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Book on Moscow versus Ukraine (1941)


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In reading some of the earlier posts I came across something about the fact that Stalin was considering an attack on the german's before he was attacked might this not explain the fact that Runstedt's army group south faced the majority of the russian tank force's?Granted he was assigned only one panzergruppe but his army group was the slowest advancing of the three.He also faced the bulk of the T-34 and KV-1s.In book's I have a large part of the photo's of knocked out russian tank's were taken in the southern sector

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Originally posted by Sgt. Steiner:

Having millions of troops, and thousands of planes and tanks massed along the frontier seems to me highly indicative of someone preparing to launch an offensive.

Given all that, I'd say Uncle Joe was indeed up to something, and was surprised only that Adolf was ready before he was..

According to Glantz, the German timing for Barbarossa was optimal, as the Soviet forces were in the midst of a massive overhaul and restructuring of their forces. Fe many Soviet tank formations had unrifled barrels or no sights, not enough prime movers were available for artillery, insufficient ammunition was stockpiled, insufficient gas etc. etc.
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Originally posted by Michael emrys:

All good points. But if #1 had been realized, Hitler might not have attacked the USSR at all. At least he is reported to have said something along those lines to Guderian.

Very true. While visiting Finland on summer 1942 (Mannerheim´s birthday), he told to Finnish representatives how unexpectedly high numbers of Soviet tanks Germany had already encountered. That in a way like he had great doubts about German success.

Btw, the conversation was secretly recorded by Finns, and has been represented in a couple of Finnish war documentaries.

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Originally posted by Sgt. Steiner:

Having millions of troops, and thousands of planes and tanks massed along the frontier seems to me highly indicative of someone preparing to launch an offensive.

Given all that, I'd say Uncle Joe was indeed up to something, and was surprised only that Adolf was ready before he was..

Steiner, I can't believe what a source of questionable information you are proving to be. There are several books which deal with this notion. One that I am familiar with is Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia by Gabriel Gorodetsky. A fine read and not too difficult. I think you'd actually like it. Live a little.

smile.gif

Michael

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I was'nt going to post any more replies to this subject because evidently I'm not informed enough but does anybody really believe that communism and national socialism could have really co-existed?As allies?Hitler stated in Mein Kampf what his intention's were,the only hope for Germanic survival was eastern expansion,Leibenstraum,living space.Stalin was no fool he realised[excuse the vernacular]that europe was'nt big enough for the two of them.He had already demonstrated his desire for communist expansion with his aggression against Finland.And with the signing of the non-aggresion pact he saw a chance to take advantage of nazi aggresion,witness his subjegation of half of Poland and the occupation of Lithuania,Latvia and Estonia.How can one think that he sat there and watched as the german army conquered most of europe and considered himself immune to the same thing.Any student of history{and I've read more than one book on the subject of WW II]MUST see that there was going to be a clash between the two.They were ideologicaly opposed,there's no doubt about this,they could not co-exist.With 24.000 tank's and million's of men mobilised do you really think that Stalin was going to be satisfied with the status quo?Communism's goal was world domination not necessaraly by military mean's but by a gradual takeover,but the survival of the Soviet state was neccesary for it's reallisation.How does one explain the fact that massive troop formation were gathered along the frontier,the first real defensive position that the german's encountered was the Stalin line and it was nowhere near the frontier.The large formation's that Runstedt's army group encountered in the Ukraine suggest's a build up for a thrust at the oil field's of Rumania and Hungary,the soviet's had to be aware of the limited amount of domestic oil that germany possessed.I cannot believe that Stalin was going to sit back and let Hitler dictate to the world,the man just does'nt strike me as that kind.I can't believe that the thought of a communist Europe occured to him after the german defeat,after all he was a deciple of Lenin not Jefferson.24.000 tank's,what were they for?tank's are inherently an OFFENSIVE weapon especially when massed in large formation's like they were near the frontier does anyone really think this massive army that he possessed was a defensive tool?...Reality what a concept

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Originally posted by White Phosphorus:

Well, before the war the Soviets believed that offense was the best defense. They could have hoped for a repeat of Khalkhin Gol if Germany attacked.

Indeed. Add to that the complete reorganisation and upgrading of weaponry the Red Army was undergoing after the Finland desaster. Also the fact that many of the new tanks went into combat with untrained drivers, no AP rounds, guns that were not zero'd in. Does not sound like an army ready for world domination, especially when there is the at that point probably most effective army of the world in time facing it.

The reason the Stalin line was so far back was that it was the old border defense. The new border defenses were still in the process of building up.

The whole idea that the Soviets were about to strike west and Barbarossa just snuck in before that is just idiotic. Especially when one considers that the Germans planned their attack on the Soviet Union from July 1940.

