Assaulting anti-Tank/Infantry guns

[JasonC]

pak - read any army or marine corps manual fairly describing attrition theory, and they will all tell you a quantitative analytical force on force exchange rate analysis of warfare is characteristic of attrition strategy, and will in contrast extol maneuverism for not requiring hard charging warfighters to do so much geeky unjocklike math. I swear I am not making this up. When a green eyeshade type over a calculator is dictating to a many-star field commander what to do, you can rest assured it is attrition thinking. When the many-star is flying by the seat of his pants into the enemy decision loop switching targets and directions opportunistically to fake the enemy out and achieve surprise, you can be sure he isn't doing any linear regressions in his head.

[pamak1970]

When the many-star is flying by the seat of his pants into the enemy decision loop switching targets and directions opportunistically to fake the enemy out and achieve surprise, you can be sure he isn't doing any linear regressions in his head.

Correct . The same applies to the Allied commanders, interdicting submarines in the Atlantic.

What happens is that certain conclusions have already been incorporated in one way or the other in military practice and became guides or procedures much before the execution of specific missions,either in attrition or maneuver warfare.

The background of equations and "why a flight path for a search mission should have a specific pattern" is not important for the carrier commander or the simple pilot.

All he needs to know is the nature of the pattern and when he wants to search a certain area he just uses the normal military way of plotting a recon flight which follows this pattern.

The scientific calculations to find the optimum dispersion patterns of depth charges , were also irrelevant on the deck. The destroyer commander needed only to know the time intervals between the orders to fire at various depths.

[JasonC]

Sorry, no, they are no separable bits with the intellectual part merely a method manipulated by the warfighter. Maneuverism entails varied, seat of the pants snap decisions made in ignorance as rapidly as possible, in the firm belief that there is no actual right answer as to the proper course of action, because situations are too fluid and there is too much uncertainty.

OR entails the belief that some procedures that would otherwise emphatically fall under exactly such discretion actually have correct and incorrect answers, that some ways of answering them will dominate others, and by dominate I mean give attritionist returns an order of magnitude superior to adaptative discretion.

One can certainly debate which applies to a given problem, whether there is sufficient information to tell, whether the head faking of getting inside the other man's head by intuition can "beat" the OR answer or not. But that they come into direct conflict is indisputable. And whenever they do, the attritionist instinct is to go with an analytical answer, and the maneuverist instinct is to reject formulas as undue restrictions on subordinate creativity and as liable to result in excessive predictability.

(Real OR recommendations will include measures to avoid predictability, but that is just another case of a common straw man, which the debate is rife with).

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[JasonC]

A division fighting effectively and inflicting serious losses on the enemy at a favorable ratio "here", will inconvenience the enemy a darn sight more "here" or "there", than said division getting itself shot to rags making little impression on the enemy, because some REMF decided it was more important to do anything now, than to do something sensible.

In fact, the second will relieve the enemy of a threat he had to guard against - the former will strain him globally as well as locally. A smart attack is simply more of a problem for the enemy, anywhere, anytime, under any operational circumstances. Yes operations have to be coordinated. They are coordinated better by acting on opportunity pull right round, and also having staff know what those are beforehand and as it is happening, than by having the staff play "let's pretend" and "wishes shall be horses". Imposing your will on the battlefield doesn't literally mean you can will realities into being.

Reckless haste is simply a dominated strategy. Needless to say, our manueverists instead preach reckless haste as a panacea. The line about any decision violently executed now being better than delay, is lifted straight from the Marine corps warfighting manual.

[JasonC]

Sure. There is plenty of straw man arguing in the debate, generally.

But on what I meant by the cartoon version of the German military tradition, please see the new thread of that title.

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[JasonC]

Stacked deck and incorrect tactics, plus variance, but still worth something.

Stacked - Russian MGs are mostly types meant for light AT work, when they actually have more Maxims. Though they'd have ATRs, realistically. This makes a difference because you spent lots of German points on PSWs, so you have effectively tailored the Russian force to specifically counter the German one.

Incorrect tactics - a spotting risk vehicle is supposed to be thick enough to require a full ATG to reveal itself to kill it. I've repeatedly explained that thin light armor to scout is an error. Also incorrect is firing a full artillery module at a single gun. FO modules are for platoons and up of ordinary infantry. If they are used on guns, it is to establish a pin not until dead - other fire should continue the pin.

The same is probably true of the use of mortars and tank fire, but I don't know exactly what you did. The comments about needing all your HE to take out of few guns suggests the same error. The first minute (occasionally 2) of HE establishes the pin, then MGs continue it. Efficiency of use of available HE is critical to the whole gradual firepower attack idea, which does not treat firing time as scarce. But there is no "assuming it is dead" involved. MGs fire continually, the location is still regarded as dangerous unless the uncrewed gun is seen, scouts approach, etc.

Variance - the 3 tanks in one keyhole, under a gun thought suppressed, obviously. A gun gone hot like that could just as easily have happened to the one fist approach.

