Direct hits on theoretically confined units

[Wartgamer]

The problem with barrel wearout needs to be explained.

Its not that they may need a few barrels replaced. Its the rapid occurance of the problem in many weapons systems at once.

Lets take the case of a guns firing 50 rounds per day. After 200 days, on average, you have many guns ALL approaching the 10,000 mark. So suddenly, you have a swamp of orders to move the barrels up (displacing other needed supplies), the urgency of replacing barrels (cant be like changing a tire if you think about it) and lack of striking power.

This happens to many weapon systems. Tracks on tanks, engines, etc. The US found this out and as good as any weapons system is, it is a fact of life. The funny thing is that with tanks, due to total write offs, you have a mixed age group. But arty hardly ever gets as mixed an age group and they all 'age' at the same approximate rate.

Ballparking things here but lets say the US fired 20,000,000 105mm rounds from D Day till end of the year, that would mean about 2000 barrel changes. Having a rotating fleet of 105mm guns themselves could aleviate this but its still a logistics nightmare.

[ March 10, 2005, 07:31 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[JasonC]

No my numbers don't get scaled down by a factor of 10, they are overall averages that are regularly achieved in operations with all such things taken into account. Arty accounts for the majority of losses. Fat shells fired run 10 times the losses that can be attributed to them, pretty reliably. Individual battles can and do see factor of 2 variations. But there is lots of averaging involved in any large battle, as to conditions typically achieved etc.

The reinforced log bunker is designed to withstand a direct hit, and it will. A thinner one without the logs or with nothing but a layer of logs, will not. Direct hits happen readily, and no not because they are achieved by pinpoint accuracy, just statistically.

A battalion position has a hundred targets. A large beaten zone is not a serious drawback, when you are shooting into an occupied area larger than said beaten zone. In CM terms, don't think one FO shooting at one squad in a trench. Put a battalion on the map, and then shoot 3 FOs at the whole area, target wide. You will hit people.

The scale of ammo fired is several times your figure. But it is trivial to replace a few thousand guns over a year, much easier than it is to move tens of millions of shells. You don't have to go switch the tubes, you just issue a whole replacement howitzer. The old one can be sent to the rear. Armies move thousands of tanks and tens of thousands of other vehicles. Every category of unit turns over its equipment in the course of a campaign, guns are no different in that respect.

As for the Khe San comparison, the NVA inflicted some losses despite having little in the way of arty. They were mauled in return by both arty within the perimeter and massive air. More to the point, the US had vastly superior forces throughout the whole theater, and could have sent portions of them to raise the seige at any time. DBP represented practically the entire French airmobile arm, virtually all its air (a few squadrons for all of Indochina, north and south). They were outnumbered 4 to 1 in infantry manpower and 2 to 1 in guns. It was crazy, based on silly underestimations of the combat power of the VM.

What does make a difference in cases like hedgerow fighting - where arty efficiency in terms of causalties caused per round fired ran about half the overall average - is target density variation from poor intel. The German defenses in Normandy did not need to defend every field, and in practice did not. You put a strong point in this field, and mines in that one, register arty on a third. You make a checkerboard of such positions several kilometers deep, and sortie to counterattack as isolated bits of the attacking infantry get into the defense. As a result, arty shot into the whole area will hit empty fields a lot of the time.

In more open terrain, the same defense scheme would be readily penetrated. The enemy would rapidly detect the gaps. In the hedgerows, your dispositions are a complete mystery, everything beyond 200m is a complete guess. The defense gets away with an uneven concentration across its front. Some shells hit the thick parts and hurt as usual. Others don't and do not hurt. Result, a lower average, but still a basically linear relation between shells fired and losses caused.

You only really depart from that relationship with massive oversaturation in time and place. That gives diminishing returns, and is wasteful from an arty efficiency perspective. It happens when commanders ask more of arty tactically than it can readily deliver. Trying to get annihilation fires on the hardest targets, for example. That is a waste. Arty should be fired at the most vulnerable targets, not the hardest ones. In moderate doses, gradually applied.

