Books

[The_Enigma]

Wow very long post.

Ive only had time to read through about half of it so far but what i have looks great.

One notes from what you have wrote in regards to the Third Battle of Kharkov, that it appears that Manstein regardless of how great a victory he scored agaisnt the Soviets that he basically did to them what they had just done to the 6th Armee.

I admit i have not read much on the battle but is this the correct impression to get from this?

[JasonC]

In the sense that Uranus is the original backhand blow, I suppose so. In both cases a promising offensive peters out into logistical limits and overextension trying to grab multiple objectives. In both cases, the operational defender's superior time to front allows them to counter that, eventually, with concentrated reserves. In both cases aided by operational surprise, etc.

There are definite differences, though. The front had gone static longer along the Don and at Stalingrad, allowing a larger logistical build up, less need for mobile razzle dazzle. Manstein did not have the global odds edge the Russians had for Uranus, though he did have an edge in concentration (the Russians were logistically unable to support their farthest forces to keep them concentrated etc).

Seeing both as instances of a form of strategic defense dominance through logistical constraints, though, is spot on. Much weaker than that dominance was under WW I conditions, but still there.

[Bigduke6]

Excellent post Jason, thank you.

[c3k]

Hmmm,

Reading "Death of the Leaping Horseman" by Jason Mark. It's the operational history (each day gets its own chapter) of the 24th Panzer Division from September '42 through its immolation in Stalingrad. Very detailed. Perhaps a bit too tactical for your purposes.

"Soldat" is a good read for the 1st person perspective.

Von Mellenthin's (sp?) book was quite good for the German perspective of various operational missions.

Otherwise, Glantz would be the best bet, using his various operational studies.

Regards,

Ken

[Gen Von Television]

Jason, thanks for your in depth reflections on Manstein memoirs: I read that book some years ago, and I also had the same impressions; from what I can remember, beside the obvious ability of this great general, you are also left with the impression that if HE had his way, the Soviets may have very well been defeated... :eek:

Anyway, about this I have some questions:

Originally posted by JasonC:

"was the 'mud' such a huge limiting factor on operations, or is it being used as an excuse?"

The latter. Some of these claims are hysterical. Russian armor breakthroughs cannot be stopped because the roads are impassable. lol. The reality is the German mobile formations consistently show better operational mobility than the Russian ones, primarily because of better staff work rather than anything weather, terrain, or automotive related. To shift a full panzer corps from Kursk north face to Orel east face in less than 48 hours, in time to take part in the breakin sectors by the afternoon of the second day of the offensive, is not a sign of bad roads, but it is a sign of excellent staff planning and POL supply flexibility.

What is really going on, though, is a German commander has come to rely on such miracles so much, that every time a hole appears on the map he thinks "I'd faced that a dozen times before and a lightning repositioning of a few PDs has always saved the day", and if on some occasion or other that fails to occur, he blames the weather or the roads or a dumb order from a politico. If you prayed for a miracle 40 times and got 38 miracles, would you rail against the gods?

First talking about the battle of Kursk, or rather the 'mobility' of the forces involved therein, doesn't seem to be appropriate, since at that moment the 'mud season' was over. I remember I read some reports about the infamous 'RASPUTITZA' when there happens literally big mud FLOODS, sometimes completely submerging villages and towns; imagine the vast Russian land becoming alive with mud tidal waves! Can you confirm the Russians were able to strike with their tanks in the high mud anyway? Sure they had great strength and ability to face the worst meteo and geo conditions: I had some readings on Valor Publishing books about their small operations in winter nights in appalling ice storms, or in their well covered and camouflaged crossings of rivers...

PS: here you may find the Valor catalogue, with many interesting books on the Eastern Front Valor Publishing

[ May 16, 2007, 08:43 AM: Message edited by: Gen Von Television ]

[JasonC]

Gen TV - sure mud sometimes stopped military operations, occasionally for several weeks. But it emphatically did not allow Russian mechanized breakthroughs to succeed because the Germans were stuck in said mud and the Russians somehow magically were not.

It is blaming the *success* of Russian mechanized breakthroughs on the mud, that is patently ridiculous on its face. Yet this silliness can indeed be found in some of the German generals' self-serving accounts.

When there was real mud rather than let's pretend excuse making mud, nobody broke through anything. People improved positions and railroads resupplied the dumps etc. Operations paused. It tends to help the defender but also whoever has the better strategic or logistic edge in rail capacity for a given area or rear area production to send. But basically it freezes ops equally.

