Question regarding permanent tiger I losses...

[Mr. Tittles]

But the Soviets don't shave thier own numbers when reporting thier own losses? Care to comment on that?

The claims German would make are at greater battlefield range than the soviets typically. So they are actually claiming damaged vehicles that will be repaired and cycled back into units.

Example: A lone Tiger faces a Soviet tank Bn. the Soviets send 10 tanks to deal with the Tiger. So the Tiger tank whacks 10 tanks. Tiger pulls back because he is alone. He reports 10 victories.

But what of the 10? 4 are burnt out. 4 are short term repaired by using two others (which are write-offs or possibly long term repairs) and are available for the next battle the following week. The remaining 2 are put in long term repair for major subsystems (need motors/turrets/etc).

In CM short view terms, he whacked 10 tanks. He had tactical victory and he reported the 'kills'.

In RL he killed possibly 5. The 4 he burned and one of the salvage tanks that is not long term repairable. The German command face the same battalion and they are at full strength (not 2/3). The initial Soviet tank company has recieved replacements and repaired the 'ghost-tanks' that have come back to life.

[ May 09, 2004, 02:54 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[JasonC]

Tittles - German reports of their own total write offs from Kursk to the end of the year are around 3800, not 6000. Total replacements and reinforcements sent east were 3600 from June to December, 1250 of them in the last 2 months of the year. The total AFV fleet in the east thus remained about the same. But the number of runners declined by 1000-1500 more - the readiness at Kursk was considerably higher than that achieved at any later part of the year (or ever, really).

The Russians lost around 18000 over the same period, so the raw loss ratio, using TWOs, was around 4.7 to 1 for this period. Kursk offensive is a big portion of this. The Russians lost around 6000, but including offensive periods in July and August (for Kursk defensive alone they report 1614 TWOs). German side accounts vary considerably, largely based on what they count as "Kursk" and on the choice of dates. The decline in runners is much higher than the TWOs, but later does not rebound.

For instance, Zetterling and Frankson in their summary chapter claim only 300 TWOs for Kursk the German offensive, but in their own earlier chapter that is the approximate number for AG center alone without even counting StuGs, and 370 with them. Their figures give 570 with AG South included, but only for the period up to 17 July included for AG South. The drop in tanks running was much larger, but they weren't written off yet.

There is also a category problem here. Zett and Frank use unit reports for main types, Pz III, IV, Tiger and StuG. (For Kursk, Panthers are easy since they were only in one unit). They do not cover Marders or Nashorn. There is also a comparison problem due to time periods - the Russian figure for Kursk defensive would be the right comparison for the 570 German TWO figure, but only with some AG center losses for the last week in 31 July backed out, and AG South losses for another week (16 to 23 July) tacked on.

The basic story is still clear from the Russian loss figures for their various operations. They lost the majority of the tanks they lost in July and August, in the Orel and Kharkov counteroffensives (half for all front for July and August), not in Kursk defensive (more like 1/6 for those months).

We can get a more realistic picture overall only by extending the time frame. July and August combined, for the whole front, they give 1331 TWOs, and runners decline by a larger figure (with replacements added back in etc).

The Russians report 17753 for the whole second half. German claims in the same period were 30668 before their standard haircut, yielding an internal German estimate of 15334 for the period.

German claims for July and August only were 16250. 8100 to 9400 would then be the amounts one might expect from German claims, with the haircut size put at 50% and 42% (their own usual practice, or the now known ratio of their claims for the year to Russian losses for the year, respectively). Basically, half the losses for Kursk to the end of the year are claimed in the July and August, first third.

What all of that winds up saying is that the ratio for the Kursk period might have been as high as 6-7 to 1 in TWOs, falling to more like 3.3 to 3.9 to 1 for the rest of the year. If reduction in runners rather than TWOs is used as the measure, the ratios drop somewhat. Then you'd get 3.6 for the whole period, split between 4.5 or so for the Kursk period and 2.9 for the balance of the year.

Note that the higher ratios for the Kursk period, taken as July and August, refer to the period including the big Russian counteroffensives at Orel and Kharkov. The ratio is clearly higher for those.

