WWII doctrines

[Brian]

Originally posted by Tarqulene:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Pillar:

[QB]Regardless of Brians picture, the actual picture, corresponding with his or not, was just posted by JasonC.

<snip>

Snipped out the message, because Jason actually started comparing Brian's picture with his picture. (Yea, now we're getting somewhere!)</font>

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Tarqulene:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

[QB]T - there were plenty of Canadian "gadgets"

Probably hard to judge, but in your opinion were most of the usefull gadgets issued? Or, maybe more to the point, did you ever happen to find yourself thinking. "Hmm, they really should have issued that gadget. There seems to be an anti-gadget bias operating in the Canadian military."? Or the opposite ("We're techno freaks!")</font>

[Tarquelne]

]Are we? Jason has yet to answer the point - how many and why were so many US Brigade and Divisional commanders sacked in the first few weeks of the push inland?

Ah, but that doesn't necessarily matter. As MD mentioned, it could have simply been because the commanders were inexperienced. Not because in their inexperience or incompetence they improperly used their troops ("sheer willpower.")Why they were getting sacked matters. Finally, if they were quickly sacked and replaced with commanders who had far more than "willpower" to draw on, it could actually weaken your argument.

I guess what I'm trying to get at is the bare fact that there was a high turnover rate doesn't really matter. It's certainly interesting, and lends support to your argument, but I don't think you can stand on it alone.

What do you have to say about the "bigger hammer" of the American artillery? Jasons post certainly certainly doesn't _rule out_ the possibility that many American commanders weren't using it properly, but I found it more persuasive than the bare fact that many commanders were sacked.

[Tarquelne]

But it does not fall into your category of not having a tailor made purpose on the battlefield, or not being a response to current tactical conditions - if we are still using that to frame the discussion?

No, on further consideration that bit was useless. All that really matters is whether a gadget/tech was adopted or not.

Or developed at all. Maybe what I should have been inquiring about is the R&D budgets.

If anything the Germans over engineer everything.

They certainly seemed to have made a habit of "pushing the envelope" too far.

A seperate issue from overengineering, but I wonder how much Germany's pursiut of high-tech toys was simply an expression of Hitler's overconfidence? If he consistently over-funded research projects? I can easily imagine that Hitler thought that the technology lead would be easily regained and that Germany could start fielding 1950s tech in a crumbling mid '40s Germany.

[Brian]

Originally posted by Tarqulene:

Are we? Jason has yet to answer the point - how many and why were so many US Brigade and Divisional commanders sacked in the first few weeks of the push inland?

Ah, but that doesn't necessarily matter. As MD mentioned, it could have simply been because the commanders were inexperienced. Not because in their inexperience or incompetence they improperly used their troops ("sheer willpower.")Why they were getting sacked matters. Finally, if they were quickly sacked and replaced with commanders who had far more than "willpower" to draw on, it could actually weaken your argument.

Isn't it important that they failed to satisfy their superiors who had a view of the battlefield which was not supported by reality? Their superiors believed that the "one shoe fits all" technology should have worked and it was a lack of either ability or aggression on the part of the commander, rather than in reality that it was not until innovation, be it in superior tactics or technical means (ie the Cullin device) that they were were able to actually push forward.

You should also remember we are talking about the outlook of an organisation, the US Army, rather than the views of individuals within that organisation. Jason has yet to explain why the upgunnng of the Sherman was resisted, as was the introduction of a heavy tank with an adequate gun, in favour of the "one shoe fits all" 75mm gun tank.

Robert J. Icks was quite scathing in his criticism of the conservatism he faced within the US Army's heirachy, both pre and during the war WRT the development of armour.

I guess what I'm trying to get at is the bare fact that there was a high turnover rate doesn't really matter. It's certainly interesting, and lends support to your argument, but I don't think you can stand on it alone.

Its a pity my copy of Hastings is on loan at the moment. However, I'm surprised someone else has not referred to it. Moreover, I'm surprised at the way in which Jason is making this such a storm in a teacup. Remember, we are afterall, in the long run talking about my impressions...

