Finns, Mannerheim, and the Continuation War

[Grisha]

I'd like to hear anyones opinion of the probability of more aggressive Finnish action against the Soviets in WWII. As it was, Mannerheim limited Finnish military operations to reoccupying the territories lost during the Winter War. Did the possibility exist that the Finns could have chosen a more aggressive plan despite Mannerheim?

[Sardaukar]

There were several political decisions made in late summer/autumn 1941 in Finnish political and military High Command. Those decision were made by political leadership of country after listening opinions of military. Lot of them were influenced by Allied backchannel diplomacy.

1. Stopping direct attack against Leningrad on Isthmus. Troops were put on defensive, which allowed Soviets to shift their reserves and sometimes even line regiments against German thrus. Finns didn't want anything to do with German plans about Leningrad.

2. Declining to participate to total encirclement of Leningrad via Syväri (Svir) river, around Lake Ladoga. Same thing as above.

3. Stopping the Finnish attack up north to cut the Murmansk railroad. Gen. Hj. Siilasvuo was given direct otder from Finnish High Command to stop advance towards Louhi. That put him into very difficult position, since he had under his command also German units, mainly SS Mountain Division "Nord", whose commander complained of him directly to Himmler. Siilasvuo couldn't tell the Germans why he did stall the offensive.

North of that, where Finnish units were under German command, no action was necessary, since chances of German advance over rugged terrain was deemed impossible and German units unsuitable for wilderness warfare.

If political decision would have been made to participate fully to German attack, there might have been 2 likely consequences. First, cutting the Murmansk off, leaving Arkhangelsk as primary harbour. That would have drastically reduced Lend Lease shipments to Soviet Union, since Arkhangels is blocked by ice for some parts of year. Two, fall of Leningrad. Especially second was deemed definite no-no.

It wasn't only Mannerheim's decision to limit the advances (and there was not much love lost towards Soviet regime by him, albeit he detested German Nazi regime too), but more like general consensus in Finnish politico-military high echelon. Pro-German faction wasn't large or powwerful enough to enforce different outcome. Even Germans realized that, so while they complained, they decided not to pressurize the Finnish Government about the issues, even when they had perfect means for that, since Finns were largely depending on German grain supply. Ironical for quite agricultural country, but unavoidable due to high percentage of manpower in military service, I seem to recall it was close to 16 % at peak time when 10 % is usually deemed upper limit. That had severe agricultural drawbacks to Finnish economy.

So...I don't see much chances for larger participation to invasion unless political power would have shifted totally, which is unlikely in democratic country. One of the signs for different objectives was that Finland carefully always denied being "allied" with Germany, but stated being "co-belligent" with Germany.

Cheers,

M.S.

[Sergei]

Well, in addition to taking back what had been lost, Pedrozavodsk was taken. Frontline before Soviet summer offensive of 1944.

But to answer your question, we might try to look at what Germany would have wanted Finland to do, and why Finland declined. First of all, the issue of Leningrad. In September the old border was met in the Isthmus and River Svir was reached to east of Lake Ladoga. Hitler would have wanted Finland to assist Germans in their aspirations of taking Leningrad. Hitler even promised the area to Finns (as it was before Peter I founded the new capital in 1703). Finns were so close to Leningrad... yet so far.

In the Isthmus things had gone well, but after the initial problems, the Red Army was starting to gain back its strength. After the old border was reached, some small advances were made across it to shorten the line, but behind the border began Soviet defence lines built before the war, and soon fighting became fiercer. Finnish army was ill-equipped for breaching such defense lines, especially when Soviets could be expected to fight to the last man to keep outside of the city perimeters. Also some own men refused to cross the old border: the aims of the war had been reached, they reasoned, so why go any further? Let Germans die for Hitler, not us.

Another possibility against Leningrad was for Finnish and German forces to meet behind it. Finns decided not to go further than get to Svir, then wait for Germans to advance northwards. But German advance was repulsed at Tikhvin, 100 km away from Finnish lines. Attacking was out of the question, because supplying the army so far away would have proven difficult. And as has been mentioned, Soviets were becoming able to fight back, making it a very risky business trying to reach out so deep into enemy territory when the alternative was to defend a short river line between Ladoga and Onega.

Yet another possibility was to attack to Sorokka railway junction at the White Sea, thus cutting the remaining land connection between Murmansk and the rest of the country. But it wouldn't have been difficult for Soviets to defend the railway by bringing in as many troops and as much shells for artillery as they wanted, while Finnish supply system would have been strained by the ridiculous "roads" in the area. Besides, Finland was still a democracy, and the Social Democrats (the biggest party in the parliament) were unhappy about the scheme of Greater Finland so happily put forth by the extreme right. So also for political reasons it was not possible to go any further.

