Attack frontages

[HarryInk]

Ok, I've done the search with the title words, but only found a little. Can the grogs out there give answers to this question?

I'm designing a scenario with 2 Brit Btns attacking side by side, 2 coys up (and 2 coys back) as seems to have been the S.O.P. in Normandy, at least. My very rough impression is that battalions attacked on about 1 km frontage. Thus I should design a 2km wide field.

Little bits I have found about frontage are that JasonC recommended attacking on about a 2plt frontage when in 2000pt games, and this post on attacking like a Russian noted that 1km wide for a btn was usual until manpower shortages drew it down as narrow as 100m!!

I'm happy to hear about attack frontages of Germans, yanks, italians, greeks as well... *G*

[Dandelion]

Hi Harry,

On the Germans then;

The Germans used "Ausdehnung" (here; density) as a pivotal operational instrument. That basically meant manipulation of subunit frontages in order to increase or decrease firepower along a unit frontage during an attack (or defence).

An attacking battallion could be assigned anything from 400 to 1000 meters, assuming it was full strength. A defending battallion anything from 800 meters to 2000 meters, again if full strength. Of course, terrain was a dominant factor in determining this as well.

Frontage would be assigned according to task. A defending unit tasked with delaying action could well manage 2000 meter frontages, whereas the same unit tasked with stopping the enemy dead in his tracks would have to concentrate its firepower on much narrower frontages. The same goes for attacking units, with probe versus breakthrough in the above example.

Along the frontage of an attack would be designated a "Schwerpunkt", point of main effort. Here frontages would be narrowed down to a minimum in order to increase pressure. An attack might well start with evenly divided and often wide frontages, changing to narrower when once a soft spot in the defence is detected. This was usually accomplished simply by inserting units along the frontage, e.g. halving a 1000 meters frontage to two 500 meter such and thus double the firepower there.

The unit inserted would the the "one back" in the normal "two up front one back" constellation. In fact more often still, the "Keil" was used with one up and two rear, inserting the two rear to triple the pressure exactly where desired.

Of course, units were not full strength, terrain was not pool-table and the enemy did not react as expected. Thus the figures given for frontages were guidelines.

Hope it helps

Cherio

Dandelion

[Michael Dorosh]

I have a good example of a German operations order I am transcribing for one of my websites, which includes an original map overlay; if I get it finished tonight I'll provide a link to it - goes into great detail as to how a dismounted mechanized infantry company went into the attack and how elaborate preparations were for such an endeavor.

[JonS]

Harry, somewhere in the archives of the CMBO is an article on "How to attack like the British" or soemthing similar. It was tailored for CMBO, so some things may or amy not work quite the same in CMAK, but it was written with Normandy/NWE in mind.

That may answer some of your questions (though I'm not sure if it dfirectly addresses frontage. I think not). Also, you might want to do a search on John Salts posts - he often posts snippets from stuff he has extracted from the PRO.

Incidentally, if you have access to it, Max Hastings "Overlord" has a quite detailed description of the opening of Op EPSOM, going into sch details as frontage etc.

Edit: found it: How to Attack Like The British

Regards

JonS

[ August 17, 2004, 01:50 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by JonS:

[snips]

Also, you might want to do a search on John Salts posts - he often posts snippets from stuff he has extracted from the PRO.

I'm reasonably sure nothing I've ever dug up from the PRO addresses frontages. Laying down frontages smacks of doctrine, and in the British Army prior to 1982, doctrine was something foreigners had.

I might have a poke around my collection of books to see what there is on frontages, although I'm not sure I'll bother for someone who misspells "Chaikovskiy" with that utterly unjustifiable spurious initial "T".

All the best,

John.

[JonS]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by JonS:

[snips]

Also, you might want to do a search on John Salts posts - he often posts snippets from stuff he has extracted from the PRO.

I'm reasonably sure nothing I've ever dug up from the PRO addresses frontages. Laying down frontages smacks of doctrine, and in the British Army prior to 1982, doctrine was something foreigners had.</font>

[Mick15]

I'm designing a scenario with 2 Brit Btns attacking side by side, 2 coys up (and 2 coys back) as seems to have been the S.O.P. in Normandy, at least. My very rough impression is that battalions attacked on about 1 km frontage. Thus I should design a 2km wide field.