It is an attritionist's weapon. It bleeds the enemy - the phrase is meant to be graphic and to illustrate the essential rate-like character of the process. It puts the enemy in a dangerous state from which he must extricate himself, or he will eventually succumb.

In CM terms, fire at adequately concentrated infantry targets (as opposed e.g. to single guns or MGs off by themselves). Fire at the exposed targets. Don't think "what places can other things not reach", think "where can I hit the most men with these shells". In CM, the best targets are infantry platoons to companies in large woods or in the open.

In practice, on defense MGs can drive men out of the open into pockets of cover, and arty then smashes them. On offense, ID the best bodies of cover and smash them with serious calibers according to a timetable (the Russian way e.g.), or walk missions of 2 minutes or less over fully IDed enemy infantry positions, woods most common. (Longer and much wider shoots were used historically. But CM rewards "dodging" and seriously limits shell budgets, repaying such "scalpel" applications of FO firepower).

The most effective calibers in CM are the 150mm, 155mm range. The 120mm mortars and Russian 122mm calibers are also effective. 105mm are OK, vanilla effectiveness, enough to get the job done.

Lighter stuff (75-82) is not nearly as effective. If a scenario gives it to you, use it only on men in the above ground (i.e. no foxholes, no buildings) in woods or open, and expect it to stun rather than kill. (Yes I know the AI can bunch up to ridiculous levels and make even the light stuff effective, but that is a stupid AI trick and doesn't work against people).

The overall goal is simply to inflict casualties with it, and as a result to face (occasionally broken) half squads instead of intact units.

[ March 10, 2005, 08:36 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[Wartgamer]

I honestly concluded at the end of World War II , when I soberly

considered what I had accomplished, that I had moved the forward

observers of the artillery across France and Germany. In other words,

my battalion was the means by which field artillery observers were

moved to the next piece of high ground. Once you had a forward

observer on a piece of ground, he could call up ten battalions of

artillery and that meant that you had won the battle. (DePuy as

quoted on page 88 of Danny S. Parker's Battle of the Bulge)

There were 224 battalions that were organic to the 61 Infantry, Armored,

and Airborne Divsions. The 260 non-divisional artillery battalions included

3 75mm Prcht Bn

16 Armored 105 mm Bn

37 Towed 105 mm Bn

72 155 mm Howitzer Bn

17 4.5-inch Gun Bn

38 155mm Gun Bn

37 8-inch Howitzer Bn

5 8-inch Gun Bn

15 240 mm Howitzer Bn

1 Captured Enemy Wpns Bn

19 Field Artillery Observation Bn

Just for reference.

[Wartgamer]

I do not think that Jason has no merit. But he has to realize that in many situations, the means to resist many artillery shells is not as difficult as it was for the French in DBP.

The hedgerows were an example. The use of hilly/mountanous terrain another. Rubble is yet another example. A collapsed building does not always 'go to bricks'. It also leaves nice walls flat on the ground that can be tunneled under. The fact that artillery 'tonnage', that the enemy 'paid for', caused this nice thing to happen should not be lost on the reader.

If what Jason is saying has anything to do with CM, then I think it is that the player SHOULD expect artillery to murder troops in the open, but it should not cause as many casualties during the actual length of time a scenario represents (when a defender has cover). It should also make troops, whatever the circumstances STAY in 'decent' cover while under arty. The actual movement to other terrain must be justified by much better cover. I see troops leaving trenches when being fired at now, where do they think they will get better protection?

[ March 10, 2005, 08:48 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[Wartgamer]

The problem with the US 105mm shortage was that it took the teeth out of many advantages that Dupuy mentions.

The majority of the US Battalions were 105mm. The actual rate of fire capability was achieved by 105mm.

Just like the Soviets making a Booboo with too many tanks and not enough fule/logistics; Perhaps the US brought too many guns to the party without enough ammo? Not as catastraphic but still it was a problem.

I have also read that the US artillery was very fireplan happy and used the heavy stuff in non-support roles. They made lots of holes everywhere based on where they thought the Germans were. Not everyone of the listed Battalions were shooting at Germans in holes in the front lines. They were engaging crossroads and killing an MP with a Battalion of 8 in howitzers, firing at a location they thought that a German battery was at, etc.