[Redwolf]

David Glantz doesn't only write books and papers, he also has an excellent survey of literature in this document:

"American Perspectives on Eastern Front Operations in World War II"

I know the name doesn't sound like it, but it contains a whole section on the care and feeding of Soviet sources.

The sections aren't too long, so allow me to quote them here. German sources first:

Postwar American Perspective on Eastern Front Operations

If American wartime impressions of combat on the Eastern Front were vague and imprecise, there was some improvement in that picture during the first decade and a half after war ended. However, during that period a new tendency emerged that colored almost all future works describing events on the Eastern Front. That tendency was to view operations in the East through German eyes and virtually only German eyes. From 1945 to 1958 essentially all works written in English or translated into English about events on the Eastern Front were written by German authors, many of whom were veterans of combat in the East, works moreover, based solely on German sources.

This German period of war historiography embraced two genre of works. The first included memoirs written during those years when it was both necessary and sensible to dissociate oneself from Hitler or Hitler's policies. Justifiable or not, the writers of these memoirs did just that and essentially laid blame on Hitler for most strategic, operational, and often tactical failures. Thus, an apologetic tone permeated these works. Officers who shared in the success of Hitler's armies refused to shoulder responsibility for the failures of the same armies. Only further research will judge the correctness of their views.

The first of the postwar memoirs to appear in English was the by now classic work, Panzer Leader, by Heinz Guderian.4 Guderian's work, which casts considerable light on strategic and operational decisions while Guderian was a panzer group commander in 1941 and later when he became Chief of Staff in 1944, set the tone for future treatment by German generals of Hitler's leadership. Guderian laid at Hitler's feet principal responsibility for all failures of the German Army and for the dismantling of the German General Staff. The German General Staff was portrayed as both used and abused by Hitler throughout the war. Guderian's message was best conveyed by the chapter heading he chose for the section of the Polish War of 1939 which read, "The Beginning of the Disaster." As in most subsequent works, Guderian included little Soviet operational data.

One of the most influential postwar German war critiques was General von Mellenthin's Panzer Battles published ln English in 1956.5 Mellenthin's work, an operational/tactical account of considerable merit, echoed the criticism of Hitler voiced by Guderian and showed how Hitler's adverse influence affected tactical operations. Beyond this, Mellenthin's work adopted a didactic approach in order to analyze operations and hence educate officers. Throughout the book are judgments concerning military principles and assessments of the nature of the Soviet fighting men and officers, most of which have been incorporated into the current "body of truth" about Soviet military capabilities. Hence, Mellenthin made such judgments as these: the Russian soldier is tenacious on defense, inflexible on offense, subject to panic when facing unforeseen eventualities, an excellent night fighter, a master of infiltra- tion, a resolute and implacable defender of bridgeheads, and neglectful of the value of human life.6 As was in the case of Guderian, Mellenthin's experiences against the Red Army encompassed the period before spring 1944 and reflected impressions acquired principally during years of German success.

Mellenthln's work, written without benefit of archival materials, tended to treat tactical cases without fully describing their operational context. Opposing Soviet units, as in Guderian's work, were faceless. Mellenthin's classic account of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps' operations along the Chir River after the encirclement of German 6th Army at Stalingrad stands as an example of the weaknesses of his book.7 In it he describes the brilliant operations of that panzer corps in fending off assaults by Soviet 5th Tank Army's units which included first the 1st Tank Corps and later 5th Mechanized Corps. On 7-8 December 1942, 11ch Panzer Division parried a thrust of 1st Tank Corps at State Farm 79 while on 19 December, 11th Panzer checked the advance of 5th Mechanized Corps. Despite the vivid accounts of these tactical successes, Mellenthin only in passing describes the operational disaster that provided a context for these fleeting tactical successes. For, in fact, while Soviet 5th Tank Army occupied XXXXVIII Panzer Corps' attention, to the northwest Soviet forces overwhelmed and destroyed the Italian 8th Army and severely damaged Army Detachment Hollidt. Moreover, Mellenthin did not mention (probably because he did not know) that Soviet 1st Tank Corps had been in nearly continuous operation since 19 November and was under strength and worn down when it began its march across the Chir.8

Similar flaws appear elsewhere in Mellenthin's work, many of which result from a lack of knowledge of opposing Soviet forces or their strengths.9

Of equal importance to Mellenthin's work, but written from a higher level perspective, was the memoir of Eric von Manstein entitled Lost Victories.10 An important work by an acknowledged master at the operational level of war, Manstein's book viewed operations from 1941 to early 1944 at the strategic and operational level. Manstein's criticism of Hitler reflected active disputes which ultimately led to Manstein's dismissal as Army Group South commander. Manstein's account of operations is accurate although again Soviet forces are faceless, and opposing force ratios are in conflict with those shown by archival materials of Fremde Heeres 0st (Foreign Armies East), Gehlen's organizations, and of the OKH (the Army High Command).11 Again Soviet superiorities are overstated.

