American and Commonwealth Tactics on Sicily through German eyes

[Michael Dorosh]

Patton wasn't just dawdling, he was almost criminally neglegtful in his dash to Palermo; even Alexander and Eisenhower afterwards saw no point in his rush to Palermo - quite the opposite direction from what he should have been travelling.

The biggest mistake was in not landing in Sicily in June, when the island was practically empty. The Germans expects landings in Greece. There is a good book I got through the military book club called THE BATTLE FOR SICILY: HOW THE ALLIES LOST THEIR CHANCE FOR TOTAL VICTORY by Samuel Mitcham and Friedrich von Stauffenberg (nice name, huh?) that studies the battle from the Axis side quite nicely.

A landing at Calabria to coincide with the landings in Sicily would have prevented any withdrawal from Messina.

In hindsight, just about any plan would have been better than the one they put together.

If you want to talk about friendly fire incidents, too, check out all the paratroopers killed by Allied AAA while still in their planes.

Not a shining moment for the Allies in any sense.

[SgtMuhammed]

The interesting thing is that as much as the U.S. fought being involved in the Med to begin with it did serve one extreemly useful purpose. It allowed the Allies to practice assaulting an enemy shoreline in an area that wouldn't lose them the war. Could you imagine the carnage that would have resulted had the allies landed in Normandy before experiencing North Africa, Sicily, and the Italian landings?

[Spook]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by JonS:

Bidwell puts it down to a 'lack of grip' by Alexander, Patton wandering off on self-aggrandizing but militarily pointless tangents (Palermo, etc), and Montgomery 'dawdling.'

All true to form then. Sounds a bit like the explanation why the Germans lost in the east. According to some schools, it appears the Red Army had little to do with it - those Uebergermans did it all by themselves </font>

[Spook]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

In hindsight, just about any plan would have been better than the one they put together.

If you want to talk about friendly fire incidents, too, check out all the paratroopers killed by Allied AAA while still in their planes.

Not a shining moment for the Allies in any sense.

Granted, the Sicilian campaign was laced with SNAFU's and was by no means a hallmark Allied feat of arms.

On the flip side, however, it didn't always reflect well on the Axis either. Sure, the Germans "skinned out" through Messina in the main, but if that was the anticipated strategic end result, why was Sicily even bothered to be defended at all?

[scoop88]

Spook:

Thanks for the link to "German Myth." Interesting reading! His criticism of German logistics reminded me of something I read a long time ago that Hitler specifically ordered before the start of Barbarossa that German Mark III and IV tanks were to be retrofitted with long-barrel, higher-trajectory main guns before the invasion began. Somehow, the order "got lost" and it didn't happen, with the result that the short-barrel, low velocity guns had trouble stopping T-34s and KVs. Had the long-barrel Mark III and IV been available in June 1941, who knows? Maybe the Germans might have won the Russian war in 1941.

His comments about games not accurately factoring in supply were also good, but for me, at least, I'm not interested in becoming a bookkeeper for the sake of historical accuracy. Contrary to what he wrote, some of the early board games did a decent job of abstracting supply without taking away from the fun of the game. Anybody out there who played Avalon Hill's Afrika Korps back in the 1960s remember how you had to roll a die before each turn to determine whether or not the Axis got a supply unit? If you got a couple of bad rolls -- especially during the period of the campaign when the odds were high of having your supply convoy sunk at sea en route to Libya -- left you in serious doo-doo. You had to expend a supply unit when you attacked, and your plans suffered big time if you got a couple of bad dice rolls in a row for that precious supply unit.

[CombinedArms]

Hey, this is a fun thread!

The discussion of the Allied failure to nab the German army in Sicily makes me reflect on what the (western) Allied armies were good at and not good at (from say mid-1942 on). One thing they were not good at, it seems to me, was completing an encirclement and thereby entrapping the whole of an enemy army.

Things they were good at:

1. Amphibious invasions (the Allies really wrote the book on this one).

2. Cracking through a strong defensive line--it might take 'em a while, but they always did it.

3. Exploiting a breakthrough (in the sense of covering a lot of ground quickly once in the enemy rear)--true at least of the Americans, if not of Monty.

