Distribution and Use of Bazookas by US

[Maj. Battaglia]

For a while I have been curious to find more info about the bazooka and its place in US rifle company TO&E. I was recently reminded of this and decided to put it out to the Forum.

I found one related thread in the archives that talks about it a bit, but there does not seem to be a lot of evidence, and the conversation centers more on use in the game. Of course, one of the reasons I am interested is because of use in the game, but I would like to find some written sources about this. Does anyone have any sources that discuss this issue?

In CM:BO, each line company gets three (in the weapons platoon) and battalion HQ company gets eight. Seven reside in the heavy weapons company for a total of 18 in the battalion.

The sources I have seem contradictory. A US infantry TO&E on the 100th Division web site shows that a company would have nine (one per squad? two per platoon with the others in HQ and weapons platoon?--it does not elaborate). Eight more are with the bn HQ co. I am not sure how faithfully this site reproduces the TO&E from the time.

The 70th Infantry Division has this to say: "The company commander also had five 3-man antitank rocket ('bazooka') teams at his disposal, and he attached them to platoons as he saw fit." From where in the company TO&E were these 15 men pulled? And was this standard, or something unique?

Overall there is no "truth" to find: TO&E at this level is often distorted to suit local needs and tastes. Some troops may have used the bazooka sucessfully and kept it, others may have had bad luck with it, or were not well-trained in its use, and left it in the depot or the side of the road.

But I am curious to find out more, particularly if there are any official or semi official sources on its use and formation of bazooka teams.

[YankeeDog]

Good links. It's not the first time I've seen TOE suggesting that zooks were somewhat more common than CM models.

As you note, there's a big difference between what's on paper and what was actually carried into combat, though.

One interesting thing about the 100th Division TOE on the website is that it doesn't differentiate which weapons were organic to squads and which weren't. For example, the BARs are listed as separate weapons, even though CM models them a squad's organic weapons, and most other TOEs I've seen show them as part of the squad's kit.

Some of the anecdotal accounts I have read also suggest that zooks may also have been carried by infantry squads simply as addition to their kit at times. IOW, there may not have been more than three dedicated zook teams per company most of the time, but you would see 2-3 more zooks distributed amongst the infantry squads in a company.

Overall, if this were modeled in CM, I have a feeling people's opinion of the AT ability of vanilla US infantry would change somewhat. . .

The other interesting thing about the 100th division is that it also show 3 'sniper rifles' per company, or one per platoon. Other sources I have read suggest that this 'sniper rifle' was carried by a member of the platoon HQ team, and this this individual was generally referred to as the platoon 'scout'. IOW, every US infantry platoon had a sharpshooter organic to its structure, which would probably more properly be a 3-man platoon HQ unit and a 1-man sharpshooter unit in CM terms.

Finally, there is a notable shortage of M2 .50 cals in the TOE for the 100th. Here other TOEs I have seen are all over the place - some suggest a lot of M2s around, others are more like the 100th TOE, with only a few in a heavy weapons company.

Interesting stuff.

Cheers,

YD

[Redwolf]

On the other hand I've read that back area units were holding back lots of Bazookas "in case they were overrun by Panzers", not distributing them to the frontlines.

The high Bazooka density the Germans faced after the breakthroughs in the Ardennes offensive is partly attributed to it. Maybe they were right after all

[YankeeDog]

Another interesting tidbit from the 70th division site:

"In both defensive and offensive operations, the squad’s actions were geared to the BAR, which provided the squad’s primary firepower. Two of the squad’s riflemen were assigned to support the BAR gunner, one as an assistant gunner and one as an ammunition bearer. In combat, the squad leader and his assistant directed the actions of seven riflemen and the three-man BAR team."

Other sources I have read about US squad-level doctrine confirm this split of a 4-man BAR team (BAR gunner, Assistant Gunner, Ammo Bearer, plus either the squad leader or his assistant in command) as the basic fire support unit, and an 8-rifle group (all the remaining riflemen, plus the squad leader or asst. leader) as the basic maneuver unit. Early in the war, it was apparently also doctrine that this basic rifle unit would further split into two 4-man groups for maneuver purposes. However, this 3-team structure to the squad was apparently seen as rather unwieldy and difficult to command, and so was not always actually used by units in combat.