These three basic memoirs dominated historiography of World War II in the 1950's and continue to be treated as authoritative works today even as unexploited archival materials challenge an increasing number of facts cited in the three works. Other works appeared in English during this period but were generally concerned with individual battles or operations.12 Whether coinci- dental or not, most of these unfavorable accounts of Soviet combat performance appealed to an American audience conditioned by the Cold War years. Notably, few German commanders of the later war years, a period so unpleasant for German fortunes, wrote memoirs; and the works of those who did (for example, General Heinrici) still remain as untranslated manuscripts in the archives.

The second genre of postwar works included the written monographs based upon debriefings of and studies by German participants in operations on the Eastern Front. For several years after war's end the Historical Division of USEUCOM supervised a project to collect the war experiences of these veterans relating to all wartime fronts. Literally hundreds of manuscripts were assembled on all types of operations. All were written from memory without benefit of archival material. The Department of the Army published the best of these short monographs in a DA pamphlet series in the late forties and early fifties.

These pamphlets were of mixed quality. All were written from the German perspective, and none identified Soviet units involved in the operations. Some were very good, and some were very inaccurate. All require collation with actual archival materials. All are still in use and are considered to be as a valuable guide to Soviet operational tendencies. A few examples should suffice to describe the care that must be employed when using these sources.

In 1950 a DA Pamphlet appeared assessing Allied airborne operations. The distinguished group of German officers who wrote the pamphlet were directed by Major General Hellmuth Reinhardt. The pamphlet critiqued German and Allied airborne experiences. In its chapter on Allied airborne landings in World War II was a subsection entitled, Reflections on the Absence of Russian Air Landings, which began with the following statement:

It is surprising that during World War II the USSR did not attempt any large-scale airborne operations. . . its wartime operations were confined to a commitment of small units.... for the purpose of supporting partisan activities and which had no direct tactical or strategic effect.13

The study went on to mention a rumored air drop along the Dnieper in 1943 but could provide few details of the drop.

A little over a year later Reinhardt discovered his error and put together another manuscript describing the extensive airborne operations the Soviets conducted within the context of the Moscow counteroffensive and adding details to his description of the abortive Soviet Dnieper airborne drop in 1943.14 Recently the Office of the Chief of Military History republished the original pamphlet describing the lack of Russian airborne activity. Reinhardt's revised manuscript remains unpublished.

A DA pamphlet entitled German Defensive Tactics against Russian Break-throughs contained similar errors.15 In a chapter describing a delaying action conducted between 5-24 August 1943 the authors mistakenly stated that German forces abandoned the city of Khar'kov on 18 August when, in fact, the correct date was 23 August.16 Such errors intermixed with accurate date cast serious doubt on the validity of these works as a whole. Despite these errors, most the pamphlets have been reprinted; and they remain one of the basic sources of data about the Red Army. Moreover, they provided impressions of the characteristics of the Russian soldier which have become an integral part of our current stereotype of the Soviet soldier.

- One of the principal deficiencies of all genres of German postwar accounts of fighting on the Eastern Front written during the 1950's was the almost total absence of Soviet operational data. The forces German army groups, armies, corps, and divisions engaged appeared as faceless masses, a monolith of field grey manpower supported by seemingly endless ranks of artillery and, by the end of the war, solid columns of armor. The facelessness of these Soviet masses, lacking distinguishable units and any individually concerning unit mission or function, reinforced the impression conveyed in these German works that Soviet masses, inflexibly employed in unimaginative fashion, simply ground down German power and finally inundated the more capable and artfully controlled German forces. The Soviet steamroller plod into eastern Europe leaving in its wake endless ranks of dead and wounded. That psychological image of the Soviets portrayed in German works has persisted ever since. Moreover, this panorama of operations against a faceless foe clouds the issue of correlation of forces and enables the writers to claim almost constant overwhelming enemy force superiority, whether or not it really existed. All of these memoirs and pamphlets appeared before German archival materials were available, hence they were written without benefit of the rich archival data on Soviet forces and operational methods found in these wartime archives.

