Pz Gdrs not SPW hotrodders - US MTO experience

[Determinant]

Jason, thanks for your interesting and thoughtful post.

So the German Army still believed in a Napoleonic concept of victory through defeating the enemy army in pitched battle? The 'decisive battles' theory. As you say a perfectly reasonable selection of COG. It had worked against the Tsarist army in WWI.

But the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was a wholly different type of opponent to the old imperial regime. It was, as you observe, utterly ruthless, ferociously disciplined and perfectly happy to keep feeding millions of men into the Nazi buzzsaw.

I think that the Nazis did mis-identify the Soviet COG. It was not the Red Army but the Communist Party. It was the CP that made the SU's war effort run.

I think that if the Nazis had purported (telling big giant fibs being one of their talents) upon their invasion that their only aim was to liberate Mother Russia, and the Soviet subject states from the 'yoke of communism' that the whole 'rotten structure' might well have collapsed. But they quickly squandered any goodwill that they might have had by their bestial treatment of their PWs and the occupied civilian population.

I think that Typhoon was a belated realisation of the true state of things: Moscow was the nerve centre of the CP and the CP was the SU's COG. Too late and a crude and bloody way to attack it. No doubt Sun Tzu would say something along the lines of 'know your enemy'.

Sorry - none of the above has anything to do with the ahistorical use of SPWs but I found it interesting.

[JasonC]

Yes, they still believed in decisive battle. So did the Russians incidentally, and the Americans, and so do I - but that is not the current subject.

As for the CP, they sent Einsatzgruppen right behind their armored spearheads to slaughter all CP members they could find, as well as all Jews they could find. This did not exactly produce the desired effects, but it certainly informed the populace about the sort of people they were dealing with. It was also one of the greatest human crimes ever.

As for ruthlessness and being happy to feed people into battle, I really don't see what ruthlessness had to do with it. Were they supposed to be less ruthless and collapse into a quivering mass of jelly, if only they were more sensible or humanitarian? No. The war was to the death by the Germans' choice, and that provided morale to the Russians, certainly.

(Russian propaganda did not focus e.g. on the Germans being capitalists or something CP-line related. It simply showed Russian women and children cowering before German masters, with captions like "soldiers of the Red Army - save us!" Rather more effective as motivation than dissertations on collective agriculture).

But the underestimation was not due to the presence of the CP, let alone to any imaginary benefit of its ruthlessness. That is too charitable to the CP, and not charitable enough to the Russian army or to the Russian people - but those are minor points. It is a downright superstitious belief in the effectiveness of ruthlessness, which one would think the operation in question refuted clearly enough.

The Russians simply had greater strength than the Germans supposed. They had the right strategy from the get-go, recognizing immediately that it would be a long war of attrition in which maximum numbers and maximum armaments output would be crucial. And they jumped through their anatomy. Was this due to CP brilliance? Hardly, the military direction of the war was pathetically poor in the first 6 months, and they were getting rings run around them on that score.

But the Russians fully mobilized for total war, and the Germans simply didn't. Not until after Stalingrad, in fact. Which was an "own goal" caused by hubris. They believed their press copy about being supermen too well. And they thought their mobile warfare methods would produce quick victory without serious attrition struggle. They targeted the fielded force of the enemy, but did not target their own rate of increase in fielded forces.

No, Typhoon was not a belated recognition that Moscow was a COG. It was a hope that the Russians were on their last legs rather than still strong. That hope increased the farther one got from the front. Men in the front line units had few illusions about how strong the Russians still were, in November. But at divisions or corps there was plenty of wishful thinking. At army levels, the thought was "we may be in bad shape, but they must be in even worse shape".

They reasonably thought this, because they had indeed inflicted probably the most comprehensive thrashing in the history of warfare, up to that date. They couldn't grasp that the target and victim of all that was still standing. At army group and supreme command, they were positively giddy, sure it was over, even frankly uncomprehending about why Moscow hadn't already fallen. A serious information disconnect had already set in by the time Typhoon jumped off.

