Questions about Russian MGs.

[Conscript Bagger]

Proving once again that this isn't just a board, it's an education... thanks dalem.

[Scott B]

Originally posted by Paul Jungnitsch:

Not necessarily. There were advances in the design of the Panther and Tiger chassis that included central greasing and easy track adjusting that made servicing quicker.

Oh, I won't make the argument that Soviet tanks were universally superior to German ones in every area of maintenance. It's merely my suspicion that the heavier and significantly more complex Panthers, Tigers, etc. had an overall higher rate of breakdown than did the T-34.

I'm not so interested in specific components as I am in the systems as a whole, and I'm not really convinced that the T-34 was more mechanically reliable than the Panzer IIIs, IVs, and StuGs that made up the lion's share of the German armored force for most of the war. I do suspect that a large trade-off for the Germans in going to significantly heavier tanks like the Panther was in maintenance and repairs.

Like I mentioned earlier, I can find anecdotal evidence that the Panther D, Tiger and King Tiger were severely handicapped as far as maintenance goes at a number of sites, including AchtungPanzer.com, but I don't find this as helpful with regard to actual loss rates due to breakdowns, and especially with regard to the maintenance performance of later models of the Panther. All armored vehicles break down like it's going out of style-- anyone that's ever spent any time in a motor pool knows what a pain it is to keep tanks and afvs "mission capable"-- it's merely a measure of how some do compared to others.

Scott

[dalem]

Originally posted by Offwhite:

Proving once again that this isn't just a board, it's an education... thanks dalem.

Offwhite-

No problem. I learn something every time I plug into one of these threads. The thing I find most interesting about U.S. Army WWII Regimental Cannon Companies is that they are so mysterious. Exact makeup and deployment seems somewhat mysterious, and I have one book somewhere that argues they may not have existed at all as regular formations except on paper because that author couldn't find any verifiable accounts! Hm. I get the impression that in some Divisions it was sort of the 'bastard step child' of the unit - the howitzer battery wasn't as effective as the divisional guns and the ATGs could spend a large time attached out to the battalions, so.... what to do with it??? Maybe it was considered a replacement pool, I don't know. If I ever try to go academic with history I'll do an analysis on either Cannon Companies or U.S. TD doctrine, one or the other.

-dale

[M Hofbauer]

Originally posted by The ol one eye.:

Anyways, back to the question. I always thought that a soldiers opinion of the enemy's weapon's was a somewhat telling thing, biased as it may be. I've heard that the Germans were often scared $hitless of the .50 cal and I imagine that means they were also repectfull of the Soviet HMG. Why did'nt the Germans also develop a 'heavier' MG, one that could repay the Allies for countless HTs and soiled underwear?

Well, we have among others the MG 131, the MG 151/15 and the MG151/20. The Germans *did* have heavy machine guns and machine cannons of the kind you're inquiring about; thing is that they were never around anywhere near the numbers of the .50cal

The MG 131 is a 13mm gun that is closest to the M2 .50cal in caliber, although it is a bit less powerful, it has about half the weight of the 50cal.

Now, the 151/15 and 151/20 were 15 and 20mm respectively. The 151/15 comes close to the .50cal in performance, but it has a higher ROF.

The machine guns above are originally aircraft MGs but later in the war saw considerable use in the ground role.

Maybe a rough comparison could be made between the use of the .50cal as discussed here in the ad-hoc "light AT role" due to their ubiquity when occasion arose, to the german use of the popular 20mm light AA gun in such a role? Just pondering.

[JasonC]

Two decent issues - 50 cals and German tank breakdowns.

First the myth of the unique US 50 cal. It is a fine weapon and the US used gobs of them, mostly on vehicle mounts due to weapon and ammo weight. But the idea that nobody else had anything like them is simply false. The Russians used 50 cals, and also 14.5mm MGs (and still do). The Germans used 13mm and 15mm HMGs on aircraft, and in some ground AA mounts. They just preferred the 20mm FLAK for most air to air, FLAK, and light armor killing roles. They fielded 20mm FLAK in very large numbers.

The reason every MG is not a higher caliber AA MG, however, is that for ordinary anti personnel work, it is usually better to bring 3 times as many 30 cal bullets. The more powerful rounds are needed to disable light vehicles, and that is what they were designed for. The US fielded all those 50 cals in the first place as part of the AA plan, which in the years the army was raised to its WW II strength was based on panic levels of concern over the Luftwaffe, supposedly so essential to the German blitzkrieg. That is why, for instance, so many of the 50 cals in a division TOE were with artillery units. In the event, the flying 50 cals in the P-47s, P-51s, and bombers had already done the job, and the Luftwaffe did not show up for the party.