4. Mobilizing to defend against a suprise enemy breakthrough (e.g. Battle of the Bulge).

But, they fairly consistently failed to bag whole enemy armies (as the Germans and Russians both frequently did) when they had the chance, even though items 3 & 4 suggest, rightly, a high degree of mobility. Examples of this failure include: Sicily, the breakout from Anzio and Cassino, Falaise, the escape of German forces from the south of France, the Ardennes (where most of the German army managed to retreat from the Bulge). The two exceptions are Tunis (where the Axis forces where isolated by sea and had no where to go) and the Ruhr, (where, presumably, the Allies finally had enough practice to master the art).

Why were the Allied forces so deficient at closing the noose around a defeated army? I haven't studied the subject closely enough to have confident answers, but I do have some plausible speculations. Perhaps the more learned could comment further. Some possibilites:

1. The two arms of the pincer were often of different nationalities (e.g. Amis and Brits.) Getting enough coordination to close the pincer was a problem. Took a long time to work out the kinks.

2. Monty had a bad case of the slows.

3. Individual egos got in the way--e.g. Mark Clark preferring to take Rome before D-Day over nabbing the retreating German army.

4. US doctrine focused on exploitation in terms of rapid forward movement, but not specifically encirclement (I'm just speculating, here, but I've never heard of them having an encirclement doctrine).

5. Ike, Monty, Hodges and Bradley were too cautious (Patton's theory.)

I'm guessing that item #1 may be a really big part of it. The Allied collaboration generally worked unusually well, but encirclement battles take place rapidly, on the fly, and require a high level of coordination. It was hard to achieve that sufficiently well to succeed at the kind of perfect encirclement that bags a whole army. And the ego issues and differences in operational style would understandably had larger play in the context of a command structure that was never fully unified.

Just a theory--further comments are welcomed.

[ May 07, 2003, 01:33 PM: Message edited by: CombinedArms ]

[Spook]

Originally posted by scoop88:

His comments about games not accurately factoring in supply were also good, but for me, at least, I'm not interested in becoming a bookkeeper for the sake of historical accuracy. Contrary to what he wrote, some of the early board games did a decent job of abstracting supply without taking away from the fun of the game. Anybody out there who played Avalon Hill's Afrika Korps back in the 1960s remember how you had to roll a die before each turn to determine whether or not the Axis got a supply unit? If you got a couple of bad rolls -- especially during the period of the campaign when the odds were high of having your supply convoy sunk at sea en route to Libya -- left you in serious doo-doo. You had to expend a supply unit when you attacked, and your plans suffered big time if you got a couple of bad dice rolls in a row for that precious supply unit.

I liked the way it was executed in Avalon Hill's "The Longest Day." You had supply "units" that would be expended during attacks or if enough subordinate artillery units fired in attack or defense. For the Allies, the challenge in the full campaign was to weigh how much in fresh supplies to bring across the channel in parallel with reinforcing units and replacement troops for earlier losses. Weather could play havoc on how quickly this stuff would come.

The Germans on the flip coin had to bring up their units and supplies through a network of "sectors." It came up quicker by rail, of course, and some rail repair units mollified earlier damage, but never enough against persistent Allied air interdiction.

It all seemed to balance well in hindsight, but TLD was still a "monster game" with high unit density, thus not easily played without sufficient time.

[William amos]

From the US Army's official WWII Website about Sicily.

As the Eighth Army's drive toward Catania and Gerbini bogged down in heavy fighting, Montgomery persuaded Alexander to shift the boundary line between the American Seventh and British Eighth Armies west, thereby permitting him to advance on a broader front into central Sicily and sidestep the main centers of Axis resistance.

The boundary change, which Alexander communicated to Patton just before midnight on 13 July, stripped Highway 124 away from Seventh Army and assigned it instead to the Eighth Army. Under the new instructions, a portion of the Eighth Army would advance up Highway 124 to Enna, the key road junction in central Sicily, before turning northeast toward Messina. In essence, Alexander was interposing British forces between the Americans and the Germans, allowing the Eighth Army to monopolize the primary approaches to Messina and giving it complete responsibility for the Allied main effort.

With its original line of advance blocked, Seventh Army was thus relegated to protecting the Eighth Army's flank and rear from possible attack by Axis forces in western Sicily—a distinctly secondary mission.

The change in front was one of the most important and controversial operational decisions of the campaign. It clearly reflected the British belief that the veteran Eighth Army was better qualified to carry the main burden of the campaign than its junior partner from across the Atlantic. Indeed, the decision did little more than make explicit the priorities and assumptions that had been implicit in the campaign plan all along.