However, the 4-man rifleman team seems to have been retained in at least one aspect throughout the war: in every AAR or anecdotal account I have read, when a platoon sends forward a scouting group of smaller than squad size, it is always a team of 3 or 4 riflemen, not a 6-man 'half squad'. The one exception to this is the aforementioned platoon 'sharpshooter', who would scout forward on his own.

Whatever the case, it is becoming increasingly clear to me that US infantry squads, at least, did not break down into two 6-man 'half squads' has CM models. Rather, it broke down into 4-man teams. Ultimately, as we move forward into CMAK and CMX2, I would like to see this reflected in the model in some way. Perhaps US Rifle squads should split into a 4-man BAR team and an 8-man Rifle team, or maybe they should actually split 3 ways into 1 BAR team and 2 rifle teams, which would allow for the historically accurate 4-man rifle team as a scouting unit.

I dunno. Splitting US squads into 2 6-man groups is clearly against doctrine and practice, though. I'd be curious to hear about Commonwealth and German doctrine in this regard as well.

Cheers,

YD

[Dook]

Was browsing through Beyond the Beachhead: The 29th Infantry Division in Normandy by Joseph Balkoski in a local bookstore the other day. It has detailed TOEs down to the squad level. IIRC, the book lists 5 bazookas per company.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by YankeeDog:

[snips]

I dunno. Splitting US squads into 2 6-man groups is clearly against doctrine and practice, though. I'd be curious to hear about Commonwealth and German doctrine in this regard as well.

Commonwealth rifle sections were typically subdivided into a gun group (two or three men with the Bren, V-B or whatever the LMG is, one probably a lance-corporal) and rifle group (the balance of the riflemen under the section leader, a corporal, perhaps a lance-serjeant).

German rifle sections I believe used a similar breakdown, but with 4 men in the gun group.

"Half-squads" are a Squad Leaderism, and have no historical basis that I am aware of.

All the best,

John.

[JonS]

Originally posted by YankeeDog:

One interesting thing about the 100th Division TOE on the website is that it doesn't differentiate which weapons were organic to squads and which weren't. For example, the BARs are listed as separate weapons, ...

Yes it does. The battalion org shows 9 Bars, and if you delve down into the company org you can clearly see that those 9 BARs are distributed one per section ... er, squad.

Personally, I can't rate the org chart show on the 100th ID website highly enough. If you haven't seen it before, the start pooint is here, and from there one can drill down into each unit to successively smaller and smaller detail. There are some odd little units in the US ID structure that I didn't know about (like the Ammo & Pioneer Plt) until I had a good rummage around there.

The allocation of M1903A4 Springfield bolt-action rifles is a bit odd though - I was under the impression that squads had one each, and thus a designated marksman at the squad level rather than platoon level.

Regards

JonS

[ June 18, 2003, 07:39 PM: Message edited by: JonS ]

[JasonC]

Action reports make abundantly clear that zooks were fielded ad hoc in much higher numbers than in the CMBO company TOE. In some armored infantry units, it was common for there to be 2-3 bazookas per platoon. They had their 'tracks to carry things, mind.

There are accounts in the Bulge of rear area troops literally breaking out crates full of the things. There were scads, everywhere, when they were wanted.

What weren't so available were men trained to use them and alive. It was a hazardous weapon to use for its intended purpose, and a heavy and cumbersome one to haul around when enemy armor was not a threat.

You can also read any number of medal citations about Sgt Whosits "equipping himself with a bazooka", almost casually. The scarce thing it required was the personal recklessless to go looking for 40 ton beasties with a stovepipe.

As for smaller than squad formations, I don't think theoretical divisions into 4 and 8 man teams had much actual meaning in the field. Because squads did not have 12 men for very long. They often had more like 6 or 8.

Moreover, they readily equipped themselves with far more than the regulation number of BARs. Also carbines, and to a lesser extent SMGs. The 1945 infantry type and the airborne infantry types are closer to the typical small arms mixes than the doctrine specified 1 BAR to 12 men you guys seem to be talking about.

[JasonC]

As for the Springfields, it wasn't for accuracy. The early model rifle grenade adaptors for the M-1 didn't work very well. (The blow back bolt mechanism and the blank cartridges use to fire rifle grenades didn't easily mesh). It was common to retain a Springfield for a rifle grenadier. As the later rifle grenade adapters came out, the M-1 got the ability to toss those and the need for a manual bolt action disappeared.