The US also fielded the most motorized army in history to that point. That made the issue of ammo weight a smaller tactical problem than it was in other armies. The ordinary reason for preferring 30 cal MGs is to hump the ammo. If a truck does it for you, who cares? It was not the Ma Deuce that was unique to the US army, everybody had such weapons. It was the Deuce and a Half. More of the latter just made it more practical to make more use of the former.

As for the quip about not making Pumas anymore, of course it just isn't true. Not literal Pumas, but things just like it. LAVs have less armor than Pumas. Bradleys are somewhat comparable - thick enough to stop an HMG bullet from the front aspect only. BTRs are as thin as LAVs. And some put 50 cals on their light armor, some use 14.5mm, some 20mm, some 25mm - just like the range in light FLAK armament back then. Meanwhile, everyone also still uses 30 cal for typical squad and infantry support MGs, for the same reasons as then - a 30 cal bullet is enough for an infantryman and easier to carry in large loads.

Next there is the issue of German tank reliability. It was certainly below the US standard. The direct question asked, though, about the rate of breakdowns in major advances with the late-war vehicle types, has no answer, simply because the Germans never succeeded in making a large scale advance with the late war vehicle types. They were on the defensive from soon after the time of their introduction. During the whole remaining time they were attacking, the heavies were still in their teething phase. Smaller scale counterattacks occurred, but did not advance far enough to test the sort of breakdown questions being asked. The closest would be the Bulge, but many vehicles were abandoned in that case when cut off or for lack of fuel, making it practically impossible to distinguish the mechanical breakdowns from other causes of loss. It was also relatively short, both in distance and time covered.

What one can say is that the readiness rates for the less common German heavies was quite low. By that I mean the Tigers and the heavier TDs. You see things like 35-50% of vehicles operational, except at the very begining of deployments. In contrast, the more common types - Panther, Pz IV, StuG - tend to have readiness rates between 50 and 75% after a short period in action, with the 65-75 range typical, dips lower seen after intense action.

Notice that the reliability difference corresponds both to divisional assets vs. independent battalions, and large production runs vs. small ones. Presumably both the availability of spare parts and service facilities tracks this distinction. Between them, they probably account for perhaps double the breakdown rate for the less common heavies.

Naturally the heavies strain their tracks and drive trains more seriously, as well. It is notable, however, that the Panther readiness rates (after the early teething period) show no difference from the Pz IV ones, despite 45 ton weight. Units that deplete in action tend to do so evenly, not to see the heavier Panthers waste away faster.

As for ballpark figures on breakdown rates from the common types, I can hazard a guess from known figures, but a guess is all it is going to be. I look at the rate of decay of the German AFV fleet in Normandy (because it is heavy fighting and there is good data, and because vehicles not kept in readiness did not escape, making it easier to relate breakdowns to eventual total write offs. Obviously there is no big advance involved). If I ascribe about 1/3rd of the shrinkage rate to mechanical breakdowns, I get 7% per week. If I ascribe half to breakdowns, I get 10% per week. I consider the former figure more likely, but at least the range is not likely to be misleading. In other words, you'd expect a common German tank to break down 1 to 1.5% per day. The heavy, rare types used in independent battalions might have twice that rate of breakdowns.

The guess about the breakdown rate fits the readiness numbers if many of the breakdowns were fixed and returned to service within a month. Thus, .99^30 is .74, while .985^30 is .64. Readiness rates for Panthers and Pz IVs tend to be around 65-75%. If the heavies have double the rate, then you get an estimated readiness prediction of 40-55% (.98^30 = .55, .97^30 = .40), within 5% of the figures typically seen. The extra 5% could be accounted for by about 5 days longer average repair time (35 days).

Does any of the above prove the German mechanical failure rates were exactly my guesses? Of course not, it is a seat of the pants, order of magnitude estimate. Is the repair time the same for every case? No, they are some distribution of lengths of time, with more quite short ones, fewer more serious ones, and the above tracking a net rather than gross breakage rate. Breakages that only have the tank out of action for a day or less probably aren't even reported at all and are just fixed by the crew. Failures that would take several months to fix probably never get acted on, with the vehicle kept only to cannabilize for spare parts. There will be every sort of arbitrary difference from nation to nation and unit to unit in what counts as a breakdown, as a repair, as short term or long term, yadda yadda. But it gives a ballpark sense, anyhow.

[ February 13, 2002, 03:51 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Chosun-few]

This s a fascinating "russian MG" topic.

Anyway, using the principle that the tank had be in action not just manafactured, by date which are the best tanks of WW2.

my choice is PZIII, against polish armour, Matilda 2 Against the PZIII, T34 against PZIII and IV. T34 Tiger 1, T34 85, Panther, JS2.

