Desert Warfare: German Experiences in World War II

[JonS]

In the spirit of Dorosh's caring, sharing example, this links to a document prepared by the US Army, though mainly written by several DAK veterans, on German experiences in north Africa during WWII. The pdf of the webpage runs to 113 pages, so I won't repost it here , but the following is the table of contents so you can get a feel for what is covered.

CONTENTS

Preface

Introduction

Chapter I. Prior Planning

. 1. Intelligence Planning

. . a. Desert Terrain and Climate

. . b. Scope of the Evaluation

. . c. Influence of Intelligence on Planning

. . d. Availability and Evaluation of Terrain Intelligence

. . e. Use of Historical Data for Planning Purposes

. 2. Operational Planning

. . a. General

. . b. Changes in Troop Organization and Equipment

. . c. Special Training

. . d. Acclimatization of the Troops

. . e. Development of Special Equipment

. 3. Logistical Planning

. . a. February-May 1941

. . b. June-Decemebr 1941

. . c. January--June 1942

. . d. July 1942--May 1943

Chapter II. Operations

. 4. General Description of the Zone of Operations

. . a. Mountain Ranges

. . b. Steep Terraces

. 5. Order of Battle of Army and Luftwaffe Units

. 6. Reasons for Changes in Organization and Equipment

. 7. Descriptions of the More Important Battles

. . a. 31 March--19 April: The First Counterattack to Reconquer the Cyrencica

. . b. May--June 1941: Battle for the Positions on the Border

. . c. July--Mid-November: The Siege of Tobruk and Preparations for the Attack

. . d. Mid-November 1944--Mid-January 1942: Repelling The British Autumn Offensive and the Retreat to the Gulf of Sirte

. . e. Mid-January--End of May 1942 The Counteroffensive to Retake the Cyrenacia and the Preparations for the Attack on Tobruk

. . f. Late May--July 1942 The Battle of Tobruk and the Pursuits to El Alamein

. . g. August--Early November 1942: The battles Around Alamein

. . h. November 1942-March 1943: The German Retreat to the Border Between Libya and Tunsia

. . i. November 1942--March 1943: The Occupation of Tunisia and the Battles Fought in Tunsia

. . j. April--May 1943: The Final Battle in Tunisia

Chapter III. Special Factors

. 8. Dust

. . a. Effect on Troops, Weapons, and Equipment

. . b. Effect on Combat Operations

. . c. Effect on Tactical Measures

. . d. Effect on Aircraft and Their Crews

. 9. Terrain

. . a. Influence on Tactical Measures

. . b. Influence on the Construction of Field Fortifications and the Use of Weapons

. . c. The Tactical Importance of the Recognition of Vehicle Tracks by Air Observation

. . d. The Use of Vehicle Tracks for Deception of the Enemy

. . e. The use of Wheeled and Track Vehicles

. . f. Influence of Desert Terrain on the Development of New Tactical Principles for the use of Motorized Units

. . g. Influence of Rainfall on Mobility in Desert Terrain

. 10. Water

. . a. General

. . b. Requirements for Troops and Vehicles, Economy Measures, ect

. . c. Water and Motor-Fuel Requirements

. . d. Tactial Importance of the Presence of Water Sources

. . e. Assignment of Engineer Troops for Water-Supply Services

. . f. Well-Drilling Equipment

. . g. Method of Distribution

. . h. Pipelines

. 11. Heat

. . a. General

. . b. Effect on Unaccustomed Troops

. . c. Effect on Tank Crews

. . d. Measures Taken to Avoid the Noonday Heat

. . e. Special Equipment for Protection Against Temperature Variations

. . f. Types of Shelter

. . g. Comparison Between the Efficiency of Troops in the Tropics and in Temperate Climates