[Michael Dorosh]

British and Canadian rifle sections "officially" had a 3 man Bren group and a 7 man rifle group. The section leader - a corporal - carried a Sten and led the rifle group. The section second in command - a lance corporal - carried a rifle and led the Bren group (a Bren gunner and a No. 2 with rifle, who usually changed barrels and mags for the Bren gunner and didn't use his rifle).

In action, however, the sections usually had 6 men in total; not sure how they divvied up "for real". See the after-battle questionnaires I posted links to in another thread that mention the number of men per section.

http://members.shaw.ca/calgaryhighlanders/quescamb.htm

http://members.shaw.ca/calgaryhighlanders/queslbacon.htm

http://members.shaw.ca/calgaryhighlanders/queslyster.htm

I had asked John in another thread if he was familiar with these forms, but I don't think he had a chance to read it; hopefully he will spot this. The forms were British, so I am wondering if he has access to others in UK archives?

[Dandelion]

The German infantry squad was really considered an extended machinegun team, very much in the manner described for the role of the BAR above.

It could and would break down in two parts. Not so much 'halves' though, even if the end effect was about the same as in CM terms. The two parts consisted of the machinegun team (gunner, loader and NCO) and the rifle team (the rest). It would normally deploy in this manner, in most situations (combat march, defense, assault etc). The default reaction to crisis would be to deploy the MG to the left flank of a squad, if possible somewhat rear of the riflemen. This was a drilled and thus automatic reaction, if the squad leader wanted it anywhere else, he would have had to make it known.

It could also break down into pairs (rotten). The men were paired up from early on and part of combat training was based on the combat-pair. In particular combat in difficult terrain, such as urban and forest combat, but also particular tasks such as scouting, securing flanks etc. It was usually such a pair that was sent forward to scout ahead (of a platoon or company). For qualified or very dangerous scouting missions, two pairs would often be sent, normally at least one of which would be an NCO pair, thus forming 4 man teams. The machinegun team, btw, was also a such combat-pair, as were Panzerschreck teams. The pair also had many other functions as organisation, e.g. when setting up camp, the rotating fixing of chow and such. Both roles in a pair were well known and drilled and thus people could be switched and still function in any pair, but of course there was an emotional element as the guys got to know eachother and all that. I believe other armies used like or similar structures.

Cheerio

Dandelion

[Maj. Battaglia]

Thank you for all the replies so far. JonS, I agree with you on the 100th Div web site. It is also interesting to check out the combat engineer battalion (I wanna jackhammer in CMX2!) and the regimental cannon company, for example.

YankeeDog, I think the shortage of the 50 cals is not a shortage, but the reality of TO&E (see the various 50 cal threads. Also, regarding the Springfield, I have seen other accounts where one person per platoon had one. One example is Lowry's "Company A, 276th Infantry in World War II" (available from the 70th Division site) has this to say: "One rifleman in each squad carried either a rocket launcher (bazooka) [author's parentheses], a sniper’s rifle, or a rifle grenade launcher."

This also supports the CM model of three bazookas per company. (As for the grenade launcher, wasn't the US grenade launcher just an adapter to essentially make a regular grenade into a rifle grenade? It was not a separate piece of gear, a la the M79 right?)

So getting back to the bazooka, Redwolf, your point about the bazookas being in the rear area is also supported by the TO&E on the 100th site. Even the regimental AT company has them (I guess in case the 57mm guns don't do their job?). And JasonC, I read an account by Charles M Schultz (yes, of "Peanuts" fame) who was in an AIB (I think mortar or MG squad leader) talk about a bazooka being handy in the halftrack he rode in.

Overall I am under the impression that the US should have more than three per company in CMBO, particularly if on defense or if there is a known AFV threat. In these cases they would have been pulled out of wherever they had been kept, if not on the front line.

But Jason, your point about who is willing to use one, particularly against tanks (they were also used in attacking fortifications), requiring someone with experience and guts is a good one. From the reading I've done, most troops had received training with the bazooka, but had probably not fired one until combat situations called for it. Not ideal circumstances. Perhaps that is one reason to limit their abundance?

Again, thanks to all for your thoughts.