The most effective calibers in CM are the 150mm, 155mm range. The 120mm mortars and Russian 122mm calibers are also effective. 105mm are OK, vanilla effectiveness, enough to get the job done.

But the new cmx2 will be smaller in scope. While it may be unrealistic to have a US company without some indirect fire capability, Having a 155mm battery in support against a non-entrenched enemy would be devastating.

[ March 10, 2005, 09:17 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[JasonC]

Well I certainly think it has to do with CM. On three different levels - (1) what CM players should expect of CM arty and how to use it in typical CM games as they are today.

That I think I've pretty well covered, and is simple enough. Go big, put on enemy infantry, watch pretty explosions, face fewer enemy afterward. It is mostly a set of don'ts - don't go small for hyperreactive fire, don't expect to follow within 30 seconds with bayonets and grenades, don't try to dig out individual MGs or area fire at distant sound contacts etc.

(2) What is unrealistic about typical CM games, but can be changed by players (or scenario designers) without any alteration of the game as it stands. The biggie there is excessive focus on ground compared to casualties. Flags, maneuever, "the mission". Well, stuff the mission. Show up, bleed the enemy more than he bleeds you, do it again tomorrow. You will win the war that way. You won't run whole armies off their feet at one go.

Designers can already accomplish this. Fewer flags, more evenly divided. Placed where the front is expected to stabilize, not a massive incentive to throw away the whole force within 30 minutes to grab an insignificant hill or hamlet. As in, I've got 2 100 points in my backfield, he does in his, neither is expected to lose them. There is one more down by the crossroads over over on that patch of high ground on left. Very occasionally both.

See, that rewards gaining important bits, and allows for a bonus for blowouts (to record higher levels of victory e.g.) But it leaves the overall score to turn mostly on the losses inflicted question.

Rather than - 1 large and 4 small flags all deep in the defender's rear. Which mentally is saying "losing your battalion is of small consequence, but the war will be won or lost depending on whether you have the last half squad on hill 342 at 5:28 PM this evening." Rewards unrealistic tactics and penalizes realistic ones.

Because, e.g., if I decide to probe, outscore the enemy in kills 2 to 1, but refuse to press home the attack because I deem it unfavorable and likely to fail - I lose 700 points. In the real world, that is a modest win with judgement and fighting another day.

You'd see the value of artillery attrition abilities and the rewards of its proper use with the realistic set up, VC wise. Arty expends ammo, but ammo rightly does not cost VPs. It inflicts casualties, which rightly do cost VPs. An arm that can asymmetrically and reliably inflict damage on the enemy without sustaining any itself, is valuable for that reason alone.

And proper use of it can be not an operational scale afterthought, but the point of one's low level tactics. You can play to get observation and herd the enemy to a place where a barrage hurts him - without loss, and without asking anything further to count it as a great success.

In chess there is such a thing as a closed game. Playing for small positional advantages. In CM, there is nothing stopping such strategies, even within the confines of a VP scoring system. They just have to be noticed and allowed for by designers.

If you mean to forbid them, consciously, as not what the real situation is supposed to require, fine. But do not suppose the fight won't be "interesting" or "fun" unless two maneuver-element-dominated forces are mashed together so hard one of them evaporates.

Similarly, there is no reason players have to religiously use the rarity system and thereby penalize larger arty calibers. There is no reason scenario designers, as opposed to QB players, need to pay all that much attention to CM prices at all. You can put in whatever level of arty you think is realistic. The CM limits are very anti-arty compared to the real deal. US forces e.g. would often send battalions worth of shells far more readily than battalions worth of men.

I am not saying you have to, I am saying there is room for a much wider range than scenario designers typically make use of. A few modules per side as an afterthought to a glorious tank duel is typical. That wasn't WW II, or even the deciding process in WW II. It is fun, it happened, it matter. It is also well covered, and other things are not. Read Dupuy's comment and ask yourself, would I get that impression playing CM? Why would an American in particular have that impression? (Can anybody afford 3 105 modules in CMAK? lol).