What do you have to say about the "bigger hammer" of the American artillery? Jasons post certainly certainly doesn't _rule out_ the possibility that many American commanders weren't using it properly, but I found it more persuasive than the bare fact that many commanders were sacked.

Its an indication IMO that the US commanders were desperately searching for a means to achieve a breakthrough and hit upon the one weapon at their disposal that seemed to work - overwhelming and massive firepower. Again, if anything, it reminds me of the mid-years of the Great War, when the British came to rely overly much on the use of artillery to shoot them onto their objectives, something the CRA, Maxe (I think that was his name) noted dryly during that conflict in criticism of that misuse of artillery.

Now, here's a different sort of take - how long do you think the German defences in the Bocage would have lasted if the US Army had developed and utilised the Crocodile or the AVRE?

[ June 15, 2002, 02:13 AM: Message edited by: Brian ]

[Michael Dorosh]

But US troops did use Crocodile on occasion...

Did the British really believe gunpower in WW I was "misuse"? Probably the same guys that put magazine cutoffs on the Lee Enfields so that the troops would not shoot so much....

[JasonC]

There is another reason I quoted so much of it, the bulk of the German side assessment. I did not want to create selection effects, for one. But I also wanted to correct common misconceptions about the course of the overall battle in the American zone in Normandy.

Many seem to have the impression that the US was hung up in the hedgerows in indefinite, slogging infantry fighting from the day after D-Day until the breakout 7 weeks later. Perhaps this is supposed to parallel the struggle around Caen in some people's imagination; I doubt claim to know. It is certainly not what actually happened in the American sector.

From D-Day to the Cobra breakout is 7 weeks, and to Falaise is 3 more. They were occupied thus -

1st - link up beaches, push inland

2nd - drive west and cut the penisula

3rd - drive north and take Cherbourg

4th - pause to reorient south and build up supplies

5th and 6th - the push to St. Lo

7th - the breakthrough struggle, ending with overrun of Panzer Lehr

8th - Released armor defeats German reserves sent to plug the gap

9th - Mortain attempt defeated

10th - Falaise

Of that period, only the period from 3 July to 24 July, 3 weeks tops, was attrition fighting in the hedgerows. The first two in the push to St. Lo, the last in the breakthrough fight. US forces only paused for one week out of the 10, between the fall of Cherbourg and the opening of the offensive southward. Throughout the St. Lo push itself, the Germans were living hand to mouth in terms of reserves, even feeding in everything reaching the theater piecemeal, moving forces from the UK front, and leaving burnt out KGs in the line.

The first three week destroyed about 5 German divisions. 39,000 PWs were taken on the way to Cherbourg alone (2 divisions complete, half of two others, and lesser units), and the two divisions directly opposite the beaches were mostly destroyed, only a cadre of 352 surviving. 17th SS was also reduce somewhat in that period.

In the push to St. Lo, the whole II FJ Corps, most of 2SS, the 2/3rds of Panzer Lehr left after its spell on the British front, and half a dozen infantry divisions were fought with, and divisions reduced to the size of battalions. The third breakout week destroyed most of what was left of these units after the first two, in front line strength.

In the week immediately after the breakout, 116 Panzer, two StuG brigades, KGs from several mobile formations and half a dozen infantry remnants, where all manhandled. 3/4 of the remaining German armor in theater then attempted the Mortain counterattack, losing about 3/4 of their initial strength in the process. The next week most of France fell.

The impression some seem to have that these guys didn't know what they were doing - or that they took a long time to do it - is way off base. Yes, Normandy was a battle of attrition. A successful one. Some people can't seem to grok the combination of "successful" and "attrition". But that is their problem, not a problem with attrition strategies.

That there was not more rapid movement directly south was due directly to US decisions about the point of main effort. The overall offensive capacity of the US portion of the force was largely dictated by logistical considerations. A single avenue of advance could be given "attack supply" levels of artillery support, while continuing the build-up of troop numbers ashore. More could not have been.