[YankeeDog]

Major -

Yes, many of the TOEs I have seen are more along the lines of the 100th division one, at least as far as M2s at the company or battalion level. I didn't intend to imply that there might have been a 'shortage' of M2s in the sense that supply issues were preventing units from receiving their allotted number. Quite the contrary, from photos and accounts of fighting in the ETO, as the war wore on the US Army seems to have developed a compunction to slap an M2 on almost anything with wheels or tracks - I've seen photos of duece-and-a-half trucks with an M2 bolted onto them.

The 100th TOE shows 2 M2s as part of the Bn HQ company, which isn't that far off CMBO's 3 M2s at this level (one per company). Since most CM battles involve somewhat less than a full battalion of infantry, if one accepts the abstraction that the Bn M2s would quite likely be deployed 'up' with the fire support company when attacking, or with the two companies 'on the line' when defending, rather than hanging out in the rear with the reserve company, then the one M2 per Company of US rifle infantry works just fine.

Certain other US infantry TOEs (like Glider Regiments) do contain significantly more M2s. The Ranger battalions also apparently loved the things, although with the Rangers it's harder to get an exact number since they tended to change their kit depending on the exact nature of the mission even more so than regular units.

As for the zooks, all of this information about just how common they were is making me speculate as to whether for CMAK or CMX2 it wouldn't be appropriate to see a few zooks as an 'AT special' in the US infantry squads, especially in the late war period. This would model nicely the fact that infantry units not necessarily assigned a zook on their TOE sometimes ended up with one. I think this would also mesh well with some of the points Jason has brought up about zooks being common, but instruction in their use not necessarily following suit. The player would not be able to directly order a squad to use its zook, and this would partially model the lack of proper training by creating all those wonderfully frustrating problems that sometimes crop up in German squads with Panzerfausts not being used when you need them to be, and then being wasted on targets of little consequence, etc. The 'squad zooks' could also be made less accurate than the 'AT team zooks' for a given unit experience level to simulate the idea that the dedicated AT teams at least theoretically have some basic instruction in how to hunt and kill tanks.

Especially for Green infantry squads, zooks might well end up being more of a liability than an asset - nothing like a big puff of smoke and a rocket trail to let the enemy know where you are!!

Of course, one issue with adding things like zooks to squads is the additional weight - one of the other things I would like to see added in CMX2 is a variable encumbrance model for squads - I sincerely doubt a Panzer Divison Escort Squad with 7 men and 2 MG42s, plus possibly as many as 3 Panzerfausts, can run as fast (or as long before tiring) as an SMG squad with nothing but their MP40s!

Thanks, too for all the comments from everyone about squad-level breakdowns among the Brits and Germans. It sounds like everyone had a pretty similar system of breaking down into an MG team of 3-4 men and a maneuver unit composed of the rest of the squad. All of this confirms to me that the way CM creates 'split squads' should be revisited for CMX2. Jason's comments about paper vs. actual squad strength are well taken, but I think these issues can be dealt with by adusting how the missing men are taken away from teams team strength - for example, in the US 12-man squad, I suspect the first 2-4 casualties should come from the 8-man rifle team, then maybe one from the BAR group, etc. Below a certain loss level - 50% or so, you probably shouldn't be able to split the squad at all - I don't read much about soldiers being sent out on scouting missions in 1s and 2s.

The only reason I see to allow at least the US rifle squad to split into 3 teams (2 4-man rifle, 1 4-man BAR), rather than a 4-man BAR and an 8-man rifle is that it is historically accurate for a platoon to send out a 3-4 man scout team, not a 6-man (current system) or 8-man scout team(if my proposed BAR team split is used, unless you want to scout with your BAR man!) - there's just no reason to risk more than you have to when you're trolling for contact.

Perhaps the best thing to do is to add an option to the "Split" command - you could either split off the 4-man BAR team OR a 4-man rifle scout team, but not both. In this case the smaller team would take the morale penalty that is currently assigned to split squads, but the larger unit would not. This would allow you, for example, to assault an enemy position with your platoon rifle teams, but leave the 3 BARs behind to continue supressive fire as the rifle teams went in, or to send forward a 4-man scout team to troll for fire while the rest of the platoon overwatches. All of this is straight out of period US small unit infantry tactics. You can sort of manage either one now, but in the former case (a platoon assault), you have to accept a 50% reduction in manpower for the actual assault when all you really want to do is leave the LMGs behind, *plus* accept a morale penalty for your assaulting half-squads, and in the latter case (scout team forward) you have to risk 50% more manpower than you really should need to.