That is, when the Germans were attacking, they achieved a ratio on the order of 2-3 times (1614 vs 570-840, TWO or approx. decline in runners). For the balance of the year, with the Russians in possession of the initiative and the front moving, again it is around 3-3.5 times (maybe 4 if one is generous about TWOs only vs. permanent reduction in runners) - 9000 vs. 2500-3000.

But for the Kursk Russian offensive period (Orel and Kharkov, generalized to July and August minus Kursk defensive) when they cracked the front, the loss ratio is much higher. Perhaps as high as 10 to 1 (counting only German TWOs), maybe only 6.7 to 1 (permanent reduction in runners).

Roughly, half the Russian losses for the July to December period occur in July and August, a third of the period by length of time alone. German TWOs are more evenly divided, with a third in those months rather than half. Over a long enough period, TWOs and reduction in runners coincide for the Russians. But TWOs are only about 75% of the permanent reduction in runners for the Germans, who never attain the readiness rate they had before Kursk again.

Note that none of the foregoing is an AFV to AFV kill ratio. It is a loss ratio. Some of the German TWOs are to mines and PAK (in the Kursk period e.g.). Many of the Russian losses are to PAK (few of their 1614 for Kursk defensive, many for the Orel-Kharkov period, some but a lower portion for the rest of the year).

As for the "usually 5 to 1" idea, it is more like that good or higher in the best periods, but below it much of the time. Obviously the loss ratio could not run 5 to 1 forever and still have the Germans run out before the Russians did, since the Russians were only outproducing the Germans by 2 to 1 overall, and 3 to 1 with German stuff sent to other fronts taken out.

The Germans did achieve loss ratios as high as 10 to 1 in 1941 (operational success vs. mostly lights) and may have again in periods like the Orel and Kharkov periods, and certainly got over 5 to 1 in such periods (on defense, Russians cracking an intact front, a high quality differential plus maximum contribution from PAK).

[ May 09, 2004, 03:30 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[JasonC]

Incidentally, on why there is a spike in your ratios in the summer of 1944, it is clearly Bagration. It is not Panthers vs. T-34s per 85, because the 85s were out by then in large numbers. It is not introduction of infantry AT, which had been out since 1943 (schrecks and decent fausts both). But clearly the Russians lost a lot of tanks smashing AG center.

The obvious contributor is PAK. It does the most when the Russians are attacking a basically intact line. When the front is moving a long way, pursuit operations, PAK can't contribute as much as AFVs. When the Russians aren't attacking (because the Germans are, or just because the front it relatively quiet), again the contribution of PAK will be relatively limited.

When a big offensive is breaking a previously intact front, PAK (and mines) will do their worst. Probably losses to mechanical causes and fuel shortages peak at such times too, or soon after, since the tanks are pushed the hardest on such occasions.

[Mr. Tittles]

Originally posted by JasonC:

Incidentally, on why there is a spike in your ratios in the summer of 1944, it is clearly Bagration. It is not Panthers vs. T-34s per 85, because the 85s were out by then in large numbers. It is not introduction of infantry AT, which had been out since 1943 (schrecks and decent fausts both). But clearly the Russians lost a lot of tanks smashing AG center.

The obvious contributor is PAK. It does the most when the Russians are attacking a basically intact line. When the front is moving a long way, pursuit operations, PAK can't contribute as much as AFVs. When the Russians aren't attacking (because the Germans are, or just because the front it relatively quiet), again the contribution of PAK will be relatively limited.

When a big offensive is breaking a previously intact front, PAK (and mines) will do their worst. Probably losses to mechanical causes and fuel shortages peak at such times too, or soon after, since the tanks are pushed the hardest on such occasions.

PAK? Why not organic StuGs in infantry divisions and SPs? Also Sturmartlillerie Bigades?

T34/85: These were introduced in March 44? I imagine they were first sent to Guards units? I am not saying they werent fielded during Bagration, just that the Panther to 85mm and greater Soviet AFV ratio was at a zenith for the Germans.

Panzerfaust Website:

Deliveries on the first order of 50,000 began in August 1943 with 6,800 pieces. Production ran until August 1944, then it was switched over to successor, the Panzerfaust 60. The first large quantity of this weapon made available to the Wehrmacht, the german armed forces, was the delivery of 8700 pieces in September 1943.

