Direct hits on theoretically confined units

[JasonC]

On 50mm vs. 81mm mortars, it is clear to me the latter is far superior as a firepower and mobility "sweet spot".

It is about as heavy as a weapon can get and still be regularly man packable (broken down), thus able to reach any terrain. It has enough range to hit MGs without reply, and the mobility to move after firing to avoid counterbattery (which was rudimentary at finding them in that era).

The effect of the shell is quite high, when a target is caught moving - much higher than CM portrays against men in the open. The casualty radius of an 81mm mortar round is not much below that of a 105mm round. It is much less effective against men with cover, because it is getting that effect from smaller fragments etc.

In CM, you drop 81mm mortar fire on a platoon and they go to ground and lose a man or two. That isn't wholly innaccurate, although sometimes the platoon would be more seriously hurt, because caught up and moving. When they hit the deck they are reasonably safe from further harm. What they don't do in the real deal is get right up again afterward, 2 minutes later minus a couple of rifles but otherwise none the worse.

No, see, they have a half dozen wounded, and only 2 are ambulatory, the others require 2 stretcher bearers each, and the medic, and somebody carries their stuff, and some of the men are rattled. And the net result is, that platoon is lucky if half of it can continue the mission half an hour later. If they are under immediate attack, maybe they can fire back with 2/3 to 3/4 strength in five minutes. Artillery stun, disorganization, and confusion is considerably higher than portrayed in CM and takes longer to pass.

Also, you know that infantry mortared in the open will be stuck there like cement as long as your ammo holds. You watch them, when more than two get up you drop another several rounds on them. The German combination was MG42s if you leave cover and 81mm mortars if you stay in it but try to move around at all. The typical result is simply paralysis - the targeted formation will not move.

Now the 50mm has no such effect. The round is far too weak for it, a hand grenade at best. A hand grenade that misses by 30m is not obviously useful - that is how far one typically throws a hand grenade, and you don't thrown them expecting to kill yourself. If they were lasers and landed on the exact 2m square you selected they'd still be useful, but they aren't and they don't. A pattern of a dozen 81mm mortar rounds with the same expected errors will blanket the target with fragmentation. A couple of 50mm mortars will not have this effect.

The Germans rapidly abandoned their 50s. Even in 1941 when they had them in the TOEs, the ammo consumption figures show they were not really being used. Almost all the missions were 105s from div arty. The only significant suppliments to that statement were 150s also from div arty, and 81mm mortars from company and battalion. Each of them firing far fewer missions than the divisional 105s. (150s because there were fewer tubes. 81s because of low range and poor resupply compared to div arty, and because the Germans were attacking).

The Russians followed suit as soon as they had enough 82mms. The Brits kept 2 inch mortars but used them mostly as smoke tossers. The US continued to use a light mortar, the 60mm at company. It is a much more substantial weapon than the 50mm, but still underpowered and underranged compared to the 81mm. The US of course also used those, but did not regard them as readily man movable (they hauled them around in trucks). They also suffered ammo shortages in 81mm, with battalions rapidly throwing all the ammo they had.

120mm mortars are excellent artillery weapons but clearly artillery weapons. They need a prime mover. The range is much longer than an 81mm (about 6 km typically) but only half that of a tube artillery piece. This puts them at a disadvantage in counterbattery terms and limits the frontage a given gun can support. They are "naturally" regiment supporting weapons, in terms of the frontages you can expect to cover from reasonable back positions etc.

They were easy to make and the Russians got excellent mileage out of them. But then the Russians needed the help in indirect fire, since their standard field artillery piece was 76mm, not 105mm. And 76mm is distinctly lacking in punch as an indirect fire weapon. (The shell actually contained significantly less explosive than an 82mm mortar round).

They had 122s at division and lots more above, which filled out the high end well. At the typical regimental combat team level, where the US or Germans would have a div arty battalion of 12 105s firing in support, the Russians instead had 120mm mortars. A workable system. But not a man packable infantry heavy weapon that can go anywhere the infantry goes, and still hit hard enough to pin an enemy platoon on demand. That is what the 81mm offered.

[JasonC]

Incidentally, in CM I also like the 81s, on map, but they are undermodeled in their effect on ordinary squad infantry - at least when commanded by humans. (The AI bunches up in a few spots and any targeted HE can mess them up badly).