Operation Jupiter 10 July 44 - 43d Wessex division attacked on a two brigade front with one brigade in reserve. Forming up position (FUP) ran for just over 2000 yards (about 1800 metres) from the banks of the Odon at Trette Poux to the eastern edge of Baron. The intention was to secure Hill 112 using the two attacking brigades to break the MLR on a front of approximately 2500 yards and then pass the third brigade (214 mounted in Kangaroos - the hybrid APCs not the animals) with 4th Armoured Brigade through to secure bridgehead(s) on the River Orne a further 2 km beyond Hill 112.

The attack of 129 brigade onto Hill 112 is well documented and has its own very good scenario in CMBO. Worth having a look at.

Less well known and perhaps more typical (if there is such a thing) is the attack on 129 bgde's left flank of 130 bgde.

130 brigade put two battalions 4th and 5th Dorsets on a FUP of 1000 yards (~900m) for an average advance of 1100 yards(~1km) to the Caen - Everecy road with primary objectives of;

5th Dorsets a fortified farm (Les Duanes) and a chateau (de Fontaine) between quarter and third of a mile (400-600 metres) from the FUP.

4th Dorsets the village of Eterville third to two thirds of a mile (600 to 1000 metres) from FUP.

Advance would commence at 0500

Both battalions used box formation (2 Coys up 2 Coys reserve) and, besides integral brigade troops, were each supported by a squadron of the Churchill equipped 9RTR (B Sqdn for 5th Dorsets and C Sqdn for 4th Dorsets). 4th Dorsets also had 1 trp Crocodiles from 141 RAC of 79 Armoured Div in support. Also available to the attacking brigades were the M10 tank destroyers of 129 battery, 86th AT Regiment RA

A third battalion (7th Hants) with A sqdn 9 RTR was in reserve and would move onto the same FUP at 0600 to be available to 'leapfrog' the leading battalions when on their objectives and continue the advance a further 1200 yards into Maltot. The two Dorset battalions would be expected to reorganise and support this advance.

Each battalion would have one battery from 112 Field Regt RA (8 X 25pdrs with relevant battery commander deployed with Btn HQ and FOO(s?) with coys) for direct support. The artillery regt commander would be deployed at brigade HQ. In this operation - for priority (uncle) targets the divisional CRA (Commander Royal Artillery) - probably a Brigadier deployed at division HQ - could call on the divisional artillery of his own (43d Wessex) and 11th Armoured, 15th Scottish and 53d Welsh Divisions. A total of 264 x 25 pdrs.

Also committed to a pre attack barrage was the 3d and 8th Army Groups heavy artillery and the Royal Naval Bombardment Force. The pre attack barrage was on a front of 3500 yards overlapping the flanks of the attack (both brigades combined) by 500 yards, had particular concentrations on known centres of resistance and lasted from 0400 to 0500 hrs.

A couple of other points. 129 brigade put all 3 of its battalions onto the FUP for the attack. Their FUP was the same length, 1000 yards but had a slightly longer line - some 1500 yards - to establish on their primary objective.

There wasn't a specified doctrine (as Mr Salt so accurately pointed out) on brigade frontage and battalions committed to attack/reserve. That decision was always informed by the notional 1000 yard brigade front for attack and then corrected for terrain and intelligence assessments and/or constrained by troop availability and exhaustion. This was of course done over tea.

I would suggest you decide on your map then over a cup or two of PG or Tetleys (with condensed milk and plenty of sugar for authenticity) decide the objectives, how realistically wrong the intelligence would be and then allocate the troops for attack/reserve.

BTW you can (or could two years ago) get a copy of the contemporary 1:25000 map of Hill 112 with the 43d Wessex Intelligence overprint of 8 July 1944 from the Keep Military Museum, Bridport Road, Dorchester. (If M Dorosh reads this I believe that at about midnight on 11 July the Canadian 4th Brigade moved into Eterville and the salient created by 129 brigade, and later 15th Scottish troops, to relieve them so it might be of interest.)

There is also a very good account in Tim Saunders "Hill 112 Battles of the Odon" ISBN 0 85052 737-6. He breaks the account up by brigade attacks and it would be an excellent source for the variety of answers to your original question if you can get a copy - it doesn't include scale on maps however.

I however am sure of the distances I quoted as I was there, on my bike, having a good look around two weeks ago.

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Mick15:

A third battalion (7th Hants) with A sqdn 9 RTR was in reserve and would move onto the same FUP at 0600 to be available to 'leapfrog' the leading battalions when on their objectives and continue the advance a further 1200 yards into Maltot. The two Dorset battalions would be expected to reorganise and support this advance.

