Need Info on German 352nd Infantry division

[Kingfish]

This unit defended the Omaha beach sector and western part of Gold Beach. In addition, it created a Kampfgruppe that consisted of its 915th Regiment and Fusilier battalion. This KG was to be a reserve for LXXXIV Corp.

Was this Kampfgruppe motorised (not the same as motorised infantry)? I know the 1st Company of the Fusiliers were bicycle mounted, what about the others?

[Harper88]

Kingfish, I can't answer your question directly, but you might try contacting the 352nd Infantry Division re-enactors. Here's their website: http://www.352nd.com/ and their email is m.mdunn@verizon.net. Good luck.

[Berlichtingen]

Highly doubtful that they were in any way motorized. The 352nd was a foot slogging infantry division at a time when the Germans couldn't motorize all the units that were supposed to be. Two battalions of the 17. SS Panzergrenadier Division were equiped with bicycles rather than trucks because of the shortages

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Berlichtingen:

Highly doubtful that they were in any way motorized. The 352nd was a foot slogging infantry division at a time when the Germans couldn't motorize all the units that were supposed to be. Two battalions of the 17. SS Panzergrenadier Division were equiped with bicycles rather than trucks because of the shortages

Normally I would agree with you, as historical data bears this out, but in doing some research I came across this map, which shows the movements of the 352nd Div on D-day. Note the movement of the reserve KG, which starts off SE of Bayeux.

A ballpark estimate shows them moving 30 km west, then the same distance east again, all in one day. That's seems a bit too much for a marching column.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Berlichtingen:

Highly doubtful that they were in any way motorized. The 352nd was a foot slogging infantry division at a time when the Germans couldn't motorize all the units that were supposed to be. Two battalions of the 17. SS Panzergrenadier Division were equiped with bicycles rather than trucks because of the shortages

Normally I would agree with you, as historical data bears this out, but in doing some research I came across this map, which shows the movements of the 352nd Div on D-day. Note the movement of the reserve KG, which starts off SE of Bayeux.

A ballpark estimate shows them moving 30 km west, then the same distance east again, all in one day. That's seems a bit too much for a marching column. </font>

[Michael Emrys]

Have you confirmed that the map accurately represents the movement? I know there is considerable controversy over the movement and placement of several German units on D-Day and thereafter.

Michael

[Berlichtingen]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

Normally I would agree with you, as historical data bears this out, but in doing some research I came across this map, which shows the movements of the 352nd Div on D-day. Note the movement of the reserve KG, which starts off SE of Bayeux.

A ballpark estimate shows them moving 30 km west, then the same distance east again, all in one day. That's seems a bit too much for a marching column.

Route march is about 3-4 mph (that's based on my experience in the mostly foot mobile 3rd Bn., 3rd Marines). Based on that map (assuming it is accurate), they had 6 hours for the first leg. The east leg indicates that it wasn't the full regiment, so that's likely because the entire regiment hadn't finished the move west. The map doesn't indicate the time on the east leg. So, based on the map, the move is doable on foot

[Dandelion]

Yes, same standards in the German army at the time - 5 km/h default standard, a days march was considered 40 km (8 hours marching time), a days forced march was 60 (12 hours marching). The latter was considered to destroy units, except regulars, paras and their like. Standard march schedule for infantry was march an hour, rest fifteen, march again and they had thirty minute breaks every two hours, and a one-hour chow break every four hours. I think this must be the same more or less in all armies, as humans are the same everywhere. In 6 hours they'd be capable to cover 30 kms, but the pace would be considered forced of course. I assume the men rested and ate before doing the same distance again.

The 352nd actually had an abnormal amount of transportation, as they had absorbed that of the 321st. But still, it means only 20 extra trucks assuming the companies of the 321st were at full strength (and excluding all unit-organic vehicles, since they had other things to carry anyway). 4 transport coys of some 40 trucks can't lift a regiment. gkdo II Fsch had no particular transport units and nor were there any combat-usable such at AOK 7. Cannibalising other divisional units for transport would mean making these static instead, and it would still be difficult to muster the needs of a regiment.

On Michaels general question - yes the Germans also had a system of transport companies, be it not identical to the UK/CW (more similar to US I think). The suffix "teilmot" or "tmot" meant that the majority, but not all, of a division could be lifted on wheels (or towed). This was achieved by a mix of unit-organic vehicles and divisional transport assets. The Germans did in certain cases have Corps transport assets as well (that were not part of the supply chain), and in some cases Army assets, but these were tasked with the lifting of static units. E.g. Army- or Corps level AA units that had no vehicles of their own. The rationae again being that not all of the latter needed redeployment at the same time. Problems arose in Normandy when they did.

Cheerio

Dandelion

[JasonC]

German mobility categories aren't about motorization, they are much more limited than that. An infantry division was rated "mobile" if it had prime movers for all artillery pieces and the allowed number of supply transports. These were wagons and horse teams. A division rated "static" wasn't one without enough trucks to move its infantry, it was one without enough horses to move its guns.

Many static divisions formed mobile KGs to send to Normandy, if they weren't immediately in the path of the invasion. These typically formed around an infantry regiment, and gathered all the available horses and wagons (from the supply train mostly - the static ones weren't supplied with any for their guns as such) to move a few guns and their ammo, while the men walked. The remaining guns were left in position along the coast, sans transport of any kind.

A mobile division or KG was expected to be able to maneuver in the field at foot speed, and therefore could hold a portion of the line, and be expected to give ground or advance to keep station with units around it, etc. A static division was not expected to be able to do these things. It was given a specific location to protect - an area of the coast or a city or a fortified area overlooking a port or what have you. With guns in position but not expected to move again, and only enough organic transport to shift ammo and supplies from rail line to fighting positions.

In Russia, many German infantry divisions formed special "fast units" that actually were motorized. These were typically formed around the panzerjaeger battalions, which were the only organic units of an ID typically authorized motor vehicles (beyond a few staff cars and a minimum of supply trucks - most supply was horse drawn). Some divisions had a company of StuGs or Marders in these battalions. The trucks from the rest could be used to lift an infantry company, and an assortment of guns (some div arty howitzers, some towed PAK, etc). They could then act as mini-KGs, fire brigading from point to point. The infantry and guns might be left in the new position, and a new set picked up for the next effort.

This was a (very) poor man's substitute for a supporting PD in second echelon. As PzJgr units transitions to mostly AFVs with a little Flak, it became less common because the excess trucks (from leaving PAK stationary) weren't available.

Some IDs in Normandy seemed to have instead created "reaction battalions" of infantry, bicycle mounted. If they had any AFVs those were part of the reaction force. Many formations had a single company in some battalions bicycle equipped. When the whole battalion repositioned, that company could go to the position first, while the foot sloggers and any supporting horse-drawn guns straggled in, in their own sweet time. The bicycle company would hold the deployment area in the meantime.

As for having enough trucks to lift entire reserve regiments, that is the kind of thing only the panzer divisions could do, in the German army. (In Normandy, they'd also try to make any such moves at night, Allied tac-air being what it was).