WWII doctrines

[Visom]

I'm reading Closing with the enemy again. Doubler refers to how american GIs and officers repeatedly faced problems that were not adequately covered in the doctrine. So, what did these doctrines look like? Are they published on a site somewhere or available in print? Mostly interested in the FM 100-5, but also other doctrines for all major countries...

[Philippe]

One of the things that dissapointed me about that book is that I was hoping to find a compare and contrast discussion of how the Americans as opposed to the Germans or the British or the Canadians dealt with three or four of the more common tactical problems. It doesn't seem to be in there, and we probably shouldn't blame the author.

So at the risk of being accused of highjacking a thread, I wish some of our more learned tacticians would outline what makes a German assault different from one made by Americans, British, Canadians, or Poles.

It seems silly to spend inordinate amounts of time dressing up Germans, Poles, Canadians, etc. in historically correct uniforms and kit, and to get absolutely frantic about having them look authentic on the battlefield, only to turn around and have them act out of character when they actually have to do something.

So please, somebody, tell me how to make my Germans act like Germans when I play CM.

[ June 10, 2002, 05:47 PM: Message edited by: Philippe ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Philippe:

It seems silly to spend inordinate amounts of time dressing up Germans, Poles, Canadians, etc. in historically correct uniforms and kit, and to get absolutely frantic about having them look authentic on the battlefield, only to turn around and have them act out of character when they actually have to do something.

So please, somebody, tell me how to make my Germans act like Germans when I play CM.

I second the motion. (Not that I ever play the Germans...well, hardly ever.)

Michael

[Fionn]

There are some good accounts of the German offensive and defensive doctrines int eh German Military Handbook. There are also numerous accounts of German small unit actions on the Eastern and Western fronts which give good tips.

The German Military Handbook is a good starting point. By the time you learn how to do the 5 standard German attacks you'll be good enough to figure out how to model the patrolling etc in CM.

What's best is that it works well and when you bring a German doctrine force up against a Soviet force (using Soviet doctrine) in CM:BB you can see how the two doctrines developed side by side during the war years and how German doctrine worked against the Soviets...

[Philippe]

Originally posted by Fionn:

There are some good accounts of the German offensive and defensive doctrines in the German Military Handbook.

This reminds me a bit of when I was in school: whenever I asked an elementary question my advisor (who lost a leg on the Eastern Front) would get a devilish glint in his eye and tell me to look it up in the Handbuch (while muttering something about Quellenforschungen).

Herr Professor Doktor, where would I go if I wanted to read the German Military Handbook ? Can it be found somewhere on the web ? And don't think you're off the hook on the other nationalities. In about three months, assuming I can find the Handbook, I'll be back to ask you about the French, the British, the Canadians, and the Poles.

[Michael Dorosh]

Canadian battalion assaults on fixed positions were usually done with as much artillery preparation as possible, with two companies up and two companies back. Not sure of battalion frontages, but I suppose they varied a little bit.

As for the platoons themselves; I haven't read much on the subject so can't really help.

At the section level, I know the infantry section was usually split into two teams - a Bren team of 3 or 4 men and a rifle team of 5 or 6. They didn't get any more complicated than that.

At the section level, the Bren Gun would be used to cover the advance of the rifle team, once contact was made. The rifle team usually attempted to flank enemy positions using the cover of the Bren Gun, or if sufficiently far away, the two groups would leapfrog, each covering the other, until a final charge with bayonet, grenade and tommygun could be made.

Reorg was usually done just beyond the enemy positions rather than in them, since it was learned in Italy and perhaps even as early as North Africa that the Germans usually preregistered their own positions with their mortars, so that when they were thrown out, they could immediately drop punishing fire on the troops who evicted them, and make an immediate counter-attack, which was standard German practice.

I think a nice touch that I have not seen many scenario designers do would be to padlock German TRPs right onto the German positions.

Also, something CM doesn't model, is the fact that German SOS fire could be called down with coloured flares. I don't know if they actually required radio or land line contact or not, or if you could really call down SOS fire with the flares, but there were pre-arranged Verey light signals that would indicate a position lost, I presume to call down the battalion mortars onto that lost position.