Check out Andrea's CMBO scenario 'Maltot' at Der Kessel. Excellent.

[Michael Dorosh]

Very interesting Mick - and yes, the Eterville battle is described in THE GUNS OF NORMANDY from the Canadian point of view...

[JonS]

Originally posted by Mick15:

Operation Jupiter 10 July 44 - [snips] the third brigade (214, mounted in Kangaroos - the hybrid APCs ... [snips]

Really? I had thought that kangaroos weren't available till TOTALISE in early August. Do you have a specific source that says that 214 was in the 'roos, and what type* of 'roos they were?

Regards

JonS

* For instance, might they have been White Scout Cars, and other such armoured half-tracks borrowed from artillery units and motor battalions (which was also done for TOTALISE) rather than de-frocked Priests, etc?

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by JonS:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Mick15:

Operation Jupiter 10 July 44 - [snips] the third brigade (214, mounted in Kangaroos - the hybrid APCs ... [snips]

Really? I had thought that kangaroos weren't available till TOTALISE in early August. Do you have a specific source that says that 214 was in the 'roos, and what type* of 'roos they were?

</font>

[HarryInk]

Ah gentlemens, yous is all excellent!! Thanks for such a nifty and fullsome discussion of my innocent question. I praise yous all most highly and thanks yous all from the bottom of my history-luving heart. Knew you'd be able to help.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

Check out Andrea's CMBO scenario 'Maltot' at Der Kessel. Excellent.

You are too kind. I actually considered it broken, and hence never released it properly.

As for the kangaroos - there is almost certainly some mishtake there. 214 Brigade was held in reserve initially, to go up with 4th Armoured Brigade later, if conditions allowed. Nowhere in the copious notes cribbed from other histories that make up Delaforce's 'The Fighting Wessex Wyvern' is there any mention of Kangaroos.

In Godfrey's history of the DCLI in WW2, it is said that 214 Brigade was supposed to exploit to the Orne in 'carriers' (this is mentioned twice). When they finally went into action, it was on foot.

[flamingknives]

Unit histories I've read often make reference to Troop Carrying Vehicles (TCVs) and carriers, but use them as an exceedingly generic term, so it's not clear if these vehicles are Uni Carriers, HTs, White scout cars or trucks. (They talk of firing Brownings and Bren guns on tripods from 'carriers')

Kangaroos are typically described accurately though.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by flamingknives:

Unit histories I've read often make reference to Troop Carrying Vehicles (TCVs) and carriers, but use them as an exceedingly generic term, so it's not clear if these vehicles are Uni Carriers, HTs, White scout cars or trucks. (They talk of firing Brownings and Bren guns on tripods from 'carriers')

Kangaroos are typically described accurately though.

"TCVs" refer to trucks, generally large ones (1 tonne and up) - these were operated by the RASC (RCASC et al) and pooled behind the lines for non-tactical movements, generally of infantry battalions who did not have organic transport capable of lifting the rifle companies.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

[snips]"TCVs" refer to trucks, generally large ones (1 tonne and up) [snips]

Indeed, and in my mind always to "Drooper", the Bedford QLT 3-ton lorry. (In WW2 British parlance, anything of 30 cwt or over is a lorry, smaller vehicles are trucks.)

All the best,

John.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

[snips]

I might have a poke around my collection of books to see what there is on frontages,

I'm not doing very well so far, but here's what I can find.

A 1979 booklet entitled "Contact!" issued by 7 Int Section of 1 (BR) Corps to tell us what the devilish Sovs had in mind at the time shows a BMP company attacking on a frontage of 800 metres. The 2004 edition of the British Army's electronic battlebox gives the normal attacking frontage of an armoured infantry company as 600 metres. These are modern and mechanized figures, so should be taken as upper limits.

A map I have from a 1947 staff battlefield tour showing the progress of 15 (Scottish) Div (with 6th Guards Tank Bde) in Operation Bluecoat has a division frontage varying (due to wiggly boundaries with 11 Armd Div on the right and 43 (Wessex) Div on the left) between 3.5 km and 2 km wide, with 3 km being a pretty good average (the fattest bit of the frontage includes a bit for a sqn of the Inns of Court to potter about in). The division launched brigade attacks in succession, so each brigade would be attacking across the whole division frontage, two bns up each attacking on their own axis.