In the 1960's reputable trained historians began producing accounts of action on the Eastern Front. These works were better than the earlier ones but still lacked balance. They were based primarily on German sources but did contain some material on the Soviets obtained from German archival sources. Some were written by individuals who spent considerable time in the Soviet Union during the war.

Alexander Werth drew upon his experiences in the wartime Soviet Union to produce Russia at War and a number of shorter works.17 Although these writings contained little operational data they did present the Soviet perspective as they focused on the suffering and hardship endured by the Russian people and on the resulting bravery as they overcame those conditions.

Alan Clark's survey account of the war in the East, entitled Barbarossa, contained more operational detail.18 However, it still lacked any solid body of Soviet data. Moreover Clark displayed a tendency others would adopt - that is to cover the first two years of war in detail but simply skim over events during the last two years of war. In fact, of the 506 page book, over 400 pages concern the earlier period. This reflected an often expressed judgment that there was little reason to study operations late in the war because the machinations of Hitler so perverted the ability of German commanders to conduct normal reasonable operations.

The U.S. Army Center for Military History made a commendable effort to correct this imbalance by publishing Earl Ziemke's work entitled Stalingrad to Berlin.19 This work, given the available source material, was a sound and scholarly one. Ziemke surveyed operations from November 1942 to the close of war, generally from a strategic and high level operational perspective. While relying on German sources, he based his research on German archival materials and did include material from the, by now, emerging Soviet accounts of operations. In so doing Ziemke expanded the American view of the war in the East and began to dispel some of the more serious errors found in earlier German accounts.

Ziemke and others who followed him with writings on the Eastern Front were helped immeasurable by Soviet historians work on the war--work which began in the late 1950's and accelerated in the 1960's. Those new works, about which I will have more to say later, although of mixed quality, added a new but essential dimension to historiography of the war. Most good historians took cognizance of them in their work. By the 1970's enough of these works existed to provide a more balanced vision of the war.

In the early seventies Paul Carell, a German author writing under a pen name, finished publication of a two volume study of Eastern Front operations entitled Hitler Moves East and Scorched Earth.20 These works, written in appealing journalistic style, contained more German operational detail and tapped numerous accounts by individual German officers and soldiers who served in tactical units. Although Carell's works were heavily German in their perspective, they did contain an increased amount of Soviet materials. Their lively narrative form has made them influential works among the reading public.

In a more scholarly vein, Col. Albert Seaton published two works, The Russo-German War and The Battle of Moscow which projected Ziemke's work down to the tactical level.21 By exploiting the official records of particular German divisions Seaton added a new dimension to the descriptions of war at the tactical level. Like Carell, Seaton tempered his German perspective somewhat by using data from a limited number of Soviet sources.

The works of John Erickson have been the most influential ones to appear since 1960. They have broken the stranglehold which the German perspective had over Eastern Front historiography and have integrated into that historiography a comprehensive description of the Soviet perspective on the war, particularly at the strategic and operational levels. His first work, the Soviet High Command, for the first time shed light on the events of the summer of 1941.22 His subsequent two books, The Road to Stalingrad and The Road to Berlin, recounted in considerable detail the course of war from June 1941 to May 1945.23 The principal value of these works derives from the fact that they distill information from literally thousands of Soviet works on the war and create from that information a detailed, sometimes frenetic, account of operations in the East. The overwhelming impact of the narrative on the reader reflects the overwhelming scale and scope of war in the East.

Erickson's works critically assess the Soviet sources and reject those that conflict with the most influential and accurate German records. The magnitude of Erickson's research efforts precluded his checking on the accuracy of every tactical detail found in Soviet accounts. Therefore, in some instances, Erickson's details do conflict with reputable German accounts. In addition, Erickson has accepted Soviet data concerning correlation of forces which, in some instances, have been inflated, in particular regarding German strength. Dispute these minor faults Erickson's effort to produce a Soviet view of the war has accomplished the major feat of providing readers with more balanced sources upon which to reach judgments concerning combat in the East. Unfortunately the size and complexity of Erickson's works precludes their appeal to a broad readership among the general public. Future historians will have the task of integrating Erickson's view with those of the host of other memoir writers and historians who wrote from the German perspective.