It still inflicted a million more casualties on the Russians. Hoth in particular made serious progress. But would they have won if they took Moscow? No, not at all. The Russians were already ready to move government functions to the east. Their force in the field remained.

If the Germans had gone for Moscow earlier, they would have had all the men they did, and a million more from the south, not lost in the Kiev pocket. Napoleon took Moscow but it didn't make any difference. In WW I, Falkenhayn didn't even bother to try, dismissing it with the quip "an advance on Moscow takes us nowhere". The Russians actually did capitulate in that case, due to a "revolution in the grand style", as Falkenhayn predicted and as the German general staff helped arrange.

German could have won in Russia by targeting the Russians fielded forces, but only if they had been prepared for a long war of attrition from the get-go, and mobilized their own economy for total war before attempting it. Germany had as much industrial capacity as Russia. Peak AFV output in 1944 reached Russian output levels. The Russians made twice as many because they go to that level sooner, close to it already in 1942, not because the peak was appreciably higher.

The Russians had perhaps twice the manpower reserves of Germany, only about 1.5 times with the Axis minors included, but with other fronts to worry about twice is the right ballpark. But the Russians took a long time to get loss ratios anywhere near that level. In 1941 the loss ration ran 10 to 1. It was running as high as 4-5 to 1 as late as 1943. You can't win a war of attrition through odds, with only 2 to 1 to work with, while losing 4, 5, and 10 to 1. So the Germans could have won a war of attrition in Russia, had they prepared for it.

Instead they simply didn't. Replacements did not even replace losses in 1941, even at 1/10th the Russian loss rate, while the Russians replaced everything. AFV output was enough to increase the fleet modestly, but at around 7k, its peak level was equal only to the Russian trough at the end of 1941. The Russians outproduce the Germans in tank in 1942 by something like 5 to 1, from the same industrial base - less when you consider the Germans captured 40% of Russia's industrial area - despite the Germans having 6 months more of prep time, from the decision to invade to the execution.

The Germans simply didn't think they'd need to mobilize their own economy, so they didn't. They didn't want to curtail all the long term projects, and impose all the civilian hardships, that would have involved.

An attritionist grand strategy with operational maneuver directed at Russian fielded forces was perfectly feasible, within Germany's capabilities. Thankfully, they didn't pull out the stops and do it. Their operational target was not meshed with their strategic assessment of the war. A fielded forces target fits an attritionist outlook at the strategic level, focusing on the ratio of fielded forces, and doing everything possible to keep it moving in one's own direction. Including the production side. "Total war", was the term at the time.

Instead they had the half maneuverist idea that they didn't need to worry about total war and attrition processes and large scale numbers. They thought the multipliers their operational maneuver methods would give them were unbounded above. That they simply trumped numbers, made them irrelevant, would destroy them in any quantity necessary. Not so. Numbers beat them. Numbers mattered. The strategy level was flat wrong. Brilliance at the operational level (in 1941 only) was not able to make up for this.

After 1941, even their operational "play" went to heck. The 1942 offensive featured divided objectives, and indecisive ones. Stalingrad was a predictable - and predicted - disaster waiting to happen. Failure to break out of it was another "own goal". Manstein saved the front, masterfully, but after that their "play" was again poor (Kursk and its aftermath offensives). They remained monsters at the tactical level, inflicting very high losses on the Russians, even while losing entire provinces. But from midwar on, they were outplayed at both the strategic and the operational levels.

The basic error in 1941, however, was not an insufficient application of maneuverism aimed at deep objectives, nor simply their political nastiness. It was flat overconfidence in their maneuverist methods, the belief that they made numbers irrelevant, that total war preparations were therefore unnecessary.

In hindsight, it was an act of madness to attack a state as powerful as the Soviet Union without even mobilizing the economy. But that is what they did. Because they just didn't think it *was* "a state as powerful as the Soviet Union". They thought it was a rotten tower of cards assembled by clueless untermenschen. Which was just plain dumb, a case of the "evil stupids" and believing your own spin.