On the other hand, by ordering the Seventh Army to stop short of Highway 124 and redirecting its advance, Alexander lost momentum and provided the Axis valuable time to withdraw to a new defensive line between Catania and Enna. The loss of momentum was best illustrated by the repositioning of the 45th Division, which had to return almost to the shoreline before it could sidestep around the 1st Division and take up its new position for a northwestward advance.

Given the circumstances, Alexander might have been better served by reinforcing success and shifting the main emphasis of the campaign to the Seventh Army. This was not his choice, however, and his decision stirred up a storm of controversy in the American camp.

Patton and his generals were furious. They had always assumed that the Seventh Army would be permitted to push beyond its initial Yellow and Blue objectives and into central and northern Sicily in order to accompany the Eighth Army on its drive toward Messina. After all, Alexander's vague preinvasion plans had never expressly ruled this out. Now that option had been eliminated and they felt slighted.

Not content to accept a secondary role, Patton immediately cast about for an opportunity to have his army play a more decisive part in the campaign. The object which caught his eye was Palermo, Sicily's capital. Capture of this well-known city would not only be a publicity coup, but it would also give his army a major port from which to base further operations along the northern coast.

Patton's first move was to coax Alexander into sanctioning a "reconnaissance" toward the town of Agrigento, several miles west of the 3d Division's current front line. That authorization was all General Truscott needed to seize the city on 15 July. With Agrigento in hand, Patton was in a position to drive into northwestern Sicily, and on the 17th he traveled to Alexander's headquarters to argue for just such a course.

Patton wanted to cut loose from the Eighth Army and launch his own, independent drive on Palermo while simultaneously sending Bradley's II Corps north to cut the island in two. Alexander reluctantly agreed, but later had second thoughts and sent Patton a revised set of orders instructing him to strike due north to protect Montgomery's flank rather than west. Seventh Army headquarters ignored Alexander's message claiming that it had been "garbled" in transmission, and by the time Alexander's instructions could be "clarified," Patton was already at Palermo's gates.

The Seventh Army met little opposition during its sweep through western Sicily. Guzzoni had recalled the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division to central Sicily soon after the invasion, and the only troops left in the western portion of the island were Italians who, for the most part, showed little inclination to fight.

While General Bradley's II Corps pushed north to cut the island in two east of Palermo, Patton organized the 2d Armored, 82d Airborne, and 3d Infantry Divisions into a provisional corps under Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes and sent it on a 100-mile dash to the Sicilian capital. Palermo fell in only seventy-two hours, and by 24 July the Seventh Army had taken control of the entire western half of the island, capturing 53,000 dispirited Italian soldiers and 400 vehicles at the loss of 272 men.

Yet for all its achievements, the Sicily Campaign also demonstrated some weaknesses in Allied capabilities, particularly in the realm of joint operations. None of the Allied commanders had much experience in joint air-land-sea operations, and consequently the three services did not always work together as well as they might have. Ground commanders complained about the lack of close air support and the inaccuracy of airborne drops, air commanders complained of their aircraft's being fired upon by Allied ground and naval forces, and naval officers chided the land commanders for not fully exploiting the fleet's amphibious capabilities to outflank the enemy once the campaign had begun.

Similarly, General Alexander's unfortunate decision to broaden the Eighth Army's front at the expense of the Seventh Army can be attributed to the newness of combined operations, for the decision reflected the British Army's proclivity to underestimate American military capabilities—an attitude that American G.I.s proved unjustified during the Sicily Campaign.

One consequence of this lack of integration within the Allied camp was that the Axis was able to evacuate over 100,000 men and 10,000 vehicles from Sicily during the first seventeen days in August. The failure of Allied air and naval forces to interdict the Strait of Messina was due in large part to the fact that neither Eisenhower nor his principal air, land, and sea commanders had formulated a coordinated plan to prevent the withdrawal of Axis forces from the island.

The escape of Axis forces from Sicily is also attributable to the conservative attitude of Allied commanders. They had opted for the most cautious invasion plan, massing their forces at the most predictable landing site. They never seriously considered the bolder option of launching simultaneous attacks on Messina and Calabria, the "toe" of Italy, to trap all Axis forces in Sicily in one blow.

