though, and were disbanded in late 1944, with the Canadians (by then dropping to about 1/3 the total strength of the Force) going back to the Canadian Army, chiefly 1 Can Para Bn.

They were certainly an exception to most of the rules governing how we view Allied soldiers in WW II - I believe the entire force was made up of NCOs - no private soldiers - for example. They saw action only in Italy and in southern France.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Panzerman:

From what I have read, three books about Canadian forces in Normandy, and other areas, such as the Rhineland, they did very well, considering the man power shortages they faced. By the time they had broken out from Caen, they were using, get this, cooks as replacements. The counter attacks by the 12th SS Panzer Division where the main reason they ended up with so many losses. Interviews with Germans stated many times that the SS men, after a few weeks, saw the Canadians as very good opponents. Most of the problems they faced were mistakes at Division or Army level. The training programs of Canadian troops during WWII was one of the best. Whether this is true or not, I don't know.

A Panzer Lehr veteran I interviewed rated the Canadians poorly, but that was only one man's opinion - he was a junior officer, but his experience in Poland, France 1940, Russia, Normandy and the Bulge was extensive.

By November 1944, Canada was scraping the bottom of the manpower barrel. A small part of this was due to the creation of a Corps Headquarters in Italy where none was needed, and as the Capt has pointed out, a misunderstanding of what casualty rates among infantry were likely to be. The Army had lots of anti-aircraft gunners by November, but few infantrymen. With the demise of the Luftwaffe, a lot of those Ack Ack boys were turned into infantry. In Italy, an entire LAA regiment was turned into infantry, and many artillery units in NW Europe were disbanded, with men going to infantry units. Also other trades, including cooks as you mention.

Also, the controversial decision to send draftees into combat was made, and in early 1945 several thousand of the so-called Zombies arrived in theatre. By that time, the crisis was past, as the winter had been uneventful and allowed the units time to absorb reinforcements, and also keep wastage rates down.

Infantry training may have been good, but reinforcements and remusters arriving in the line in October, at the height of the crisis, often had never fired many of the main infantry weapons, had not been taught fieldcraft, etc. They were the exception, but many regimental histories do mention these untrained men coming into the line due to the high casualties being incurred in the Scheldt fighting, so I have to conclude they numbered in the hundreds or possibly thousands. Wounded men were returned to action with great haste - again, I don't know of the scope of this practice, but many histories mention it.

Purpose trained infantrymen went through many weeks of training in purpose built Infantry schools in Canada and also Battle Dril schools in Canada, England and also divisional battle schools on the Continent - when time permitted.

Nonetheless, many of the training methods of the Canadian infantry were criticized by historians and some vets, and the long period spent training in England was felt by some to have been squandered and ill-used. Whether they are right or not is hard to say. Montgomery himself, a superb trainer of troops, felt there was far too much emphasis on low level drills, and not enough training by units as units - a company has to know how to fight in several phases of war - the attack, the defence, the river crossing, the withdrawal, the relief in place, etc. Some feel that too much emphasis was spent on simple battle drills and not enough on unit training.

How this truly impacted the army's ability to fight is a good question.

[ May 09, 2002, 08:16 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Dirtweasle]

Thanks. I'll have to look for a repeat of the prgram so I can watch the whole thing.

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> However, any serious study of D-Day will echo what the Canadian artillery officer who served with 21 Army Group’s Operational Research section wrote in June 1944. Major John Fairlie noted that none of the elaborate methods of bombardment of the defences destroyed any significant part of the Atlantic Wall. The defences in the Canadian sector, wrote Fairlie, were overcome by "D.D. (Duplex Drive) tank, engineer and infantry assault."

Indeed, there was little indication that the massive fire power directed at the Juno beach area had any significant neutralizing effect. "The defences," Fairlie concluded, "were substantially intact when the infantry touched down and the enemy was able to deliver lethal fire in great quantity against our troops." The evidence from the British and American beaches leads to a similar conclusion.

This always makes me wonder about the people who claim Dieppe was a necessary precursor for invasion in Normandy - that the Dieppe Raid taught the Allies this crucial lesson in pre-invasion firepower without which D-Day would have failed...

</font>

[Pzman]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

A Panzer Lehr veteran I interviewed rated the Canadians poorly, but that was only one man's opinion - he was a junior officer, but his experience in Poland, France 1940, Russia, Normandy and the Bulge was extensive.

The Lehr was a very good unit, no matter who they faced, so they would see it very much that way. I could have worded it better, to say the some SS men had respect for, rather then seeing them as very good. It would depend on the unit they where faceing as well. If they were facing the AA boys I can see why they would say that. If he faced vets from Italy I don't know if he would feel the same way.

[ May 09, 2002, 08:40 PM: Message edited by: Panzerman ]

[Desdichado]

I think the statement that Canadians were the only troops to obtain all their D-Day objectives is inaccurate. Wasn't Caen a D-Day objective? It is true, however, that Canadians penetrated further inland from the beach than any other soldiers on D-Day. Not their fault if the objectives weren't realistic.

How did they perform overall? Well, if the goal was a breakthrough on the Caen front, then they failed. Whether that's their fault, the fault of the British, or the vagaries of circumstance is irrelevant.

If the goal was to tie down German forces and allow an American breakout, then they succeeded beyond expectattion. Same reasons as above.

If the question is really: Were Canadian soldiers good soldiers? Then based on what little I know the answer is yes. They hung in, put out, continued fighting despite reverses and did not break under counterattack.

[JonS]

Originally posted by Desdichado:

I think the statement that Canadians were the only troops to obtain all their D-Day objectives is inaccurate. Wasn't Caen a D-Day objective? ...

For 3rd British Div, not 3rd Canadian.

...Not their fault if the objectives weren't realistic...

True :mad: (mad at history, not you D)

...Well, if the goal was a breakthrough on the Caen front, then they failed...

Ahh, but they did break through at Caen in the end. Also, remember that they, and the rest of the Allies, got to the Seine well ahead of the pre-invasion schedule.

Which reminds me of a quote by, hmm, someone famous-ish which no doubt one of the members has on the tips of their tongue:

Overlord was an operation that went according to plan, but not according to schedule

Regards

JonS