That limitation dictated making Cherbourg the first priority, because long term combat power depended on greater means of supply for twenty plus divisions in intense combat than was possible over open beaches. Cutting the penisula before driving for the port itself was dictated by obvious operational considerations. It allowed overwhelming fire support to be brought to bear on the defenders, with no prospect of those defenders replying in kind. Cherbourg fell quite cheaply, and operations to that date had certainly inflicted far greater losses on the Germans than the Americans had sustained.

In the meantime the southern sector was quiet. US losses in the first 6 days after D-Day, while still attacking in all directions to link up the beaches and gain room to deploy, were less (combined) than on D-Day itself. There was no poor bloody infantry slogging anywhere without sufficient awareness of the conditions in front of them involved in any of those preliminaries. Nor, obviously, in the post breakthrough campaign, either the breakout fight with the German reserves, meeting the counterattacks, or capturing France.

So the whole thesis is reduced to 2-3 weeks from the opening of the southern offensive until the breakout. Naturally, it should have taken 2-3 days. 2:1 odds attacks in hedgerow terrain always achieve breakthrough in 2-3 days, especially if you bring along a few dozen funnies. Don't they? That was the actual period of true attrition fighting.

And it worked. The US waited until the southern front could be the focus of their entire logistical efforts. That let them attack with as many as 10 divisions, in three corps, with usually 2 side by side and occasionally all 3 attacking simultaneously. And throwing 5-10 times as many shells at the defenders as the defenders could afford to throw back at them.

That is how a logistical superiority is applied. You focus on a particular target (not every direction at once), and you turn on a firehose of shells. It is not fun being the "poor bloody infantry" that probes forward in tight terrain even with that kind of edge. US infantry losses were high, and losses to independent armor battalions working with the infantry were also high. But not because they were not applying a known technical means, a "bigger hammer", to exploit a large logistical superiority.

The Germans could not in the end stand to lose hundreds to more than a thousand men per day from their outnumbered and heavily outshot defending divisions, for 2-3 weeks on end. The US could and did stand losing 250 men per day from their attacking infantry divisions, limiting the attack period for each to 1-2 weeks when possible (by adjusting the breadth of the attack over time).

Good troops and good defensive terrain cannot in the long run outmatch 5-10 times the weight of shell fired. The Germans quickly (a few weeks) ran out of reinforcing formations to feed into the meatgrinder, and as soon as they did the front split wide open.

I am sure Brian knows all of this, in substance. I do not post it for his benefit, but as context to our discussion. Because not everybody listening to either of us can be expected to know all of it.

[Brian]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

But US troops did use Crocodile on occasion...

[/qb

But they did not develop nor utilise it themselves, relying upon the British to supply both vehicles and crews, Michael.

[qb]

Did the British really believe gunpower in WW I was "misuse"? Probably the same guys that put magazine cutoffs on the Lee Enfields so that the troops would not shoot so much....

It was the CRA, Michael, Ivor Maxe (again I think that was the spelling of his name, perhaps John or Jon could supply more detail) who was quite critical of the emphasis placed upon long and large pre-attack bombardments by most commanders during the mid period in WWI (ie after the Somme and before the 100 days). Its mentioned in I believe Bidwell's Firepower.

[Tarquelne]

I'm going to ignore the rest of the your post. For now, at least. Maybe someone else will repond to it. I'm most interested in the part below... and it's the least complicated to respond to:

Now, here's a different sort of take - how long do you think the German defences in the Bocage would have lasted if the US Army had developed and utilised the Crocadile or the AVRE?

How _did_ the Brits or Canadians do with the Crocadile and the AVRE in the hedgerows? (Or whever "gadgets" they used.) Esp. as compared to the non-gadgety, big-hammer Americans? Far fewer casualites? Faster progress? (This'll probably necessitate a shift back to general doctrinal isses - good.)

The gadget using Brits or Canadians didn't have a high commander turnover rate? (I think I saw another message mention they did.)