In CM, the main role of on map 81-2s is destroying towed guns - which they will typically do in 1 minute, occasionally 2 - and pinning or breaking MGs in woods or (slightly less good at, compared to flat trajectory HE) trenches. Their ammo is generally too precious to spend on ordinary infantry, unless the need is urgent or it is late in the fight.

Compared to towed gun overwatch, they can hit reverse slopes, readily get at stuff not visible from the start line, etc. And compared to tanks, they can do so without revealing themselves (FO spots etc). Very important for the guns. And the rounds can be where you need them in less than a minute, not 4-5 minutes as with FOs.

I generally don't take the off map kind. They don't hit quite hard enough for the price and the delay all FOs involve. I prefer 120s for the Russians and 105s from the Germans. The marginally longer delay is easy to handle if you call for fire well ahead of time, and walk the aim point around as you get new intel. The total delay may be somewhat longer, but counted from a time well before any actual engagement. From the time you know you need it, the delay is typically 2-3 minutes in either case. And the 105s-120s hit a lot harder when they land.

[Wartgamer]

Originally posted by JasonC:

In the Stalingrad position example, I see 31 MG positions and 64 other infantry fighting positions on a frontage of 5 km, with maximum depth 1 km. Do I have to worry that one of my rounds might land 150 yards long, when I am firing at a target that is 5 km long by 1 km deep? I do not. Do I have to ensure my converging sheaf brackets a single slit trench, or does it only have to land on or near any of 100 fighting positions (or the accompanying open trenches)?

And again, lets repeat, you are firing at a line. You are not firing along the front. And the 'depth' of 1 Km is dead space. You should really research German defensive positions.

You do not realize that infantry in defensive positions are hard to destroy because you do not know what those positions even look like.

By showing that Stalingrad trench system, you have destroyed your argument.

[ March 23, 2005, 11:20 PM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[JasonC]

Make a little square 250x250m, put it on the map, move it around, count items under it. Front line area typically 4-6 positions, up to 8 for the best locations. CP and weapons area in the rear, up to 6 positions. Worst front line areas, 2-4 positions. Plus 250m to 500m of trench line. These are squad firing positions or fire team locations for the MGs.

Now, look at the Normandy example. These are now individual positions, marked separately in detail. At that scale, your 250x250m overlay is going to be pretty sizeable. Count positions again. The wonderful thing about having sources is we don't have to make these things up.

[Bigduke6]

I agree the 82mm is a powerful on-board piece, and I don't know how the point values stack up, but I am a big fan of the lighter 50mm and 60mm as well.

Sure the little mortars have their limitations for taking the stuffing out of an attack, small blast an all, although again if you get 2-3 firing a pattern they will deny a patch of ground to movement well enough.

The light mortars however are truly boffo if you are infantry attacking, or even counterattacking.

First they're only a little less mobile than your infantry squads, while 81-82mm are S-L-O-W, even worse than MGs. Sure you can slow down your infantry attack, but that gives the enemy more time to react yada yada.

Second they are just the thing to blast the enemy out of a trench or foxhole. Usually 1-2 minutes, even if the target is something ueber.

Part of the effectiveness it of course a function of crew quality, obviously more range means you fire longer. But that said, it seems to me it usually takes a light mortar less than 60 seconds to blast an MG out of its hole, and that pretty much is the key to getting infantry forwards in an attack. Ditto for an enemy gun, hit it with accurate light mortar fire for a couple of turns, and pretty much you can write off the gun.

True SP guns often can do the job of light mortars better and sometimes with more flexibility. Also true if I have to choose I want 82mm mortars landing on the enemy's head, not 50-60mm.

But for me, light mortars are a real important part of an infantry attack, and sometimes it seems to me like they are the key. I just wish they had more ammo sometimes.

[Wartgamer]

In Jason's origional 'analysis', he had companies in 200 meter squares. It should be evident to him that is not the case of defensive targets. In the Stalingrad map, 250mx250m may not actually encompass a platoon.

Even in the Normandy map, the dugouts are not always riflemen. He should count weapons positions.

Having sources is great. Understanding them is better.

Again, I will repeat that in Normandy, having an individual dugout in a hedgerow was proff against most artillery. So while it may be convenient to have sources, you really need to tie them into the discussion development so far.

