Fascinating S.L.A. Marshall commentary

[JasonC]

All the German divisions sent to Normandy get there and get there intact. They run low on armor because they have to send new production to the east, so the west fights only on the - quite large - initial stock of armor the mobile divisions bring with them.

On infantry, they have lots more they don't use, and transport does have something to do with it. But it isn't fear of Jabos, it is lack of even horses, that keeps the "static" divisions sitting in their seaside fortresses. Plus lingering fear of a second invasion, and a desire to deprive the Allies of ports as long as possible.

If they had sent 50,000 infantry replacements a month they probably would have held another month. If they added 500 tanks a month to that they might have held indefinitely - but would have just collapsed in the east.

On Dupuy studies, they stem from the period between the war and the early heyday of board wargames, when "combat factors" were being invented. They had only the haziest understanding of what translated into combat power, besides raw numbers. All armor as superior, or uber Germans, or tech superiority of armor, were one batch, defense dominance another, factors like air a third (heavily promoted by USAF types and by "its all Goering's fault" excuse making from the German side).

In the history of wargaming it is quite clear the whole period is one of deep ignorance. It wasn't until systems like Panzergruppe Guderian from SPI that people looked at ways mobility itself translates into combat power for armor, instead of just higher "combat factors".

There was then a vogue explaining WW II performance discrepancies one the basis of supposed operational virtuousity and maneuver - until enough Russian history came out to make it clear the Russians were actually far better at all of that than even the Germans were, from 1942 on.

Then we had the small unit cohesion story, basically atttributing German performance to low level leaders and higher morale, as we'd call it.

A lot of it based on one sided accounts and quite inaccurate pictures of actual performance. Just being braver doesn't help very much against industrial strength artillery.

By now we know many of those old explanations do not withstand scrutiny. The main advantage the western allies had was overall logistic superiority expressing itself through firepower arms - particularly artillery ammo - and rates of replacement for everything from riflemen to medium tanks. With the Russians, it was systematical outstanding operational planning coupled to numbers, masking serious and long-lingering tactics deficiencies.

The main advantage the Germans had in practice was not from their armor - which was superior but also frequently misused and not a large net outperformer overall (particularly not against Americans) - but from the quality of their infantry particularly in defensive fighting. In Russia, their division to corps level artillery control was also highly effective on defense, particularly against the Russian penchant to overload narrow attack sectors. Which reflected superior small unit tactics and good infantry equipment and training - especially the former.

Air was a bit player in all of it. Western air did not give a commensurate return for all the resources lavished on it until the summer of 1944, through defeat of the Luftwaffe in open battle, then strategic bombing of oil plants. In resource return, a flak gun beat a fighter bomber hands down. Germany had a particular weakness in oil that only strategic bombing could exploit, and only after defeating their fighter force in sustained air to air combat. That is the only decisive contribution the western air forces made, and it had its impact quite late.

[dieseltaylor]

JC

As we tend to disagree of the value of heroic acts in the overall scheme of warfare what is your take on this:

Marshall also discusses an "incident at the Bourcy roadblock to the north of Bastogne on the morning of December 19, 1944." In this instance, twelve "very nervous" American infantrymen, firing in the darkness at what they thought was a reconnaissance formation, encountered instead the leading elements of the 2. Panzer-Division, and turned it back. So fierce was the American resistance that the German commander reported being attacked by superior forces. As a result, the German corps commander ordered 2. Panzer-Division to alter its planned movement and swing northward, "thereby wasting precious time and traversing unnecessary space." The results wrought by the bravery of these few American soldiers were profound.

"Had the enemy made one good lunge against the Bourcy roadblock, he could have turned southward and entered Bastogne before the American forces had assembled. The whole body of evidence from our own and enemy sources supports the conclusion that had this happened, the Ardennes campaign would have run a far different course and the enemy would not have been checked short of the line of the Meuse."(15)

I think we can agree that the war would still have ended the right way but the effort and deaths that may have been caused if the Germans had broken through would have been considerably more. I always feel that you think these heroic acts are almost an irrelevance to the result but I always believe that you should look at it in shorter time frames to establish if the benefit is really there.

[Kingfish]

Originally posted by JasonC:

All the German divisions sent to Normandy get there and get there intact. They run low on armor because they have to send new production to the east, so the west fights only on the - quite large - initial stock of armor the mobile divisions bring with them.