All of the above can be handled without any questions of accuracy of the game. There is nothing wrong with it, in any of the above senses. (One can quibble all day about pricing decisions and QB settings - and I have! - but in the end is so easy to roll your own, you can decide such matters for yourself).

The last way, (3) that is might matter to CM is that CM may get things wrong that might deserve tinkering.

Things like men's ability to move under arty fire, to leave cover in order to dodge - which exploits the predictability of the scale of typical CM bombardments. See, in the real deal you didn't know when you saw the spotting round that the pattern would be 60 by 140 laid out east-west and would arrive in the following minute, ergo a brisk jog 100m to north or south would mean instant safety.

Try doing that under 3 batteries firing simultaneously using target wide at aimpoints spaced out by 100m each. In CM, such barrage scales are so rare players discount them. In WW II, they were so common the men hugged the bottom of their holes and wouldn't dream of going jogging during a barrage.

The resistence of fortifications to shellfire, gradations of it across a wider variety of fortifications, entry and exit of them (dugouts for squads etc) - all can obviously be improved and apparently will be for CMx2. Buildings should have cellars modeled - they were vital and their tactical niceties important (hard to see or fight from, very good cover, etc).

I think morale recovery from shellfire should be distinctly slower than it is. It is a bit silly that most of the effects of a barrage that wounds half the men in a platoon have dissipated within 2 minutes. This might take some doing, in terms of tracking sources of morale decline or having some deeper "shock" register that effects morale recovery rate.

Indirect fire by on-map guns besides mortars would be nice. It was certainly done. Obviously accuracy should suffer seriously. But a battery firing reasonably sized HE for a minute or two could deliver a credible barrage. Might have some shooting delay before execution, like the present FO countdown clocks.

Do I think the key missing thing is inability to account for the ASL original "2" critical hit TEM reversed result? Um, noooo.

[JasonC]

In terms of CM fire missions, US 155 missions would be about as common as US 105 missions. Yes there are fewer shells fired. But you get fewer rounds per CM module, in about the right proportion. It certainly doesn't need to be less than 2/3rds as common as the 105, as a module.

There was nothing rare or high level about 155s. They just weren't kept at division level. IDs had one battalion, but most of them were in the corps arty (arty brigade groups) to maximize opportunities to support additional units. They most certainly were not shooting at deep targets exclusively. 4.5 inch guns and 155 guns (as opposed to howitzers) did that, but the standard 155mm howitzer shot anything and everything, especially the front line.

It would be perfectly ordinary for a company to receive 155 support. It would get 105 support somewhat more often, but almost always one or the other. Not 81s. There is this idea that lower units shot more often. It is not true. The bulk of the rounds were fired by div arty and corps arty for the US, by div arty for the Germans, by div and army arty for the Russians. That is where they put the fire control and the supply arrangements etc.

Similarly for the Germans, 150s were not scarce or exclusively shooting deep. If you look at the ammo, the 105s fire roughly 4-5 times as much as the 150s, but the ratio of ammo in the CM modules is between 2 to 1 and 3 to 1. So 1/3 is the right ratio of CM 150 modules to 105 modules. For them the 81s are more common than for the US, but still less common than the 105s - no more common than the 150s actually, in module count.

Is big arty somewhat overmodeled compared to smaller in CM? Sure. The effects are most realistic for the 105 to 120 range, and above that are exaggerated and below it understated. Probably as a result of overly literalist square functions or some such. It is even more pronounced for direct fire, because the effect is sensitive to exact shell placement to too great a fineness. (The squad isn't actually all on the same 2m patch, after all). That is a reason to (1) restrict use of superheavies (which actually was rare, while 150 range stuff was not), (2) tune the models a bit. It is not a reason to pretend 155s did not exist or were not standard or fired into podunk instead of at the front line.

[Wartgamer]

155mm could certainly be used as direct support but many accounts describe its divisional control having missions like counter-mortar. The German mortar fire was a rightly feared threat for an attacking Army like the US. So while 155mm may be available, it may also leave suddenly.

