Book on Moscow versus Ukraine (1941)

[manchildstein (ii)]

http://militera.lib.ru/h/stolfi/

i'm wondering whether the experts here give this book a yay or nay.

it appears as though it may have been written in russian and translated to english.

[Andreas]

Generaloberst Herrmann Hoth (GOC Panzergruppe 3 during Barbarossa) in his assessment of the campaign ('Panzeroperationen - published 1956) agrees with that assessment.

[kevsharr]

I obtained a copy of this book a few year's ago from the military book club and it is very good.I also agree with his conclusion that this was a fatal decision on Hitler's part.At the time there was next to nothing in front of Guderian to stop a successfull advance on Moscow

[manchildstein (ii)]

what i found interesting as well were the comments on the french/balkan campaigns...

i'd never thought of the entire thing having been lost by august of 1941... but from the book there it makes at least some sense...

as for the idea of it having been translated from russian... it's the periods - instead of what should be commas - after the first phrase of many of the sentences which may have fooled me...

interesting that it's on an 'ru' website anyway

there was another theory somewhere about how the germans were lured into yelnia by the soviet command... and that it all 'turned' there...

[Andreas]

That would be Fugate/Dvoretsky 'Thunder on the Dnjepr - how Stalin defeated Hitler's Blitzkrieg' (or somefink).

Hoth is scathing about the operational ineptitude shown by OKW (read: Hitler) and OKH in concert, and of Guderian's playing along with it. In that he and Fugate/Dvoretsky agree.

[kevsharr]

One interesting aside is that the german's invaded russia with less tank's than they had to invade france and the low countries.Granted by the summer of '41 they had less pz-1's and II's and more III's and IV's but with ger. intelligence estimating 10.000 tank's in the russian inventory and given the land mass they intended to occupy...talk about audacious

[Sgt. Steiner]

Still and all, the weather is mainly what defeated the Germans. IMO, the delay to Barbarossa caused by the Balkans campaign is the main culprit. Barbarossa was originally scheduled to begin in April or May of 1941. But having to bail out the bungling Mussolini in Greece (and the unexpected tenacity of the Greek defenders) pushed back the timetable. If the Germans had arrived in front of Moscow one or two months earlier, the war in the east would have had a very different outcome. With Russia out of the picture, the campaign in the west would have had a very different end as well. With no more Russian Front, Hitler could finally have afforded to send Rommel enough tools to finish the job in North Africa, and D-Day likely could never have succeeded with the entire German army (plus millions of Osttruppen) available to man the Atlantic Wall..

[Ant]

the delay to Barbarossa caused by the Balkans campaign is the main culprit. Barbarossa was originally scheduled to begin in April or May of 1941.

I'm sure that I've read many times that this is a bit of a myth. As I understand it the Germans were incapable of a major invasion of the Soviet Union in April/May because they couldn't get everything prepared in that time. The lack of prepared forward airbases for the Luftwaffe has also been stated as the reason for the relatively late schedule for Barbarossa.

[Andreas]

Sgt. Steiner - the book is expressly saying that not the weather but operational indecisiveness in August caused the German defeat. When they finally decided to go for Moscow 6 weeks later, three main factors had changed:

1) The German mobile forces were a lot more worn down

2) The Soviet defenses had been prepared on the Moscow axis

3) The weather was going to get bad six weeks earlier.

'3)' is not what mainly defeated them, 1) is. Without the operational indecisiveness, the Germans would have taken Moscow before the onset of winter, because there would have been little in their way.

'The weather defeated us' is the same tired old line as 'It was all Adolf's fault'. It is equally wrong.

[Pack Kuma]

There was an extremely long and entertaining thread over at the Matrix/Steel Panthers forum in the Art of Wargaming section that addressed these very questions. Don't be put off by the seemingly unrelated thread title, it gets into a lot of the details about this campaign, and one of the principal posters strongly argues that the USSR was in fact preparing to launch an attack on Germany. Happy reading!

http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/showthread.php?s=&threadid=21873

[Sgt. Steiner]

As I stated before, IMO, repeat, IMO, I believe the Greek campaign had not been intended on, and it caused a significant delay in the German timetable. And yes, I'm sure there was indeed a delay due to time needed to prepare forward airfields for Barbarossa.

But, had there been no Balkans campaign, there would have been more time to prepare for Barbarossa, and therefore a month-earlier launch of the invasion is not improbable. Of course, had Barbarossa taken place in May 1941, no one knows what decisions might have been made, or which way things would've gone.