[ March 14, 2004, 05:48 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Andreas]

Moved to new thread.

[ March 17, 2004, 03:31 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Andreas]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Later maneuverists, and also early British ones (Fuller, Hart) envisioned deep objectives as an alternative to destruction of the enemy force. That was not part of the German recipe in WW II. It was not that they failed to consider it, they did. But as a professional body, they rejected it as unsound. (Anybody who likes can think them wrong about that, but that is what they thought). Thus, the channel not Paris, and the Kiev pocket not Moscow.

I don't quite agree with this from the reading I have done. The infighting between OKW (Hitler) and OKH (Brauchitsch/Halder and then Halder) had started before the war against France, with varying positions being taken by the actors. By the time of Barbarossa though, Halder (the professional German military man) was clearly up for the deep objective all along, while Hitler was shilly-shallying (good to be observed in the treatment of AG North, IMO), and the field commanders seemingly were not quite clear what was going on, or just were fairly opportunistic about it (Guderian in particular). I.e. - the German professional army leadership wanted Moscow, but the interference of the Bohemian private made it impossible for them to carry out their plans. It may well be though that the assumption was that in the direction of Moscow lay the opportunity to destroy the enemy forces even more decisively.

Friesner puts the moment of accepting subservience at the time of the Halt Befehl in May 1940, when Hitler rescinded the OKH order to hand the mobile forces from von Rundstedt's army group to the army investing Dunkerque (numbers maybe wrong - no sources at present) while visiting von Rundstedt's HQ.

The mistake by the German command was neatly summed up by Heusinger (chief of operations at OKH, later commander of the Bundeswehr), when he said that the Russian does not accept operational defeat, or something to that effect. Meaning that even the string of operational victories that the Germans thought could win them the war, did not add to the required strategic victory.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Determinant:

So the German Army still believed in a Napoleonic concept of victory through defeating the enemy army in pitched battle? The 'decisive battles' theory. As you say a perfectly reasonable selection of COG. It had worked against the Tsarist army in WWI.

Determinant - the Wehrmacht had to believe in the concept, because WW I had shown that the other approach (trying to win a war of attrition) did not work for a country so ill-placed in geographic terms, and so ill-equipped with raw materials, and unable to feed its people without reliance on external supplies.

I do not know a lot about the Great War in the east, but I am not sure that your characterisation of the Tsarist army being defeated in pitched battles is quite correct. At least not if you look for decisive events. It seems more to me that it collapsed internally, and that the occupation of Ukraine was more a question of railroad logistics, then anything else. What would have happened if in the east another democracy or reasonably developed state had stood, instead of the rotten edifice of Tsarist Russia, is anyone's guess.

The assumption for Barbarossa was probably quite similar. Only this time the edifice was not rotten.

[ March 17, 2004, 03:37 PM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[CombinedArms]

Originally posted by Kevin Kinscherf:

My reading indicates that WW2 armored infantry fought mostly dismounted - by design and doctrine. ..[snip] Should the loss value of trucks and APCs be increased to limit their tactical use?

Kevin

I don't think the loss value needs to increase. I think CM has it about right. Currently, an HT's point value is about 40-45 points. Lose a couple of those and it's nearly equivalent to gaining or losing a small flag. Use HTs wantonly and the five HTs you might need to carry a platoon and support weapons into the enemy position, if killed by the many capable weapons on the CM battlefield, will cost you 200+ points. That seems to me a reasonable penalty....and one I think about all the time when I deploy HTs.

Anyway, I seem to be following universal WWII doctrine as derived from battle experience in using them predominantly as battle taxis that disgorge their infantry to fight on foot at some safe locale behind cover. I then withdraw them to a safe location and hold them in reserve until the endgame. If, by then, I think I've KO'ed all the enemy armor and ATG capability, I might them bring them out for their MG firepower. Some of my opponents seem much more willing to risk their HTs than I am, but I think the penalties for that are reasonable.