Panzerfaust 60: It replaced the Panzerfaust 30 m, production started in September 1944. Early production plans for the Panzerfaust called for 400,000 pieces per month. This figure was not met until October 1944. By then the request had been increased in September to 1.5 million per month, this was almost achieved in December 1944 with close to 1.3 million produced. A large number of different companies produced the Panzerfaust, the major contributor was the HASAG Hugo Schneider AG Lampenfabrik in Leipzig.

The two cut n pastes are from the Panzerfaust website. My main thought is that the Panzerfaust 30 models were all that were available at the time of Bagration. It is such a close ranged weapon compared to bazookas or shrecks. Was it that common a weapon to take out a AFV?

If Bagration was such a bum rush hit, how come they had such a poor trade in armor? Was German armor not committed to this battle?

[ May 09, 2004, 07:35 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[arax3]

Jason: It is no use!! Give it a rest. A3

[Wol]

Actually, I think that Mr Tittles gives a good (if ad hoc)account of why such figures can arise. It is precisely because of not counting the same things when accounts are used thatcauses problems. I recall many instances in writings where 'our' KOs (here meaning something like write-offs), are compared with enemy losses. Even worse sometimes our write-offs with enemy losses from all sources.

But let us be clear about one thing. Providing an account of how some rubbery figures can be arrived at is not to provide any defence (even if intended) of the utility of these figures.

BTW I would have thought that the ratio of KO to TWO was more like 3.5 to one for T34s. I recall that the average T-34 was rebuilt about 3-4 times during the war. Of course, many rebuilds may have been necessitated by mechanical rather than battle damage needs.

[JasonC]

StuGs are part of the AFV force obviously. My point was that PAK do their damage most at definite times in the regular sequence of breakthrough, exploitation, stiffening, and lull. They do their stuff opposing the breakthrough, mostly. The more mobile AFVs can contribute throughout. The PAK don't contribute much unless the other guy is attacking, and then contribute most if your own side is standing, rather than running regularly.

Which maps to particular dates - second half of July plus all of August in 1943, after which the front goes mobile and before which the Germans are attacking in early July, and it is a lull before that back to March. In 1944, the breakthrough fighting is June and July, with lull before then, back to February or so, and exploitation and a moving front after.

The faust 60 is fielded too late in 1944 to account for a Russian loss spike in June and July. They've had 30s for 9 months.

As for Panthers vs. 85s, it isn't nearly as lopsided a match up as the previous year. In 1943, the Russians had T-34/76s and the Germans already had some Tigers and Panthers, and the bulk of their force have long 75s and 80mm front hulls.

In 1944, the Russians have IS-2s, ISUs, and T-34/85s. The portion of the German fleet that is Panthers has gone up somewhat. But mostly in the AG South area (including north and south Ukraine). Most of the AFVs in AG Center for Bagration are StuGs, because there aren't many mobile divisions there. Russian deception successfully drew attention to the northern Ukraine instead, west of Kiev but south of the marshes.

The quality match up is clearly worse in 1943. And there is no sudden discontinuity in that variable. What does change suddenly in mid-1944 is the Russians go balls out in their attack on AG Center, and basically destroy it. 25 German infantry divisions are wiped out. This coincides with the spike in the loss ratio.

Clearly, when you use your tanks to destroy large infantry formations, you lose some tanks and kill stuff besides enemy tanks. The tank loss ratio won't look great - because you can't rack up AFV kills just by wiping out infantry - but the operational map will look fine - because you can rip hundred mile wide holes in fronts just by wiping out infantry.

Some of the Bagration loss spike will be a defensive advantage helping German AFVs (mostly StuGs in this case) score somewhat higher than normal. But a lot of it will be the Russians going up against PAK, and going all the way against them, until they are wiped out, taking whatever losses they need to in the process but overwhelming them locally, one set after another. Some will be larger losses to mines in the break-ins. Some will be pushing tanks harder and farther to exploit, and losing more of them to break downs in consequence.

As for own side losses, the Russians were pretty free with their write offs. Their armor force is a conveyor belt from factory to Stavka reserves to fronts and tank armies to battle and loss. Recoveries will stay in the units or, if the front moves enough, might migrate back into Stavka reserves. But as a marginal increment to the continual inflow from the factories.