In any case, a German arrival at the gates of Moscow a month earlier would very likely have had a tremendous effect on the outcome.

[manchildstein (ii)]

Originally posted by Sgt. Steiner:

As I stated before, IMO, repeat, IMO, I believe the Greek campaign had not been intended on, and it caused a significant delay in the German timetable. And yes, I'm sure there was indeed a delay due to time needed to prepare forward airfields for Barbarossa.

But, had there been no Balkans campaign, there would have been more time to prepare for Barbarossa, and therefore a month-earlier launch of the invasion is not improbable. Of course, had Barbarossa taken place in May 1941, no one knows what decisions might have been made, or which way things would've gone.

In any case, a German arrival at the gates of Moscow a month earlier would very likely have had a tremendous effect on the outcome.

i would recommend reading what the author has to say about the balkans campaign and its relation to barbarossa... i found it interesting...

[Foxbat]

It would be interesting to see if it really does have an in-depth overview of the russian defensive strength rather than just the assumption that it must have been stronger than 6 weeks earlier.

As I understand it troopstrength in the Moscow sector was not increased between Yelnia and the counteroffensive.

So a direct thrust against Moscow would lead the germans against perhaps less prepared defenders, but they would probably have to face the reinforcements that were historically diverted south.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Foxbat:

It would be interesting to see if it really does have an in-depth overview of the russian defensive strength rather than just the assumption that it must have been stronger than 6 weeks earlier.

As I understand it troopstrength in the Moscow sector was not increased between Yelnia and the counteroffensive.

So a direct thrust against Moscow would lead the germans against perhaps less prepared defenders, but they would probably have to face the reinforcements that were historically diverted south.

Troop strength may have been the same, but the troops were certainly six weeks better prepared. I don't think anyone would assume those troops would just sit on their rear for six weeks waiting for the Germans to attack.

A big problem with the early push would have been the insecurity on the flanks (21st Army attacking into the southern flank and troops in the Waldai hills).

[von Lucke]

Even if the Germans had taken Moscow --- 2nd Panzer Division made it to within 20km, and recon elements actually pushed into the suburbs before the Sov counter-attacks in December --- what makes you think it would have changed the outcome of the war? Didn't work for Napoleon, and it wouldn't have worked for Hitler.

The Soviet Union was too vast, with too many resources (especially manpower) for the Axis forces to ever conquer it with the troops they had available. Axis logistics were stretched thin from the get-go, and after even less than a year of war, the pointy end of their spear (the panzer divisions) had been blunted --- as an example, by 10 December '41 the 6th PD was down to one tank!

If the Germans had started a few months earlier, they might have taken Moscow, sure. But they would never have held on to it --- and IMHO the outcome of the war would remain the same.

[Keke]

Unfortunately Stolfi belongs to the group of "revisionists" who believe that USSR was preparing to attack Germany about the time of Barbarossa (and there were no Holocaust!..). More importantly, what these so called historians usually forget to mention, is how German Army intellingence had underestimated the strength of Soviet Army, especially the number of formartions the latter had. Based on that information, the decision to "divert" south on August 1941 was quite logical; to destroy so large part of the Red Army, that it couldn´t recover during the year. Soviet counter-attacks at Yelna also contributed to this; many German commanders were more willing to search for a "soft spot" from the

Soviet lines. So only with huge hindsight one can claim that the massive and succesful pincer attack made around Kiev was the turning point at the Ostfront.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Keke:

Based on that information, the decision to "divert" south on August 1941 was quite logical; [snip] So only with huge hindsight one can claim that the massive and succesful pincer attack made around Kiev was the turning point at the Ostfront.

Interesting statement, unfortunately it appears that historical documents from August 1941 don't quite agree with it. Many German commanders saw the problem in turning south then, and disagreed with it.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Interesting statement, unfortunately it appears that historical documents from August 1941 don't quite agree with it. Many German commanders saw the problem in turning south then, and disagreed with it.[/QB]

And what are those historical documents?

[Keke]

I must remind you that most memoirs written by former German generals (during the 50s under U.S. Army supervision, btw) are usually full of hindsight. That is not to say that all field commanders actually agreed with OKH/OKW plans, but that is not my point. My point is that the decision made in German High Command wasn´t so foolish as it may appear afterwards (with hindsight).