[JasonC]

To Brian on the T34 copy issue -

I am no expert on the subject, but what Guderian says about it is "The officers at the front were of the opinion that the T34 should simply be copied, since this would be the quickest way of putting to rights the most unhappy situation of the German panzer troops: but the designers could not agree to this. This was not primarily because of the designers' natural pride in their own inventions, but rather because it would not be possible to mass produce essential elements of the T34 - in particular the aluminum diesel engines - with the necessary speed. Also, as far as steel alloys went, we were at a disadvantage compared to the Russians owing to our shortage of raw materials." Thus the decision to continue the Tiger and design the Panther, according to Ch. 8 of Panzer Leader. How accurate those reasons are I leave to more competent people to judge.

[Michael Dorosh]

Brit and Canadian commanders were indeed fired practically left and right.

The adoption of the APC was a big boon in at least one battle, but they were used thereafter to good effect, and a British counterpart to the Kangaroos (1st Canadian APC Regiment) were formed.

Artificial Moonlight was another innovation used to varying degrees of success, allowing night time actions. Not sure what the rationale behind this was - nullifying the impact of AT weapons? Increasing surprise? It certainly had its problems, ie moving vehicles in the dark, and the problem the Canadian encountered on at least one occasion, of being silhouetted by their own searchlight batteries.

Did the Yanks turn to night attacks? This is getting interesting.

But both sides turned to carpet bombing to blast them out of their ennui - the Americans during the start of Cobra, and the CW during (Charnwood?) the first week of July and the final drive on Caen.

Yes, Brian, I meant to say you were on the money about 79th's Crocs being British vehicles and British crews on loan to the Americans on occasion.

[ June 15, 2002, 02:22 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[JasonC]

On the AVRE and Croc question, I don't think they would have made the slightest difference. Whenever a tank could get that close alive in the hedgerows, it did the trick even with 75mm HE. The problem was the tanks had no long fields of fire, and when they went in close infantry AT clobbered them. The limited number of open lanes were easily mined or covered by PAK. AVRE and Croc are answers to thick bunkers anyway, not to restricted LOS.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by JasonC:

On the AVRE and Croc question, I don't think they would have made the slightest difference. Whenever a tank could get that close alive in the hedgerows, it did the trick even with 75mm HE. The problem was the tanks had no long fields of fire, and when they went in close infantry AT clobbered them. The limited number of open lanes were easily mined or covered by PAK. AVRE and Croc are answers to thick bunkers anyway, not to restricted LOS.

Did you have some loss figures for Crocodiles; I'd be interested in reading those.

[JonS]

Originally posted by Brian:

[QBIts a pity my copy of Hastings is on loan at the moment. However, I'm surprised someone else has not referred to it...[/QB]

Oh, alright:

Hastings, M. (1984), Overlord: d-day and the battle for normandy 1944, Pan Books Ltd, London (1985). p. 291.

...the roll call of senior American officers found wanting and sacked in Normandy was astonishing: two successive commanders of 90th Division, Brown of 28th Division, McMahon of 8th (who told Bradley frankly, "Brad, I think you are going to have to relieve me."), Watson of 3rd Armored, to name only the most prominent. Bradley also foud 83rd Division's leadership "uncertain", and that of 79th adn 80th suspect. Of the corps commanders, only Collins had distinguished himself. The commander-designate of First Army, Courtenay Hodges, was considered by most of his peers to be an officer of limited imagination...

Mike,

I'm assuming that your comment re: calibration of guns only being carried out only by the Canuckians was tongue in cheeck

Regards

JonS

P.S. Brian, its "Maxse"

[ June 15, 2002, 02:38 AM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[JasonC]

I will now do my Brian impersonation (tongue firmly in cheek).

"Those yanks, excitable lot, wot? Need a little steadying, dontcha know. Weren't around for more than a few minutes of the last one, poor sods - missed all the lessons. Darned unimaginative too. Strictly commoners you know, wot? Do things one way, can't understand improvements. Oh, build well enough if we give them the plans. Can't fight worth a damn, but then there are a lot of them, seeing they let in all that European lot. The wogs begin where? Right-ho. Now, if they'd let Monty run the whole show, be in Berlin by now, wot? Simply mindless. Shoving the lads forward, leaning on the guns - right out of Sassoon. Naturally they blame the chap just under them, so half have already got the sack. And the wars just started for them, wot? Any be left at the end of the show?"