Losses and factory inflow are basically matching each other, each running around 2000 a month. Sometimes they push harder and lose more for a while, and let the Stavka reserve empty out a bit. Then they pause and build it up again, top off the front line units, etc. There isn't any big fluctuation in readiness. At the big scales the Russians planned these things - fronts and tank armies and month-long operations - tanks were treated as essentially a form of ammunition.

In contrast, the Germans have tanks reported on strength regularly holding at twice the running tank strength. Within a unit, a pause lets some of these get back into runner status, while action knocks them back again. Units last a long time with the supply of tanks they are given, running it down and nursing the damaged ones. When burnt out, the whole unit will be taken off the line and rebuilt to TOE, then a corps of rebuilds put back in somewhere, as a major operation.

Before Kursk, the Germans had a long lull and got their operational totals up quite close to their total AFVs. They also got a lot of new AFVs to the front. In a graph of vehicle strength in the east, just before Kursk is a high cusp. (Jentz covers this well incidentally). In total AFVs in the east, that then drops through September. leveling off at a level well below the pre-Kursk peak (despite new shipments etc).

In runners the decline is larger and lasts longer. By the end of the year, the total vehicle strength climbs back to Kursk levels. But runners are still somewhat lower (though the fleet mix has also improved - the old stuff is gone and the portion of Panthers has risen).

And a permanent decline in runners is a TWO change in all but name. The difference between the two is significant but not huge - a matter of TWOs running 75% of permanent decline in runners. Over short time scales it can be way more than that, but they coincide that much over long (multi-month) time scales.

As for Russian claims, about their own strength it is perfectly reliable. About the Germans they've taken out it is hopelessly inaccurate. You can't pay any attention to them. With the Germans, rules of thumb like the 50% haircut can give decent estimates of later real losses. Not so with the Russians. I mean, for periods when the Germans have around 600 TWOs and experience a 900 permanent drop in runners, Russian claims run as high as 3600. You just can't take them seriously at all. The ratios are too large and do not follow any consistent pattern (unlike the 50% haircut rule the Germans were able to use).

Proper methodology is to ignore claims of the other guys losses and get losses from own side reports. When a reasonable, repeating relationship is seen between claims and known other side losses, it can be roughly relied on - not to be accurate but to be within a factor of 1.5 or so, say - after it has been subject to appropriate "haircuts".

Uncut claims about what happened to the other guy, by anybody, are meaningless noise. Even own side staffers know it and do not rely on such things when actually estimating enemy strengths or planning campaigns. The same thing happens by the way in air to air combat. Estimates of kills are always high, systematically. (The worst are claims by air - anybody's air - about things they took out on the ground - even less reliable than Russian tank kill claims).

These are well known facts and relationships. You will find them in all sorts of histories and analysis, in staff work, etc. Only people doing propaganda, report own claims of enemy losses as though they mean anything. It is just how it works. These relationships do not need to be "explained" by believing every own side claim has some real something behind it. They don't. They are just plain wrong, every time. Unadjusted, they aren't data at all, any more than all units are always at 100% of TOE, all officers are always brilliant, all soldiers are always brave, yada yada. Claims aren't kills, at all. Anybody's.

[ May 10, 2004, 04:30 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[JasonC]

Last (I hope), I will address the idea that the only source of differences between absurdly high own side kill claims and actually dead tanks on the other side, is real battlefield KOs recovered and returned to service.

This hypothesis predicts that every time a claim is made, a tank shot and killed an enemy tank in battlefield knock out terms. And we just know that isn't so.

- the claim may be nothing but air.

- the tank may have fired and missed, but thought it hit.

- the tank may have hit and thought it killed, when it didn't and the other just drove away.

- the tank may have hit and damaged the other, but not killed it. E.g. immobilization or shock.

- the tank may have hit and killed the target, but claim it multiple times (e.g. one of the preceding, followed by a real kill).

- multiple tanks may claim the same target.

- multiple causes (AFV, PAK, infantry) may claim the target. The real cause may be any of them or something else.

- the target might be a tank killed 2 days previously seen on the horizon and shot again.

- the target might have broken down and been abandoned, but still be claimed. Hit while empty or not hit at all.

- or the tank may be hit, KOed, and recovered.

There is no reason whatever to suppose every difference between a claim and a TWO is the last.

Moreover, all of the above is only half the ledger. Because on the other side, there are tanks that are lost without ever being hit in combat.

