German Artillery Organization in WW II (JonS? JasonC? Germanboy? et al?)

[JasonC]

"Arko was both an officer, and the designation for his headquarters"

Correct. Artillery commander for an artillery command. That is what is was called, "kommando", not a unit size like "brigade" or "regiment". Because the number of subunits and where they came from was not set, anymore than "kampgruppe" always meant a regiment or half-division. Think of artillerie kommandos as being like KGs for guns. That is the best first approximation to the whole system in practice. Typically the size of the formation involved was an artillery brigade.

"either a) all the artillery units within a corps

or all corps-level artillery units within a corps"

Neither. He coordinated whatever units he took over in the higher echelon formation (like a corps) or in the sector (a frontage or whatnot) that was assigned to him. He was not "the corps artillery commander". He was the commander of an "artillery kampgruppe" made up of - whatever. Sometimes several battalions of army level guns, sometimes several battalions picked out of divisions under his corps, sometimes a mix of both. They were not permanent assignments.

Not every corps had an arko, either. If there weren't higher level guns assigned and the organic battalions fired for their own divisions, then the standard artillery regiments of each division could coordinate the fire without any added structure.

Somebody had to command the higher level guns. There was also an occasional need to retask and coordinate some of the guns of each division, to work with units outside of each division. Both tasks could be fufilled by arkos.

"Harkos, then, created later in the war"

They were around a long time, certainly from 1943. The "h" marks the command as a senior one; some harkos were 3 star generals. They coordinated subordinate artillery formations. If you wanted the equivalent of an "artillery corps" in support of something, you'd use a harko.

"all the artillery units within an Army or all army-level artillery units within that army?"

No, on either count. There were armies without any harko. Arkos commanded army level guns, not solely corps level guns; they just commanded them in brigade size slices. Harkos could command arbitarily large slices, subordinate arkos, subordinate regiments or werfer brigades, etc. The substantive distinction between an arko and a harko is 1 star or 2-3 stars, and a brigade or a lot more than a brigade. As ad hoc artillery formations - ad hoc in the sense of what guns were assigned to them, that is. It was not a "corps vs. army" distinction, although you wouldn't find a harko entirely under a single corps because he'd be equal in rank to the corp commander.

"the independent artillery regiments - ranging from 10.5cm regiments up to the heavy 17 and 21 cm stuff"

First, they were usually organized as battalions, not regiments. Permanent regimental organization with assigned guns for artillery above division level was relatively rare. It was used occasionally, and werfers used it most of the time. There were some free floating regimental command staffs to which battalions would be assigned - and there were arkos, which could use one of those or take over a divisional artillery regiment staff.

"would usually be assigned as fire support for x, y or z division?"

Much more detailed than that on the fire assignment, actually. A front line battalion, or at most a regiment. But these fire assignments could be changed every day or two. Meanwhile the guns themselves were assigned to a divisional artillery regiment HQ, or to an arko. Which decided on such fire assignments, in a sector as wide as a corps.

"Their FOs would stay with that unit for several days, or as long as considered necessary, and their fire would be dedicated for that unit only - no other requests were possible."

Their FOs were with particular front line units, yes. They could have more than one set, but generally one such "had" the fire (making switching easier, registration possible, little else). Requests for additional fire beyond dedicated support would have to go to a higher level artillery command - an artillery regiment or arko - which might have some battalions unassigned for contigencies, or might retask units on the fly if some weren't being used in other sectors, etc.

But the system was not set up for that; it was designed to seperate the fire allocation decision (which unit to support, made by staffs each day or so) from the "fire now, at this" decision (made by the front line unit or the FO with them).

Also, remember that fire assignments are not always front line support assignments. If the mission of a given battalion is counterbattery or interdiction, they may be working off a fire plan that has nothing to do with any front line unit. They then get their target orders straight from an arko or artillery regiment staff.

I hope that helps.

[ August 11, 2002, 01:44 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Michael Dorosh]

It does, thanks.

Did Jerry ever master the TOT?