What else? Germany was in charge of all operations in Lapland. They fared poorly in their attempts to take Murmansk. Could Finns have helped? I doubt. The terrain in the area is so difficult for fighting wars of any kind, and Soviets were determined to defend such vital cities as Murmansk or Leningrad, it would have been futile.

Also, Finnish politicians were not blind nor were they idiots. They knew very well that no power in the world could stop Germany, especially not the weak and corrupt Soviets who would collapse before winter... The intention was to take good defensive positions and wait for Germany to finish the job. As Soviet Union held on, Finland couldn't reach a victory, but neither could it negotiate a peace with Soviets because of the Germans.

In my opinion, instead of attacking to east in 1941, we should have invaded Sweden. We could have easily enslaved the whole nation.

[Sergei]

Damn, Sardaukar beat me to it... :mad:

[Runyan99]

I don't know much about the continuation war, but my general impression is that the Finns were always handicapped by a manpower shortage. Limited resources always meant that Finnish objectives had to be modest.

As an aside - I have one book on the '39-'40 Winter War, but I have not come across any books on the Continuation War. Can anyone recommend a good history?

[Sergei]

Far more men were put into arms during the Continuation War than were in the Winter War, because Finland hadn't been as well prepared for war in 1939 as it was in 1941. Booty was gained from destroyed Soviet divisions, some late arms shipments arrived from Britain and France in 1940, and more was bought from Germany and Sweden. Finnish arms industry continued to churn out rifles and shells. Furthermore, the responsibility of most of Northern Finland was taken by Germany. Of course, as Finland was a nation of 3 million, there never was quite enough troops to reach the Urals, but still enough so that after the defensive perimeter was reached, some of the troops could be demobilized.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Runyan99:

I don't know much about the continuation war, but my general impression is that the Finns were always handicapped by a manpower shortage. Limited resources always meant that Finnish objectives had to be modest.

Yep, the offensive phase had been more costly than the Winter War. With population of 3.5 million one can do just that much.

Originally posted by Runyan99:

As an aside - I have one book on the '39-'40 Winter War, but I have not come across any books on the Continuation War. Can anyone recommend a good history?

There are no books, at least no comprehensive ones, about the Continuation War in English. The main reason is that Finns kept such low profile about it after the war in effort not to irritate the eastern neighbour needlessly. So it has been a "forgotten war", and Soviet propaganda views have prevailed.

[ November 16, 2003, 09:01 AM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[rum]

Originally posted by Grisha:

As it was, Mannerheim limited Finnish military operations to reoccupying the territories lost during the Winter War. Did the possibility exist that the Finns could have chosen a more aggressive plan despite Mannerheim?

Speaking formaly, this is not absolute truth. Finnish troops went something farther then 1939 borders. I think where were several reasons why they didnt continue offensive operation

1. Lack of resources - finnish army suffered from the Winter War already, and didnt have sufficient ammo production for any large scale attacking.

2. People will - the soldier morale was very high then retaking the ground which gone to the USSR with the 1940 agreement, but morale went much lower then they had to occupy territories outside of 1939 borders.

3. While being very well trained in the defensive fights, finns had luck of training in offensive operations.

[Keke]

Originally posted by rum:

3. While being very well trained in the defensive fights, finns had luck of training in offensive operations.

That isn't quite true. Most Winter War successes were achieved by counter-attacks, and in 1941 many infantry formations achieved 'blizkrieg'-rate of advance (IIRC max. 75km/day) in tough terrain. If there were problems with offensive operations, it was caused more by lack of proper resources than training.

[rum]

Originally posted by Keke:

That isn't quite true. Most Winter War successes were achieved by counter-attacks,

I'd consider this couter-attacks as a "tactical defense", or "mobile defense". Their purpose, if i understand correctly, were inflicting casualties to the attacking soviet troops, not the re-capturing and control of territory.

Originally posted by Keke:

and in 1941 many infantry formations achieved 'blizkrieg'-rate of advance (IIRC max. 75km/day) in tough terrain.

Pardon me? Could you please give me the sources? Do you mean the offense, not the marches/regrouping on friendly territory?

Considering the total finnish advance, i can not realize where were such speed. And if sustained such advance rate for several days, finns would outrun Leningrad and left it far behind front lines, are they?