I am assuming the T34 didn't see action until Barborossa and that the British Centurian didn't see action.

Would like to include the Sherman, but It caught fire to easily, crew comfort and ease of maintainance is one thing, frying the crews is another.

Feel free to argue, I know you want to.

In defence of british tank design, pre war, they were all built on the cheap and had to fit on the narrower gauge brit railway. Hence small, cramped and horrible. The Matilda is a masterpiece of design when this is considered.

Since Quotes are in fashion hows about...

He's not a bad chap

said harry to Jack

but he did for them both

with his plan of attack.

[PJungnitsch]

Percentage operational, from Jentz:

EASTERN FRONT WESTERN FRONT

Pz IV Panther Tiger Pz IV Panther Tiger

31May44 84 77 79 88 82 87

15Sep44 65 72 70 80 74 98

30Sep44 65 60 81 50 57 67

31Oct44 52 53 54 74 85 88

15Nov44 72 66 61 78 71 81

30Nov44 78 67 72 76 71 45

15Dec44 79 69 79 78 71 64

30Dec44 72 61 80 63 53 50

15Jan45 71 60 73 56 45 58

15Mar45 54 49 53 44 32 36

Overall 68 62 70 71 65 65

[JasonC]

I'd agree with Chosun-few's list except for his putting the T-34/85 between the Tiger I and the Panther. The T-34/85 was not deployed until the spring of 1944, and first saw action in large numbers in Bagration in the summer of 1944. The Panther had been out for a year already, and the number deployed by then was substantial. It is not like the Russians passed the Germans then, as his list would have it. The T-34/85 was a definite improvement, but it was at no time the best tank on the field, and more than the Sherman 76mm was.

[Marlow]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Bradleys are somewhat comparable - thick enough to stop an HMG bullet from the front aspect only.

I would be surprised if a HMG would penetrate the side of a bradley. The thing is only a "light" armored vehicle by modern standards, as it weighs as much as a WWII medium tank. The base model

M-2 (phased out of the active U.S. Army) weighs in at 25 tons, and has side and rear armor consisting of spaced steel and aluminum plates that are something like two inches thick. (two quarter inch steel plates, and the rest being aluminum). The latest version, the M-2A3 adds a couple of tons more steel applique armor to the sides, titanium armor to the top, and kevlar anti-spall blankets to the interior. It weighs in at over 30 tons. While it would not stand up to modern tank guns or AT missiles, it sould be able to stand up to a HMG.

[Iron Chef Sakai]

Originally posted by dalem:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Iron Chef Sakai:

Ya the Germans would say....."the T-34 does not have the best optics in the world, this piece of junk tank is no match for us, if only we had some Shermans to fight them with." Pick any book you want, whether you realy like the Sherman or not, it is FACT that in World War 2 the T-34 was better then the Sherman.

Oh, do go away. You're not funny, you're not knowledgeable, and you're not relevant.

-dale</font>

[Iron Chef Sakai]

Originally posted by Big Time Software:

Is this "my mommy is bigger than your mommy, so there NNNNNNNNAAAAAAAAH!!!" thread really necessary?

Each weapon system has its + and - factors. If I had the ability to tailor pick a tank for each individual circumstance I as a tanker would face, I can PROMISE you that I would likely not choose the same one each and every time. To say what "best" or "worst" is, one has to first define what that means. Survivability? Well, I think the Matilda scores damned well in that regard for its day, but was it the best tank? No. Best armored? Something like the Ferdinand/Elephant was the best in its day, but I wouldn't like to be caught up in a swift moving battle where the rest of my buddies were headed towards me in a great hurry. Reliability? It would probably be something like a Stuart, which I certainly wouldn't like to get into a pissing match with anything more than a Hitler Youth with a defective Panzerfaust.

And so on and so on.

What does any of this crap prove? That some of you have WAAAAAAY too much time on your hands

Steve

HAHA! I could'nt agree more. How come they don't throw weak insults and yell at you when you say it though?

[Scott B]

I must be misunderstanding the function of the "ignore list." I can still see his posts. Does it just block e-mails or something?

[JonS]

Originally posted by Iron Chef Sakai:

HAHA! I could'nt agree more. How come they don't throw weak insults and yell at you when you say it though?

Hmm, let's see ...

Steve is intelligent, articulate, has a proven grasp of history, plus a willingness to learn and accept his mistakes where demonstrated. Oh, and he's the owner of the forum, so ultimately his word is law around here.

ICS is a silly little man who posseses none of the above attributes.

Does that answer your question?