The map shows the position at last light on 31 Jul 44, and includes a single coy of 9th Cameronians occupying St-Martin-des-Besaces. It may be reading too much into the graphics, but the dashed line joining the isolated coy to the rest of 46(H) Inf Bde makes a neck from 600m to 400m wide.

The minimum possible frontage is obviously that used by 4 KSLI from 11th Armoured Div, who, that night, infiltrated forward three miles in the dark to establish themselves on the road running West out of St-Martin-des-Besaces. They did it in single file.

All the best,

John.

[JonS]

Oh, John, all this talk about BLUECOAT reminds me: did I ever send you the 21st AG ORS report on the heavy bombing in support of that op?

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by JonS:

Oh, John, all this talk about BLUECOAT reminds me: did I ever send you the 21st AG ORS report on the heavy bombing in support of that op?

If you did, I lost it down the sofa.

I can't remember whether it was heavies or mediums -- I think mediums -- but ISTR one CO was quite surprised to discover that the place he had just advanced to was scheduled to be flattened from the air in half an hour or so. This, despite the use of "contact cars" kitted out with lots of radios on both ground and air frequencies.

All the best,

John.

[Mick15]

Originally posted by Jon S

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Originally posted by Mick15:

Operation Jupiter 10 July 44 - [snips] the third brigade (214, mounted in Kangaroos - the hybrid APCs ... [snips]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Really? I had thought that kangaroos weren't available till TOTALISE in early August. Do you have a specific source that says that 214 was in the 'roos, and what type* of 'roos they were?

Very much looks as though you are correct - I went scurrying to my notes to find were the kangaroo info came from.

I have two accounts of an interview with Pat Spencer Moore, ADC to Major General Thomas (GOC 43d Division)

He describes a commanders conference in the tower of Fontaine Etoupefour church at 1500 on 10 July as it became clear that progress to the crest of hill 112 was stalled and as Eterville/Maltot was being heavily counterattacked.

The GOC made 3 decisions

1 4th Dorsets would be recommitted to support 7th Hants in Maltot.

2 Over ruling Brigadier Michael Carver of 4th Armoured Brigade elements would be brought south of the Odon to support an attack to "stabilize the battle for Hill 112 - perhaps even win it".

3 5 DCLI of 214 brigade would be the only infantry committed to this attack as 7th Somerset Light Infantry and 1st Worcestershires were already committed to support 130 brigade at Eterville.

In describing this first hand account in my copy of the book "Hill 112 Battles for the Odon" the author then goes on to state;

"5 DCLI in their assembly area north of the Odon ... dismount from their Kangaroo armoured personnel carriers and move by foot to the bottom of hill 112"

This statement, on page 115, is not a direct quote from the ADC's account nor is it referenced - so given the information revealed by a quick google search and Michael Dorosh's link probably not Kangaroos but one red herring - sorry.

I would like to know what 214 brigade were intended to ride though. I personally doubt that operational planning in July '44 expected shank's pony to be the best way to allow an infantry brigade (214) to accompany an armoured brigade (4) on a rapid pass through a taken, but potentially unsecured, enemy MLR to a relatively distant objective (establishing an Orne bridgehead).

As I have several sources making it clear that this was the original final phase objective for Operation Jupiter and as I cannot think of any more allusions to animals I shall leave you with that question.

[HarryInk]

Amidst my thanks for the excellent answers you chaps have provided, might I just add a moment of particular praise for Mick15, a junior member. Very fulsome answer, very detailed reference to sources, and he even rode his pushbike over the ground to get it (sort of) 1st hand. Phew!! Now there's grogginess for you.

Sir, I dips me lid to ya! Thanks.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Mick15:

I would like to know what 214 brigade were intended to ride though. I personally doubt that operational planning in July '44 expected shank's pony to be the best way to allow an infantry brigade (214) to accompany an armoured brigade (4) on a rapid pass through a taken, but potentially unsecured, enemy MLR to a relatively distant objective (establishing an Orne bridgehead).

As I have several sources making it clear that this was the original final phase objective for Operation Jupiter and as I cannot think of any more allusions to animals I shall leave you with that question.

I thought I had answered that by looking into Godfrey's 'History of the DCLI'. The answer to your question is 'Carriers'. Since we are talking British Army here, I guess it is safe to assume that 'carriers' does indeed mean Carriers, and is not a stand-in for 'a vehicle that I could name but shall only refer to by a generic term.'

