U.S. Army Cavalry Group at Work 1944

[John Kettler]

Blundered across this most informative discussion of the Cav in the ETO. Seems to offer all sorts of interesting CMETO possibilities. Haven't explored main site. The 2 September '44 entry has a wholly unexpected indication of canister combat effectiveness.

http://members.home.nl/alasoe/113th_cav_gp_sept_1944.htm

Regards,

John Kettler

[JasonC]

Sorry, it just doesn't remotely imply that. 2 Stuarts and an M8HMC catch a German infantry platoon in the open, after a flanking maneuver. The Germans thought they'd be firing at a dense vehicle column from behind a hill. Instead the are caught running in the open by 3 tanks, with 37mm canister yes, but also with 7 machineguns between them and 75mm HE. As they had no ranged anti-tank weapons, they surrendered. Nothing is said about lots of them being hit or anything remotely like it.

[John Kettler]

JasonC,

It was unexpected in that I never expected to encounter a canister engagement when reading the report. If the canister fire didn't do anything, then why would the war diary or whatever the right term is make so much of a big deal about the canister effectiveness in the engagement cited?

Regards,

John Kettler

[JasonC]

It simply doesn't. You are reading into it. They just factually say the 3 AFVs fired a few rounds of canister and 50 Germans came out to surrender. Considering the circumstances and the strategic context (whole combat commands beating up any company with a PAK that makes a stand, etc), it is perfectly understandable. If the German platoon had had a chance to shoot up trucks with MGs and rifles from relative hiding, they would have. When instead they are caught running by armor, they give up. They can see what the consequences of trying to fight would be - and those consequences would be the same if the 3 US AFVs only had machineguns. Men without ranged AT weapons caught moving in the open by armor are beaten. The round is irrelevant, it is the impunity of the armor and the vulnerability of moving infantry that are decisive.

[John Kettler]

JasonC,

I quote the online document for 2 September 1944

"Captain Orman took two light tanks and one Assault Gun to the left flank and fired direct cannister fire at a group of Germans running to a draw behind a hill. A few rounds brought about fifty of the enemy to the road to surrender."

I see no mention of a) MG fire directed at the Germans and/or 75mm fire from the M8 HMC. Since it seems to me that had such been employed it would've been mentioned (after all, the incoming rifle and MG fire was specified), I fail to see how you can so airily dismiss what is plainly and clearly recorded. What seems to be happening is that you don't want to concede that canister fire was the means of forcing the surviving Germans to surrender, hence are offering plausible sounding alternatives while resolutely ignoring what the account actually says.

Regards,

John Kettler

[wunwinglow]

Why would canister ordnance be substantially more effective at persuading the German soldiers to surrender than any other type of ammunition? Now, if they had been fired on by a Crocodile, I could understand the issue.

Tim P

[JasonC]

It says 50 Germans caught in the open by tanks toward the end of the race across France surrendered after a few shots were fired at them, and your thinking the round type fired had anything to do with it is transparently silly and not in the document. The rounds they fired were canister yes, the threat not the effect is what brought about the surrender. Does it say "wounded 50 Germans who were speedily captured and sent to the hospital"? Nooo. If you've read a thousand such narratives from North Africa to the end, you know that gobs of infantry surrendering to tanks when caught in the open is quite common.

[Harry Yeide]

All that said, the 37mm canister round was very effective in the bocage and the Pacific, where close-in engagements were common. I've seen reference to crews liking the fact that they could fire canister on the move as pin-point accuraacy was not all that important.

[Wicky]

On Wednesday 13th Sept there is another reference to the use of canister...

"On the left flank, Troop “C”, 113th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron reinforced by Troop “E” and 2 platoons of Company “F”, likewise met stubborn resistance consisting of an enemy strong point of about 100 men with small arms and machine guns. Lieuenant Kilbane, commanding the leading platoon, at once initiated aggressive dismounted patrols to “feel out” this position and determine its opposition. It was discovered that while this position consisted of many men with rifles and machine guns, there were no anti-tank weapons. Accordingly, the reinforced troop closed in on the enemy with armored cars and tanks and fired “point blank” with 37mm canister ammunition at the dismounted Germans. The strong point was thoroughly reduced - killing about 20 enemy and captured the rest."

[dieseltaylor]

Wicky

I think you are reading too much into it. I think you will find that they were firing MG's also and this was what caused all the deaths. My research shows that with 800,000,000 rounds manufactured and a historical lethality of.00069 and given a probable duration of this minor skirmish then it can only have beeen MG's.

: )

[JasonC]

"there were no anti-tank weapons. Accordingly, "

Operative phrase. After which, anything will serve.

[John Kettler]

Doubler's CLOSING WITH THE ENEMY, in the hedgerow busting section, describes a most interesting drill used by a pair of Stuarts. When they burst through the gap created by explosives, one fired canister down the enemy side of the now breached hedgerow to the left, while the other did the same to the right.

This was deliberately and repeatedly done as a sanitization measure against enemy infantry typically dug into the back side of the hedgerows.