I think I've successfully used HTs exactly once in a PBEM as a mobile strike force; i.e. in an attack where I reduced the enemy AT capabilities to nothing through a long and costly attritional attack by tanks, arty and dismounted infantry. I then rushed a platoon in HTs into a breach in the line to exploit. It was sweet when it happened but very, very tricky to pull off and I happened to get lucky in choosing the right moment.

HTs can be handy in an ME if you can find a covered route into the central main flag(s). You can then dump your infantry into cover to hold the flags. But, I think, one should then immediately withdraw the HTs to good cover till enemy AT capabilites are reduced to nil. They can then return to the fray to provide MG support.

[sand digger]

A contemporaneous description of a carrier bourne assault on an Axis position in the area of trig 29 on 25 Oct 42 in the war diary of 2/48 Bn, here-

http://www.awm.gov.au/atwar/remembering1942/alamein23/awm52_2-48th_bn.pdf

[JasonC]

At night. Immediately behind an artillery barrage. Against a unit whose COs had just been captured with maps, revealing their exact positions and the absence of mines along the route. The procedure then was driving platoons of carriers, 4 abreast, up to the hill, then the men jumped out, first platoon went left, second right, last directly over. Complete surprise, enemy still hiding from the arty and dazed. I believe I already mentioned night coup de main style descents e.g. in Russia early in 1943.

[sand digger]

Originally posted by JasonC:

At night. Immediately behind an artillery barrage. Against a unit whose COs had just been captured with maps, revealing their exact positions and the absence of mines along the route. The procedure then was driving platoons of carriers, 4 abreast, up to the hill, then the men jumped out, first platoon went left, second right, last directly over. Complete surprise, enemy still hiding from the arty and dazed. I believe I already mentioned night coup de main style descents e.g. in Russia early in 1943.

There was a bit more to it than driving up and dismounting, as a reading of the entire action clearly shows.

Firstly, it was a well tried tactic against significant defensive positions. This particular attack had been scheduled prior to obtaining the enemy's map of the position. As a result of obtaining the map, the forming up place and bearing of attack were changed to reduce the area of mines that would have to be cleared.

The full account then goes on to describe in detail the entire action which included bitter hand to hand fighting and significant casualties on both sides, followed eventually by the usual in such situations Axis surrender.

To make out that it was something much less than a hard fought confrontation is IMHO an insult to those involved on both sides.

[JasonC]

I read it. I just love insulting those involved. My point was (1) it was a night coup de main behind a barrage, not a charge at aware and shooting defenders and (2) yes there was a fight afterward, but after they dismounted from the carriers and went around the hill, right and left, as well as over its crest.

The role of the carriers was not to bring the men through hostile fire during the approach, but to get them there fast behind the barrage. The hard fight was conducted after dismounting, and later against the enemy counterattack attempts. The enemy was suppressed during the approach, the carriers sheltered on the near side of the hill, the infantry went to the enemy side of the hill dismounted. And all of it was at night.

This is, not to put too fine a point on it, a night and day difference from charging across 1 km of open ground swept by enemy fire while firing mounted, then dismounting right on top of those firing defenders. Which is what your short description seemed to me to "bill" it as. And is not what it said when I actually read it.

[Claus B]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Source? Cooper says that Hitler thought it was an Italian word, FWIW. I am quite keen on finding out the truth of the matter....has it been spotted in some 1930s literature, for example?

"Blitzkrieg", as a phrase describing what the Germans were doing in 1939, was the invention of British journalists, but the word itself was used occasionally in German military litterature of the interwar period.

"Blitz-" something was a used generally to indicate something fast and furious and not uncommon at the time (in Denmark where I live, the phrase "Lyntog" was coined in 1935 meaning "Lightening Train" ).

In German military litterature "Blitzkrieg" was a broad phrase, referring to a strategic assault, hitting an enemy country without warning using all available assets. But AFAIK it contained no concept of tactics, doctrine or operational methods. It has its French equivalent in the "attaque brusque".