[ June 10, 2002, 07:15 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Runyan99]

I believe the handbook, and lots of other good info (some interesting AARs) are available here:

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/DL/chron.htm#AWorldWarII19391945

[Visom]

I can find the German Army Handbook and German Infantry Handbook. I did find what seems to be a german version, Handbuch Militärisches Grundwissen, but my german is really bad... Any clues on where to find this German Military Handbook? Or is it Handbook on German Military Forces from the US War Department?

[Fionn]

Philippe,

Ah I didn't mean to be short with you. It is just that there was a choice between directing you to one of the seminal works ( although certainly not an entirely accurate one) or spending a couple of hours typing out stuff from the book word for word... or in my own inimitable style of English ( non-native speaker) ).

As re: the other nationalities. I'm really not the best on Western doctrines. I know NATO doctrine and German and Soviet doctrines from 1920 onwards but I'm sure others know their Canadian etc doctrine better than I. I really focussed on the Soviets.

[Fionn]

Ps. That URL is a gold mine. Some VERY good stuff there.

[Philippe]

Originally posted by Fionn:

Philippe,

Ah I didn't mean to be short with you. It is just that there was a choice between directing you to one of the seminal works ( although certainly not an entirely accurate one) or spending a couple of hours typing out stuff from the book word for word... or in my own inimitable style of English ( non-native speaker) ).

As re: the other nationalities. I'm really not the best on Western doctrines. I know NATO doctrine and German and Soviet doctrines from 1920 onwards but I'm sure others know their Canadian etc doctrine better than I. I really focussed on the Soviets.

No offense taken, and, to tell the truth, I was delighted that you had replied since you were the person I was hoping to hear from in the first place.

As for being directed to seminal works, well, I like seminal works, especially when I'm unfamiliar with them. Must have been all that Quellenforschungen...

[ June 11, 2002, 03:03 PM: Message edited by: Philippe ]

[kmk24]

Hi,

here's some tactics

finnish and soviet tactics

[Michael Dorosh]

While Phillipe seems unimpressed with my response to his query about the difference between CW and German doctrine, I am still interested; anyone care to address this? My instinct is that CW troops relied far more on elaborate artillery fire plans to shoot their troops onto their objectives, and that once there they often simply stayed there barring and other impetus to move than what was contained in the operations order.

The US Military Handbook on German Forces is a fascinating document, though there are significant errors in it - it has to be remembered that it was written during the war, when intellgience was not exactly perfect, though it is astonishing the amount of stuff they managed to get right.

Surely there are more contemporary books available on the subject?

In general I suppose one might look at the hardware each side had to work with for the most obvious kinds of tactical approaches they would take; the Allies had heavy bombers, tanks and artillery in abundance - the Germans did not. (duh)

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

[snips]

As for the platoons themselves; I haven't read much on the subject so can't really help.

Same as the Brits, I would think -- "Two up, bags of smoke".

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

[snips]

Reorg was usually done just beyond the enemy positions rather than in them, since it was learned in Italy and perhaps even as early as North Africa that the Germans usually preregistered their own positions with their mortars, so that when they were thrown out, they could immediately drop punishing fire on the troops who evicted them, and make an immediate counter-attack, which was standard German practice.

I think a nice touch that I have not seen many scenario designers do would be to padlock German TRPs right onto the German positions.

[snips]

Indeed. It continued to be a standard British Army technique to carry on 100m or so past the enemy position after fighting through it up until the early 80s for just this reason. Some time around then the doctrine changed to re-orging in the captured fire trenches; presumably someone had by then tumbled to the fact that we weren't fighting the Germans any more. AFAIK it is still an SOP to search an enemy casualty to make sure he is not lying on a grenade, so presumably the news about the Japanese giving up hasn't yet penetrated to all corners of the Strategy Hutch.

To be slightly more serious, there is the question of distinguishing specific tactics (or, to be modern, TTPs -- Tactics, techniques and procedures) from the more elusive and general "doctrine". I have never been at all clear exactly where the boundary lies, but have often suspected that if it helps the tactical commander decide how to fight his battle, it's TTP, not doctrine.