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Originally posted by dizee:

Originally posted by von Lucke:

Even if the Germans had taken Moscow --- 2nd Panzer Division made it to within 20km, and recon elements actually pushed into the suburbs before the Sov counter-attacks in December --- what makes you think it would have changed the outcome of the war? Didn't work for Napoleon, and it wouldn't have worked for Hitler.

The Soviet Union was too vast, with too many resources (especially manpower) for the Axis forces to ever conquer it with the troops they had available. Axis logistics were stretched thin from the get-go, and after even less than a year of war, the pointy end of their spear (the panzer divisions) had been blunted --- as an example, by 10 December '41 the 6th PD was down to one tank!

If the Germans had started a few months earlier, they might have taken Moscow, sure. But they would never have held on to it --- and IMHO the outcome of the war would remain the same.

but it worked 1917
Ummm --- huh?

In WWI the Germans never even came close to taking Moscow. Matter of fact, the East Front stayed pretty much in the area of Poland, Hungary, and Rumania.

In 1917 the Russian Empire went down in flames because of internal revolt --- ya know, the October Revolution? The Bolsheviks? Lenin, Trotsky --- Stalin, for god's sake?

[ November 18, 2002, 04:42 AM: Message edited by: von Lucke ]

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Originally posted by Simon Fox:

Stolfi's arguments are made in a total vacuum with regard to Soviet dispositions, reserves, strengths and intentions. Perhaps if the Germans were swanning around Russia in the absence of any opposition they might hold a shred of credibility. The absence of a balanced viewpoint terminally undermines Stolfi's thesis. Suprise, suprise that one of his collaborators on this one was von Mellethin. Personally I'm rather fond of Greenbaum's demolition of this one on Amazon:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />It is an unbalanced and ultimately worthless version of a wistful vision of defeated generals, of no service to responsible historical research.

Ouch! Now that's gotta hurt.

In my opinion Stolfi, Hoth and Andreas are wrong. Keke and Foxbat seem to have a firmer grasp of reality :D </font>

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Originally posted by kevsharr:

The bombing of Rotterdam led to the surrender of the low countries.

Rotterdam was bombed AFTER the surrender. Rotterdam wasn't the Capital.

Okay, you have a point that Capitals are of crucial importance. What I find interesting is that a lot of people stick to the idea that wars are won by military means only. IMO, Germany lost the war for political reasons. If you conquer a country and tell the people: You are "sub-humans" we will kill most of you, others will work as slaves and few will be "Germanized". You have to leave big Garisons to keep the gained territory under controll (Norway, Greece, France, the Low Countries, Poland,...). Imagine you go to Russia that time and tell the people: "We don't fight you, we want to remove the Communist" - while setting up a "fair" rulership of the occupied land. When this was partly recognized towards the end of the war, it was heavily discussed in the German high-command... (lots more to discuss on this)...

Now imagine you come with a shiny army and tell the people: We bring you Coca-Cola, Cigaretts and Democracy. Make your choice.

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Originally posted by kevsharr:

I believe so but I still believe that the capture of Moscow would have resulted in the collapse of the communist regime. I realise that it's only one city but it was the economic and political centre of the Soviet Union. Capitol's have there importance like France capitulating right after the fall of Paris, Hitler's own stubborness in realizing that the Soviet's goal was to capture the lair of the facist beast-Berlin. The bombing of Rotterdam led to the surrender of the low countries, Warsaw was the focus of the attack on Poland. The capture of Belgrade by the 2nd SS led to Yugoslavia's demise so one must be carefull to underestimate the importance of these politicaly important target's.

One must be careful not to over-emphasize their importance either. All the countries you mention (with the possible exception of France) are about the size of a cricket pitch. By the time their capitols were overrun, their armies had already been destroyed in the field, and were in total rout (again, with the exception of France). Taking their capitol cities was mere formality.

Moscow the economic and political center of USSR? Stalingrad had more significance politically --- and look how the Sovs fought there. Stalin actually bugged-out of Moscow for a few weeks in November, when he thought the Germans were on their way in, and the government didn't collapse. As has been mentioned before, the Big Guy had the full support of the Stavka, and wherever he hung his mink-fur cap was the capitol of USSR.

Economically? Leningrad and Eastern Ukraine were the industrial centers in 1941. Stalin gave orders in July that all manufacturing plants in danger of being overun be moved to the Urals and Siberia. Between July and November something like 1500 factories were successfully relocated --- more than 500 firms and 200,000 workers left the Moscow area in October - November alone.

As has been pointed out by Michael (whom I pretty much agree with on everything he's said, so far), Moscow was not the only rail hub in Nothern Russia. It would have been an inconvenience to lose Moscow --- nothing more.

The Soviets had something like 5,000,000 men called up and put in uniform by December '41 --- enough to cover the losses they'd suffered in the previous six months. Losing Moscow would have given them a reason to fight all the harder to take it back --- again, see Stalingrad for an example. Soviet forces had been pushed back, but on the whole, were not beaten by any means.