TWO are equal to real battlefield KOs minus recoveries but also plus losses to mechanical causes etc that do not occur in front line combat (including mines, air, etc).

There is no particular reason to think recoveries are larger than the non-combat KOs. If they aren't, then TWOs and battlefield KOs will coincide, not by definition but "accidentally" as it were. The deviation of KOs from TWOs is not "monotonic", on one side only.

The likely balance of the two is a figure close to unity, maybe differing by a small factor. But not by a large one. Notice, this is of true battlefield KOs and TWOs - not of claims and true battlefield KOs.

Every other category listed above will cause a gap between claims and battlefield KOs, not between KOs and TWOs.

There is no way (1) all the above categories except KO and recovery are empty and (2) there are no losses outside of combat on the other side of the ledger. But these are *required* for the gap between claims and TWOs to reflect multiple real KOs per TWO.

Claims aren't kills. Own side data are the only realistic measure of losses.

[Mr. Tittles]

So if the Germans had 3800 TWO and we use your 1.5 multiplier, then we get less than a third of the Soviet reported TWO being caused by the TOTAL panzer (Panzer III, Panzer IV, Panther, TigerI)and panzerjaeger (Marder and Nashorn and Elephant)and StuG units (afvs in infantry divisions and independent brigades as well as Panzer/PG units)?

You are basically saying that Towed-PAK/FLAK/Planes/Mines/LATW/ARTY did the rest?

Mind you, mines and arty, while capable of rendering a short term KO, usually do not TWO a AFV. LATW were in its infancy and not much more than last ditch defense measures. Planes were not that great a tank killer despite claims.

So its the tubes of the PAK and FLAK that get most of this 70% of the TWOs?

[ May 10, 2004, 01:01 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Mr. Tittles]

Table 2: Reported Tank Kills along the Eastern Front

total kills of enemy armor

Eastern Front 1944 January February March April Total comparison: amount of the respective

anti-tank weapons supplied to the

troops in these four months

Jan:4,727

Feb:2,273

Mar:2,663

April:2,878

12,541 total # of killed tanks

cause known

Jan:3,670

Feb:1,905

Mar:1,031

Apr:1,524

8,130 Total (about 2/3 known)

by Faustpatrone /

Panzerfaust

58

45

51

110

262 Total

Faustpatrone 30 and Panzerfaust 30: 656,300

by Panzerschreck

9

24

29

26

88 Total

RPz.Gr. 4322 and 4992: 278,100

by Hafthohlladung

21

13

14

19

67 Total

by hand grenade

6

5

5

6

22 Total

by Tellermine

20

4

43

11

78 Total

These numbers are from Panzerfaust website. Its interesting that the cause is known. I take that as verified. A 1/3 shave it seems. In any case, it is early 44 and LATW are still not great tank killers.

Shreck:

Initial orders called for 382,000 RPzB.54 to be produced. This order was later reduced, and by July 1944 production ceased with a total number of 289,151 delivered. The process of equipping the fighting forces with Panzerschrecks progressed quite slow, in 1943 comparably few reached frontline units. By January 1944 21,141 had been issued to combat units, while another 39,526 lay unused in the armories. Panzerschreck weapons were produced by the following companies: Enzinger Union in Pfeddersheim, Gebr der Scheffler in Berlin, HASAG in Meuselwitz, J ckel in Freistadt, Fa. Kronprinz in Solingen and Fa. Schricker in F rth-Vach.

Faust:

Deliveries on the first order of 50,000 began in August 1943 with 6,800 pieces. Production ran until August 1944, then it was switched over to successor, the Panzerfaust 60. The first large quantity of this weapon made available to the Wehrmacht, the German armed forces, was the delivery of 8700 pieces in September 1943.

I would say that 43 saw these weapons slowly entering service and probs related to that slowed its use as a AT weapon system.

[ May 10, 2004, 03:41 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Mr. Tittles]

88mm Flak 18 and 36

1941 126

1942 176

1943 296

1944 549

1945 23

These numbers are Army Flak guns delivered. They are not that common considering this is the whole German Army.

Most Flak 88 guns go to the Luftwaffe and by 44 there are 10,000 or so defending cities, etc. In 43 4416 go to Luftwaffe compaared to 296 to Army units.

So if the PAK/FLAK are taking out the Soviet afvs, then its more likely the PAK40, PAK38 and PAK43/41 (long 88mm) are doing the majority.