[Sergei]

Originally posted by rum:

I'd consider this couter-attacks as a "tactical defense", or "mobile defense". Their purpose, if i understand correctly, were inflicting casualties to the attacking soviet troops, not the re-capturing and control of territory.

Hmm, I don't know if I understand you... although Finnish counter-attacks, such as that in Tolvajärvi, weren't large scale operations, I find it hard to see how this wasn't gaining back the territory, even if just a portion of it.

To assess this, maybe you could explain what you mean by "lack of training in offensive operations". Do you mean that the soldiers could only stand in their trenches and wait for a Red onslaught, or do you mean that Finnish generals didn't know how to execute a strategic offensive?

[Sergei]

Originally posted by rum:

Considering the total finnish advance, i can not realize where were such speed. And if sustained such advance rate for several days, finns would outrun Leningrad and left it far behind front lines, are they?

Finns advanced nearly 300 km to the east of Leningrad, you know... (see the map link I provided above)

[Keke]

Originally posted by rum:

Pardon me? Could you please give me the sources? Do you mean the offense, not the marches/regrouping on friendly territory?

Considering the total finnish advance, i can not realize where were such speed. And if sustained such advance rate for several days, finns would outrun Leningrad and left it far behind front lines, are they?

Lol...I threw it from top of my head, and on a second thought it sounds a bit too much. I have no books me just now, and I'll be out of town next week, but I'll search the correct maximum advancement rate from proper sources. Anyway it happened N and NE of Lake Ladoga (Laatokka), so not on the Karelian Isthmus where it would have reached Leningrad pretty fast.

[Frunze]

Did Finnish political leaders consider whether Finland might have a better chance of a long-term independent existence bordering the USSR than bordering a Greater German Reich stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals?

Is that a possible factor in their decisions?

[Keke]

Originally posted by Frunze:

Did Finnish political leaders consider whether Finland might have a better chance of a long-term independent existence bordering the USSR than bordering a Greater German Reich stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals?

Is that a possible factor in their decisions?

No. Why? Because Soviet Union had already attacked once without any provocation.

[Andreas]

OT - nice sig Keke

[Sardaukar]

Originally posted by Frunze:

Did Finnish political leaders consider whether Finland might have a better chance of a long-term independent existence bordering the USSR than bordering a Greater German Reich stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals?

Is that a possible factor in their decisions?

Yes. That was definitely considered, not to mention that Nazi racial views didn't encompass Finns into "Nordic people" that their dogma idolized.

Generally, Finns were more into Western Alliance (Britain/France) pre- and during Winter War, but circumstances forced us to tie our fortunes with German, so to speak.

Co-operation was easy, since lot of the upper echelon officers were WW I German trained, volunteers in Imperial Prussian Jaeger Battaillon 27 that fought on East Front during WW I.

Interestingly, Finns came to consider Germans inferior in combat capability in our area of operations. While Finnish officers sometimes admired Germans about their strict discipline (Finns tend to appear to be as undisciplined bunch..and still do...I should know after my own professional military service in FDF), orienteering/navigation, cross country skiing and certain "initiative" in lower ranks in combat was something even elite units like Gebirgsjaegers never caught really in alien enviroment that was called "claustrophobic forest battles" by them.

So, while Finns did tie their success to German arms, their combat utility in North was soon seen to be less what Finnish could achieve. That did cool down the prominent pro-German faction in military.

Cheers,

M.S.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Sardaukar:

[Yes. That was definitely considered, not to mention that Nazi racial views didn't encompass Finns into "Nordic people" that their dogma idolized.

Now could you tell me who considered it in 1941?

Originally posted by Sardaukar:

Generally, Finns were more into Western Alliance (Britain/France) pre- and during Winter War, but circumstances forced us to tie our fortunes with German, so to speak.

Co-operation was easy, since lot of the upper echelon officers were WW I German trained, volunteers in Imperial Prussian Jaeger Battaillon 27 that fought on East Front during WW I.

One should not forget that many Finnish officers served in the Russian Army before and during WW1, including Mannerheim who commanded the [Russian] 6th Cavalry Corps on the southern front during the late phases of the war.

[Grisha]

Thanks to many of you for your responses. So, the consensus is that the political reality for Finland back then was not to advance much further than the 1939 border (realize some advances were made, but by and large no active participation with German offensive activity). So, for purposes of wargaming it would not be unreasonable to assume limitations with the advancement of Finnish units into the Soviet Union due to reasons outside the scope of military concerns. Would this be generally agreed upon amongst the posters here?