My apologies to PG Wodehouse and the entire population of the UK.

[ June 15, 2002, 02:39 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Brian]

mmm, doublepost. Not sure why.

[ June 15, 2002, 02:42 AM: Message edited by: Brian ]

[Brian]

Originally posted by Brian:

My understanding of the decision to change over to dusk/night attacks was indeed to nullify the superior long-range, German AT weapons and allow the British/Canadians to utilise the mass available to them to smash their way through the German lines. Further it allowed Bomber Command to bring in their bombers. Harris was reluctant enough to utilise them tactically let alone in daylight, unless ordered to.

No idea. Perhaps Jason can tell us?

They used them in several operations in numbers from about 700 to over a 1,000. Most of the big offensives which utilised Montgomery's ideas on "collosal cracks" featured the use of strategic bombers tactically. TOTALISE and the others, afterwards, spring to mind.

Its interesting though, that it was more the use of tactical fighters by the American Quesada (?sp) during Cobra which was more telling than the bombers IIRC. I think the one place where the bombers could/should perhaps have been used, they weren't - MARKET-GARDEN.

[Brian]

Originally posted by JonS:

[QB]Originally posted by Brian:

Its a pity my copy of Hastings is on loan at the moment. However, I'm surprised someone else has not referred to it...Oh, alright:

Hastings, M. (1984), Overlord: d-day and the battle for normandy 1944, Pan Books Ltd, London (1985). p. 291.

Thanks, mate. Now, does he mention as to the reason why they were sacked? I seem to remember it was because of both a perception of incompetence and lack of aggression on their part.

[JasonC]

"hit upon the one weapon at their disposal that seemed to work - overwhelming and massive firepower"

They didn't have to cast about for "one thing that seemed to work", because that solution was their doctrine from the get-go. It was not a fall back, it was the whole idea. And as you barely notice in passing, it worked. (Not just "seemed to", either).

The US army in WW II did not have the prejudice against artillery and overwhelming firepower that you yourself show here (and that is common enough among maneuver advocates, incidentally). It was in fact designed for it.

The normal path to division command in the US army in WW II was through the post of divisional artillery commander. That was the lower position that "fought the division". Not a 1a staffer, the head of div arty. Because he allocated the divisional fires, which were the chief means US division level HQs used to determine points of main effort, support attacks, etc.

The US army of WW II was not designed for maneuver arms razzle dazzle. Lower level commanders in regimental combat teams were trusted to maneuver sensibly, for the most part, and all echelons of the triangular unit designs worked much the same, from platoon to corps. The army was instead designed to exploit the huge logistical superiority of the US war economy.

The armor and airborne had different cultures in this respect, to be sure. Although combat commands maneuvered independently very often, making armor division command a less operational post, certainly than command of German panzer division.

Most of the higher level commands, corps and army, and the infantry division commands, followed the same basic outlook. It was a rare higher level commander (e.g. Patton) who was primarily operations, armor, or maneuver minded. Some were logistically minded, many from artillery backgrounds directly, and most infantry background but used to relying on artillery.

The taught doctrine was firepower minded, and coordination of movements with firepower support was stressed as the primary distinguishing factor between a successful commander and a mediocre one. Those coordinations were normally of the "command push" type, not "mission pull". Which fit with firepower allocation as a basic means of influencing battles.

You are free to think this was a stupid doctrine. But it was their doctrine, not a fallback or makeshift. And it worked just fine, with the level of logistical edge the Americans could bring to bear, and overall Allied odds.

[Brian]

Originally posted by JasonC:

I will now do my Brian impersonation (tongue firmly in cheek).