But PAK in 1943 are being produced at a similar rate than the total Panzer/StuG/PJ vehicles are (approx only counting 75mm and greater for either PAK or AFV)? PAK are usually distributed and dispersed? PAK also have a short shelf life once committed. They are very hard to remove under fire.

Seems fishy to me.

[ May 11, 2004, 04:07 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Mr. Tittles]

Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

So if the Germans had 3800 TWO and we use your 1.5 multiplier, then we get less than a third of the Soviet reported TWO being caused by the TOTAL panzer (Panzer III, Panzer IV, Panther, TigerI)and panzerjaeger (Marder and Nashorn and Elephant)and StuG units (afvs in infantry divisions and independent brigades as well as Panzer/PG units)?

You are basically saying that Towed-PAK/FLAK/Planes/Mines/LATW/ARTY did the rest?

Mind you, mines and arty, while capable of rendering a short term KO, usually do not TWO a AFV. LATW were in its infancy and not much more than last ditch defense measures. Planes were not that great a tank killer despite claims.

So its the tubes of the PAK and FLAK that get most of this 70% of the TWOs?

Of course, everyone knows that the Soviets, like the Allies in the West, had a greater proportion of their TWO due to battle causes than the German's did. So Jason's 1.5 gets even harder to defend.

[Wol]

Originally posted by Mr. Tittles:

88mm Flak 18 and 36

...These numbers are Army Flak guns delivered. They are not that common considering this is the whole German Army.

Most Flak 88 guns go to the Luftwaffe...

What on earth makes you think Luftwaffe Flak did not engage tanks?

[Mr. Tittles]

88mm Flak 18, 36 and 38

1939 183

1940 1130

1941 1872

1942 2876

1943 4416

1944 1933

1945 715

These are the delivery numbers of 88mm to Luftwaffe.

In January of 1944 there were 20,625 FLAK guns (7,941 heavy guns and 12,684 light/medium guns) with 6,880 searchlights defending Germany. Stationed on other fronts were another 9,569 anti-aircraft guns and 960 searchlights, these totals do not include Army and Navy FLAK units.

By August 1944 10,930 FLAK 18, 36 and FLAK 37 guns were defending the Reich.

279 of the improved FLAK41 were in use by Febuary of '45 in the air defense role.

The only Luftwaffe 88s would be in Luftwaffe field divisions/FlakKorp. Here is the experience of a Flakorp in Normandy.

http://home.swipnet.se/normandy/gerob/othghq/3flak.html

This book:

http://www.angelraybooks.com/books/shelf/0002sh.htm

Also says the Flak were predominately based away from the front during the war.

[ May 12, 2004, 03:15 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Mr. Tittles]

The Luftwaffe Flak arm was the second largest branch of service, after the infantry, of the entire Wehrmacht, comprising over a million troops (inclusive of teenage Hitler Jugend auxiliaries) organised in 30 Flak Divisions by the war's end. The '88' was its most numerous weapon (successively the 8.8cm Flak 36 L/56 and the higher-velocity 8.8cm Flak 41 L/71) which was produced in enormous quantities (by 1944, 14,000 were in service) and concentrated around key industrial centers such as Schweinfurt. Yet it was never an efficient destroyer of high-flying bombers, an average of 16,000 shells from a Flak 36 or 8,000 from a Flak 41 being required to bring just one down. To tie up so many weapons, men, ammunition and so much production capacity at a time when the Eastern Front in particular was desperately short of high velocity anti-tank artillery, was a major strategic error. Meanwhile, at the local, tactical level the 88's potential in ground combat was appreciated early on, for instance by Rommel at Arras (1940) and Halfaya Pass (1941). Individual battery commanders such as Sepp Prentl pioneered this Sturmflak role: having won the Knight's Cross for knocking out 25 Soviet tanks with his battery in July 1942 and formed a Flakkampfgruppe which supported both infantry and Panzer formations during the debacle following Stalingrad (January - February 1943). Prentl was charged by the renowned commander of Luftflotte 4, von Richthofen, to establish a Flakerdkampfschule to train all the Flak units under his command in ground combat (direct fire against tanks, bunkers etc.), operational from April 1943. The success achieved by the Sturmflakartillerie from 1943 onwards in Italy, Normandy and the East - small Flakkampftrupps of 2-3 guns often causing major casualties and hold-ups to Allied and Soviet armor - indicates the folly of the decision to retain so many 88's in the static anti-aircraft defense of the homeland, although the provision of adequate transport and fuel for mobile operations at the Front would have been a major problem. At the very end of the war, static Flak batteries were time and again forced to engage in ground combat as the front disintegrated and Soviet armor flooded into the German homeland.