[ March 24, 2005, 01:15 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[JasonC]

Actually in my original analysis I said a platoon will be under the footprint and a company might well be. Try to position forces in those attack concentrations (St. Lo maps) without putting a company in a square that size. And there is that much under a footprint in the hedgerows, easy. The Stalingrad position counts as thin, it is not built up at all, it was readily penetrated. It still has platoons under such a footprint, marginally more than that in the best few placements for fire missions.

The German Normandy position was most certainly manned. It held off repeated attacks by two regiments for about a week. Including several battalion scale flanking attempts that found how layered the position was, and the fact that the secondary lines etc were all actually manned. They tried repeatedly and with so much because it was on important ground. (Notice the contours? The back CP is up at 400 feet (there are 3, one as low as 300 feet), the main line starts at 290 feet, the outposts are at 260 feet elevation and the mines are down at 250 feet. It is a hill).

It repays detailed examination, incidentally. Read the narrative (Push to St. Lo, US army green books). It counts as a dense deployment, in close rather than open terrain.

Now, explain again with the Normandy map held in front of your eyes as you type, exactly why calculating a converging sheaf on a target of one foxhole, anything that misses that solitary foxhole being a miss simply, will tell us the typical effectiveness of a WW II artillery barrage.

[ March 24, 2005, 08:47 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[c3k]

JasonC,

Several minor points for you to ponder. First, I agree with your analysis of the utility of the 81mm mortar. However, you mentioned that the 50mm mortar was displaced by a combination of the 81mm variety and divisional artillery. I would submit that the German regimental infantry gun section of 75mm and 150mm guns filled that gap. (The could be used for direct fire, indirect fire, or forward observer directed fire.) (I believe a book by Knapp details their early use.)

Secondly, you mention the useful range of a hand grenade being 30 meters. That range being in excess of the effective range of the resulting explosion. I disagree. I've thrown many hand grenades (all during training). I'd NEVER use one if I did not have cover between me and my target. Of course, those are modern grenades. I don't know how their lethal radius compares with WWII varieties.

Regards,

Ken

[JasonC]

the 50mm mortar was displaced by a combination of the 81mm variety and divisional artillery

Err no, I certainly said no such thing. I said most of the ammo expended was from div arty, and only tiny amounts of 50mm were fired, proving that they were not really being used at all, even in 1941. IG guns fire much less than div arty as well. Direct fire opportunities are less frequent and riskier, fewer shells per target are used, etc.

On grenades, of course I've thrown them too. I wouldn't feel safe not hitting the deck, but that doesn't mean I'd be hit if I didn't. It means I don't run unnecessary risks. Grenades that land more than a few meters from their target are rarely going to do anything. And the probable error of a German 50mm mortar (in the range) is around 30m, not 3m.

[Wartgamer]

Back o the enveloper - 7857 m2 middle area, 26302 m2 farther area. Assume a platoon in the former and 2 more plus weapons in the latter. A mix of foxholes and trenches, 1.5 m2 average per man, with 40 men in the middle area in 20 positions and 120 more in the farther area in 60 positions. JasonC

Your math was based on this.

The bottom line is your whole argument is based on density of troops in an area. The reality is that troops are spread out in a thin line and area is largely dead space.

For a laymen translation: Jason is saying that rounds that don't hit what he is aiming at will surely hit something else.

[Wartgamer]

This shows a SQUAD trench system. The shelter at the rear is the bomb proof. The Unterstand was the hide out during intense bombardment. The 'U' in the trench system were small dugouts for less intense bombardment.

[ March 24, 2005, 10:46 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

[Wartgamer]

http://img62.exs.cx/img62/7726/mgpost4jk.th.jpg' alt='mgpost4jk.th.jpg'>

A MG position showing a 'U.' position adjacent

[Melnibone]

<yawn> Gosh you're clever. Sooooooo clever. </yawn>

[Wartgamer]

Well its either I am one thing or another. No pleasing everyone thats for sure.

I forget. Have you ever had anything memorable to say? You seem sarcastic and annoyed.

[Dave H]

Originally posted by Wartgamer:

(snip)For a laymen translation: Jason is saying that rounds that don't hit what he is aiming at will surely hit something else.

Then am I correct in making a second layman's translation: Wartgamer is saying that rounds that don't hit what he is aiming at will surely not hit something else?