. . h. Effect on Material and Equipment

. . i. Effect on Visibility

. . j. Effect on Airplanes in Taking Off and Landing

Chapter IV. Miscellaneous

. 12. Cartographic Service

. . a. General

. . b. Reliability and Methods of Use

. 13. Camouflage

. 14. Evaluation of the Enemy Situation Through Aerial Photographs

. 15. Visibility at Night

. 16. Choice of Camp Sites

. 17. Selection of Battle Sites

. 18. Time of Day Selected for Combat

. 19. Influence of the Desert Climate on Daily Service Routine

. 20. Special Problems of the Technical Service

. 21. Influence of Light, Shade, and Sandstroms on Combat

. 22. Influence of Darkness on Radio Communications

. 23. Wind

. 24. Special Equipment and Procedures for Aircraft Crews

. 25. Dry Docks and Port Installations for Aircraft Crews

. 26. Reinforcement of Sand Surfaces for Landings by Amphibious Craft

. 27. Changes in Loading and Unloading Procedures

. 28. Material Losses and Replacement Estimates for Desert Warefare

. 29. Modifications in Supply-Dump Procedures

. 30. Diseases and Insects in the Desert

. 31. Desert Weather Service

Chapter V. General Remarks and Experiences

. 32. Special Equipment for Desert Warfare

. 33. Research and Development Possibilities for Special Desert Equipment

. 34. Unusual Supply Problems

. 35. Nutrition

. 36. Clothing

. 37. Comparison with Desert Warfare in Southern Russia

. 38. Troop Welfare in the Desert

These are the German blokes who contributed to the study:

Major General (Generalleutnant) Fritz Bayelein, chief of staff, German Africa Corps, 1941-42.

General of the Air Force (General der Flieger) Paul Deichman, chief of staff of the German Second Air Force.

Major Helmut Hudel, commander, 1st Battalion, 7th Armored Regiment, Tunisia.

General of the Army (Generalfeldmarschall) Albert Kesselring, Commander in Chief, South, 1942-43.

Regierungsbaurat (official title in the construction engineering profession) Dr. Sigismund Kienow, military geologist, German Africa Corps, 1941-43.

Brigadier General (Generalmajor) Gerhard Mueller, commander, 5th Panzer Regiment, 1942.

Lieutenant General (General der Kavallerie) Siegfried Westphal, who functioned in North Africa in 1941-43 as operation officer of Panzer Group (later Panzer Army Africa); chief of staff, German-Italian Panzer Army in Africa; commander, 164th Light Africa Division; chief, Operations Branch, German commander in Chief, South, attached to the Commando Supremo; chief of staff,Commander in Chief, South.

Dr. Wilhelm Wagner, medical officer, 21st Panzer Division, 1941-42.

Major Hubert Ziessler, commander of an artillery regiment, 1941-43.

One thing to bear in mind while reading through this; nearly everything I have read on the desert comments that the Commonwealth forces were more 'at home' in the desert than the German or Italian forces. True, Rommel ran the British led forces ragged on a few occasions, but the men of the Empire seemed better able or inclined to cope with the stark desert environment.

Regards

JonS

[Andreas]

Nice find Jon.

[SgtMuhammed]

Really nice when you check out all the other stuff that is available from that site.

[Michael Dorosh]

I remember from my ASL days that their rulebook mentioned German wheeled transport was particularly unsuited for the desert environment, in comparison to British equipment.

Heh, I see reference to the British "87.6mm Guns" - was this the American translators changing the name of the 25 pounder, or did the Germans actually call them by this name?

[ May 06, 2003, 01:58 PM: Message edited by: Michael Dorosh ]

[kipanderson]

Jon,

Yup, very interesting stuff. Always good to read this sort of thing.

All the best,

Kip.

[JonS]

Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:

Heh, I see reference to the British "87.6mm Guns" - was this the American translators changing the name of the 25 pounder, or did the Germans actually call them by this name?

Not sure, but as a point of reference Nafzinger refers to them as 25-prs. - not 87.6mm - in the appropriate places in his TOEs of DAK units. von Mellinthin may also mention them in his passage on the desert war - anyone got his book handy? Finally, an artillery equivalent of Chamberlain and Ellis' 'German Tanks' book should settle it (would that be Hogg?).

Regards

JonS

[Michael Dorosh]

I would imagine the Germans would have been more inclined to call them 8.76 cm guns, if anything, but again, it could be a case of the American translator converting cm to mm...or not...

ahh, sweet ephemera....

[Ron]

Been rereading von Mellinthin's Africa chapter, and while I don't recall any specific mention of the 25 pdr, he does make reference to the 2 pdr and 6 pdr as such. He also mentions the '3.7" AA gun' the British have and is quite critical of them not using it like the Germans did their own 88mm.

Excellent link BTW, great reading.

Ron