Barbarossa was folly from the moment it started... But, hey! We got a nifty game out of it!

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Although it's true that to change direction was a strategic error (momentum on main axis was lost). The question remains what the huge russian force in the deep right flank of a further push toward moscow might have done. Certainly they wouldn't have done nothing but instead attack the right flank. And as anybody knows the initial force allocation was that the Russian anticipated the german main thrust into the Ukraine (Southern axis). What masses of russian tanks might have done to the german right flank mostly defended by infantry one can easily imagine...

Disregard of the flanks would certainly have been a huge gamble..and even a notorious gambler like Hitler must have felt decisively unsure..

However the taking of Moscow would have been a major blow to Stalin and the Russians. Once the germans would have been there the Russians would have bled white in trying to retake it.

If winter wouldn't have come so early the germans would have captured it anyway no doubt.

Ah, and don't forget Leningrad a further dissipation of force away from the main axis for nothing !

Greets

Daniel

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Originally posted by von Lucke:

Stalin actually bugged-out of Moscow for a few weeks in November...

Do you have a source for that? I ask because all the accounts I've read so far claim that although the civil administration was moved (to Gorki? I forget...), Stalin personally remained in Moscow during the critical period.

Michael

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That you have crammed several issues into a single paragraph makes it difficult to answer in a coherent manner, but I will try to address a couple of them.

Originally posted by kevsharr:

...does anybody really believe that communism and national socialism could have really co-existed?

No, of course not. Hitler had made that abundantly clear. He meant to annex at a minimum Poland and Ukraine and either annihilate or enslave the existing populations there.

As for Stalinist/Soviet expansionism, I think that is a far more subtle and complex issue than you credit it. For one thing, to see it clearly one must draw a distinction between two powerful forces, Communist Internationalism and Russian Nationalism, and then observe how they interact to generate policies that have historic outcomes.

Stalin was certainly a Communist, but I think he was even more profoundly a Russian Nationalist (though born in Georgia). That is, he was first and foremost concerned with the preservation of the Soviet Union as the progeny and replacement of the Russian Empire. He along with the bulk of the Soviet hierarchy was intensely suspicious of the West and not without reason. Following the October Revolution, Germany had made vast inroads into Russian territory and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk gave them a virtual license to steal huge quantities of grain and other goods. After the war had ended, the country was again invaded, this time by Britain, France, Poland, the United States, and IIRC even Japan.

[i have to leave now and will have to postpone completing this post for a few hours. Sorry for the interuption. Interesting subject and I'm glad we will have the opportunity to discuss it.]

Resuming the discussion...

I think Stalin's first concern before the war was ensuring the security of the Soviet Union which first and foremost meant restraining Germany. But There were difficulties in this as no other country wanted to form an anti-German alliance with him. He attempted before the Munich sell-out of Czechoslovakia to engage Britain and France together with Czechoslovakia, but to no avail. There was even an effort to do the same for Poland, but that country scotched the idea. Therefore, to buy time and gain space, he entered into the Ribbentrop Agreement, which gave the USSR a slight buffer zone before armies attacking from the west would gain access to Soviet soil. A year later, they moved into Bessarabia and the Baltic states to the same end.

Stalin was going to great lengths to avoid a war with Hitler, at least until such time as the Red Army had an even or better chance of winning, which meant not before 1942. This entailed swallowing his pride and accepting several diplomatic slaps in the face, including the Danube Conference, German troops moving into Rumania, and a dismissed offer to mediate the differences between Germany and Yugoslavia. It also meant that he was slow to fortify or even reinforce the new border between the two countries. Zhukov finally persuaded him that it was time to do so in the spring of 1941 and forces were being moved into the area pursuant to that, which has given some people the false notion that he was preparing to go to war. The fact is, he was tardily preparing to resist a German offensive. Even so, he was profoundly shocked when war began as he had great, if illusory hopes pinned on recent diplomatic moves.

Now jump forward four years. After long, bitter, and destructive fighting, the Red Army has pursued the Wehrmacht all the way to Berlin and beaten it, with considerable help from the West. In the process, they found themselves in possession of several Eastern European countries. Over the next three years and following, they would tighten their grip on these countries. Why? Soviet Imperialism?

Well, that may well have been part of it. But remember, most of the war had been fought on Soviet soil, and they had suffered horribly. They had lost in the neighborhood of 25 million dead and untold billions in property damage and lost production. The Soviet leadership from Stalin on down was determined that the next war would not be fought on Soviet territory.

It would not be until Gorbachev that a Soviet leader would be willing to risk trusting the West not to invade again and relinquish their grip on Eastern Europe. The Soviet occupation had been a heavy financial burden on the USSR, and every kind of burden on the subject peoples. It was a profound apprehension of the consequences of another war on Soviet soil that kept them there.