Across the span of time from 1945 to the present, despite the work of Erickson and a few others, the German view of war on the Eastern Front has predominated. In part, this has resulted from a natural American parochialism that tended to discount or ignore the importance of operations in the East in the overall scheme of war. During the earlier postwar period the German view prevailed by default. Numerous German accounts appeared, and nothing in the way of Soviet material appeared to contradict them. By the 1960's, when Soviet accounts began to appear, the German view was firmly entrenched. Moreover, the cold war atmosphere often prompted out of hand rejection of the Soviet version of war. The German view, sometimes accurate, often apologetic or accusative, and usually anti-Soviet, prevailed. As a result, this view was incorporated into high school and college textbooks and into the curriculum of U.S. military educational institutions. Most impor- tant, is provided a context within which to judge the contemporary Soviet military. Only today is that view increasingly being challenged. Those challenges are made possible by intensified Soviet publication efforts, efforts that are slowly raising from obscurity details of Soviet operations on the Eastern Front. These Soviet publication efforts, however, must overcome serious barriers if they are to produce a view which can complement the German perspective and produce a more balanced picture of war on the Eastern Front.

[Redwolf]

And the second part:

Soviet Sources: Perceptions and Reality

American perceptions of the war on the Eastern Front have been shaped in part by the course of Soviet historiography on the war. As stated earlier, the Soviet reticence of address operations in detail during the immediate postwar period left the field open for the German perspective, which in turn predominated. Soviet efforts to set the record straight began in the late 1950's and continue today but have only partially tempered that German view.

Three principal barriers exist to block or inhibit Soviet historical efforts from influencing the American perspective. The barriers are, in sequence: a lack of knowledge in the West concerning Soviet historical work, the language barrier, and a basic distrust of the credibility of Soviet works. The first two of these barriers are mechanical and can be easily addressed. The third is more fundamental and more difficult to overcome.

Most Americans and Westerners are soon unaware of the scope of Soviet historical efforts. They assume that the Soviet reticence to talk openly of operational matters, characteristic of the period prior to 1958, continues today. In fact, Soviet historical efforts have increased geometrically, and Western audiences need to be educated to that fact. The fact that most of these works are only in Russian inhibits that education. To remedy this problem more Americans need to learn Russian (an unlikely prospect), or more Soviet works will have to appear in English. Increased research by American military historians using Soviet sources can also contribute to overcoming this first barrier. The second barrier is a physical one regarding language. If a source cannot be read, it makes little difference whether or not it is available or, for that matter, credible. The only remedy to this barrier is more extensive translation and a publicizing of Soviet sources by their use in more detailed historical monographs.,

The third barrier, involving credibility, is more fundamental. It is, in part, an outgrowth of ideological differences which naturally breed suspicion on the part of both parties. It is also a produce of the course of Soviet war historiography which itself is subject to criticism, depending on the period during which the Soviet sources appeared.

In the immediate postwar years, from 1945 to 1958 few Soviet military accounts appeared about operations on the Eastern Front.24 Those that did appear were highly politicized and did not contain the sort of operational detail which would make them attractive to either the casual reader or the military scholar. Indeed, they were of little use to the military student(Soviet or foreign), which may, in part, explain their paucity of accurate detai1.

Beginning in 1958 more accurate and useful accounts began appearing in a number of forms. From its inception, Soviet Military History Journal has Bought to publish high quality articles on relevant military experiences at all levels of war.25 The journal after 1958 immediately began investigation of a series of burning questions, perhaps the most important of which was an investigation of the nature of the initial period of war, (Nachalny period voini), a topic noticeably ignored in earlier Soviet work. Military History Journal has since focused on practical, realistic questions within a theoretical context. It has personified the Soviet penchant for viewing military affairs as a continuum within which individual issues must be viewed in a historical context.

In 1958 the first Soviet general history of the war appeared, Platonov' History the Second World War.26 This volume, for the first time, addressed Soviet wartime failures which had been almost totally overlooked in earlier years. For example, it openly referred to the abortive Soviet offensive at Khar'kov in May 1942, a subject hitherto apparently too sensitive to talk about. Platonov offered few real details of these failures but did break the ice regarding a candid reference to failures in general which represented a quantum leap in the candor of Soviet sources.

At the same time Soviet authors resumed a wartime tendency to teach by use of combat experience. Kolganov's Development of Tactics of the Soviet Army in the Great Patriotic War, published in 1958, contained a thorough review of wartime tactics by combat example.27 This didactic work sought to harness experience in the service of education and did so by drawing upon a wealth of tactical detail, some of it relating to failure as well as success. Kolganov's accounts, although fragmentary, seemed to affirm a Soviet belief that one learns from failure as well as success; and, if one is to be educated correctly (scientifically), details must be as accurate as possible in both cases.