Their conservativeness was somewhat justified, for multinational amphibious operations of this magnitude had never been attempted before, and the initial landings would have been outside of the range of Allied fighter cover. Nevertheless, the advantages to be gained by taking the enemy by surprise and destroying an entire Axis army would seem to have merited greater attention by Allied strategists than it received.

The fundamental reason why the Messina-Calabria option was not seriously considered had to do with grand strategy, not operational considerations. At Casablanca the Allies had agreed only to invade Sicily, not Italy, and U.S. leaders had clearly stated their opposition to anything that might further delay a cross-Channel attack.

A landing in Italy, even a local one intended purely to assist the Sicily Campaign, threatened to open the very Pandora's box Marshall wanted to avoid. Of course in the end, the Allies invaded Italy anyway, only to be confronted by the same German troops who had made good their escape from Sicily. But in the spring of 1943, coalition politics ruled out a Calabrian envelopment, and Allied planners confined themselves to a narrow, frontal assault in southeastern Sicily.

Sicily was thus an important victory for the Allies, but not a decisive one. Coalition politics and the innate conservativeness of men who were still learning how to work the intricate machinery of joint, multinational operations tied Allied armies to a strategy which achieved the physical objective while letting the quarry escape. Nevertheless, Axis forces did not escape unscathed, and the experience Allied commanders gained in orchestrating airborne, amphibious, and ground combat operations during the campaign would serve them well in the months ahead, first in Italy and then at Normandy.

Site

[ May 07, 2003, 02:38 PM: Message edited by: William amos ]

[KanaljeFätter]

Originally posted by: sgtgoody (esq)

The interesting thing is that as much as the U.S. fought being involved in the Med to begin with it did serve one extreemly useful purpose. It allowed the Allies to practice assaulting an enemy shoreline in an area that wouldn't lose them the war. Could you imagine the carnage that would have resulted had the allies landed in Normandy before experiencing North Africa, Sicily, and the Italian landings?

Well they had already learned their most important lesson from the Dieppe raid: DON'T do amphibious assaults against cities. The Canadians are probably still reeling from that disaster

[William amos]

And the Official Site for Nothern France for US Army. Seems to read very similar

Ever since Bradley's order of 13 August, the Allied failure to close the Argentan-Falaise gap has been the source of controversy. Bradley's later account of the action, taking full responsibility for the decision to halt XV Corps but criticizing Montgomery for not doing more to seal the gap, indicates the passions aroused by the affair. Yet despite the presence of an obsolete boundary, Bradley was under no real restriction which prevented him from sending XV Corps north toward Falaise.

Of the reasons which he gave for halting Haislip, the only one that rings true was his concern that an advance toward Falaise would leave XV Corps' flank exposed to a massive thrust by German troops within the pocket. This vulnerability may well have been reported by ULTRA and was decreasing by the hour with VII Corps' advance northeast from Mayenne. While one can be understanding of Bradley's decision, given the "fog of war" in the rapidly evolving situation, the attractive option of a long envelopment toward the Seine, and the fact that it was the Canadians who were supposed to meet the Americans at Argentan, he can be chided for overcaution.

Bradley himself later indicated his true feelings on the subject when, facing another opportunity for an envelopment later in the war, he indicated to an aide that he would not make the same mistake twice.

At least in part, the failure to close the Argentan-Falaise gap can be blamed on lack of communication that resulted from growing jealousies within the coalition. In Normandy, the Montgomery-Bradley relationship had been characterized by mutual respect and deference, but friction between the two staffs had increased with Bradley's rise to army group command and the corresponding growth in stature of the American effort within the Allied command structure.

Given their successes, the Americans were less willing to accept a role subordinate to a British officer, especially one they viewed as arrogant and overly cautious. Montgomery had to defer to this growing independence while continuing to exercise responsibility for coordinating Allied movements until Eisenhower formally assumed command on the Continent.

To complicate matters further, the French were already showing a dismaying tendency to go their own way on matters they considered vital to their national interest. In the cases of the Falaise gap, the liberation of Paris, the long envelopment to the Seine, establishment of boundaries, and debate over the single versus broad front, it is not surprising that coalition politics hampered the efficient exercise of command. Eisenhower's political skills as supreme commander have often been taken for granted, but they were certainly tested during the campaign for northern France.