Also, the designer has mentioned that arty ammo use will play into victory conditions. So you shoot your wad and it 'costs' you. I am not sure how currentyou are on the recent cmx2 topics.

[ March 10, 2005, 10:48 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[Nidan1]

Originally posted by JasonC: As for the Khe San comparison, the NVA inflicted some losses despite having little in the way of arty. They were mauled in return by both arty within the perimeter and massive air. More to the point, the US had vastly superior forces throughout the whole theater, and could have sent portions of them to raise the seige at any time. DBP represented practically the entire French airmobile arm, virtually all its air (a few squadrons for all of Indochina, north and south). They were outnumbered 4 to 1 in infantry manpower and 2 to 1 in guns. It was crazy, based on silly underestimations of the combat power of the VM

Not exactly an accurate asessment for several reasons, but since this is not the topic of this particular thread, I wont belabor the issue here. Suffice it for me to say that Giap tried to duplicate the conditions of Dien Bien Phu at Khe Sanh, but failed under the weight of superior firepower that was deployed by the Americans.

[JonS]

Originally posted by Wartgamer:

So the 25 lbr crew must load the projectile, ram it home, load the 'powder' (or is this in a brass cartridge?) and then close up and fire?

Yes.

Is the US gun a single warhead/cartridge (fixed or not, they are one man load)? The loader throws this in and thats it?

Not really. The round doesn't magically appear in the loaders hand prepped and ready to go.

Is the US gun autoclosing once the shell is thrown in? Does the spent cartridge auto eject?

No. No.

I believe that a US 105mm could achieve 12 RPM or more.

10-12 for 'red-hot fire missions'(per Cooper).

25-pr. acheived 12 rpm on a regular basis. 17 rpm was not unknown (per Blackburn).

Type of ammo is not the only limiting factor. Det size and weapon ergonomics have at least as much effect.

[Wartgamer]

The much publicized ammunition shortage became evident with orders which rationed ammunition strictly, (105mm was zero). However, the Group obtained two 88’s and two German 150’s with plenty ammunition These were manned by the idle 105mm gun crews. Also the three forward observer tanks in each armored battalion were used as batteries, since the 75mm ammunition was still available.

While in the Champey area the Group established a schedule of three movies per day in a large wall tent and the battalions were allotted quotas each day.

On the 31st of October the Group moved...

This seems to show that 105mm ammo was getting scarce before the Bulge even.

[Wartgamer]

I suppose that Jason's ascertions could be put to a test if the following were known:

D Day to D Day+30, how many arty rounds fired?, how many German casualties?

If the US arty-mortar Battalions fired 10 million rounds, and it takes 100 rounds to make a German a casualty, were there 100,000 German ccasualties?

The problem is that the US dropped tons of bombs, millions of bullets, rockets, tank rounds, etc.

General Patton said it "Sure takes a lot to kill one German"

Mortars/Arty are also not as permanently incapacitating as direct fire weapons. Many wounded are short term and long term 'repairs'.

[Nidan1]

You would probably also have to include shells fired from ships in the channel. German positions were still in range of naval gunfire probably into mid-July.

[Wartgamer]

As far as 25 pdr vs 105mm..

The semifixed 105mm could be 'ready-zoned' so that they need not be 'assembled' as needed. Its a down time job and not applicable to rate of fire in a short term time frame.

The semifixed 105mm may be a heavier total 'thrown-load' but its still a one part movement not a multipart drill. The need to ram the shell home and extract the rammer is a waste of motion.

I have seen footage of 105mm fast firing and it is not 5 seconds between firing.

This website claims its 12 secs between firing for 'intense'. I think not.

http://nigelef.tripod.com/maindoc.htm#Rates%20and%20Times

[ March 10, 2005, 12:07 PM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[Wartgamer]

Originally posted by Nidan1:

You would probably also have to include shells fired from ships in the channel. German positions were still in range of naval gunfire probably into mid-July.

Yes and I do not believe that the Germans had that many casualties anyway. Anyone know if its around 10,000? Thats my gut feel. Which is an order of 10 off.

