Direct hits on theoretically confined units

[Wartgamer]

Since the US and British+Canadians numbers are very close, I would assume a half damage inflicted by these two 'forces'. Its about equal to the German 'damage' (not counting prisoners).

I would say that US forces may have inflicted, on average, around 40K casualties a month on the Germans using all forms of firepower. Lets assume that 30K a month is artillery.

This must be a period of intense artillery use and the number of shells fired must be fastly depleting war stocks and rapidly approaching the delivery rate. In other words, this is where Jason's theory is in swing.

He claims that US used as much in the ETO theatre as the Germans did in the war. What number of shells a month were being fired? 10 million? 20 million? MORE??

Lets assume the US had 3000 tubes (lets count only large mortars and artillery pieces during this period). Each fires 50 rounds a day. Thats 4.5 million a month. Thats 150 rounds for one casualty.

[ March 10, 2005, 02:32 PM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[Wartgamer]

My own opinion of Jason's theory is that it is WWI-headed. It is not as applicable as he thinks.

Take the case of the Battalion Commander that can call in a 10 Battalion concentration. He does not care about attriting anything. He does not even need to destroy that much. He can use his battalion to quickly followup such a devastating attack and sieze the enemy in a disoriented state. He captures the enemys. See? War ends without attrition.

But the war was a race to Berlin and there was no time for WWI silliness.

The hedgerows made 10 battalion concentrations dangerous to anyone and they negated such tactics.

[ March 10, 2005, 06:02 PM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Wartgamer:

My own opinion of Jason's theory is that it is WWI-headed. It is not as applicable as he thinks.

Take the case of the Battalion Commander that can call in a 10 Battalion concentration. He does not care about attriting anything. He does not even need to destroy that much. He can use his battalion to quickly followup such a devastating attack and sieze the enemy in a disoriented state. He captures the enemys. See? War ends without attrition.

But the war was a race to Berlin and there was no time for WWI silliness. The hedgerows made 10 battalion concentrations dangerous to anyone and the so negated such tactics.

I thought TECHNIQUE was more important than WEIGHT of fire? ie Time on Target, creeping barrage, etc.

Were they many instances of masses of dazed defenders simply meekly surrendering after undergoing heavy bombardment?

[Wartgamer]

A Time On Target is a Weight of Fire. Its a massive amount of Firepower applied in a very short period of time i.e. within seconds.

And the dazed troops can stay in their trenches/bunkers. Doesnt matter, they are being out manuvered. The point is that the US was taking ground in WWII. Not attriting an enemy.

[Nidan1]

On the 11th Armored Division front on the opening of Operation Goodwood, 1000 Lancasters and nearly as many B-17s pounded the German front from 1500 meters in front of the advancing British across the German positions and into their rear area. 1000 and 500 lb bombs were used by the RAF and smaller fragmentation bombs were used by the AAF to prevent cratering. As units of the 3RTR advanced a rolling artillery barrage followed the bombers and lead the way for the British tankers.

The following is taken from a Pen and Sword book on Operation Goodwood.

Bill Close a British tanker remarked:

"We rolled on through boiling clouds of dirt and fumes, 38 Shermans doing their best to keep up with the rollng curtain of fire. I could vaguely see tanks on either side of me picking their way through the ever-increasing number of bigger and bigger bomb craters.... Dazed and shaken figures rose from the uncut corn, and attempted to give themselves up to the leading tanks. When I waved them to the rear, they stumbled off with their hands over their ears. Other Germans squatted in their foxholes staring stupidly, completely demoralized as we passed. Our infantry would collect them, or so we hoped. Sure enough, we could see David Stileman's carriers rounding them up."

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by Nidan1:

Suffice it for me to say that Giap tried to duplicate the conditions of Dien Bien Phu at Khe Sanh, but failed under the weight of superior firepower that was deployed by the Americans.

But did he actually try, or was he bluffing as some have suggested? I'm inclined to believe the latter.

[Nidan1]

Originally posted by Kingfish:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Nidan1:

Suffice it for me to say that Giap tried to duplicate the conditions of Dien Bien Phu at Khe Sanh, but failed under the weight of superior firepower that was deployed by the Americans.

But did he actually try, or was he bluffing as some have suggested? I'm inclined to believe the latter. </font>

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Wartgamer:

A Time On Target is a Weight of Fire. Its a massive amount of Firepower applied in a very short period of time i.e. within seconds.

And the point of a TOT is what?

To deliver that firepower on an area at precisely the same time, so that anyone above ground is effected - ie don't have time to reach cover once the shells start dropping...

[Wartgamer]

It could effect people above ground and below ground directly or indirectly. I bet even a Eastern Front VET might be taken aback.

Whats your point?

There were different techniques to doing TOT. One was a concentration which suddenly stopped, followed by TACAIR, which completed and then a TOT announced that troops should start the assault.

Another technique was to do a TOT but all the different batterys would use different fuze settings. So there would be airbursts, ground bursts, sub terrain bursts.