"Those yanks, excitable lot, wot? Need a little steadying, dontcha know. Weren't around for more than a few minutes of the last one, poor sods - missed all the lessons. Darned unimaginative too. Strictly commoners you know, wot? Do things one way, can't understand improvements. Oh, build well enough if we give them the plans. Can't fight worth a damn, but then there are a lot of them, seeing they let in all that European lot. The wogs begin where? Right-ho. Now, if they'd let Monty run the whole show, be in Berlin by now, wot? Simply mindless. Shoving the lads forward, leaning on the guns - right out of Sassoon. Naturally they blame the chap just under them, so half have already got the sack. And the wars just started for them, wot? Any be left at the end of the show?"

My apologies to PG Wodehouse and the entire population of the UK.

Jason, you know, its because of this sort of thing people get more than a trifle annoyed with you. It adds nothing to the debate and merely raises the temperature.

It also indicates IMO a deep-seated insecurity complex in that you appear unable or unwilling to take onboard any criticism, either positive or negative of the US military or its methods in WWII. Such a retreat to nationalism is IMO completely out of place here.

Now, as the start of this debate was a comment by someone else who attempted to make a disparaging claim that the US Army was indeed "gadget happy" I'm increasingly at a loss as to why you're upset that I've been attempting to refute that claim by suggesting it was actually a great deal more conservative than that original poster claimed.

Do you really want to see the US Army viewed as being "gadget happy", despite IMO there being no evidence to prove it?? :confused:

[JasonC]

I can give numerous examples of the way this attitude was built into the whole structure of US WW II forces. What other army regarded a self-contained means of indirect fire support as an organic unit essential in all unit types and at practically all levels?

US armor battalions had 105mm assault gun sections in part to be able to deliver indirect fire, the same as a howitzer battery. They were often used in battery that way. They also had a 81mm mortar platoon in their command group. For an armor battalion - would any German think *that* a requirement? Flakpanzers sure, but organic mortars?

Cavalry had their M8HMCs not for CM rushes but for indirect fire support at the battalion level. So did TD battalions. Can you imagine the Germans thinking every Jagdpanzer formation needed organic Wespes?

The cavalry insisted on indirect fire means down to squad level, in the form of their 60mm mortars. The protested violently against proposals to reduce them to 2 mortars per platoon. So natural was it to regard indirect fire as the natural compliment to thin skinned vehicles.

Everybody had some form of fire support at the regimental level, but usually types meant for direct fire on the battlefield. The Americans wanted to fire batteries of pack 105s indirect, as in div arty.

Then the Americans fielded as many battalions of artillery above divisional level, as in divisions. There were 3 battalions of heavier pieces - mostly 155mm, some 8 inch - for every division. On top of 54 105s per division regardless of type (counting regiments), and 12 155s per infantry division.

It was not just the number of guns, the number of heavier ones, or their being put everywhere. All of that just amounted to nozzles for the ammo stream. The American army of WW II applied the principle of mass by concentrating artillery ammo to support important points, using its trucking abilities especially. This allowed single battalions at points of main effort to fire 5000 rounds a day as a matter of course.

Whole German corps had artillery rations like that. The US expended about as much artillery ammo, most of it in less than one year of large scale fighting on the western front (other fronts were in action longer, but much smaller) as the Germans did in the whole war, all fronts. Even though the western front was a fraction of the size of the eastern and in existence only about on fifth as long.

When the Germans in Normandy noted they were facing 5-10 times as many shells per day as they had to reply with, that was not an unusual flurry. It was perfectly normal for the enemy they were up against. Yes, there were shell shortages in the fall and early winter, especially of 105s. But that is because previous consumption had been higher still.

This is easy to understand, if you remember that Germany was directing a fraction of her overall effort at the western front, and only 1/2 to 1/3 of it at the US sector of the line (varying by date), while the US, with 4-5 times the raw industrial capacity, was directing 2/3rds of her output against just Germany.

Relying on superior firepower in the form of vastly more shells available to throw was therefore perfectly realistic and sensible for the US army of WW II. It was an enourmous potential edge and they built their doctrine around trying to make the most of it.