Oh, and Dandelion, as far as a 'buddy' system among US Infantry, I have never heard of one existing in the sense you speak of - i.e., soldiers actually being paired up during training. However, the it was definitely true that GIs rarely ever did anything alone, whether it be making a water run to fill canteens or whatever. The US also taught (and still does, AFAIK) that foxholes be dug 1 hole per 2 soldiers. The inevitable result, I think, was that soldiers tended to pair up based on who got along well enough to live together in a stinking, muddy hole most of the time, and so an informal 'buddy' system did exist.

It was doctrine at the time that minimum size for any independent combat control (i.e., moving far enough forward to lose immediate contact with the parent platoon) was at least three men, and more often in first-person accounts and AARs, I hear of forward scouting being done in 4-person teams.

Somewhat lower danger duties like guard duty at night, OP/listening post work etc. I often read of being assigned to just a pair of soldiers, but usually only when the observation/guard position is within shouting distance of the main body.

Sorry for the long post. It's a slow day at work, and I need something to keep me occupied. . .

Cheers,

YD

[Maj. Battaglia]

YD, that is an excellent idea with the split use of bazookas: teams that use them well and in-squad usage used less well. A new engine could model rounds as grenades are (counted, that is) in CM:BB. Actually, I think BFdotC was going to put bazookas in squads originally (if you look at the unused .bmp files there's one that looks like it would have been placed like panzerfausts are in the unit info box), but decided to go with teams (which given the choice are a better solution).

With weight, perhaps if such bazookas only had a few rounds (about 4, each round weighs about 3.4 pounds) that would mitigate the problem. After all, the BAR weighed 20 pounds and that does not slow down the squad.

By the way, regarding your comment about 50 cals on trucks, actually this was not just an ad hoc occurrence. Based on what I have found, I would estimate that upwards of 25 percent of trucks in the Quartermaster Corps (as opposed to those organic to divisions) had these as standard equipment. Since they would be in longer convoys the 50 cal would give the convoy some AA protection. Forty's "US Army Handbook 1939-1945" not only shows 2-1/2 ton trucks with these, but also Federal 4x4 semis. Also, support vehicles such as the M26 recovery vehicle had them as standard equipment. Of course, in CM no trucks should have them as is the case.

Regarding infantry use in CM, I would simply argue that 50 cals should not be organic to rifle companies, but available for purchase in QB. Designers should limit their use, especially on offense, and keep in mind that the M1917 was the primary weapon in the battalion heavy weapons company, even after the war.

[CombinedArms]

One of the CMBO infantry issues which seems to lead to problematic allied firepower has to do with the tendency toward generic unit definition in the RL Allied TOE's. The Allies had only a few types of infantry units. If soldiers in the field found that the standard TOE didn't work too well in practice, they adapted by glomming on to more of the most useful weapons (eg. zooks, PIATS, BARs, SMGs), but the official TOE's were slow to reflect this.

OTOH, the Germans seemed to spawn new unit types like a spring pond full of tadpoles. These new and ever-evolving unit types showed the increasing use of anti-tank and automatic fire weapons more closely. So the official German TOE's are closer to real war weapons use. Thus, in CMBO, the Germans are rewarded for the arguably (in real life) counterproductive practice of employing a maze of diverse unit types.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

[snips]

I had asked John in another thread if he was familiar with these forms, but I don't think he had a chance to read it; hopefully he will spot this. The forms were British, so I am wondering if he has access to others in UK archives?

A simple-minded search using "battle experience" ("battle experience questionnaire" having vome up blank) suggests that there might be something of this kind in the SHEAF papers collection, WO 219/2981. Also, strangely, there seems to be something about US battle experience in the 21 AG papers, at WO 205/410.

I'll have to see if I can remember to pull these next time I'm in Kew.

All the best,

John.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

[snips]

I had asked John in another thread if he was familiar with these forms, but I don't think he had a chance to read it; hopefully he will spot this. The forms were British, so I am wondering if he has access to others in UK archives?

A simple-minded search using "battle experience" ("battle experience questionnaire" having vome up blank) suggests that there might be something of this kind in the SHEAF papers collection, WO 219/2981. Also, strangely, there seems to be something about US battle experience in the 21 AG papers, at WO 205/410.

I'll have to see if I can remember to pull these next time I'm in Kew.

All the best,

John. </font>