[JasonC]

It may also help to understand a little of the "functional differentiation" of the different echelon levels of the artillery. The different levels had different staff responsibilities.

A regimental staff - or an equivalent substitute, like an arko - was necessary to *plan* fire.

Meaning, to create integrated fire plans for support-counterbattery-interdiction, assign fire among front line units, coordinate and process artillery intel from ranging, sigint etc, plot enemy unit locations and battery positions on maps.

They are the level with situation maps, intel sections, staffers updating all the battlefield info, processing records of shell supply and expenditure, so they are also the level that must plan fire, work with senior maneuver unit commanders and operations officers. The clerks are here - in civilian equivalents, it is "the office".

This functional level could be performed by each division's artillery regiment if all the fire involved was to be delivered by organic divisional artillery and in support of organic units of the division. The staff functions involved could also be performed by an independent artillery regiment staff, which was a free floating thing without permanent guns.

Whichever *staff*/regiment was used, somebody also had to *command* the firing battalions assigned. If they were one division's guns, no problem, the commander of the divisional artillery regiment does so. Otherwise, you create an artillery command and put somebody in charge.

A battalion level was essential to *supply* the guns. The ammo processing was at the battalion level, making a battalion the effective operational unit. The logistic "tail" is here, the manual work is here. It is "the factory", from loading dock to warehouse etc.

You can therefore redeploy an artillery battalion from here to there and it will work fine wherever it sets up. Which is not true of mere battery. And it is not necessary to move a whole regiment to have that effect.

A battalion almost always fired in support of the same unit. Its batteries where generally located near each other for ease of command and supply. Where small or mixed batteries existed, they would be subordinated to some existing battalion.

The battery was needed as the fine grained deployment level, to keep the guns reasonably seperated to avoid counterbattery. And was the minimum unit to fire at a particular tactical target. A battery could deliver a fire mission all on its lonesome, but it couldn't plan or coordinate anything and had essentially no organic logistic tail to keep itself in action. It is "a room within the factory" where the primary work (firing) is done.

The regimental level had to be "filled". But it could be filled flexibly - meaning, which battalion has its fire planned and coordinated by which regimental staff did not have to be set in concrete.

Anything above a regiment was only needed for command and coordination purposes (upper floors of offices).

I hope that helps.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by ASL Veteran:

Thanks. Reagrding the sources I used, how good is your German? I am away from home, and did this post from memory. I also would not have seen much of a point in putting in German references that are inaccessible to 90+% of the board, if not more.

I based my comment on the quality of the GAH on the original statement by Bakker@home. I do not own the book or have ever really looked at it, but I recall a few times when people used it here to support their statements and it was found to be wrong. Hence my comment.

[Bakker@home]

Hi all,

I realize I spread some confusion by my spontanious and chaotic post. Let's hope i can remedy this with so many grogs watching my every move .

First

With the 'Handbook on German military forces' I meant the one written by the U.S. war department and reprinted by the Louisiana state university press.

Second

About the 100mm guns in the heavy artillery battalion. I clearly misstated that. A quick glance in the 'Handbook on German military forces' (page 148) and Engelmann's 'German Artillery in World War II 1939-1945' (page 124), learnes that it was standard TO&E in the ' Panzer Artillery Regiment'. Thus my statement about early war use of 100mm guns in 150mm how. batteries due to shortage of 150mm how. pieces is clearly false and has no basis.

Both sources state the TO&E (roughly) of the Panzer Artillery Regiment gun battalions as;

I. armored/SP battalion consisting of

2 light armored how. bateries of 6 105mm how (Wespe)

1 heavy armored how. bateries of 6 15omm how (Hummel)

II. howitzer battlion with

2 or 3 light towed how. batteries of 6 105mm how.

III. heavy howitzer battalion (mixed) with

2 heavy towed how. batteries of 6 150mm how.

1 towed gun battery of 4 100mm guns

And it seems to me that it indeed would be logical to include some long range firepower in the artillery regiment of highly mobile troops such as the Panzer- and PanzerGrenadier Divisions. See Andrea's post.