Isn't Jason saying that for every 25-30 shells fired one will normally land close enough to somebody to cause a casualty? Differences in the density of the enemy soldiers within the impact area would not appear to have an effect on the rate of casualties. If the enemy soldiers are spread uniformly through the area, a single shell may miss completely, or only land close enough to affect a single soldier. If the enemy soldiers are concentrated in part of the impact area, more of the shells will miss completely, but any shells that hit the area of concentration may cause multiple casualties. Six of one, half a dozen of the other. Wholesale killing with artillery is neither very romantic nor very heroic, is it?

[Melnibone]

Originally posted by Wartgamer:

Well its either I am one thing or another. No pleasing everyone thats for sure.

I forget. Have you ever had anything memorable to say? You seem sarcastic and annoyed.

Not annoyed at all. Nothing memorable to say either...much like yourself...although I've said nothing memorable in far less posts than you.

[Wartgamer]

]web page

Here is data for a German 150mm divisional artillery piece.

Note the 50% zones in length and width.

[Wartgamer]

Originally posted by Dave H:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Wartgamer:

(snip)For a laymen translation: Jason is saying that rounds that don't hit what he is aiming at will surely hit something else.

Then am I correct in making a second layman's translation: Wartgamer is saying that rounds that don't hit what he is aiming at will surely not hit something else?

Isn't Jason saying that for every 25-30 shells fired one will normally land close enough to somebody to cause a casualty? Differences in the density of the enemy soldiers within the impact area would not appear to have an effect on the rate of casualties. If the enemy soldiers are spread uniformly through the area, a single shell may miss completely, or only land close enough to affect a single soldier. If the enemy soldiers are concentrated in part of the impact area, more of the shells will miss completely, but any shells that hit the area of concentration may cause multiple casualties. Six of one, half a dozen of the other. Wholesale killing with artillery is neither very romantic nor very heroic, is it? </font>

[jacobs_ladder2]

Hey, I appreciate all the help Jason and Jon. This stuff is making a huge difference and allowing me to move quickly past a major stumbling block. Thanks.

Also, I don't want to get involved in any arguments (mainly because I honestly don't understand what this particular one is about) but didn't the Russians basically defeat the Germans in a giant war of artillery attrition? I mean sure, Barbarossa started out as a highly mobile affair but really, once the RKKA started producing lots of T-34s and German tank losses piled up didn't things basically grind to a halt except for a few spurts of significant motion?

Jason's statements about the long term detrimental effects of sustained artillery pressure ring fairly true to me when I think about the fate of the German army. I might be mistaken about this, but didn't the Russians essentially win by neutralizing the German armoured threat and then slowly grinding away with concentrated artillery (in the order of hundreds of guns per kilometre of front)?

Cheers

Paul

[Wartgamer]

The Germans would counter with depth if they could.

They basically had a thinly held front line backed up by strength in depth. Putting all your pies in the window was not too smart.

[jacobs_ladder2]

Originally posted by Wartgamer:

The Germans would counter with depth if they could.

They basically had a thinly held front line backed up by strength in depth. Putting all your pies in the window was not too smart.

Interesting. Meaning that the effect of the massed artillery was to force the Germans to adopt a strategy that could not possibly win a war?

Or rather, they couldn't stand against it, but could only delay the inevitable?

Yikes.

[JasonC]

My very first post in the thread was about the need for serious fortifications with thick overhead cover if you are to withstand artillery bombardment. I was specifically pointing out that lying down in a foxhole or slit trench was not sufficient. Because arty simply has more shells to throw at people, than you might suppose - orders of magnitude more shells than men they are fired at, that the receiving side can afford to lose etc.

Now the fellow who was trying to explain that a single gun is too inaccurate to hit a foxhole, wants to say infantry can avoid arty by having shell proofed meter thick dugouts everywhere. Um, who came in to make the point that that is what it takes to stop 105s and up from bleeding you white?

Barrages are not laid down 8 yards wide by 150 yards long. I've fired a few of them - I doubt he has. Trust me, they aren't as thin as a pencil and you can't avoid them by taking three steps to your left.

Any position being probed regularly by enemy infantry has to be manned. That means thick fronts, not everyone in their cellars all day. Everyone in their cellars all day results in artillery waste, I point I also made in this thread and a related one. The solution is to add the threat of infantry attack, then blast the resulting required front.