Arguably, very crudely. There is nothing subtle about an HE sledgehammer, and nothing brilliantly refined about planning on having 10 times as much ammo as your enemy before you even engage. But it is decent work if you can get it.

As one veteran described his WW II experience in the US army - "we fired at them, they fired at us, we fired some more, they ran out of ammo and surrendered".

[JasonC]

It is not a "retreat to nationalism" Brian, it is a joke for crying out loud. Lighten up, dude.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Canadians are certainly not anti-tech, but all of our tech seems to be a result of experience.

ISTR that another Canuckian invention was radar-directed counter-battery fire. They had an experimental unit in France post break-out from Normandy. Now if I could only remember where I read that... 'Guns of war'?

[JonS]

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />...the roll call of senior American officers found wanting and sacked in Normandy was astonishing...

does he mention as to the reason why they were sacked? I seem to remember it was because of both a perception of incompetence and lack of aggression on their part.</font>

[JonS]

Originally posted by Andreas:

ISTR that another Canuckian invention was radar-directed counter-battery fire. They had an experimental unit in France post break-out from Normandy. Now if I could only remember where I read that... 'Guns of war'?

Yeah, this has been going around for a while. I think Blackburn mentions them as being a Canadian part of 21st AG. However, I don't think the R.A. were ignoring the possibilities offered by radar.

From Pemberton A.L. (1951), The development of artillery tactics and equipment, The War Office, p.230:

Radar As A Counter Mortar Weapon

By the end of 1943, radar (G.L.III) was being used to improve the accuracy of artillery shooting by the tracking of free balloons, and the deduction of upper wind values, when visibility was too poor for direct observation. But it was as a counter-mortar weapon that it was to render its greatest service to the field artilleryman at this time.

The need was urgent. The normal German infantry division included 57 x 8-cm. and 12 x 12-cm. mortars, ... , and it was estimated that about 70 per cent. of the British casualties in Normandy were caused by mortar fire. On our side the only special equipment available at the beginning of operations (in Normandy) was the "four-pen recorder" (a more sensitive sound ranging unit introduced especially for the detection of mortar baseplates), which was still in the early stages of development and could be supplied only to 1 and 30 Corps. Before long thoughts again turned to the possibilities of radar, and experiments were re-started in France with a new expert and immediately began to yield the most encouraging results. Meanwhile in Italy, where, owing to the nature of the country, the enemy mortar was still more of a menace, experiments with radar had also been in progress, and a radar regiment, R.A., was eventually formed.

Later, as the first auto-following radar sets became available the accuracy and speed of location were considerably improved. With the G.L.III, locations involved a certain amount of guesswork, and to avoid gross errors, a number of observations had to be made and the means taken. With the A.A. No. 3 Mk. 5, continuous trajectories could be plotted from the observation of one or two rounds, and a mortar could be located to within 25 yards, even if the initial 2,000 feet of the trajectory was missing...

In reading the full text its quite remarkable just what varied uses the R.A. used radar for, and the results they were able to achieve with it. Certainly it was far more advanced than I had thought.

Oh, BTW, the quote above mentions that experiments were 're-started in France.' In late 1943 and early 1944 experiments had been carried out in England with respect to using the radar as a counter-mortar means, but it was "held in abeyance as savouring too much of the defensive at a time when, by order of the higher command, attention was to be devoted exclusively to consideration of the offensive."

With the use of rockets, or "land mattress", the U.K. Ministry of Supply was working on a development of the Royal Navys "sea mattress". It was still in development when 1st Canadian Army asked for a battery to support the assault on Flushing. The was some doubt about the advisability of letting them use it (on a number of grounds), but approval was given anyway. A few days after Flushing it was used again in support of the Polish Armd Div at Breda, and again early in December in support of 15th (Scottish) Division at Venlo. As a result of the latter action R,A, 12 Corps thought there was a definite requirement for one rocket battery to each corps. Shades of MLRS there

Regards

JonS

Edit: spelling

[ June 15, 2002, 07:06 AM: Message edited by: JonS ]