[Grisha]

And, Sergei, thanks for that pic of the Finnish frontline in 1944. Very helpful.

[Keke]

Originally posted by Grisha:

So, for purposes of wargaming it would not be unreasonable to assume limitations with the advancement of Finnish units into the Soviet Union due to reasons outside the scope of military concerns. Would this be generally agreed upon amongst the posters here?

Yep. Btw, all the strategic/operational-level wargames that I know of, about the Eastern Front including Finland, have limitations for Finnish involvement which usually expire only in the case of outstanding German success.

[ November 16, 2003, 06:41 PM: Message edited by: Keke ]

[Sardaukar]

Originally posted by Keke:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Sardaukar:

[Yes. That was definitely considered, not to mention that Nazi racial views didn't encompass Finns into "Nordic people" that their dogma idolized.

Now could you tell me who considered it in 1941?

Originally posted by Sardaukar:

Generally, Finns were more into Western Alliance (Britain/France) pre- and during Winter War, but circumstances forced us to tie our fortunes with German, so to speak.

Co-operation was easy, since lot of the upper echelon officers were WW I German trained, volunteers in Imperial Prussian Jaeger Battaillon 27 that fought on East Front during WW I.

One should not forget that many Finnish officers served in the Russian Army before and during WW1, including Mannerheim who commanded the [Russian] 6th Cavalry Corps on the southern front during the late phases of the war. </font>

[Sardaukar]

Originally posted by Grisha:

Thanks to many of you for your responses. So, the consensus is that the political reality for Finland back then was not to advance much further than the 1939 border (realize some advances were made, but by and large no active participation with German offensive activity). So, for purposes of wargaming it would not be unreasonable to assume limitations with the advancement of Finnish units into the Soviet Union due to reasons outside the scope of military concerns. Would this be generally agreed upon amongst the posters here?

I think so. When advances were made, they were made to militarily sensible locations. Also, there were aspirations to add Finnish-related people and areas to Finland in East Karelia. That was the main expansionist drive in Finland that time, which did show in the limits of advance. Those areas were considered Finnish in many sense, by population and tradition.

It's good to note too, while insignificant per se militarily, that there were lot of unease among troops when 1939 border was exceeded. And while AKS (Academic Karelia Society) was popular among educated people and among lot of officers, it's ideas were not really those of society as full, that is to add the Karelian/East Karelian areas to Finland.

So, as in both historical and wargaming sense, it'd be (IMHO) very difficult for Finns to commit more what we did. It'd mean quite major change in internal "power struggle" and also abandoning some common sense. As others in thread have pointed out, it would have been also a military burden to extent the reach too much.

So, IMHO, political and military considerations against the extended invasion were so grave, that common sense prevailed easily.

Cheers,

M.S.

[ November 16, 2003, 07:36 PM: Message edited by: Sardaukar ]

[Sergei]

Originally posted by Frunze:

Did Finnish political leaders consider whether Finland might have a better chance of a long-term independent existence bordering the USSR than bordering a Greater German Reich stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals?

Finnish east-relations between 1918-1944 ("the First Republic") can be divided into four sections, the Civil War years 1918-1920, the years of peace 1920-1932, the years of pact 1932-1939, and the years of hostility 1939-1944. Signing of the non-aggression pact in 1932 helped a great deal in improving relations. As Soviet Union had talked of itself all the time as a friend of peace, it was also considered that then invading a weak neighbour without provocation would tarnish the Soviets forever. In 1938-39, as USSR was pressurizing Finland over the border question, the need for improving defenses was felt, but most didn't think that things would come to the point where shots would be exchanged. During this time, sure, Soviet Union had to be accepted, and it seemed like a much more peaceful neighbour than Germany did.

The Soviet invasion in November of 1939 then changed everything. With the peace of 1940, Finland had lost its main defense line and also had to tolerate a Soviet military base in Hanko. There certainly was no trust towards Stalin and Molotov anymore. You could say that it was thought that Stalin would only take you seriously if you were able to take that pipe of his and ram it into his ass. To do this, Finland needed a stronger ally, Germany, but then it was also hoped that communism would end in Russia.

This might have meant becoming a vassal of Germany, but if you think it the other way, Germany was going to win a confrontation with Soviet Union anyway, so Finland didn't really have a choice (nations like Finland usually don't try to decide the fate of world history, rather they try to adapt and benefit from it).

[Frunze]

OK, guess I was running on hindsight there.