The British newsmen may have lifted the term from a book by a German called Sternberg(?) published in Britain in the late 1930ies. Sternbarg was arguing, that Germany was in no position to wage a long war, only a "lightening war". Curiously, the book was first published in the UK

Thats how I recall it, based on a couple of articles I've read on the subject - both recommended:

- Fanning, William: "The Origin of the Term Blitzkrieg" in The Journal of Military History, April 1997

- Raudzens, George: "Blitzkrieg Ambiguities" in War & Society, September 1989

Claus B

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PS: I think Jason has done a good job of trawling the books. Currently, I dont have the time to go through my references and find the cases where mounted SPW attacks were conducted. However, I'm sure they are out there, but often it is not specified or unclear how the operation was conducted exactly. What would you make of this one, for example:

“..taking advantage of the heavy snowfall, the attack moved ahead at a good pace, but it stalled just outside of Bütgenbach. Several armoured personell carriers penetrated into the village, but had to retreat again, as the Volksgrenadiers were unable to advance...”

Did the PzGrens of the 9. Kp attack in their SPWs or alongside them? Wouldn't the fact that the PzGrens could enter the village while the Volksgrenadiers could not imply that the PzGrens took advantage of their armoured mounts? Or was it just the additional firepower of the SPWs that brought the PzGrens forward - on foot - where the VGs failed?

There are plenty of such accounts that are rather ambigous and some which clearly deals with dismounted troops as well as some, like the one I qouted earlier from Fürbringers book on 9. SS-Panzer, which clearly refers to a mounted attack.

What about this one:

"The 9. Kompanie of the Schützenbattalion... was able to roll forward outside the Soviet minefield. It came under heavy anti-tank fire from the left flank. It pinned the enemy down with its 2cm triple and single barrel guns and overran the anti-tank gun positions."

Mounted infantry or not, it seems to me to show SPWs in direct combat with Soviet anti-tank guns and winning! It continues:

"The other armoured personell carriers continued to advance on Bart.... A number of the vehicles got stuck in a creek bed. Three armoured personell carriers with the.. [commanders names].. broke into the village from the north. They were effectively supported by the German Panzers. The armoured personell carriers pushed past the church and on to the southern edge of the village."

Again, it does not say what the Panzergrenadiers were doing at the time, but clearly the SPWs were fighting, driving around in the middle of the enemy fire and getting away with it.

[ March 27, 2004, 01:15 PM: Message edited by: Claus B ]

[JasonC]

Two of those three passages fit one regular combat use of them I have seen repeatedly and commented on. That use is a transitional dash, especially into the edge of a village or town. This was used in Russia and quite common in the Bulge. It generally involved the following sequence and tactical logic, with a few variations I will cover afterward.

The overall locality is defended. Meaning there are enemy infantry (typically), occasionally with a small number of guns too, in the village or town. The lead is usually a small number of real AFVs - usually tanks, occasionally StuGs or Jagds, a platoon or less typically to minimize the possible losses. In the Bulge, a pair of Panthers was a typical case.

These leading AFVs make a dash for a limited part of the village or town. The rest of the armor unit is supporting by fire or overwatch from farther away. The dash is meant to put firepower right in the town, and also partially to scout the route. If they make it without loss, then SPWs follow along the same route, pull just inside the building area, and the infantry inside dismounts. They spread through the buildings around the lead AFVs, and transform that little corner of the village into German territory.

After which the fight within the village or town usually proceeds by the usual tank-infantry team methods. The use being made of the SPWs is first of all dash speed, to follow up the tank rush rapidly, rather than with a significant delay. In addition, the basic idea is to find a hole in the ATG coverage. Which may be considerably easier than finding a hole in the MG coverage. The micro location where the entrance is made is meant to be unoccupied. The leading tanks will try to make it so, if it wasn't to start with and they discover that by being fired upon.