ISTR infantry fireteams rode on the engine deck for close in protection, too.

Personally, I believe that the reason we see canister used in the several examples cited is because it's all about instantaneous firepower and suppressive effect. One trigger depression puts out a gigantic shotgun blast of projectiles covering a significant swath of ground laterally and vertically. Contrast this with a handful of point aimed MG bullets released in that same instant of time.

The JMEMs (Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manuals)

tell us that the first volley is the most effective, indeed compute artillery and mortar fire casualties based on two separate tables (standing for initial volley and prone for all subsequent volleys) because of this, so it seems to me to make eminently good sense to instantly put down a dense pattern of projectiles on an exposed target, rather than scare it with a few rounds likely to hit only a couple of men, if that. This is parallelled by Allied experience with the MG-42 in which the GIs found it fired so fast that the initial burst tore the men apart before they could even get to cover. Same with canister. Not only does the target unit take a bunch of casualties at the same time (some quite grisly given multiple hits), but those unhit have heard death whistle past while the very ground itself seems to explode at their feet. Any doubters could be rapidly convinced by a follow up round, thanks to the very high ROF for the 37mm. I believe the effect would be a small scale version of shock and awe in which fire superiority is achieved so rapidly that target morale simply collapses. Judging from the 13 September piece Wicky posted, it would appear that canister had significant impact even against troops not caught on the hop in the open. Last I checked, "strongpoint" implied being dug in or in other good cover, usually deliberately enhanced.

The U.S. 37mm M6 AT gun firing canister was instrumental in stopping Japanese banzai attacks in Guadalcanal, inflicting enormous casualties. Want to say it was at the Tenaru River. Adding to Japanese misery, they were then counterattacked by Stuarts which literally ground the victims under the tank tracks.

Regards,

John Kettler

[JasonC]

Armored cav tries to attack in Hedgerow country -

"After a quick and successful start, the first hedgerow was taken but the enemy called upon heavy artillery and mortar fire which began to slow the advance of the Squadron. With the initial objective almost in our hands, the Germans hurled a severe counterattack supported by self propelled guns. Having suffered many casualties, our weakened troops were driven back and all the fiercely won ground was lost. Late in the afternoon, having been reinforced by Troop "A" of the 102nd Cavalry Squadron, another attack was made and this time the ground was retaken. And held. The Squadron suffered 108 casualties as a result of the day's action and the tank company was reduced from seventeen to a strength of four effective tanks by enemy action and by tanks being stuck on hedgerows."

Not transparently a smashing success. The fact is, light armor just wasn't up to it.

Endless examples of armor, any armor, doing its its thing vs. infantry - "Approximately 300 Germans, forced from the town by the Troop "E" bombardment, broke from the eastern edge of the town, coming into full view of the supporting elements of the attacking troops at a range of about 2500 yards. Intense artillery and 50 caliber machine gun fire was brought to bear on these enemy troops, causing a complete rout and inflicting innumerable casualtes."

Note the range. Note the called fire, plus the reach of all the 50s on the vehicles.

Doesn't even have to be open ground "the first platoon, commanded by S/Sgt Briglio, had made contact with a tank outpost in a thick wood two miles east of the town and was engaged with dismounted enemy on either side of the tank. After a fire fight with machine guns and hand grenades 82 prisoners were taken, including two officers"

Sometimes the infantry can break contact instead "Troop "C's" first platoon, under Lt. O'Brien engaged enemy delaying forces in almost company strength ar the crossroad one mile west of Champion. Fire from assault guns, armored cars, and the maneuvering force caused the enemy to withdraw."

Lots of Germans were looking for reasons to surrender "1st Lt. Farmer led the force in a wild charging attack on the town from two directions, with tanks, armored cars, and dismounted men, which netted many prisoners"

Sometimes canister is the agent in repelling an infantry attack "barrage was followed at 0600 by the attack of the 1st Battalion, 751st Regiment, 326th VG Division on "C" Troop's right and the 2nd platoon, "F" Company, S Sgt. Bielicki commanding, defending the Roer Valley in Monschau. The spearhead of the attack was completely smashed by cannister fire of the tank platoon delivered at a range of 50 yards."

Sometimes it is called artillery fire - "A "C" Troop patrol under Tech 5 Van Order broke up other attacking elements as they emerged from Menzerath, with artillery and mortar fire which be called for and adjusted by radio."

Sometimes it is vehicle MG fire, followed up by called artillery fire - "This attack was first brought to a halt by machine gun fire from "C" Troop's 2nd and 3rd platoons, and then smashed by fire from the 62nd FA Battalion and "E" troop"

Sometimes it is just 2 men with a radio to the M8HMCs firing indirect "At 0400, a "C" Troop listensing post under Tec 5 Allen Anderson on the Menzerath Hill detected a force of 60 or 70 enemy approaching their post. They called for and received fire from "E" Troop within two minutes, which broke up the enemy endeavor."

"were finally driven off with machine gun fire, and punished severely by artillery fire as they retired"

Endlessly. Any weapon serves. Breaking up groups of 50 or so German infantry really isn't much to write home about.