So much for a thumbnail sketch of Soviet statecraft. Now what about Communism? The Communist ideologues in the Soviet Union certainly dreamt of an international league of communist parties all striving hand it hand toward some imagined utopia. The Comintern, based in Moscow, went to some lengths to raise, organize, and support such movements in other countries, especially the industrialized countries of the West. How did this fit in with Uncle Joe's statecraft? Clearly he would like to have friendly—or at lest non-hostile—countries on his borders and elsewhere abroad. And remember, the Soviet Union had many sworn enemies in other countries, Winston Churchill being a prominent but by no means solitary example. So, as long as it served his ends, Stalin was happy to support Comintern in its machinations. But notice that he also was willing to rein it in during the late '30s because it was causing him diplomatic difficulties in dealing with the West.

Stalin was a nasty guy, no doubt about that whatsoever. But he was also very much a pragmatist and possibly the most rational (within certain defined limits) of the major world leaders at that moment. Which isn't saying much...

Michael

[ November 18, 2002, 03:06 PM: Message edited by: Michael emrys ]

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Originally posted by Keke:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Sgt. Steiner:

Having millions of troops, and thousands of planes and tanks massed along the frontier seems to me highly indicative of someone preparing to launch an offensive.

Given all that, I'd say Uncle Joe was indeed up to something, and was surprised only that Adolf was ready before he was..

According to Glantz, the German timing for Barbarossa was optimal, as the Soviet forces were in the midst of a massive overhaul and restructuring of their forces. Fe many Soviet tank formations had unrifled barrels or no sights, not enough prime movers were available for artillery, insufficient ammunition was stockpiled, insufficient gas etc. etc.</font>
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Originally posted by Andreas:

Troop strength may have been the same, but the troops were certainly six weeks better prepared. I don't think anyone would assume those troops would just sit on their rear for six weeks waiting for the Germans to attack.

True, but is often assumed that the german army had wiped out any significant units in the area at Yelnia and the russians needed the "breather" to get their troop strength up and bring in the "Siberians". For example Kevsharr says that "At the time there was next to nothing in front of Guderian to stop a successfull advance on Moscow".

A big problem with the early push would have been the insecurity on the flanks (21st Army attacking into the southern flank and troops in the Waldai hills).
Not to mention the problem of what to do when they actually got to Moscow.

Clear the flanks? Time-consuming and costly and gives the russian the time to reinforce th ecity or even counterattack.

Lay siege? Not very practical with the city being fed from behind and an encirclement would leave the encircling troops (and probably their rear areas and supply roads) wide open to counterattacks.

Bomb it into submission? they tried that - it didn't work.

Take it from the march? Think Stalingrad style city-fighting using the worn out remnants of an army group that has just fought its way there and that doesn't have nearly enough tanks, artillery, planes or even basic supplies to support such an operation.

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Hitler this, OKW that. Ok, the corporal did mess with plans he had no business messing with. So did Dzugasvili. To start with, without the the man Barbarossa would've never happened. Probably invasion of Poland neither.

Any quesses when the red army would've stormed europe without the debacle with fascist Germany? And would it have taken them six weeks or more to arrive at the channel?

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Originally posted by Michael emrys:

Agreed. That simply wasn't the Soviet style. Such a campaign, even if it ultimately proved successful, would be too problematical and too costly.

Besides it would have to happen at the exact right moment, which simply wouldn't occur. And with the kind of lead time the soviets (or later WarPac) needed to get such a thing organised would be excessive (we're talking years here). Whatever popular support the party had would be out the window, ethnic minorities (not to mention the poulation of occupied countries) would run riot, internal strife would gargantuan. And let's face the history of the red army is one of repeated acts of incompetents, followed by getting their teeth kicked in and a painfull route back to competence and efficiency.

The USSR via Comintern was into assisting native communist administrations become established in their own countries and then establishing friendly relations with those countries.
At best, mostly the Komintern was into strife, playing rival leftist movements against each other and using local sympathisants to act in a way that was best for the russo-soviet national interest. Even when they were actively involved in the war in Spain they couldn't help themselves from screwing the "other" left.

The commie juggernaut was a Cold War bugaboo.

Michael

One that both sides needed to believe in, a bit like kids and Santa Claus really. Kids never wake-up to reality despite whatever hints they may pick up, because it is not in their interest to disbelieve it :D
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Originally posted by Foxbat:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael emrys:

The USSR via Comintern was into assisting native communist administrations become established in their own countries and then establishing friendly relations with those countries.

At best, mostly the Komintern was into strife, playing rival leftist movements against each other and using local sympathisants to act in a way that was best for the russo-soviet national interest. Even when they were actively involved in the war in Spain they couldn't help themselves from screwing the "other" left.</font>
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