For all the recent interest in the ULTRA secret, it does not appear that Allied access to high-level German radio traffic played a decisive role in the Northern France Campaign. When British Group Capt. F. W. Winterbotham first revealed to an astonished world in 1974 that the British had broken the German ENIGMA code early in the war and that Allied commanders had regular access to deciphered German radio intercepts, many observers called for a revision of the history of World War II.

At least with regard to the campaign in northern France, this does not appear to be necessary. In the case of the German attack at Mortain, Winterbotham and Ronald Lewin have claimed that ULTRA alerted Bradley four days prior to the attack. However, in a more recent work which cites directly from the documents, Ralph Bennett argues convincingly that the Allies did not receive word from ULTRA until practically the eve of the attack. The evidence on ULTRA'S role during the action at the Falaise gap is more inconclusive, but it does appear that ULTRA, at the least, provided much useful data and at the most, may well have caused Bradley to halt XV Corps near Argentan. In general, ULTRA appears now to have been a valuable tool, particularly in confirming data from other sources, but it did not win the campaign in northern France.

For the U.S. Army, the campaign represented one of its most memorable moments during World War II. The pursuit across France showed the Army at its slashing, driving best, using its mobility to the fullest to encircle German formations and precluding any German defensive stand short of their own frontier. American troops would long cherish memories of triumphant passages through towns, basking in the cheers of a grateful, adoring populace.

More informed observers would point to D-day as the point at which German defeat became inevitable, but the Northern France Campaign drove home to almost all that Germany had lost the war. While Hitler could still hope that secret weapons or a surprise counteroffensive would retrieve his fortunes, and while destruction of the Nazi regime would in the end take a longer, harder fight than seemed likely to jubilant Allied troops in mid-September, the Allies in northern France had taken a giant step toward ultimate victory.

Site

[ May 07, 2003, 02:42 PM: Message edited by: William amos ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by KanaljeFätter:

Well they had already learned their most important lesson from the Dieppe raid: DON'T do amphibious assaults against cities. The Canadians are probably still reeling from that disaster

Dieppe didn't teach anybody a damn thing they didn't already know. Technically it was a raid rather than a landing; the method of approach may be the same but the logistical end would be completely different if a permanent lodgement were being formed.

Dieppe was a stupid waste and taught nobody anything they wouldn't have learned elsewhere on their own - or had already learned via Gallipoli, Wake Island, etc. I can't imagine Normandy having been planned any differently had Dieppe never happened.

[KanaljeFätter]

I don't think the Canadians knew any of that... That seems obvious to me.. Why on Earth would they sacrifice these troops if they knew it would end in disaster? the answer is they must have been unaware of that...

[Andreas]

Originally posted by KanaljeFätter:

I don't think the Canadians knew any of that... That seems obvious to me.. Why on Earth would they sacrifice these troops if they knew it would end in disaster? the answer is they must have been unaware of that...

Err, the Canadians did neither order nor prepare nor plan the raid. Mike is right, the important lessons could have been learned if someone had bothered looking up the Gallipolli experience, instead of sending hundreds of men into a death-trap with crappy preparation. But hey, Mountbatten was a member of the Royle family, so instead of getting the sack he was sent to be C-in-C SE Asia in Ceylon, and got a medal. In the best traditions of the Empire.

[CombinedArms]

I'd suggest that William Amos's very interesting posts support my thesis that one of the main reasons the Allies had trouble pulling off encirclements was the difficulty of coordinating wings of different nationalities. One can win a war by using the combined power of an international coalition, but completing a successful encirclement is another matter altogether.

[ May 07, 2003, 09:11 PM: Message edited by: CombinedArms ]

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by CombinedArms:

I'd suggest that William Amos's very interesting posts support my thesis that one of the main reasons the Allies had trouble pulling off encirclements was the difficulty of coordinating wings of different nationalities. One can win a war by using the combined power of an international coalition, but completing a successful encirclement is another matter altogether.

I'd suggest you're correct; the Falaise Gap was closed by Poles, Canadians and Americans. The Canadians were inexperienced (4th Armoured Division was ashore less than a month) but fought hard - one major got the VC at St Lambert sur Dives with his armoured squadron and an infantry company fighting off swarms of Germans fleeing the trap. The gap wasn't left open due to cowardice, or necessarily even incompetence, since the Americans were fighting hard too; my impression was that it was simply mixed signals - an all too common occurence among the Allies.