"Doctrine" always seems to me to be more the province of people who wave their hands around and use words like "over-arching". Personally, I would take "doctrine" to mean simply "that which is taught", but I have been told, with some asperity, by a Very Senior MoD Person, that I am entirely muddle-headed and wildly wrong to thing so (as, presumably, is the Oxford Dictionary).

ISTM that one of the difficulties in attempting any comparison between different national TTPs is that it is pretty hard to find any formal language (not necessarily verbal; pictures would be good) in which they can be expressed in a common form. Without expressing them in a common form, it's pretty hard to compare them. If doctrine is a more refined and abstract concept than TTPs, then presumably the difficulty there is greater still.

Of course, the ability to express TTPs/doctrines in a precise (or, for that matter, neatly fuzzy; formal, anyway), executable symbolic form would have the side-benefit of enabling wargame writers to produce different national-flavoured AIs for games like CM. But I suspect that there would be a lot more benefits than just that.

All the best,

John.

[JasonC]

I can address US WW II doctrine. First a bit of an old post of mine on this subject, on the particular question of leading with tanks or having them trail. Then some more general points.

(old post portion)

U.S. WW II doctrine made a distinction between pursuit-exploitation fighting, and deliberate attacking. The question of whether to lead with tanks or infantry turned on which sort of fighting was going on.

For armor force units in an exploitation phase, the lead unit was a tank unit, usually a full company of Shermans. The second unit was a combined arms unit, with mixed infantry and tanks. But if it were a case of deliberate fighting against an enemy in position and in contact, then the lead unit would be mixed infantry and tanks, usually armored infantry riding on the tanks instead of in their halftracks. The infantry then dismounted on contact and led from that point on.

For infantry force units in an exploitation phase, they led with attached tanks or tank destroyers, with infantry following, in trucks if available. But in deliberate fighting, the infantry went first, scouting for the tanks, which provided overwatch and reacted to the resistence the infantry encountered.

The idea behind the dicotomy was to avoid having a mobile column pinned down by light enemy forces, on the one hand, while providing scouting and combined arms for the tanks in the case of serious opposition, on the other hand.

Light roadblocks, small ambushes, a few delaying MGs, the enemy outpost zone - all of those were better dealt with by hitting them with more medium tanks than they could handle, and all at once, without providing soft targets. But if the enemy had armor, PAK, was in position in strength, or dug in - then forget about trying to run him off his feet that way. Instead, scout ahead deliberately with the infantry, and use the tanks to destroy all resistence encountered by fire, from range.

The US doctrine explicitly stated that tanks fight by fire, from range. The importance of their mobility on the attack was to prevent the attack from losing momentum, in the sense of retaining the ability to change the axis of attack under enemy MG or artillery fire. Not to run over or through the enemy.

The doctrine also noted that while flanking attacks were preferably in theory, once down to the battalion level or below almost all attacks were head on affairs. All arms cooperation and deliberate reduction of each defense point by fire was stressed. The infantry advanced first to scout the enemy, then after he was suppressed by fire, to finish him off. Close coordination of the maneuver arms with supporting artillery fire plans was stressed as the key difference between excellent field-level commanders and mediocre ones.

That was the historical doctrine. Many histories note that the difference between a green infantry unit and veteran infantry could be seen in whether they had learned to lead the tanks, or expected the tanks to go first. Green infantry invariably expected the tanks to go first, based on the obvious intuitive sense that an armored anything was less vunerable to the most common enemy arms than a man on foot.

What the vets had learned is that it is not the first contact that matters but the subsequent fight to reduce the enemy who opens up. And that it is better to have the tanks alive to outshoot the defenders, than to lose them on contact and then be ordered to continued the attack anyway.

Units were pushed to reach their objectives by higher HQs, unless deliberate attacks with whatever they still had with them had already expensively failed. As a result, it was cheaper for the infantry to go first and keep their support alive and effective, even from the standpoint of the infantry themselves.