Hope this will help.

[ August 12, 2002, 12:50 PM: Message edited by: Bakker@home ]

[Andreas]

Bakker, the TO&E you give there is of course the mid-war TO&E after the introduction of armoured SP artillery. In 1941 (presumably 1942 also), batteries were towed by Motorzug (motorised) in the armoured and motorised divisions, and had four guns each.

E.g. 1. PD, June 1941

I. Abt

3 x 4 10,5cm lFH18

II. Abt

3 x 4 10,5cm lFH18

III. Abt

2 x 4 15cm sFH18

1 x 4 10cm K18

This was standard, although there seems to be some debate about how many 10cm K18 were actually present.

Sources on this:

v. Senger und Etterlin: 'Die deutschen Geschütze 1939-1945'

W.Fleischer & R.Eiermann: 'Die motorisierte und Panzerartillerie des deutschen Heeres 1935-1945'

Engelmann 'German artillery'

OOB information of deployed (as opposed to paper) strength in:

Glantz 'The initial period of war'

Hoffmann 'Die Magdeburger Division'

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Did Jerry ever master the TOT?

Didn't everyone?

For some reason, I don't know why, TOT shoots seem to be treated in many wargamerly quarters as a uniquely American trick. As far as I know, any competent gunners should be able to manage this. After all, you only need to be able to subtract the time of flight from each gun position from the required TOT. Probably German and certainly Japanese gunners were able to co-ordinate the impact timing of their shoots with the timings of enemy salvos, in an attempt to get the firers to check fire because they think they are dropping short. I doubt that they'd have much difficulty co-ordinating things with friendly guns.

All the best,

John.

[Tero]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

Didn't everyone?

For some reason, I don't know why, TOT shoots seem to be treated in many wargamerly quarters as a uniquely American trick.

Could it be most of the ink spilled in English on this has been from the Anglo-American POV ?

As far as I know, any competent gunners should be able to manage this. After all, you only need to be able to subtract the time of flight from each gun position from the required TOT. Probably German and certainly Japanese gunners were able to co-ordinate the impact timing of their shoots with the timings of enemy salvos, in an attempt to get the firers to check fire because they think they are dropping short. I doubt that they'd have much difficulty co-ordinating things with friendly guns.

The same applies to air bursts. Because the Ami arty was the only one to field true VT fuses it is assumed nobody could time their shells to detonate above ground in an effective altitude.

[Michael Dorosh]

I don't doubt German gunners could count; but if they were not as able to mass fire, I was wondering if they were sufficiently organized to try to time their fires as well. I could have phrased that better.

[Mammou]

I don't have my source here at work, but I remember that the Germans gave a higher priority to establishing/maintaining communication with their artillery than to higher command. I don't have any knowledge if that was SOP in allied armies though.

Cheers,

Mammou

[JasonC]

No, "everybody" didn't master TOT shoots. Everybody didn't have any cause to. The point of a TOT is not the split second, it is using many guns for very few rounds each instead of a few guns for many rounds each. It is one use of massing flexibility.

If one battery is firing the mission, a TOT consists of saying "fire". If one battalion is firing the mission, it is not much more than that, because the batteries are probably close to each other so the flight time difference is minimal. And if you want the effect of ~100 rounds out of one battalion, each gun is going to fire 8 times, which is going to take a couple of minutes - an ordinary fire mission.

TOT is firing the same 100 rounds from 8 battalions all within range of the target so that all 100 shells go off within 5 seconds of each other. For which you need (1) 8 battalions in range (2) not otherwise engaged (3) but they can go right back to what they were doing before after firing off their TOT round at their scheduled time.

The German system of dedicated support of a few firing battalions to maneuver battalions was not conducive to doing this. What you need for it is a generalized pool of guns available to anybody who calls (1), plus a lot of lead time to plan the shoot (2). Which normally don't go together, but can with advanced planning.

Since a front line German battalion could not order supporting fire from every gun in the corps, he could not tap 8 battalions for a TOT. Even for one round per gun. He didn't have "ownership" rights over all those tubes, and the German system was based on such "ownership" not on momentary "renting".