[Dook]

On the subject of kill ratios for Tiger tanks, I would recommend looking at "Swinging the Sledgehammer: The Combate Effectiveness of German Heavy Tank Battalions in World War II" by Christopher Wilbeck. He calculates combat kill ratios for Tigers of 12.2 to 1. He calculates the ratio when measured against all Tigers lost, regardless of reason, as 5.4 to 1.

[flamingknives]

on heavy Flak:

Yet it was never an efficient destroyer of high-flying bombers, an average of 16,000 shells from a Flak 36 or 8,000 from a Flak 41 being required to bring just one down.

But the point of heavy flak isn't necessarily to shoot down bombers. By forcing the bombers to fly above the Flak, you reduce their effectiveness. Remove the heavy flak, and the bombers can fly much lower and will do more damage.

[Mr. Tittles]

I am reading Tigers in the mud and Armor battles of the SS right now. A mention is made by the Germans is that when fighting soviet ATGs it is harder than fighting tanks (when attacking of course). The quote stated that PAKs should count twice as much as tanks when tallying.

In the forgoing analysis of the second half of 1943 on the eastern front, I would not imagine that the Soviets were bashing away at PAK fronts while the German armor was doing the same against Soviet PAK fronts. That is, since the soviets had the initiative (after Kursk), the German armor would have to be brought to bear to stop the onslaught. Panzerjaeger units, of course, WOULD do this as it is its function. StuG units of all types would have to do this to support the infantry situation. Panzer units, probably the ones least wanting to perform this defensive function, would also be dragged into the fray.

[ May 14, 2004, 02:22 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]

[Karl_Smasher]

Taken from microfilm at the National Archives in Washington. example of Tiger losses.

Tiger losses at Kursk, southern front (4th Panzer Army).

4th July, Onhand 89 PzVI's.

Day (DESTROYED + ABANDONED)

4 0

5 2

6 1

7 1

8 1

9 0

10 0

11 0

12 0

13 0

14 1

15 0

16 1

17 1

18 0

Formations which lost the Tigers.

(DESTROYED + ABANDONED)

3rd Pz Corps - 3

DR SS PzGrD - 1

LSSAH PzGrD - 1

T SS PzGrD - 1

UNATTACHED - 2

The entire southern Front at Kursk lost 8 Tigers from 4-18th July. No Tigers were lost at Prokhorovka, only 14 took part in that battle on the 12th. 6 Tigers are listed as damaged end of day on the 12th.

All were returned on by July 18th.

Returns

Day #PzVI

13 4

14 10

15 5

16 6

17 4

18 0

[Mr. Tittles]

http://www.geocities.com/SouthBeach/9898/spa505.htm

Heres some info on the 505.

I just finished reading Tigers in the Mud. Its clear that it took luck to get kill ratios for ANY tank when it was attacking rather than defending. This guy Carrius seemed to have some luck doing both (and great combat instincts). On a tank on tank battle against JSIIs and T34s, he and a handful of Tigers mopped up. And he was attacking. He basically did what Wittman did. He charged into a mass of AFVs that were at the head of an attack column and raised hell. After this victory (and they were all afvs, no ATG), he then crosses a water obstacle and shoots up another column of AFVs with tank riders.

Part of the Tiger dominance is from the poor 2 man turrets in the early T34s. The author just gets the jump on them and its not modeled in the game. A 5 man tank is described as an organism and the crewmen are just extensions of that organism. So CM with its shared spotting and 'raising the organism to include other tanks that dont have radios or 3 men turrets; is wrong.

The book says that Tigers are continually being rotated back and forth from the workshop. In some cases, mortars hole radiators causing the tigers to pull back. Its evident that the cooling systems were exposed to fragments from above.

A good read and a real tankers book.

[ May 18, 2004, 05:48 PM: Message edited by: Mr. Tittles ]