After 1958 a flow of memoir literature, unit histories, and operational accounts began that has continued, and, in fact, intensified, to the present. The Soviets have sought to capture the recollections of wartime military leaders at every level of staff and command. These include valuable memoirs of individuals at the STAVXA level (Shtemenko, Vasilevsky, Zhokov), front level (Rokossovsky, Konev, Meretskov, Yerememko, Bagramyan), army level (Moskalenko, Chuikov, Krylov, Batov, Galitsky, Grechko, Katukov, Lelyushenko, Rotmistrov), and at the corps level and below.28 Soviet military historians have logged the experiences of many Soviet units including armies, tank armies, corps (tank, mechanized, and rifle), divisions, and even regiments and separate brigades, although with a few notable exceptions.29 Memoir literature has also extended into the realm of the supporting services (air, navel, engineer, signal, etc).

Over time some excellent operational studies have appeared focusing on major operations (Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, Belorussia), on lesser operations (Novgorod-Luga, Eastern Pomerania, Donbas), and on specific sectors in larger operations.30 Written by academic historians (Samsonov) or military historians (Zhilin, Galitsky, Sidorenko) many of these are first rate works containing massive amounts of, for the most part, accurate detail. Building upon the memoirs, unit histories, and operational studies were valuable functional works which distilled the sum total of those experiences. These studies included general military histories and histories of operational art (Semenov, Strokov, Bagramyan, Krupchenko), operational and tactical studies based on combat experiences (Radzievsky, Kurochkin), studies on the use of armored and mechanized forces (Rotmistrov, Babadzhanyan, Radzievsky, Losik), treatices on operational art and tactics (Sldorenko, Savkin, Reanichenko), and studies on numerous other topics relating to combat support.31

New general histories of the Great Patriotic War and World War II, have appeared since 1960. A six volume history of the war in the East provided a more candid view of political issues of the war than earlier war histories and added some operational details hitherto not revealed.32 Its size, however, limited coverage of lower level operational or tactical detail. An eleven volume history of World War II was politically less candid but did add another measure of detail to accounts at the strategic and operational levels.33

Thus it is apparent that massive amounts of Soviet military data concerning operations on the Eastern Front do exist. Moreover, the sum total of that information, as Erickson has demonstrated, forms an impressive picture of operations in the East. On balance much of that information is accurate as well.

There are however, some problems with these sources, just as is the case with German sources, that must be critiqued if one wishes to prevent creating a Soviet bias similar to the earlier German bias I described.

First, Soviet works tend to contain a high political or ideological content. In essence, they are intended to indoctrinate as well as teach. In theory, of course, war, in all its detail, is a continuum of the political and, hence, ideological context. Thus the political content is understand- able, if not obligatory. A critical reader must recognize what is political and what is not and must not allow his judgment of the one to affect his judgment of the other. He must also realize that many of these works, especially the briefer and more popular ones, are written to inspire. Thus, interspersed with operational and tactical fact are inevitable examples of individual or unit self sacrifice and heroism (which may or may not be accurate). The tendency of the Western reader is to note the often romanticized single act and reject also the account of action surrounding it.

Soviet military works written before 1958 were highly politicized and focused heavily on the positive role of Stalin in every aspect of war.34 Correspondingly, operational and tactical detail was lacking. After 1958 the political content of military works diminished as did emphasis on the "cult of personality," leaving more room for increasing amounts of operational and tactical detail. Since that time the political content of military works has varied depending on the nature of the work and the audience it intended to address. Hence the briefer the article and the less sophisticated the audience, the higher was the political content. First-rate operational and tactical studies limited political coverage to the role of the party structure in planning and conducting operations.

Soviet military writers also have tended to accentuate the positive, to cover successful operations in more detail than unsuccessful ones. Thus, until recently, little was written about the border battles of June-July 1941, about the Khar'kov and Kerch operations in May 1942, about the Donbas and Khar'kov operations of February-March 1943, and about the warning stages of many successful operations.35 Likewise, few unit histories have appeared of armies which operated on secondary directions in the period 1943-1945.36

The Soviets in the early sixties began noting these failures, saying, for example, that in May 1942 Soviet forces launched an offensive at Khar'kov but the offensive was unsuccessful. This is certainly correct but not very helpful to one who wishes to learn from failures. As time has passed more material has appeared concerning these failures (for example, a chapter from Moskalenko's Na yugozapadnom napravlenil (On the southwestern direction) provides considerably more detail on the Khar'kov disaster.