Does this mean it was physically impossible? Of course not. That it never happened, even with say just the guns of one artillery regiment for one coup de main situation, say? Of course not. But it was not an ordinary practice or ordinarily available to typical German units.

Note that US methods of shell rationing (at some points in time, anyway) also encouraged TOT methods. Rations were often stated in allowed rounds per gun of a given caliber per day, over a short period like the coming week. This let every gun fire a little, even when the shells were otherwise scarce. That is somewhat wasteful, because guns with low priority targets fire off "theirs" rather than doing nothing, to allow another battery with better targets to fire more than the ration amount.

The more often you fire missions as dribbles from all guns (as TOTs do) instead of massive amounts from a few guns (as in dedicated support, e.g. firing in defense of a unit under attack continuously for 4 hours), the more balanced the ammo expenditure. Which works with that rationing scheme. But it is also better suited to planned, short but heavy offensive fires than to sustained defensive ones.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by JasonC:

No, "everybody" didn't master TOT shoots.

So could you name a nation which participated in WW2 whose gunners were not capable of firing a TOT shoot?

Originally posted by JasonC:

Everybody didn't have any cause to. The point of a TOT is not the split second, it is using many guns for very few rounds each instead of a few guns for many rounds each. It is one use of massing flexibility.

I would have thought that the point of a TOT shoot was plainly to get maximum intensity of bombardment for any given density. The number of tubes used is surely only relevant insofar as it helps deliver the required intensity -- as the old gunner saying goes, the shell is the weapon, not the gun. I expect the Germans may have regarded Nebelwerfers, when available, as a preferable means to achieving high intensity, which would explain a lesser fondness for TOT shoots, but this is merely speculation.

Originally posted by JasonC:

The German system of dedicated support of a few firing battalions to maneuver battalions was not conducive to doing this. What you need for it is a generalized pool of guns available to anybody who calls (1), plus a lot of lead time to plan the shoot (2). Which normally don't go together, but can with advanced planning.

Since a front line German battalion could not order supporting fire from every gun in the corps, he could not tap 8 battalions for a TOT. [snips]

I'd be interested in knowing your source for this. It does not seem to agree very well with the following passage, taken from page 139 of Bruce Gudmundsson's "On Artillery" (Praeger, 1993):

"The only area in which American artillerists seem to have failed to catch up with the Germans was the massing of fire of many divisions. The culprit here seems to have been the relatively inflexible nature of American command arrangements. Whereas the Germans were perfectly happy to put divisional artillery under the direct operational control of another artillery headquarters (whether artillery division headquarters, Arko, independent regimental headquarters, observation battalion, or 18th Artillery Division), the Americans seem to have resisted such infringement of on the autonomy of division commanders. As with the French, there remained a wall between division and corps artillery that prevented the kind of unitary leadership that had been central to German artillery practice since the days of Bruchmuller."

As for needing "a lot of lead time" to plan the shoot, I suppose that depends on what you mean by "a lot". During the breaching of the Hitler Line by 1st Canadian Corps in May 1944, one target was engaged with 3,509 rounds (92 tons) fired by 668 tubes (19 field, 9 medium and 2 heavy regiments). The time from the request being received by CRA 1st Cdn Div to the first rounds impacting was 33 minutes. (Source: "The development of artillery tactics and equipment", Brigadier A L Pemberton MC, The War Office, 1950 -- thanks, JonS).

All the best,

John.

[Tero]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

Originally posted by JasonC:

Everybody didn't have any cause to. The point of a TOT is not the split second, it is using many guns for very few rounds each instead of a few guns for many rounds each. It is one use of massing flexibility.

I would have thought that the point of a TOT shoot was plainly to get maximum intensity of bombardment for any given density.