[ November 16, 2002, 08:19 PM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[Keke]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Hoth is scathing about the operational ineptitude shown by OKW (read: Hitler) and OKH in concert, and of Guderian's playing along with it. In that he and Fugate/Dvoretsky agree.

Did I understand this right? Hoth critisizing Guderian about following OKH/OKW plans? Oh boy, I thought Guderian was the spokeperson against the "diversion" attack (according to his memoirs, that is)...

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Sgt. Steiner:

...the delay to Barbarossa caused by the Balkans campaign is the main culprit. Barbarossa was originally scheduled to begin in April or May of 1941. But having to bail out the bungling Mussolini in Greece (and the unexpected tenacity of the Greek defenders) pushed back the timetable.

This old wive's tale has been dealt the deathblow but continues to get repeated over and over again. It's like some zombie that won't stay in its grave.

Aside from the fact that late rains would have compelled a postponement of Barbarossa in any case, what Andreas says about the unpreparedness of the Wehrmacht is true. Van Creveld examined this issue fairly meticulously in his book Hitler's Strategy 1940: The Balkan Clue and showed that the redeployments after Marita were on time. The biggest delay incurred, after that imposed by the rain, was due to the difficulties in scrounging up enough motorized transport for the army. Western Europe was virtually stripped of any truck that would run and still it was not enough.

As for the reasons for the failure of the attack on Moscow, they were many and certainly the extreme cold made everything harder for the Germans. But their biggest problem was that they had outrun their supply lines, and getting there sooner wouldn't have helped that very much if at all. Hitler had not planned on any heavy combat more than 300 km inside the border, so the German preparations to get the Soviet rail system functioning were vastly inadequate. Supply bottlenecks extended all the way back to Warsaw. It was a nightmare, and mostly so for the troops at the front who were having to go without practically everything.

Michael

[dizee]

Originally posted by von Lucke:

Even if the Germans had taken Moscow --- 2nd Panzer Division made it to within 20km, and recon elements actually pushed into the suburbs before the Sov counter-attacks in December --- what makes you think it would have changed the outcome of the war? Didn't work for Napoleon, and it wouldn't have worked for Hitler.

The Soviet Union was too vast, with too many resources (especially manpower) for the Axis forces to ever conquer it with the troops they had available. Axis logistics were stretched thin from the get-go, and after even less than a year of war, the pointy end of their spear (the panzer divisions) had been blunted --- as an example, by 10 December '41 the 6th PD was down to one tank!

If the Germans had started a few months earlier, they might have taken Moscow, sure. But they would never have held on to it --- and IMHO the outcome of the war would remain the same.

but it worked 1917

[Simon Fox]

Stolfi's arguments are made in a total vacuum with regard to Soviet dispositions, reserves, strengths and intentions. Perhaps if the Germans were swanning around Russia in the absence of any opposition they might hold a shred of credibility. The absence of a balanced viewpoint terminally undermines Stolfi's thesis. Suprise, suprise that one of his collaborators on this one was von Mellethin. Personally I'm rather fond of Greenbaum's demolition of this one on Amazon:

It is an unbalanced and ultimately worthless version of a wistful vision of defeated generals, of no service to responsible historical research.

Ouch! Now that's gotta hurt.

In my opinion Stolfi, Hoth and Andreas are wrong. Keke and Foxbat seem to have a firmer grasp of reality

[Simon Fox]

Originally posted by Keke:

Did I understand this right? Hoth critisizing Guderian about following OKH/OKW plans? Oh boy, I thought Guderian was the spokeperson against the "diversion" attack (according to his memoirs, that is)...

Well who'd have imagined it: a former German General blaming his own failures on Hitler after the war. Wonders will never cease.

[kevsharr]

I have to disagre about the statement that the taking of Moscow would not have changed anything.A look at a map of the soviet union at the time show's that Moscow was the very heart of the soviet rail system.The trans-siberian rail line had moscow as it's terminus and all the lines north,west and south spider web from it.Also if the german's had attacked five or six week's earlier Zhukov and his siberian's who were the decisive factor in the "miracle at Moscow"would not have been available.Hitler's indecision as to the shwerpunkt of Barbarrossa is also a causative factor in the failure of Barb.The field commander's were of the opinion that Moscow was indeed the main objective but Hitler changed his mind in august and decided that Leningrad and the Caucasus were more important.After the defeat of the russian forces aroun Kiev he had another change of heart and ordered Oper.Taifun but by then it was to late,the weather and the condition of his Panzer unit's and the present's of the siberian forces doomed it.