A similar pattern emerged in Soviet treatment of their own airborne experiences, which were notable for their lack of success. There were few references to those failures prior to 1964. Yet by 1976 most of the unpleasant details were public, although romanticized a bit.

Very naturally Soviet interpretation of operations have often differed sharply from the German. In fact, over time differences in interpretation have appeared within the circle of Soviet military writers. In the case of memoir material this takes the form of debates over the rationale for and the outcome of operations - debates conducted by competing memoirs.37

One is struck in Soviet accounts by the accuracy of facts, principally concerning unit, place, and time. Soviet sources in this regard invariable match up with the operational and tactical maps found in German (or Japanese) unit archives. It is apparent in some cases that Soviet military historians have made extensive use of such German archival materials in preparing their own studies.38 Less unanimity exists over what actually occurred at a given place and at a given time. Just as is the case in some German accounts, towns abandoned by the enemy were "taken after heavy fighting," and units driven back in disarray simply "withdrew to new positions."39

Especially striking are those frequent cases where low level Soviet accounts precisely match German accounts. In a history of the 203rd Rifle Division the author described the operations of that unit in the frenetic post-Stalingrad days of December 1942 when Soviet forces pressed German units southward from the Don and Chir Rivers toward the rail line running from Tatsinskaya to Morozovsk.40 The 203rd Rifle Division was ordered to advance by forced march about 50 kilometers, cross the Bystraya River, and reach an encircled Soviet armored force at Tatsinskaya. The author described the action as the worn division, by now running short of ammunition, reached the ridge line north of the Bystraya. There it confronted an advancing force of German armor and infantry dispatched north of the river. The German force, estimated at 15 tanks, struck two regiments of the 203rd Rifle Division which, because of ammunition shortages, were forced to withdraw several kilometers. Just as he was fearing for the fate of his division the Soviet divisional commander contacted a nearby antitank company which provided the division supporting fire. Miraculously the German force broke contact and withdrew south of the river. This Soviet account did not mention the designation of the German unit.

In a casual interview with a former lieutenant from 6th Panzer Division, which fought along the Bystraya River in late December 1942, I asked the lieutenant about his unit's operations on the day of the events described by the Soviet account.41 He responded that 6th Panzer dispatched an armored kampfgruppen north of the Bystraya with about 15 tanks and supporting infantry in order to disrupt the Soviet advance to and across the river. He was in the task force. The force struck a Soviet unit, elements of which withdrew after desultory firing. The German unit pursued a short distance until it came under fire from an undetected Soviet artillery unit, fire which stripped the infantry away from the tanks. Fearing the loss of critical armored assets left unprotected by infantry, the Germans withdrew south of the river.

This isolated incident is often typical of the complementary nature of Soviet and German (and Japanese) accounts regarding unit, place, and time. It also vividly underscores the necessity, or at least the desirability of having both sides of the story.

A major discrepancy between Soviet and German sources concerns the number of forces at the disposal of each side. Examination of both sources and German archival material indicates several tendencies. First, Soviet accounts of their own strength seem to be accurate and reflect the numbers cited in documentation of Fremde Heeres 0st.42 Conversely, Soviet sources tend to exaggerate the strength of German forces they opposed. Moreover, Soviet exaggeration of German strength regarding guns and armor is even more severe than in regards to manpower. In part, this results from the Soviet practice of counting German allies, auxiliary forces, and home guards (Volksturm) units. But even counting these forces, Soviet estimates of German strength, when compared with the strengths shown by OKH records, are too high.43 Just as the Germans exaggerate when they cite routine Soviet manpower preponderance of between 8:1 and 17:1, so also do Soviet sources exaggerate Soviet-German strength ratios as being less than 3:1 and often 2:1 up to 1945 when higher ratios were both justified and recognized by Soviet sources. For example, the Japanese armored strength of about 1500 tanks cited in Soviet works on Manchuria exceeded tenfold the actual Japanese armored strength, which, in addition, was comprised of armored vehicles scarcely deserving of the name (and apparently, for that same reason, never used in the operation).