(end old post portion)

The basic tactical unit was the company. Individual platoons of supporting arms (engineers, tanks, TDs, light armor, AA) might be attached, but a full company of one of the basic battle types (infantry or medium tanks) was always the basis of any tactical fight. Battalions or battalion sized task forces were the lowest operational maneuver element.

Most attacks were delivered by infantry battalions, with the most common form being one company attacking as the main effort, a second making a feint or demonstration nearby or supporting by fire from near the original start line, with the third in reserve behind those two. A single infantry company moving onto the terrain was the basic way most ground was taken. I'll go into how that worked a bit more below.

The reserve company was used to defeat local counterattacks and to relieve the attacking element as soon as the position was consolidated, to hold the ground taken and give the attack company a chance to reorganize. How fast such a relief could be made varied. Sometimes it would be close enough it would approximate attacking with two companies in column. Sometimes it wouldn't be until the following night. Often the attack company would have to defeat the first local counterattacks itself, but could then be relieved by the reserve. The attack role was rotated to give men time to rest and to allow replacements for losses taken in the attack, etc. The "feint" company was in the "on deck" position in this rotation.

For particularly tough objectives, two (or more rarely all three) companies would go in simultaneously, side by side. Basically the usual feint was upgraded to an attack in its own right. Besides this expedient, the main way stronger positions were taken was by increasing the strength of supporting arms. Typical levels of support for ordinary battalion attacks, led by single infantry companies, were one platoon of medium tanks or TDs, one platoon of engineers if obstacles were expected (their role was to allow movement, more than destroying strongpoints), and a battalion of artillery firing in support - almost always 105mm. Against tougher objectives, the tank support could rise to a whole company, and the artillery support could rise almost arbitrarily high, with fire by a full division's worth of artillery fairly common. Such artillery concentrations were also used to help protect front line battalions in danger of being overrun by counterattacks.

In armored formations a similar pattern was following, but the standard unit was a battalion size task force, built around either 2 medium tank companies and 1 armored infantry company, or 1 medium tank company and 2 armored infantry companies. In exploitation fighting a full medium tank company would lead. In other cases, a company of each would be paired and fight together, with the infantry dismounted and going first, as explained above. Artillery support would generally be one battalion of 105mm. Compared to infantry fighting, the tank support was higher, while artillery support was typically somewhat lower. The armored infantry was perpetually understrength because of their role in leading almost every attack. Sometimes infantry battalions would be cross attached to armor combat commands to enable then all to use a 1 medium tank to 2 infantry company task force layout, which allowed one infantry company to act as a reserve and some rotation off the line to be practiced.

Cavalry and light tanks were rarely used for attacks. They mostly had recon, defensive, or most common of all screening-patrol type missions. Light tanks in company strength were a favorite local reserve. They were also pressed into every sort of "utility" duty, hauling ammo, fuel, wounded, and other supplies, running messages, etc. That they could do such things cross country and through artillery barrages when necessary, was the attraction. And the 37mm main armament was recognized as inadequate for 1944-45 conditions.

When delivering an attack, an infantry company with some sort of support was the typical attack force. But the infantry was not expected to expell the enemy from his positions single handed. They were expected to fix the enemy and make him reveal himself. Then they went to ground, and supporting firepower arms blasted the located enemy positions. Called artillery fire first and foremost, direct fire from supporting tanks, and infantry heavy weapons - mortars, MGs, and to a lesser extent BARs - all took part.

When the enemy was suppressed (e.g. while the artillery is still falling), the infantry and medium tanks moved closer to swell the volume of fire on the enemy positions. This period is supposed to deal with all enemy MGs and AT weapons still firing. Then the artillery fire lifts and the infantry closes in, to finish off those hiding in their holes, cellars, etc - mostly with hand grenades, also with their small arms when necessary. Any remaining points of resistence encountered at this stage are dealt with by supporting direct fire weapons - tanks and infantry heavy weapons. "All is one continuous movement of firepower and then men onto the target".