This worked quite often. Sometimes the leading tanks would be destroyed by heavy AT weapons after pushing too far into the town. But they were usually right about the initial dash. The basic fact being exploited is that villages and towns are frequently far too large for the defending forces contained within them, to seriously cover everything. If every building needed defenders, it would take a division to hold places that actually have to be held by companies or battalions.

Buildings break up AT weapon lines of sight, too, once the vehicles get close. The infantry is needed rapidly, however, unlike other places tanks lead. Because the danger to the tanks from infantry weapons is serious, if they lack infantry support while remaining stationary in their little corner of the town for any length of time. Tank riders might also do this. But the risk from small arms is obviously lower in SPWs.

The two variants of this I have seen are rare compared to the basic scheme above, but did happen occasionally. Variant one is when the AFVs are not available, or all support from overwatch positions, while a handful of SPWs do the dashing. This is a weak man's version of the same idea, and works if the defender is also weak or spread so much that the hole is complete, even in the smaller calibers needed against an SPW rather than a heavy AFV.

Variant two occurs when the defenders are thin on the ground inside a relatively large town. Then the push may be continued while mounted. Essentially the idea is to expand the toehold rapidly, expecting little resistence in town interior spots where the defenders probably don't expect to see enemy, very close in time after the initial entry. This is rare, but I've seen a couple. Once inside, SPWs are frequently used e.g. to run supplies or relief forces around, with the benefit being every sniper doesn't have to be flushed out to move around.

As for the case of the SPWs and their gun armed supports (gun SPWs or ACs) fighting duels with ATGs, it is quite rare in my reading. Yes gun armed HTs were sometimes pressed into such full AFV roles. But generally only against weak opposition (a single roadblock e.g., or infantry only) - if they encountered more they typically called it off.

There are scads of cases in the Kursk unit combat narratives for instance, of "received flanking fire from W, halted", "unable to proceed because of AT fire from x", or "tried to enter woods y but were stopped by AT fire/flanking fire from Z". While I don't doubt it occasionally happened, it cannot have been the norm, or there would be a lot more dead SPWs resulting from such reports.

Understand, the units that had SPWs practically always had access to real AFV support. Screening roles for panzer recon were occasional exceptions, and sometimes a gap might open between the leading tank force and the SPW force, back to front. In either case the SPW force might fight weak enemies (low force to space in the screen case, or already penetrated in the follow case) without real AFVs (still) around. But normally, the same KG had them, and they led.

Useful stuff, thanks for taking the time to look for them.

[Claus B]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Useful stuff, thanks for taking the time to look for them.

Both cases are from Hubert Meyers history of the 12. SS-Panzer which I leafed through the other night. I think it is good for this purpose because it contains so much information and detail - even though it is still vague on the mounted-dismounted issue.

In the span of some 30 pages, I found at least 8 cases of SPWs involved in combat one way or the other. Of these, two clearly states that the Panzergrenadiers dismounted, the others including the two mentioned above, doesn't specify, but I would tend to read them as the infantry being mounted, because the situation indicates that inside the SPW was indeed the safest place to be due to armour protection, speed and the ability to follow the tanks and take advantage of the results of their heavy firepower.

As you point out, SPWs usually operated with the armour. Hardly surprising, that was their raison d'etre after all In Meyers book, the available tanks and the SPW battalion usually form up "the armoured group". It is my impression that this most often would involve the entire SPW battalion operating with a sizable tank force, typically battalion strength.

Heres another one, apparently an early dawn attack:

The Schützenpanzerbattalion advance along both sides of the Köbölkut-Muzsla road. The II. Panzerabteilung followed behind on the road because of suspected mine barriers.

Interestingly, the SPWs advanced where there was a risk of mines. Because an SPW was a lesser loss than a tank, because mines could be spotted easier from the SPW or because the grenadiers walked?

The III./26 [thats the SPW battalion] came under fire from anti-tank guns and artillery from the direction of Muzsla. Consequently, the Panzerabteilung .... moved forward to the point, with the 2. kompanie ... in the lead.