[Iron Chef Sakai]

Originally posted by Offwhite:

Proving once again that this isn't just a board, it's an education... thanks dalem.

I think we need a crow bar to pry this guys head out of Dalem's butt.

The only thing i've learned so far on here is that most of the big bad war buffs on here behave worse then your steryotypical annoying spoiled brat.

Don't get me wrong there are some cool people on here with a sense of humor and some knowledge that they don't try to wield as a weapon on other people because they have small....you know what i'm getting at.

Dalem to think your brilliant because your posting about World War 2 on a World War 2 game forum is about as impressive as i don't know.....some Star Trek enthusiasts on a Star Trek board thinking they are smart because they can post in Spok language or something, and calling someone else stupid because they disagree on the subject that Spok was the smartest guy on thier spaceship thing.

Dalem, don't take this too hard...your still OffWhites hero, and if you ask me i think he's even going to send you a Valentine card tomorrow.

[Iron Chef Sakai]

Originally posted by JonS:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Iron Chef Sakai:

HAHA! I could'nt agree more. How come they don't throw weak insults and yell at you when you say it though?

Hmm, let's see ...

Steve is intelligent, articulate, has a proven grasp of history, plus a willingness to learn and accept his mistakes where demonstrated. Oh, and he's the owner of the forum, so ultimately his word is law around here.

ICS is a silly little man who posseses none of the above attributes.

Does that answer your question?</font>

[dalem]

Originally posted by JasonC:

As for the quip about not making Pumas anymore, of course it just isn't true.

I know. It was an illustrative quip. Someone was whining about how 'unreal' it was that .50cals were popping his Pumas left and right and how surely that didn't happen in real life. Hence the quip. I wouldn't have brought up BTRs and BMPs without knowing that they fill much the same niche as a Puma would.

-dale

[Conscript Bagger]

Originally posted by Iron Chef Sakai:

...your steryotypical annoying spoiled brat.

[/QB]

hey ICS, go to www.m-w.com and look up "irony."

[Iron Chef Sakai]

Originally posted by Offwhite:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Iron Chef Sakai:

...your steryotypical annoying spoiled brat.

hey ICS, go to www.m-w.com and look up "irony."[/QB]</font>

[JonS]

Originally posted by Iron Chef Sakai:

If i was in charge of this board you'd be calling my crap ice cream as well, and that is why you are a little little man....run along now kid.

My, what an interesting sentence. I'm a little man and a kid because you eat your own feaces? Highly developed debating skills you have there.

[Iron Chef Sakai]

Originally posted by JonS:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Iron Chef Sakai:

If i was in charge of this board you'd be calling my crap ice cream as well, and that is why you are a little little man....run along now kid.

My, what an interesting sentence. I'm a little man and a kid because you eat your own feaces? Highly developed debating skills you have there.</font>

[Iron Chef Sakai]

Bowel i meant....well this "debate" is going ot have to wait, i'm going out now...you kids play nice.

[dalem]

Originally posted by Iron Chef Sakai:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by dalem:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Iron Chef Sakai:

Ya the Germans would say....."the T-34 does not have the best optics in the world, this piece of junk tank is no match for us, if only we had some Shermans to fight them with." Pick any book you want, whether you realy like the Sherman or not, it is FACT that in World War 2 the T-34 was better then the Sherman.

Oh, do go away. You're not funny, you're not knowledgeable, and you're not relevant.

-dale</font>

[JasonC]

On Paul's citation of front-wide readiness returns, I thank him for the table, but I don't think it really addresses the question asked. The issue is readiness while in action, not readiness sitting in reserve. And while the readiness figures for whole fronts may be close for Tigers compared to the vanilla types, that does not extend down to battalions in action. The difference between the two being, how often and how long the units are committed to action.

Here is some data about Tiger readiness in heavy combat, well below the level of aggregation of Jentz's front-wide figures. They tell quite a different story.

Tigers at Kursk, the case of SS Panzer Corps

Operational Tiger strength unengaged, 4 July - 35

Soon after commitment 9 July - 7

Recovering, 11 July - 15

After Heavy Action, 13 July - 4

Recovering, 16 July - 23

By comparison, the figures for the same dates for combined Pz III and IV models are 274, 154, 188, 148, and 159. Source - Glantz.

Thus, in very heavy combat Tiger readiness fell to 17-30%. If kept off the line for a few days they could recover to around 65%, and once clear of action could return to unengaged levels of readiness. The net loss rate after out-of-action recovery time was on the order of 3.4% per day. But the initial reduction in operational vehicles in periods of heavy action was on the order of 1/2 every 1-2 days.