Notice, there is practically no mention of tactical maneuvering, finding flanks, disarticulating the enemy, or any kind of razzle dazzle. Flanking and encircling maneuvers were definitely sought at the operational level, battalions and above moving around on the map. But at the tactical level, almost all attacks were delivered straight ahead on an enemy who could and did turn to face the attackers. The focus is on combined arms integration to deal with each portion of the enemy defense, and on the suppressive effects of heavy HE firepower.

The infantry forces typically used at one time were actually rather small for the objectives and size of defending forces. The principle there was to minimze overall losses in failed attacks - economy of force. If one company - or at most two - can't get onto the objective, it is quite unlikely sending more will do the job. It would only produce a larger casualty list. Instead, send a lot more shells, then try again with a small infantry force.

Defensively, the US replied on massing of artillery firepower, on "alert" movements of armor reserves to the threatened area (especially TDs), and on local reinforcement and blocking moves by the "back" portions of typical deployments (3rd battalions or 3rd regimental combat teams sliding over to cover gaps, etc). Intact portions of the front line infantry might stay in place calling for fire or retreat onto local reserves, depending on the situation. Reserve armor reaching the area, and sometimes air power intervention, was supposed to stop German armor.

Artillery concentrations were supposed to strip off his infantry before that, depriving the attackers of combined arms. MG and BAR fire also tried to do such striping, while bazooka teams supplimented TDs and armor in hunting down intruding tanks after that worked. Infantry defenses tended to be positional and fairly rigid as to each tactical unit, but deeply layered due to "2 up - 1 back" deployments, from platoon up to regiment. Armor was almost always behind the lines at first, and defended more fluidly - supporting successive blocking positions and falling back.

The overall doctrine relied on the logistical superiority of US forces, which they ordinarily could count on in most fights. It placed minimum strain on the tactical ingenuity of the lower level commanders, captain and below. They focused on the morale aspects of leading their men, and on coordinating fire support. It showed a typical American reliance on technical means and machinery, with combined arms understood as finding "the right tool" - most commonly "a bigger hammer".

In the event, infantry losses were still too high for what the army had planned (leading to the replacement crisis, addressed by disbanding AA units and the like), while machine losses were lower (tens of thousands of tanks made, only a few thousand lost), and ammo consumption was higher even than the prodiguous levels planned (leading to the fall-winter shell shortage). Which did not lead to any appreciable changes in doctrine, they just slowed down attacks in places where and when shells or replacements were not available.

I hope this helps.

[CMplayer]

Originally posted by JasonC:

I hope this helps.

Of course it helps. Write a book and I'll buy it. I even checked at Amazon in case you already had, but it only turned up a Jason Cowley who had written something called _Unknown Pleasures_. I figure that wasn't you.

[edited to add that I'm not pulling yer nong. That post was really enjoyable]

[ June 11, 2002, 05:05 PM: Message edited by: CMplayer ]

[JohnO]

I thought I would throw in my two cents. Being always wanting to play the Germans in CMBO. And after reading the Handbook on German Forces. Which I would have to agree with Michael Dorosh on the handbook. I went and got the "Truppenfuhrung, part 1 and 2. It is a very interesting book to read on German tactics and procedures

[Philippe]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

[QB]While Phillipe seems unimpressed with my response to his query about the difference between CW and German doctrine, I am still interested; anyone care to address this? My instinct is that CW troops relied far more on elaborate artillery fire plans to shoot their troops onto their objectives, and that once there they often simply stayed there barring and other impetus to move than what was contained in the operations order.

QB]

Michael, by now you must have realized that I'm impressed with everything that you do.

Far from not caring about how the CW dealt with tactical issues, what I yearn for is a kind of grid, nationalities across the top, tactical situation down the left side, so that you can see at a glance what, in the crudest terms, you are supposed to be doing in a given situation if you are role-playing a tactical commander of a given nationality. And this grid would have lots of useful little notes like "before Decemer 14, 1944, the American commander is not even allowed to whisper the word 'overwatch'."

[ June 11, 2002, 05:38 PM: Message edited by: Philippe ]

[Sarge Saunders]

Thanks JasonC. Almost everything in your post has ramifications for CM battles. A true testament to BTS that historical Amercian tactics are the best way to play for good results.