Not that we should judge too harshly; they had a difficult job to do, and made up a lot of stuff on the fly. For example co-ordinating heavy bomber support. The Americans and RAF both wounded or killed Allied general officers (McNair in Cobra, and the Canadian Keller on the British front) through short bombings. Everyone had a steep learning curve in Normandy - and your point about having to co-ordinate not just among the different services (air and ground) but also different nationalities (Polish, French, Canadian, British, American, plus small contingents of Belgians and Dutch) added a lot into the mix.

[William amos]

Baptism of Fire - Dieppe

Allied operations on the sea and in the air were making major contributions to winning the war. However, once the Allied leaders had made the decision to concentrate on defeating Hitler's forces before turning their full attention to those of Japan, it was clear that ultimate victory could only be achieved on land by driving the Nazi forces from the countries they occupied and finally invading Germany itself. That meant an invasion of western Europe, but it would take time to amass the necessary manpower and material. Moreover, the plans and equipment for amphibious operations had first to be tested and German defences probed to determine the chances of success. The need to relieve the pressure on the beleaguered Soviet Union demanded action as well. Finally, Canadian generals, politicians, and public were insisting that their bored and frustrated troops see action.

For all these reasons, Combined Operations Headquarters decided to launch a raid-in-force on the French port of Dieppe on August 19, 1942, with the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division providing most of the assaulting troops. It turned out to be a massacre. Surprise was only partly achieved and only a minimal preliminary bombardment preceded the attack. German positions remained intact, the defenders uninjured and ready.

What followed were "ten hours of unadulterated hell". Entire battalions suffered virtual annihilation. Those Canadians who managed to escape their landing craft and scramble to shore were swept by incessant fire from unassailable enemy positions on the adjacent cliffs. If their tanks did not sink in the water, they found it almost impossible to manoeuvre on the baseball-sized pebbles that littered the beaches. Poor communications led to additional troops being dispatched unnecessarily. It was a tribute to the spirit and fortitude of the Canadian soldiers that some of them managed to get off the beaches and into the town.

Their losses were catastrophic. Of the almost 5,000 Canadians who formed the assault force, 3,367 became casualties including 907 killed in action and 1,946 made prisoners of war. Hitler's "Fortress Europe" seemed impregnable. However, the sacrifice was not wholly in vain. D-Day's success two years later was in some measure purchased by the lives of those Canadians who died at Dieppe.

WWII Video of dieppe Survivors

http://www.archives.ca/05/0534/053403_e.html

Canadian tanks got bogged down on the pebbled beaches at Dieppe and very few ever made their objective of getting up the cliffs and into the town.

German soldiers round up Allied prisoners following the Dieppe Raid.. 1, 874 Canadians were captured during and after the assault

Canadian and Allied soldiers take care of their own after being taken prisoner during the Dieppe Raid

One of the few tanks that actually made it up off the beach and into the Dieppe area and was later destroyed

Victoria Cross Winners

Lieutenant-Colonel

Charles Cecil Ingersoll Merritt The South Saskatchewan Regiment Dieppe, France, August 19, 1942

Honorary Captain John Foote Canadian Chaplain Service Dieppe, France, August 19, 1942

[Michael Dorosh]

"Entire battalions almost suffered virtual annihilation"?

Overdoing it a bit; William you need to find less dramatic websites!

A full strength Canadian battalion had 800 men in it. Of the six battalions engaged (and part of a seventh), they only sent their rifle companies and elements of their support companies, about 500 - 600 men from each. The Royal Regiment of Canada suffered the most complete disaster, and close to everyone that set down was captured or killed. But all the battalions left sizeable cadres back in the UK to reform on.

Annihilation is defined as "utter destruction" in Oxford. This didn't happen to any of the battalions involved; the Royal Regiment came closest, though - if one only counts troops actually landed. Overall casualty rate was fifty percent - shockingly high, for no gain whatsoever, but not "annihilation" either. Even the Royals managed to get 20 men off the beach and up the cliff, amazingly enough, though they were captured later in the afternoon - including Doug Catto, their CO.

The Second Division was hastily rebuilt, though the effects of Dieppe dogged it even in Normandy and beyond. It became known as a "hard luck" outfit, especially after other disasters such as Verrierres Ridge.