I haven't read the whole thread, so pardon me if I misinterpret, but are you saying the above in jest or truly believe it?

[JasonC]

No jest. Losses from air attack to combat units moving to Normandy were miniscule. Some soft transport was shot up and columns delayed, that is about it. As for the armor accounting, full units brought over 2000 AFVs to Normandy, and that is what they had to fight with. They arrived over a month or so. They got no large scale armor replacements to existing units. It went east, and later was assigned to the green new panzer brigades.

[JasonC]

dt - there were lots of small roadblocks all over and also plenty of roads at the time, after clean breakthrough of the front lines. The Germans looked for open roads and found them, following them to many miles west of Bastogne. They fought small roadblocks when they had to but avoided them whenever possible. Since they often came with mines, that was sensible and overall it speed things up. It was also doctrine - hit where they aren't not where they are, reinforce success not failure, etc. None of it stopped them from encircling and bypassing Bastogne, nor from assaulting it, nor made the guys inside hold when so assaulted. So no, I don't remotely consider such trivialities decisive in warfare.

[Kingfish]

OK, I agree that airpower played a minor role in interdicting the arriving columns, but it isn't entirely true that all the divisions arrived intact, nor that no replacements were sent. Both 1st SS and 2nd SS Panzer experienced their own nightmares with getting their units to the front, while there were some tank and SPG reinforcements sent.

[JonS]

From Zetterlings site:

Tiger II: 12 tanks. No reinforcements

Tiger I: 126 tanks, no reinforcements

Panther: 626 tanks, 8 reinforcements

Pz IV: 841 tanks, 56 reinforcements

Pz III: 30 tanks, no reinforcements

StuG and StuH III: 453 tanks, 27+ reinforcements (poss up to 100)

StuPz IV: 16-28 tanks, no reinforcements

Marder: ~60 tanks, no reinforcements

JagdPz IV: 104 tanks, no reinforcements

Jagdpanther: 25 tanks, no reinforcements

Totals: 2300 tanks, 90-160 reinforcements (4-7%)

So, strictly JasonC was 'wrong', but it hardly effects his statement. I suspect he is well aware that a few vehicles were brought up as reinforcements, but chose to ignore them as trivial.

Regards

JonS

[ March 21, 2006, 05:34 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[Kingfish]

Jon,

Are the numbers Zett listed only include those which actually fought in Normandy, or also include AFVs in transit but did not arrive in time? Not that it would make much of a difference, but for instance 12 Panzer IVs were sent to 12th SS Pz on August 10th, but did not arrive until Sept 5th.

[JasonC]

Kingfish - a strange choice of words, as the nightmares mostly belonged to French civilians. 2SS was "detained" killing people, and simply short trucks compared to establishment.

17th SS lost one count 'em one StuG to air attack on the way to Normandy. It was on a flatcar along with some oil that ignited and was destroyed by the fire.

Some reports claim Panzer Lehr - by far the hardest hit - lost all of 5 tanks on the way to Normandy, and large numbers of halftracks (like 80) and trucks (like 90). But it is disputed by the head of the maintenance section of the division at the time. And the claimed losses to halftracks about equal the actual figure for all of June, not the approach march.

What actually happened is some divisions had to unload from trains farther from the theater due to rail cuts and blown bridges. Some made it from Paris to the front in four days. Sometimes vehicles had to go into maintenance after such road marches, but they weren't knocked out or lost, they just needed a few days to be made operational again once in theater.

Some took a month to fully arrive from the south of France - though that generally reflects about a week spent loading and some units arriving in 2-3 weeks, the last not meeting up with them until the longer figure. And that is for infantry divisions without adequate organic transport.

Meanwhile some infantry simply walked from Brittany and made it in a week for the mobile elements and 2 weeks for less mobile ones.

9th and 10th SS make it from eastern Poland to the front in less than 2 weeks, entire.

[JasonC]

Sent 10 August is well after the battle.

Germany was producing 1500 AFVs per month at the time. They practically all went east. Had to, Bagration was destroying AG Center. A quarter of them would have meant 750 replacement tanks for the west in June and July alone, up to the breakout fight. Did they get that? Not remotely. They got the whole units already in being, and the whole production stream was thrown east. In August, they needed armor in the west again to reconstitute a line. But the panzer brigades snarfed up the new production sent west - and lost it recklessly. Leaving the existing divisions to starve. They weren't rebuilt until the Bulge.