Or not?

[Moon]

Not sure if this was mentioned yet and if it was, sorry for double-posting, but here is info taken from the 1945 US War Department Handbook on German Military Forces -

"Normally a sector assigned to a platoon is between 165 and 220 yards. A company attack sector is about 330 to 550 yards. A battalion sector is 440 to 1,100 yards, while a division sector may be 4,400 to 5,500 yards"

In the defense,

"normal sectors are: platoon, 220 to 550 yards; company, 440 to 1,100 yards; battalion, 880 to 2,200 yards; regiment, 2,200 to 3,300 yards; division 6,600 to 11,000 yards."

Now keep in mind that this was written in 1945, so the information in the Handbook has always to be taken with a grain of salt, as the knowledge at that time was limited in some areas. However, sector width is probably one of the more reliable information in that book.

Martin

[Andreas]

Martin

Those are quite ideal standards as far as the late-war German situation goes. In AG Centre before Bagration, divisional sectors were up to 32km in 4. Armee sector (3 divisions, a further 6 divisions had 22-27 km, and one had 17km), defended by 6-9 battalions. In 9. Armee, Korps sectors were 123km (5 divisions), 69km (3 divisions) and 114km (2 divisions!).

For IX.AK, the battalion frontages were:

252.ID - 30.1km

I./461 - 7km (46 men/km)

III.461 - 5.3km (57 men/km)

III./7 - 8.3km (48 men/km)

FuesBtl 252 ID - 6.0 (59 men/km)

I.7 - 3.5 (80 men/km)

Korps-Abt. D 30.8km

IR171

I./171 - 3.4 (80 men/km)

FuesBtl 56 - 6.0 (59 men/km)

DivGrp 262

RgtGrp 462 - 5.4 (67 men/km)

Rgtgrp 482 - 6.3 (56 men/km)

IR234

III./234 - 4.7 (79 men/km)

II./234 - 5.3 (74 men/km)

These strengths probably exclude battalion supply echelon and refer to what the Germans called 'Gefechtsstaerke'.

It looks to me as if the sector information is based on ideal, textbook circumstances.

Greiner & Degener, in their 1941 handbook 'Taktik im Rahmen des verstaerkten Infanteriebataillons' (a textbook for German officers) give the following frontages:

Attack

Battalion - 400-1,000m

Company - 300 - 500m

Platoon - 150 - 250m

Defense

Battalion - 800 - 2000m

Company - 400 - 1,000m

Platoon - 200 - 500m

Rearguard

Battalion - 1,600 - 4,000

Company - 800 - 2,000

Platoon 400 - 1,000

Regarding depth, they say that breadth = depth. I.e. if your battalion is spread out 600m, then your reserve company should be 600m to the rear.

They also counsel that the situation and the lay of the land can make significant adjustments necessary.

[Dandelion]

Agreeing with Andreases post and re-emphasising what I have already written above.

However, returning to Harry and writing with a designer hat on, reality cannot be converted indiscriminately to CM scenarios.

IRL, the advancing squad in line (abreast) would spread out to a "normal" (i.e. textbook normal) some 25-70 meters frontage depending on terrain. For comparison, a church in CM is 20 meters wide. The CM squad frontage is roughly 2 meters or so.

The issue not being capacity to receive fire, as squads can get hit even if incoming does not actually hit the squad graphics. Problem is outgoing fire, and LOS. I.e. capacity of controlling the environment with projected firepower. E.g. if you pout your squad right behind said church, it will not be able to spot or fire straight ahead as if the line stretched out 2-25 meters on both sides of it.

CM frontages are thus by necessity reduced, from squad and up. An attacking platoon can, IMHO, effectively control a 100 meter frontage if full strength, and ineffectively (but still to some extent) control a 200 meter frontage. Quite regardless of nationality or weaponry.

Adding a squad to create 4 squad platoons, as some are, does not really alter the frontage maximum, as the "in command" function dictates maximum distances.

And so all the way up the unit hierarchy, frontages must - for playability purpouses - be reduced in comparison with real ones. And consequently, the larger the unit, the larger the reduction.

So, Harry, for design purpouses, I wouldn't look to realistic frontages, neither textbook nor actual historical realities. I'd do some testruns and see what works with the game.

Let us know what conclusions you reach.

Cheerio

Dandelion