BTW, in CM terms how many FOs would represent a battalion of 105mm guns? I always assumed FOs fired in batteries of 4 guns salvos.

Probably an arty modelling question...

-Sarge

[Philippe]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

In general I suppose one might look at the hardware each side had to work with for the most obvious kinds of tactical approaches they would take; the Allies had heavy bombers, tanks and artillery in abundance - the Germans did not.

Personally I have always suspected that culture affects how you go about problem-solving in the most fundamental ways. North Americans tend to get hung up on gadgetry, and assume that the answers flow from the hardware. My favorite (albeit half-baked) example of the influence of culture on thought process is the German attempt to use a philosophical solution (Stosstruppen tactics) to end the stalemate of trench warfare in WW I, rather than relying (at least in their imagination) on more artillery, more tanks, more blood.

Continuing in that vein, given the disparity of national cultures involved, I am sure that the French, the Poles, the English, and the Germans, presented with an identical problem and given identical hardware, would tend to come up with different solutions to it simply because their culture (read: education and training) would compel them to think differently about what they were facing, and equip them with different problem-solving styles.

[Fionn]

"A true testament to BTS that historical Amercian tactics are the best way to play for good results."

Must.... take.... sedative.... . Must.... not.... mention.... 1936.... Soviet... doctrine

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Philippe:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

In general I suppose one might look at the hardware each side had to work with for the most obvious kinds of tactical approaches they would take; the Allies had heavy bombers, tanks and artillery in abundance - the Germans did not.

Personally I have always suspected that culture affects how you go about problem-solving in the most fundamental ways. North Americans tend to get hung up on gadgetry, and assume that the answers flow from the hardware. My favorite (albeit half-baked) example of the influence of culture on thought process is the German attempt to use a philosophical solution (Stosstruppen tactics) to end the stalemate of trench warfare in WW I, rather than relying (at least in their imagination) on more artillery, more tanks, more blood.

Continuing in that vein, given the disparity of national cultures involved, I am sure that the French, the Poles, the English, and the Germans, presented with an identical problem and given identical hardware, would tend to come up with different solutions to it simply because their culture (read: education and training) would compel them to think differently about what they were facing, and equip them with different problem-solving styles.</font>

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Philippe:

North Americans tend to get hung up on gadgetry, and assume that the answers flow from the hardware.

I think that is true now (at least here in the USA), often depressingly so, but was less so in WW II. My impression (based on entirely too little research) has been that often junior officers, NCOs, and even common grunts in the Allied armies often worked out their own doctrines on the squad to battalion levels chiefly by watching what the enemy did and learning to anticipate their moves. Thus, problem solving relied at least as much on "psyching out" the enemy as on technology.

Michael

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

...the Germans only HAD infantry by 1918, so they were certainly hamstrung in that regard, and I could make a case that any tactical solutions - or doctrine, if you will - had to represent that reality, and not the other way around where they preferred to use infantry vs. other arms.

Although I regard your idea of tactics being strongly influenced by the material means at hand as worthy of serious consideration in general, I wonder if you have selected a good example to make your point.

Fact is, the Stosstruppen tactics were first used on the Russian Front and then against Italy, a full year before they were applied on the Western Front. Unless you can make a compelling case that they were lacking in all the other arms of war in those theaters, I would suggest that the Germans had some other good reason for adopting that tactic.

Michael

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Michael emrys:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

...the Germans only HAD infantry by 1918, so they were certainly hamstrung in that regard, and I could make a case that any tactical solutions - or doctrine, if you will - had to represent that reality, and not the other way around where they preferred to use infantry vs. other arms.

Although I regard your idea of tactics being strongly influenced by the material means at hand as worthy of serious consideration in general, I wonder if you have selected a good example to make your point.

Fact is, the Stosstruppen tactics were first used on the Russian Front and then against Italy, a full year before they were applied on the Western Front. Unless you can make a compelling case that they were lacking in all the other arms of war in those theaters, I would suggest that the Germans had some other good reason for adopting that tactic.

Michael</font>