Glantz's conclusions on Kursk

[Redwolf]

let's try that again

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0891415327/qid=1047093934/sr=8-1/ref=sr_8_1/002-4257893-4759235?v=glance&s=books&n=507846

[ichadwick]

Originally posted by Lt. Kije:

"The settlers, particularly those implanted in the great bend of the Yellow River, tended to nomadise themselves when dessications set in and thus to swell the numbers of the horse peoples who beat in successive waves against the Wall; offensives by the horse peoples also undid the efforts of the frontier commanders to sinicise the semi-nomads whose natural home the inter-zone was."

Deserving of the Bulwer-Lytton award for run-on sentences, the Rudolph Flesh Award for obvious obfuscation and the Strunk and White award for breaking every rule in the book!

[kipanderson]

Fionn, hi,

“The Soviets have never been shy of sacrificing men and material in order to attain the overall objective (even if said sacrifices may seem like wholesale squandering to one's opponents). Soviet and Russian history is replete with "lost battles" which won the war . There is a great lesson in there for military historians and grognards en etudant.”

You and Grisha/Greg clearly look at things the same way. I am very sympathetic to the operational arguments.

However, cost/price “always” matters. Everything is relative to its highest valued alternative forgone. There are no exceptions to this. In some cases such as the Normandy Landings it is true that vast casualties would have been a price worth paying in order to get a foot hold on continental Europe. However, even here there would have been limits, in any one location. There always are.

In the case of Kursk the exact same resource could have slowed their Uber armoured enemy more effectively if the Soviets had used them in defense. If the same Tank Brigades had been used defensively, in the path of the attacking Tigers and Panthers, the Germans could have been slowed more effectively and at lower cost. Thus the Soviets would have more easily attained their goals.

It remains my view that tactically, even operational, in the use of armour, the Soviets were not on their best form at Kursk. That is why I always think of Kursk as the last of the Old Style battles on the Eastern Front.

On such a big subject we were never all going to agree . That adds to the fun . (PS. A book to look out for, that is due sometime in the next year, is Glantz’s book on the Red Army in 43. To say it will be interesting is an understatement. BTW. The next House/Glantz book is on Stalingrad.)

When it comes to argument about Kursk being a battle the Germans could have won, as I explained above, I am firmly of the view that Kursk was far from a close call. There was never any hope of Germany winning and they did not come close. In my view.

All good fun,

All the best,

Kip

PS. I find Glantz stunningly exciting . But I am after all the information and opinions he gives.

[Grisha]

Kip,

I agree that it would've been much preferable to have Soviet tanks, guns and men ready and waiting along the approach path of the German advances at Kursk. In fact, this is the ideal situation for stopping an offensive: to be lined up right in front of them, entrenched, guns registered, tanks bore-sighted. In the southern pincer this wasn't possible because Soviet defenses began off-balance. And, that was due to Vatutin (or anybody else in STAVKA) being unable to determine the exact path of advance the Germans would take down south. And even if the Soviets' had determined where the Germans were jumping off, this would've been of fleeting value, something the Germans demonstrated later by sidestepping eastward a bit before going up the middle. Von Manstein was too good an operator to let his army drag itself through strong defenses if an opening was available elsewhere. The geography of the region greatly aided von Manstein, since it was serious steppe country - few forests, and these only small patches, fairly gentle topography, no insurmountable river barriers to speak of. Really, it was mainly a task of German tactical reconnaissance finding weakpoints in the Soviet line, then making those trademark single-night regroupings. The Soviets were well aware of such capabilities of the panzers, and it was paramount that the Germans not be given any breathing space. The only avenue for the Soviets - who really had no means of determining German shifts during the operation until after the fact - was to hit the German flanks whenever the situation presented itself.

Given the gaps in 1943 between the Soviets and Germans in terms of tactical expertise and equipment, the average tactical engagement was not going to bode well for the Soviets. Certainly, the Red Army was a very different beast from 1941-42, but relative to the Germans there were still serious inadequacies to be addressed (and these would be dealt with more or less by 1944). Add the fact that Soviet forces were counterattacking at exactly the points where German armor forces were massed, and you have a grim job that had to be done from an operational perspective.