I have seen footage of a TOT and its apparent that there is slight arrival differences but its quite a show. Would not want to be in one.

[ March 10, 2005, 08:11 PM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

The inquisite craftsmanship shown by the intrepid German soldier...

"Inquisite"??? As in, "questionable"?

Michael

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Wartgamer:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Andreas:

What is the '214,000' number? If that is supposed to be the number for the east, it is far too low (presumably ignoring MIA that were in reality KIA). The Germans lost 180k in Romania alone, IIRC.

I am not just talking about KIA, I assumed Jason was not either. WIA/MIA other than POW should also be counted if you want to look at total damage done to a force.

Yes it says killed. And I am also counting wounded also. I am assuming them from a 1:6 ratio also mentioned by the source. </font>

[Wartgamer]

Why?

I am basing my calcs on other data. Good luck on the eastern front.

[ March 11, 2005, 12:14 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[JasonC]

My statement of equal expenditure to all of Germany's is wrong. It is about equal to Germany's for all fronts for the same period, not to all fronts for the whole war. Tens of millions of rounds absolute scale. I regret the error.

For the period from D-Day up to September 1, the figure I find for German losses in the west is 293,802. German sources quoted in US official history. As a check, Feldgrau gives 805k for the period until November 30th.

For particular US ammo expenditures I find - July, 837k 105 plus 351k 155 plus 40k other large (4.5 inch, 8 inch, 240mm - no 4.2 inch mortars included). For August, much lower when the front moves - 409k 105, 150k 155, 31k others. Thus 1.82 million for the two month. But that leaves out June, compared to the figure above. I haven't found the figures. My guess is well below July, because the force ashore was less, the month is "light" one week at the start, and the focus was on Cherbourg rather than the drive south, a smaller operation by about half the force ashore. Maybe above August maybe not. Less mobile but more troops ashore.

If you estimate June as the average to the lower August figure you get a range of 2.4 to 2.7 million. Divide the German losses into Brits and US and there are about 150k to the US. Arty might be as low as 1/2 (since "fragments" which cause 3/4 is a medical category and broader) or as high as 3/4. Putting the shells per casualty caused by arty around 20 to 35.

By the fall, the rate is 2.5 to 3 million per month But the critical period for shell supply started in October, hitting 3rd army then (but not 1st). A reasonable estimate is 5-6 million additional by the end of November. (The rate is rising simply because there are far more divisions in action at the westwall at the end of November, than in June or July in Normandy). German losses in the west to November 30th are 805k. The same sort of calculation gives 25 to 45.

Call it 30 and accept that it is going to have a large error, the order of magnitude right but not much else to trust in the number. (E.g. the fall shell figure is an extrapolation, the portion to arty might be considerably lower with PWs taken into account properly, these might offset each other if the former is high, etc).

[ March 11, 2005, 12:49 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[JasonC]

Incidentally, for eastern front German losses in June, July, and August I have 916,860. You can't believe killed figure extrapolations for months that include Bagration because reporting broke down. You get spikes in the "missing" category of several hundred thousand per month.

[Wartgamer]

The Sherman 75mm (which was designed for indirect fire also) and M10 TD units (which made themselves usefull as arty) could be counted in.

The M10 could actually shoot further than a M7 and had the same mobility. Its rate of fire was slower I suppose.

The Sherman 75mm HE was a decent sized payload for its caliber. It was used indirect by both the US and CW.

It would be guessing what percentages of these ammo types were used in this fashion. A side note is that M10 AP ammo was rationed. Not sure if it was HVAC but the source states 'AP'.

The 81mm light round should probably be thrown out but the heavy round and the 4.2 in HE are both 'cover-defeaters'.

[Wartgamer]

As far as the 105mm shortage, my feelings are as follows:

1. The US built up a mountain of the stuff in England pre-D-Day.

2. The need for 105mm gets maxed almost immediately as battle bogs down.

3. The task of loading ammo off England onto boats and unloading jams up the works.

4. The arrival of cargo ships from US with 105mm ammo becomes the source at France. No stopping at England.

5. 105mm in England becomes the reserve and the ships from US to France becomes the 'pipeline'.

6. Getting 105mm to units requires much trucks/gas in France.

So the factorys can create shells at great quantities but the bottlenecks limit the firing schedules. Using the arty ammo in ways that gain ground becomes the proper use of it. Attriting the enemy is pissing away resources.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Wartgamer:

Why?

I am basing my calcs on other data. Good luck on the eastern front.

Because IIRC ca. 220k Germans were KIA and permanent MIA in Romania in the 2-3 weeks following August 23rd 1944 alone. So unless the Germans had 6k Zombies revived in all the other operations (you know, the irrelevant stuff like Bagration etc.), the number 214k KIA can not be correct.

That's why.

[Wartgamer]

A cute TOT story was just read.