[Carl Puppchen]

There is a new Rolling Stone magazine with Keifer Sutherland of "24" fame on the cover. On page 54 they have an article about US basic training called "The Killing Factory". Here is a quote

"During WWII an army historying named SLA Marshall decided to study combat behavior... 75% of American soldiers, he claimed, had failed to shoot back when fired upon... the firing rate during the Korean War roes to nearly sixty percent. In Vietnam it was ninety percent, and in the first Gulf War it reached 98%. In Iraq, the number of soldiers who fail to fire is thought to be statistically insignficant. American forces never lost a major engagement in Vietnam, and they have not lost one since."

The article is semi-interesting... I like their description of the town where the training occurs and some of the other elements but they make someludicrous comments:

"a single, inexperienced modern combat soldier, with full combat support, has as much death at his fingertips as a 300 man company did in WW II"

Also

"the army's infantry schools graduate nearly 20,000 soldiers a year. No institution in history has come close to training so many people to kill so effectively in such a short time"

Sorry I can't seem to find a link to the post or I'd put it in here.

Once again not defending their items but find it fascinating that Rolling Stone, a magazine that basically doesn't know squat, quotes Marshall.

[LongLeftFlank]

Originally posted by Carl Puppchen:

Find it fascinating that Rolling Stone, a magazine that basically doesn't know squat, quotes Marshall.

... Next thing we'll be reading music reviews in Janes or Military History.

Franz Ferdinand -- Bouncing Back From Sarajevo, the "Archduke of Soul" Reinvents Himself as a Gang of Four Tribute Band.

[Bigduke6]

What a load of doo doo.

I think those numbers have just about zip to do with brilliant advances in U.S. infantry training, and everything to do with the relative firepower the U.S. army's opponents had, and the fact that, the more incompetent the opponent, the more likely Joe is to risk his life and to try and shoot back.

German army = All arms, outstanding artillery, world-leading officer corps superior to the Americans', excellent tactical communications. If Joe sticks his head up and fires his personal weapon while fighting Germans, and the Germans are not actively supressed, Joe is going to get return mail, and usually very accurate.

Korean/Chinese army = Infantry and light artillery, almost no tanks after the initial onslaught, almost no medium to heavy artillery (prior to trench warfare), infantry is very effective in crummy terrain or weather, a tactically competent officer corps by no means superior to the Americans', poor to crummy tactical communications, definate limits to small arms ammo. The main enemy tactic is waiting for bad LOS conditions and then trying to swamp U.S. positions. Return fire is not near the threat to Joe as from the Germans.

Vietnamese Army - As above but worse officer corps, as a whole more poorly-trained troops, no artillery beyond mortars, and most Vietnamese units are incapable of sustaining a firefight beyond the limits of individually-carried ammunition, and tactical communications between units are WWI technology: runners. The Americans on the other hand can call in, and regularly do, everything from Arc Light strikes to Specter to fire base support absolutely invulnerable to Vietnamese interdiction, for dumb little company-sized firefights.

The main Vietnamese tactic, over the course of the war, is to ambush and run before American support firepower levels the general area. The only threat to Joe, for practical purposes, is either being on point or close to it, or being hit by a very random round in a firefight. If by some miracle the Vietnamese achieve momentary fire superiority, the U.S. tactic is not to shoot it out depending on superior U.S. riflery, but rather to back off and call in copious high explosives.

Iraq - See where I'm going with this? At most U.S. army firing ranges pretty much all soldiers on line fire their weapons, and the danger to them was arguably not much less, then from rare and clownish return fire attempted by the Iraqis in 2003.

Mostly, the Americans are getting better at choosing opponents, is what's happening. I will concede soldiers in modern U.S. force would probably try and fire their weapons a bit more against a modern first-class opponent, say the better Chinese or Russian formations, than the U.S. Joes in WW2.

But not for long. There's a reason soldiers don't fire their weapons: if you shoot you have to stick your head up, and if the enemy manages effective return fire, then people sticking their head up die. The less effective the return fire, the more infantrymen willing to risk their lives and stick their head up. So the way I figure it, if the U.S. military went to war against a first- or second-rate opponent, as opposed to a fourth- or fifth-rate, Joe would return to his WW2 level of one in three shooting, and the other two hiding.

See, most of the ones that believed the training propaganda about using one's rifle to win a battle would be dead.