[ May 08, 2003, 12:40 AM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by William amos:

If their tanks did not sink in the water, they found it almost impossible to manoeuvre on the baseball-sized pebbles that littered the beaches.

I thought the problem was not that the tanks found it impossible to maneuver on the shingle, but that they couldn't find a break in the sea wall that would permit egress off the beach. In fact, I've read accounts of tanks driving up and down the beach until they were finally shot up and disabled.

Michael

[SgtMuhammed]

The failure to close the gap at Falaise rests entirely with Bradley. He knew that Patton was in position to close the gap and all it would have taken was a quick call to Ike to redraw the boundry line between the American and British forces. In fact Patton actually joked that he could close the gap and drive Monty into the sea. Bradley's refusal to do this stemmed from professional jealousy. He felt that he had done his part so now Monty should do his. Not one of Bradley's more shining moments.

One of the reasons for not changing the boundry was the possiblilty of friendly fire incidents. As it turned out, however, the Polish unit that made contact with the American arm engaged them even with the boundry in place. Given that it happened anyway I don't put much credence in the friendly fire argument. The allies blew it there much like they blew it during the bulge counter attack.

[SgtMuhammed]

It was both. Vehicles couldn't pass the shingle, the same problem that would later be encountered at Omaha.

Just a little trivia. Don't go to Normandy today and expect to see what they saw then. Most of the boccage is gone and the Engineers buldozed the shingle away shortly after the landings.

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by sgtgoody (esq):

Just a little trivia. Don't go to Normandy today and expect to see what they saw then. Most of the boccage is gone and the Engineers buldozed the shingle away shortly after the landings.

Which beaches? In the photos I've seen, only the eastern (British) beaches had noticable shingle. The American beaches appear to be mostly if not all sand.

Michael

[Andreas]

In the light of what started this thread, I am currently reading:

R E P O R T N O. 18

HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

1 Nov 47

THE CAMPAIGN IN SOUTHERN ITALY (September - December 1943)

Information from German Military Documents regarding Allied Operations in General and Canadian Operations in Particular.

from the same website. There are some classic thigh-slappers in there.

Such as this one from a German KTB:

The troops from the Dominions - used to life in the open - showed particular aptitude for attacks during the night and in fog.

(Emphasis by me)

All those trappers and Mounties from the Canadian Dominion really showing what they are made off. That hard outdoor life in Halifax, Montreal and Calgary must have made all the difference.

Interesting quote from a footnote by the Canadian author here though:

Apparently as early as 1943, the Germans experienced a shortage of competent field officers. The reports at times are quite critical of the disastrous orders that were given to experienced armoured troops by senior officers of 90 Pz Gren Div who had no comprehension of the tactics of tank warfare.

[ May 08, 2003, 06:42 AM: Message edited by: Andreas ]

[Michael Emrys]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Apparently as early as 1943, the Germans experienced a shortage of competent field officers. The reports at times are quite critical of the disastrous orders that were given to experienced armoured troops by senior officers of 90 Pz Gren Div who had no comprehension of the tactics of tank warfare.

I guess a lot of the experienced men who would have been field grade officers in 1943 were dying on the Eastern Front in 1941-42 as company grade officers.

Michael

[Michael Dorosh]

The chert beach at Dieppe was hard to maneuver on; the chert pieces got inside the drive sprockets, and eventually caused track pins to stress and break. There were areas where the chert was piled high, so the tanks sank in and bogged (hence the chespaling carried by some Churchills at Dieppe). And yes, the only exit to the beach was supposed to be breached by the Royal Canadian Engineers who were all killed before getting anywhere near the single exit onto Rue Sygnoyne.

There is a CMBB battle at the Depot by me called Commando Raid or somesuch; I left the reference to Dieppe out on purpose to see if anyone would get the joke, but apparently not.

If you're masochistic, it depicts the assault on the main beaches, complete with single exit for the Churchills and a reasonably accurate depiction of the terrain. No idea how balanced it is, but it gives an appreciation of the scale of the area, and has been changed to provide a pregame bombardment for the allies that the Canadians never had that day.

[Michael Dorosh]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr /> The troops from the Dominions - used to life in the open - showed particular aptitude for attacks during the night and in fog.

(Emphasis by me)

All those trappers and Mounties from the Canadian Dominion really showing what they are made off. That hard outdoor life in Halifax, Montreal and Calgary must have made all the difference.

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