Soviet sources also adversely affect their own credibility with regards to wartime casualty figures. The earlier practice of totally ignoring casualties has begun to erode, but one must look long and hard to find any loss figures, indicating that this is still obviously a delicate question for Soviet writers. Gross figures do exist for large scale operations (Berlin, S.E. Europe, Manchuria), and one can infer casualties from reading divisional histories which sometimes give percentages of unit fill before and after operations and company strengths.44 Comprehensive coverage of this issue, however, does not exist; and the reader is left to reach his own conclusions (One of which is that the Soviet author has something to hide).

Thus, in addition to the general American (and Western) ignorance of the existence of Soviet source material and the presence of an imposing language barrier, Americans question the credibility of Soviet sources. While this questioning was once valid, it is increasingly less valid as time passes. Soviet sources have some inherent weaknesses; but these weaknesses, over time, have been diminishing. Unfortunately, the American perception of Soviet sources remains negative; and, hence, the American perception of the Eastern Front has changed very little. Only time, more widespread publication of candid operational materials (some of it in English), and more extensive use of those materials by American military historians will alter those perceptions. That alteration will likely be painfully slow.

Full document on:

http://leav-www.army.mil/fmso/documents/e-front.htm

[JasonC]

The only part of Glantz's analysis I find bizarre is the claim that we can't expect people to read Erickson because it is so long and intricate, but we should instead expect a sea change from translating hundreds of Russian monographs (which actually Erickson already read and digested). Um, is the general reader expected to read hundreds of Russian monographs but incapable of reading 2 English ones?

There are limitations in Erickson. He makes mistakes on the tactical level because he believes his sources too much. He fails to vary the level of analysis to convey a more vivid sense of action on different scales. His maps are primitive. He tends to shy away from evaluative analysis. All of those would be improved by reading the Russian sources directly. But it is far more demanding, intellectually, not less.

I read this as in part a rather lame attempt to damn an illustrious predecessor with faint praise. Glantz himself owes more to Erickson than he sometimes lets on, and wants his mantle. For the most part he deserves it. But Erickson will continue to be read, and remains (along with Glantz's own volumes) the primary corrective to the German-centric problem he describes.

[Redwolf]

I agree. Glantz himself is very hard to read (for me), and while I agree Erickson isn't much more enjoyable I skipped both "When Titans clashed" and the Erickson books because there is just so much material as good as them but more enjoyable. I made it through Overy's book, though. All of the above I would, today, never pick up in a bookshop for lack of maps alone and in fact I ditched them all in a used book sale.

Interestingly enough, Glantz becomes more and more readable the less "professional" the publication is. His hardcovers and Titans are like wading through half-molten rubber for me, but his self-published, photocopied old papers are straight and to the point, as are most of his downloadable writings on the Internet.

Overall, however, I am drifting back to the ETO, and summer 1944 in particular, because although I think the Eastern front is more decisive the documentation situation is behind, and I mean several steps behind.

[The_Enigma]

Re: Panzer Operations

Still plodding through this book.

Currently at the portion were he talks about the retreat from Kursk.

Its funny to note, when the book starts, he has high praise for Ivan, there fighting skill and courage but is quick on occasion to say how crap they are.

However it seems to be a decent blend of this.

Following the battles outside of Moscow and then deploying for Operation Winter Storm, there is one hell of a twist.

Ivan have became complete incompetents, it appears he is more inclined to say its all because of him it worked out and that he knows better then the guys above him.

Or so it appears to be as i read further.

There starts as well some inconsistencies with other books ive read (Eastern Front isn’t really my thing). His revolving battle he describes as being one day taking up around 10 hours while other books have said it went on for days - i find that interesting.

There was one or two other examples but i forget them now lol

His cover of the fighting near/around/in Kharkov and Operation Citadel were very brief whereas talking about creating a bridgehead in some backwater part of Latvia and its in-depth.

As he rises in command the book does seem to get a little more duller.

I have noticed that so far, its only the Soviets who have committed any atrocities ... no mention of anything his troops may have seen or done etc (same thing in Kurt Meyers book - evil Russians, were saints, evil Canadians, were saints)

On top of that ive found several of the maps to be very unhelpful, especially when they have been talking about an action at location X and it isnt even on the maps they provide!

Other then that, i hold firm in the opinion as i said before that the book is however very interesting.

[Cuirassier]

Does anyone know a website that has free detailed maps of European Russia? I'm reading "Before Stalingrad" right now and have found the maps in the book somewhat inadequate. I'm particularly interested in the Smolensk area.

Thanks.

[Cuirassier]

Bump