[Andreas]

Total Normandy KIA/WIA casualties according to the D-Day museum were >200k for the Germans. Plus >200k POW (many of whom would have been wounded?). 90k KIA/WIA/POW at Falaise out of 400k total. Casualties for D-Day alone estimated at 4-9k KIA/WIA.

I'd say 100k looks somewhat high, but not outrageously so, if the D-Day museum has its numbers correct.

[Andreas]

Overhead cover against heavier stuff in a long-term position (probably near Kirishi in 42/43).

German use of 155 during mobile campaigns - because the 155 was the only MotZ arty bn in the infantry division, it would be employed as support for the Vorausabteilung, built out of the motorised divisional elements (AT, some pioneers, elms of recce, 155 bn). So at the sharp end of divisional operations, the chances to have 155 in support for an infantry platoon were pretty good in those days.

Later 155 suffers from the general German artillery problem. There is not enough to go round of anything.

[Sergei]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Overhead cover against heavier stuff in a long-term position (probably near Kirishi in 42/43).

Is the couch booty from a Soviet Artisan Brigade, or was it stolen from a Möbelwagen?

[Andreas]

The inquisite craftsmanship shown by the intrepid German soldier even in the most adverse circumstances was a harbinger of what a united Europe, standing firm in the fight against the Bolshevik thread, could have been, put for the plutocrats sending their unfit fighting men to die in their tommy-cookers, holed numerous times by the invincible TIger, a tank that to this day striked fear in the hearts of descendents from those who died at the rounds of its magnificent 88L57, a gun which has seen no better. The problem was that the German soldier was just too good at anything and everything that he touched with his skillful hands.

Phew, don't know what just came over me?

Liberated in a Russian house, is my guess.

[Wartgamer]

One source...

Germans losses, June – November 1944 (starting with Allies invasion in Normandy and before Germans fronts collapssed both at East and West):

killed 214,000 54,000

So 54,000 killed for the whole western front. Perhaps assume 300-400K wounded. In 6 months facing US and British and others in ETO.

I doubt that 100,00 K were inflicted by US against Germany in one month in Normandy.

[ March 10, 2005, 02:06 PM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[Andreas]

What is the '214,000' number? If that is supposed to be the number for the east, it is far too low (presumably ignoring MIA that were in reality KIA). The Germans lost 180k in Romania alone, IIRC.

I am not just talking about KIA, I assumed Jason was not either. WIA/MIA other than POW should also be counted if you want to look at total damage done to a force.

[Wartgamer]

Typical hedgerow.

Note that just laying in the ditch on the opposite side of incoming fire probably gave you excellent protection. If you burrow into the hedgerow you get invulnerability to many forms of attack.

[ March 10, 2005, 02:05 PM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[Shadow 1st Hussars]

Just ran this test... 1 Full company of Russian Infantry in Tall pines being suppressed by MG fire as the rounds fell. 1x 105mm Spotter with 60 rounds managed to do this....

*Edit - OK the image is of low quality... but incase you can't see it the results where 171 casualties

[Wartgamer]

Another source...

CASUALTIES

Most of the casualties occurred amongst a relatively small number of troops. Infantry made up only 14% of the British Army but suffered 90% of its casualties. For the soldiers in the front line, Normandy was as dangerous as the Western Front in World War I.

Ground force casualties: D-Day to end of August 1944 (Source; Official History)

Killed Wounded Missing

Total British & Canadian 16,138K 58,594W 9,093M 83,825T

US Armies 20,838K 94,881W 10,128M 125,672T

Total 36,976 153,475 19,221 209,672

German Army (estimated) 240,000 200,000 prisoners

[ March 11, 2005, 12:17 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[Wartgamer]

Originally posted by Andreas:

What is the '214,000' number? If that is supposed to be the number for the east, it is far too low (presumably ignoring MIA that were in reality KIA). The Germans lost 180k in Romania alone, IIRC.

I am not just talking about KIA, I assumed Jason was not either. WIA/MIA other than POW should also be counted if you want to look at total damage done to a force.

Yes it says killed. And I am also counting wounded also. I am assuming them from a 1:6 ratio also mentioned by the source.