This would appear to be right out of the field manuals. Once ATG fire is encounted, the tanks take the lead and deals with it by virtue of their heavier armour and superior firepower compared with the SPWs.

The enemy was overrun before daybreak and the village was secured by the armoured group. The dismounted Panzergrenadiers of the I. and II./26 [these only had trucks for transport] followed and cleared the terrain.

Again, it seems to be a text-book manouver. The armoured group taking advantage of its speed, firepower and armour to break into the enemy position and secure the objective, while the dismounted infantry mops up.

Obviously, it does not say whether the SPW grenadiers were driving or walking, but given that this is a text-book attack, I dont see why they shouldn't have attacked mounted - or mounted-dismounted in rapid succesion - given the conditions.

Heres another one:

In bitter fighting, Panzergrenadierregiment 25 broke through the forward Soviet positions. When daylight broke, the regiment was stopped by artillery and mortar fire for some time. The SPW-battalion was brought forward and it overran the second network of positions under heavy Soviet fire .... Because of the difficult terrain conditions, the attack of the III./26 [the SPW battalion] could not be supported by the Panzers.

If artillery and mortar fire stopped the grenadiers on foot, what advantage would the SPW battalion have, if they attacked dismounted? I'd say none and would assume that they took advantage of their armour and speed to get through the shellfire and into the Soviet position. It is interesting that the SPWs could apparently go where the armour could not. In this case, the Soviets were well entrenched in deepth and the brunt of the fighting fell on the dismounted grenadiers. Still, the SPWs found a usefull application when the grenadiers on foot failed.

Claus B

[JasonC]

On the occasion when the PzGdr group lead "on either side of the road" due to mines, I suspect they dismounted - leading units if not everyone. That is, a few squads on foot on either side of the road, with vehicles along the road. The ability to dismount like this is one of the reasons infantry had to be part of the armored group. (Crossing a stream would be another such case).

As for the attack that mentioned seizing the village, to me the relevant line was "The enemy was overrun ***before daybreak*** and the ***village was secured*** by the armoured group." I do not connect the first and the second, as referring to the same locale. That is, they made a night attack mounted behind tanks. It got through the enemy lines, because (naturally) the AT defense became porous without long LOS. The village being secured is behind those lines - it is a function of the previous breakthrough. They grab a piece of defensible terrain in the enemy rear before daylight, in other words. That turns the momentary passage of the lines into a lasting break-in - the enemy can't get infantry out of the village.

As for the last section, I read it as the defenders calling down a standing barrage to defend a section of the front. The foot grenadiers can't get through the barrage. The SPWs carry their infantry through the standing barrage. They then dismount and fight through the enemy trench and/or AT ditch system, which may not have been all that heavily occupied (that is, the defense in this sector is arty and obstacle heavy). Tanks couldn't handle the ground at the other end. Foot troops couldn't get through the barrage.

[JasonC]

On the occasion when the PzGdr group lead "on either side of the road" due to mines, I suspect they dismounted - leading units if not everyone. That is, a few squads on foot on either side of the road, with vehicles along the road. The ability to dismount like this is one of the reasons infantry had to be part of the armored group. (Crossing a stream would be another such case).

As for the attack that mentioned seizing the last village, to me the relevant line was "The enemy was overrun ***before daybreak*** and the ***village was secured*** by the armoured group." I do not connect the first and the second, as referring to the same locale. That is, they made a night attack mounted behind tanks. It got through the enemy lines, because (naturally) the AT defense became porous without long LOS. The village being secured is behind those lines - it is a function of the previous breakthrough. They grab a piece of defensible terrain in the enemy rear before daylight, in other words. That turns the momentary passage of the lines into a lasting break-in - the enemy can't get infantry out of the village.

As for the last section, I read it as the defenders calling down a standing barrage to defend a section of the front. The foot grenadiers can't get through the barrage. The SPWs carry their infantry through the standing barrage. They then dismount and fight through the enemy trench and/or AT ditch system, which may not have been all that heavily occupied (that is, the defense in this sector is arty and obstacle heavy). Tanks couldn't handle the ground at the other end. Foot troops couldn't get through the barrage.