Note that the lighter tanks had a higher long-term loss rate - 4.4% per day. But the reductions in readiness on going into combat, and the recoveries afterward, are far less steep - less than 1/2 vs. 4/5ths in the first 5 days, for instance, and -1/5 rather than -3/4 at the climax. More of the Tiger operational reductions are recoverable, but there are also proportionally far more of them.

Tigers in Normandy

101 SS, unengaged readiness 82%

16 June, soon after commitment - 42%

6 July, after heavy action - 0%

11 July, recovering - 39%

17 July, after heavy action - 4%

24 July, recovering - 52%

1 August, out of action - 80%

9 August - 8 operational remaining

102 SS, unengaged readiness 82%

11 July, soon after commitment - 52%

13 July, in action - 38%

15 July, recovering - 66%

20 July, in action - 55%

30 July, out of action - 30 operational, essentially all

5 August, back in action - 20 operational

11 August, 7 operational remaining

11 August - 7 operational remaining

503 Heer, unengaged readiness 87%, 39 operational

18 July, soon after commitment - 9 operational

25 July, recovering - 20 operational

1 August, 45%, 13 operational

6 August, 11 operational remaining

Source - Gerob's Normandy OOB.

Thus, one sees 80-87% readiness only when not engaged, after periods of maintenance and repair or before commitment to action. Soon after commitment, readiness falls to half or less. Heavy action sometimes results in no readiness at all, but more typically it fluctuates between 40% and 60%, rising with rest periods or lighter action, falling with heavier action.

Overall, there were 96 battalion-days, or 32 days average, from commitment date to the last strength figure cited, during which ready strength fell to 4/5ths of initial vehicle strength. The net loss rate was thus around 5% per day, higher than at Kursk and for a more extended period, but in the same ballpark.

These are not comparable to what you see for in-action Panther and Panzer IV units in Normandy. While some readiness hit right after commitment is typical for all types (seen also in the Kursk Pz III and IV figures above), they stabilize at 65-75% readiness, not at 40-50% readiness.

How does this square with Jentz's whole front figures? Are they flat incompatible, so that one or the other must be simply wrong? No. The two sets of figures fit, as long as the period of commitments to action of the Tigers are typically less continuous than those of the line Panthers and Pz IVs, with more spells off the line to recover to reasonable readiness levels.

If a tank breaks down twice as fast, you can have the same overall readiness rate if half of them are in action and half are not, or they are in action half the time and not in action half the time. Readiness when committed, while in action, is obviously the question that is being asked. Overall front wide readiness is not at all the same thing, and can be boosted to any desired level by simply not using that asset as frequently.

[dalem]

Originally posted by Iron Chef Sakai:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Offwhite:

Proving once again that this isn't just a board, it's an education... thanks dalem.

I think we need a crow bar to pry this guys head out of Dalem's butt.

The only thing i've learned so far on here is that most of the big bad war buffs on here behave worse then your steryotypical annoying spoiled brat.

Don't get me wrong there are some cool people on here with a sense of humor and some knowledge that they don't try to wield as a weapon on other people because they have small....you know what i'm getting at.

Dalem to think your brilliant because your posting about World War 2 on a World War 2 game forum is about as impressive as i don't know.....some Star Trek enthusiasts on a Star Trek board thinking they are smart because they can post in Spok language or something, and calling someone else stupid because they disagree on the subject that Spok was the smartest guy on thier spaceship thing.

Dalem, don't take this too hard...your still OffWhites hero, and if you ask me i think he's even going to send you a Valentine card tomorrow. </font>

[JasonC]

Marlow will be surprised, then. The maximum thickness of armor on the Brad is 40mm, front only. The sides are only about 20mm thick, that is less than 1" rather than 2". The rear is still thinner.

WW II 50 cal rounds penetrated 25mm of steel, and modern 50 cal SLAP ammo can penetrate 30-35mm. The front armor thickness on the Brad was specified to stop 50 cal ammo at all ranges, and it will - but the side armor will not. It will stop 30 cal rounds and artillery fragmentation, that is all.

Incidentally, the laminate armor developments used by the Brad do dramatically improve its anti-HEAT performance. You could not take one out with a WW II bazooka, or even a schreck. But it makes essentially no difference against kinetic energy AP rounds.

As for the LAV, it is armored like BTRs and WW II halftracks. The Afghans made swiss cheese of Russian BTRs with 30 cal MGs, let alone with 50 cals. Why the brass loves LAVs over the Brad for the new brigades is a sordid tale, starting with (I kid you not) the better gas mileage. Which for some reason (hint, they aren't riding in them) the rear echelon you-know-whatters consider more essential than not being shot up by HMGs.