The Germans manned fronts in the east instead of defending in depth because they didn't have enough men to defend in depth on 1000 miles of front. Also, because they were regularly ordered not to give ground, etc. The thin position of 5 km by 1 km deployment illustrated above was penetrated and defeated. The thick one, in the Normandy hill bocage defense, resisted heavy infantry attack successfully - but is clearly a much better target for artillery fire.

Go read push to St. Lo. Follow the progression from an intact front and reserves arriving while the US is still cleaning up the Cherbourg area, to the collapsing front that allows the Cobra breakout. Read 7th army's own account of what happened to it. From 6 July to 25 July is not a lot of time. The Germans had excellent infantry, well equipped, on excellent defensive terrain. They had defense schemes like that depicted above - in depth, multiple lines facing tiny fields, a battalion plus (I count 71 MG positions) deployed in a strongpoint on key terrain 600-800 yards on a side. The Americans took heavy losses trying to attack positions like that.

But the Germans ran out of men. Ran out of infantry. Because every day several thousand rounds came over. Three quarters of battle losses come from shell splinters. In less than 3 weeks, divisions defending in front of 2 US corps were reduced to cadres, double or tripled size reduced. What happened to them? Didn't they have 4 feet of overhead cover? Aren't they invulnerable? Isn't artillery throwing spitballs, that never hit anything? If somebody tells us they are still there and won, are we supposed to believe him?

[ March 24, 2005, 06:15 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[PLM]

this thread of mine has become quite ammusing

[JonS]

Originally posted by jacobs_ladder2:

didn't the Russians basically defeat the Germans in a giant war of artillery attrition? I mean sure, Barbarossa started out as a highly mobile affair but really, once the RKKA started producing lots of T-34s and German tank losses piled up didn't things basically grind to a halt except for a few spurts of significant motion?

Well, sort of, except those "spurts of significant motion" were months-long campaigns invoving vast amounts of men and material. Something the Western Allies wouldn't really be able to do until March-May '45.

the long term detrimental effects of sustained artillery pressure ring fairly true to me when I think about the fate of the German army. I might be mistaken about this, but didn't the Russians essentially win by neutralizing the German armoured threat and then slowly grinding away with concentrated artillery (in the order of hundreds of guns per kilometre of front)?

Artillery and mortars caused by far the largest proportion of cas in all armies, AFAIK. On the order of 60-80%.

There are others (calling Kip! Calling Kip! Kip, please come to reception!) far more capable of speaking to the Russian tactics in the later war years, but your description above is somewhat simplistic. Also, the 'X hundred guns per kilometre' kind of stats - when applied to the army of any nation - are fairly meaningless. Easy to visualise, but meaningless. Command and control, and resupply, are the real arbeiters of artillery 'power', though they're much hander to visualise.

Regards

Jon

[JasonC]

"Something the Western Allies wouldn't really be able to do until March-May '45"

Um, were they still in the south of France in March? Were they in Normandy? Salerno or the toe of Italy? The beaches of Gela? The edge of Tunisia? At El Alamein?

There were spurts in the west just like there were spurts in the east. Rapid exploitations that stall from logistical overreach, build up, large scale hard fighting with attrition, one side getting too weak to stand at the old positions, a collapse and a new pursuit phase - was utterly normal on all fronts.

El Alamein to Tunisia. Tunisia falling. (Sicily falling - pretty overdetermined frankly, that one). Southern Italy falling. The jump from the Gustav line to the Appenines. The fall of France. And then yes in addition the 1945 collapse.

To get these to happen they had to attrite DAK of its armor, withstand the Tunisia counterattacks and grind down what was left after them, defeat the Salerno counterattack, chew through the Gustav line, attrite their way through the hedgerows, chew on the west wall and repulse the Bulge and Alsace counterattacks.

Attrition preceeds breakthrough, when the defender knows what he is doing and has a remotely adequate force for the area he is trying to defend.

In the east, the attrition of Stalingrad preceeds the counterattack. The attrition of Kursk defensive preceeds the breakthrough counterattacks on the wings. Logistical stall stops the Stalingrad breakthrough, with counterattacks. Logistical stall stops the post Kursk breakthrough, with very heavy attrition fighting at the Dnepr bend. Bagration is a rout from the start, but ends in the same stall in Poland. Etc. The Russian front is bigger and the forces much larger, that is about all one can say.