In the Finnish arty the purpose was (is) to get the most of the surprise value of the rounds impacting at or almost the same time. And the point was (is) you had to (have to) be able to do it with no ranging shots. I have not read anywhere the Americans were able to do that with point targets like impromptu counter attack assembly areas uncovered by radio listening service the way the Finnish arty could do it. I have read they did break up the odd counter attack with arty fire but only if they could observe it massing.

The number of tubes used is surely only relevant insofar as it helps deliver the required intensity -- as the old gunner saying goes, the shell is the weapon, not the gun. I expect the Germans may have regarded Nebelwerfers, when available, as a preferable means to achieving high intensity, which would explain a lesser fondness for TOT shoots, but this is merely speculation.

Any idea what kind of a sheaf the respective artillery services preferred in the Western Front ?

[ August 15, 2002, 02:58 PM: Message edited by: tero ]

[Tero]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

I don't doubt German gunners could count; but if they were not as able to mass fire, I was wondering if they were sufficiently organized to try to time their fires as well. I could have phrased that better.

IMO that is down to how well they could do a site survey. And the target survey. What you have to get is the elevation data of the individual gun positions and their relation to the target elevation. For a TOT mission these are very critical factors.

From

http://www.poeland.com/tanks/artillery/artillery.html

(This site is heavy on the US procedures)

[ August 15, 2002, 03:27 PM: Message edited by: tero ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by tero:

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

I don't doubt German gunners could count; but if they were not as able to mass fire, I was wondering if they were sufficiently organized to try to time their fires as well. I could have phrased that better.

IMO that is down to how well they could do a site survey. And the target survey. What you have to get is the elevation data of the individual gun positions and their relation to the target elevation. For a TOT mission these are very critical factors.

From

http://www.poeland.com/tanks/artillery/artillery.html

(This site is heavy on the US procedures)

Would accurate maps be a prerequisite for that? I understand they were in rather short supply in Russia (for the Germans at any rate).

Even if the shells were 10 seconds apart though, due to irregularities in the ground/miscalculations in your survey, etc., rather than split-secondly timed (was that the real objective of TOT, incidentally?) that is still going to have a huge surprise factor, no?

By "real objective", I mean - what was realistically achievable? Could they really time it so perfect that an entire field regiment - or several - would land their shells at the same second in time? What was acceptable deviation? 5 seconds? 10 seconds?

[ August 15, 2002, 03:31 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Tero]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Would accurate maps be a prerequisite for that? I understand they were in rather short supply in Russia (for the Germans at any rate).

Yes on both accounts.

Anybody have the juice on the German cartography service and how it performed ?

The überFinnish cartograhy (fotogrammetry) service could produce 1:20 000 scale maps with a hex grid and names of places in place and have them available for front line troops on average within 48 hours from the taking of the photos.

http://foto.hut.fi/seura/historia/toiminta.html

A Finnish site, sorry. Happy Babelfishing/Googling.

Even if the shells were 10 seconds apart though, due to irregularities in the ground/miscalculations in your survey, etc., rather than split-secondly timed (was that the real objective of TOT, incidentally?) that is still going to have a huge surprise factor, no?

By "real objective", I mean - what was realistically achievable? Could they really time it so perfect that an entire field regiment - or several - would land their shells at the same second in time? What was acceptable deviation? 5 seconds? 10 seconds?

Lets say you assign a 20 rpg barrage. You have 10 batteries on call so that is 40 guns.

EDIT: that is stretching it a bit. Lets give you 20 batteries at 10 rpg. That evens out at 80 guns and 800 rounds in the allotted 60 secs. That is more realistic.

That makes it a 800 shell barrage. You use a converged sheaf to concentrate the barrage the most effective way. If the max ROF of the guns is 20 rpm you will have rounds out within 60 sec (give or take) of the order.

Imagine having those 800 rounds impacting at the target area withing (say) 70 seconds. That is on average 11 shells a second. Given that the deviation between the the first and the last round impacting is pretty academic.

What counts is the aim is true and the enemy in the target zone gets taken by surprise because there are no ranging shots to warn them. They have no time to find cover when the **** hits the fan.

[ August 19, 2002, 01:48 AM: Message edited by: tero ]