Notice that this is following up a night infantry attack that took the first line positions. The defenders probably were trying to seal off an existing break-in by counter-concentrating with artillery fire. The main enemy ATG and infantry defense was probably already smashed by the night attack.

[Claus B]

Originally posted by JasonC:

As for the attack that mentioned seizing the last village, to me the relevant line was "The enemy was overrun ***before daybreak*** and the ***village was secured*** by the armoured group." I do not connect the first and the second, as referring to the same locale.

I dont think the reference allows for such an interpretation. It seems evident to me, that the armoured group broke through the enemy line and secured the village in one continuous motion.

Originally posted by JasonC:

As for the last section, I read it as the defenders calling down a standing barrage to defend a section of the front. The foot grenadiers can't get through the barrage. The SPWs carry their infantry through the standing barrage. They then dismount and fight through the enemy trench and/or AT ditch system, which may not have been all that heavily occupied (that is, the defense in this sector is arty and obstacle heavy).

The thing is, that the reference does not say anything about it, so you interpret it in the light of you opinion that mounted attacks did not (or rarely) happen. I see this in the light of the stated doctrine as a typical case of mounted combat where SPWs are used to carry the troops right into and on top of the objective. There is nothing in these references from Meyers book that suggest that practice was different from doctrine - in fact they seem to show numerous cases where mounted combat by the SPWs was possible and desirable.

I think the key here is, that if you try to follow the actions of the SPW battalion, there are many cases of the SPW being used as a combat vehicle as opposed to mere transport, and many cases where the action they take part in conforms with doctrine. But if you look at battles involving German armoured divisions in general, the few SPW units (12. SS had only one SPW battalion) does not really stick out. I suspect they do in Meyers account because one of his sources is a guy from the 9. kompanie of PzGrRgt 26 - i.e. one of the SPW companies

As for the mounted/dismounted issue, some clarification may be in order.

By dismounted combat, I refer to what I would call the "US doctrine": The APC (SPW) is a battle-taxi that can bring the armoured infantry onto the battlefield without getting hurt at the speed and to the locations where tanks can operate. But the APC is not used as a combat vehicle per se, nor is it driven into enemy positions with the infantry mounted. It may give some firesupport to the dismounted infantry, but thats its only combat role.

By mounted combat, I refer to what I would call "German doctrine": The SPW is a combat vehicle that is used to drive the infantry across the battlefield all the way into and on top of the enemy position. In doing so, the weapons mounted on the SPW will be used while the troops are mounted, and the troops may contribute using their arms. In the actual attack, troops will mount and dismount their SPW as appropriate, but they will do so while in combat.

In the examples I've found in Meyers book, the majority of the examples points to the latter form of combat, not the former. And the way SPWs are used seem to be in line with the stated doctrine as per the manuals.

These cases are of course open to interpretation, but when interpreting them, I'd prefer to see them in light of the stated doctrine rather than what I may think is right and proper

Claus B

[Sirocco]

Originally posted by Claus B:

This comment jumps out at me. I admit I've read examples of tanks dealing with AT guns, but I think the SOP was to have dismounted infantry deal with them?

[Claus B]

Originally posted by Sirocco:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Claus B:

This comment jumps out at me. I admit I've read examples of tanks dealing with AT guns, but I think the SOP was to have dismounted infantry deal with them? </font>

It is my understanding, that in an armoured attack, it was up to the tanks to deal with anti-tank guns and any other heavy weapons that presented themselves, ideally in cooperation with artillery and infantry.

It would be contradictory to the concept of the tank in the German Army to have it stop and wait for the infantry (and artillery) everytime it ran into an AT-gun.

As you can see in one of the examples above, even lightly armoured SPWs could succesfully engage enemy anti-tank guns as long as they could utilize superior speed, firepower and mass - a mixture to which the tanks could add fairly heavy armour.

Claus B