US units have a SS unit bottled up. The SS, in a town, have discoved much liquor. They get crazy drunk and decide to perform a night attack with knives and grenades.

They charge across an open space but are discovered there and the area has been registered as a TOT defensive fire. The Germans are virtually wiped off the face of the earth.

One lone drunk was hiding under a M10 TD and is shot point blank by a crewman as he climbs to the top to drop in a granade.

Those Germans sure know how to party.

[ March 11, 2005, 09:40 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[Wartgamer]

I think that Jason agrees that the Germans KIA/Wounded/blasted-to-pieces may be around 30-50K a month for the first few months in Normandy by the US forces alone.

How many were 'arty-d' could be from half to 3/4 I suppose.

The situation on the eastern front was more chaotic during the summer of 44.

[Wartgamer]

The SS story brings up a point. Not all shells fired by the US were at defensive positions. The Germans were counterattack happy and got a taste of just how good arty can be.

So it must be considered that many Germans were not hiding in bunkers/trenches/etc but were 'did good' out in the open.

Not a majority but I think it further dilutes the stats.

[Wartgamer]

A purely mathemeatical approach could analyze the microsituation also. This and the rough stats developed so far could ballpark a feel for what is going on.

What I will try to do is use the spread of shells against a modeled bunker target. The target will be small but vulnerable to a direct hit. Like a small trench position. The stats should show how many shells are needed on average to get one 'trench-hit'.

I have German 105mm divisional howitzer data somewhere. I will model the small trench as a 1mx4m target. Lets assume that any hit within a 2mx5m area will 'get' some people in this target.

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Wartgamer:

The situation on the eastern front was more chaotic during the summer of 44.

Yes. But the total losses are still known, even if they can not be broken down into categories. The numbers are in the archives, and I have seen some people who have actually looked at them there.

[Wartgamer]

Agreed. Its not as clearly documented as the western front where for the first few months, the slaughter was better tracked. The Germans were not disintegrating as much.

I will use the following data:

1. German 105mm Howitzer. Charge III, 866m/s, 6290m max range

2. 50% zone is 96 yds long 10 yds wide.

I assume that means that if 100 shells are fired, half will fall in a rectangle described by those dimensions. If this is a bad assumption, please correct my stats.

I must assume that the target is 'known' and the exact range to use has somehow been determined by artillery methods. In other words, its just bad news for the guys in the trench or so it seems.

Edit: I can't find my Statistics book, someone here must know this by heart.

But if 100 shells are fired, half fall in the 96 yd zone. If our target is only modeled as 2 meters along this line, could more than a few actually 'get' the range? If they do 'get' the range, there is still the width variation in the fall of shells, so a 'length' hit could still be a 'width' miss, if you follow my s**thouse statistician thinking.

This is under optimal shooting conditions. Its very hard to determine exact ranges and also very hard to know that you are really 'centering' the spread of shots to fall about the target. It may take a dozen shells to reveal the actual 'spread' is being applied correctly.

So I will look for my book and the stats guys are invited to tear me apart till then.

Edit: Heres an interesting webpage about this topic.

http://www.poeland.com/tanks/artillery/dispersion.html

The dimension of this rectangle is much longer in the direction of fire than in the lateral direction -- typically by a factor of four to five. Each 1/8 division along the long axis (the line of fire) is known as a range probable error; along the short axis is a deflection probable error. For the 155mm gun M1 at 18000 yards, the range probable error is 43 yards and the deflection probable error is 9 yards, so the whole rectangle is 344 × 72:

By using the range probable errors, you can compute the chance that a shell will directly hit a target of a particular size if the guns are aimed perfectly, for instance, in the above example a 86 yard × 18 yard target (to make the math easy: two range probable errors by two deflection probable errors) with its long axis aligned with the line of fire would be hit by 25% of the shells in the above example, since it's the same size as the black central 25% rectangle.

An anti-tank gun of size 4.3×0.9 yards, being 1/400th of that size, would be hit by about .0625% of the shells, so you'd have to fire about 1600 shells at it for a direct hit (though, since the burst radius is large, you'd have scared off the crew with much less ammunition).

Unfortunately, I only have a couple of range probable error figures that were used as examples in the FM6-40 manual. (If anyone out there has the WWII firing tables, I'd love to hear from you.)

[ March 11, 2005, 10:37 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Wartgamer:

1. The US built up a mountain of the stuff in England pre-D-Day.

2. The need for 105mm gets maxed almost immediately as battle bogs down.

3. The task of loading ammo off England onto boats and unloading jams up the works.

Which wasn't helped by the loss of the American Mulberry in the Great Channel Storm.

Michael

[Wartgamer]

Jeesh I am losing my memory. I had just read a month ago about 90mm US antiaircraft guns being used indirect.

Since they did not have many bombers to shoot at, the were certainly employed , like M10 TD, in an indirect fire role.

So these would need to be piled into the arty round count or at least, like the shermans, swing the ratio further.

Edit: also the towed 76mm tank destroyers.