The second force uses a higher armor to defending gun ratio and reflects force tailoring etc. If you are going to give the Germans more tanks, pull the 50s can give the Russians their 4th gun etc.

The usual result of charging in a first with lots of Panzer IVs is a lot of dead Panzer IVs. If the terrain is "celled" enough, only 1-2 and taking a subcell or three, to be fair.

You are welcome to try 1st SS, 1st Day, the second scenario, using that approach. The Russian set up will not be nerfed.

[JasonC]

On German tradition essay - wasn't even talking to you, the comment was to abneo - and it is a more important subject than anything you've tried to bring up. You were welcomed to comment on it. You aren't interested obviously. I put it down to your present personal pique and to childishness.

[JasonC]

Other issues - the Russian force is only 700 points, not 1000. The German force used in the second type is 1400, or 2 to 1 point odds. The probe setting means the Russians have no fortification points, therefore no trenches for the guns and no minefields possible, and their 120mm mortars are not registered. Therefore they have a 5 minute fire minimum, where with TRPs it would be 1 minute on a registration and 3 minutes off one (target TRP then a shift). While local 2 to 1 odds attacks do occur, they aren't typical of a "probe", nor are Russian infantry and gun defenses against armor in open terrain typically attempted without field fortifications.

[JasonC]

I tried an example of it anyway, the fast way with 2 to 1 point odds, no defending fortifications, and twice as many attacking tanks as defending ATGs. The Germans were on the objective in 5 minutes and had beaten most resistence by 10. They lost 3 out of 7 Panzer IVs and half the infantry. This was with defending cover so poor they were mostly in shellholes in open steppe.

[JasonC]

So next I try the real deal, meaning an attack not a probe, with 3:2 point odds not 2:1. The attackers have 7 Panzer IV H, 1 Panzer III N rounding out the second panzer platoon, 2 panzergrenadier platoons plus 2 MG42s riding with the HQs, and a single green 105mm FO for prep fire. Cost is 1350, attack odds armor force type hitting a 900 point defense.

The Russians take an infantry company, 3 extra Maxims bringing the total to 4 (a standard MG platoon), one 82mm mortar added to the 2 50mm the company comes with, 4 ATRs and 2 tank hunters rounding out the infantry weapons, and a single 120mm FO with 1 TRP. Then they have 4 76mm ZIS-3 guns and 6 trenches. The guns are all in trenches, as the largest change from the previous outings.

In the first minute the Germans approach unmolested. In the second, all 4 ATGs open at the same time at targets in the left side panzer platoon, one each. All ATRs simultaneously open, and all the MGs and mortars. The FO calls on the TRP, though he will need an adjust to be on target.

By the end of the first minute of fire, second of play, there are 2 gun damaged Panzer IVs left alive, one in broken morale state. All other tanks are brewed up or dead or bailing out. The foremost Panzer IV lives until 15 seconds into the 3rd turn (2nd of fire), while the broken one reverses out of LOS of all but one gun, and the German fire mission manages to silence that one. Meanwhile all the Russian infantry unhides and fires at the scrambling German infantry.

ATRs and a tank hunter ding the remaining panicked and gun damaged Panzer until it moves into LOS of a gun and dies, several minutes later and after losing a crew member and passing through shock from just the ATRs. The nearest squads slaughter the foremost German units and the MGs pin the remainder. The mortars and adjusting 120s play over the remainder, along with the 3 remaining 76mm guns using HE.

20 routed Germans flee the field alive. Elapsed time, 7 minutes. German losses, total. Russian losses, 1 76mm gun and a half dozen men, virtually all of them lost to German artillery fire, which would have done the same without the rest advancing an inch.

ATGs without cover pin rapidly to the replying *MGs* on the tanks. This gives the tank *guns* all the time they need to find the direct hit and finish the gun, without much reply fire. The guns get off 1-2 shots and have maybe one chance in 3-4 of killing a tank, in that case, and that is why the "fast" attack seemed to work against them. Against entrenched guns, the MG fire does not pin the guns. They continue to fire, and they smash tanks at a rate of 1-2 *per minute*.

Charging in is thus a straight gamble on whether there are dug in guns ahead of you or not. If there are no guns, you will arrive fast and fine. If there are guns but they are in poor cover, you will trade through them in roughly even point loss terms. But if there are guns and they are entrenched, you will lose your entire force while not accomplishing anything.

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[JasonC]

Here is an example of the right 1350 point force mix for the deliberate firepower version -

5 Panzer IV H

panzergrenadier company

(3 platoons, 4 HMGs, no foot mortar variety)

2 SPW 251/2s

1 105mm radio FO

2 Quad 20mm AA

- variants -

If you want a "risk scout" AFV, trade one Quad 20mm for a Panzer IIF and downgrade the FO to phone rather than radio. Or if you want to be "gamey", take a Somua (better vs. 45mm ATGs and the like).

Overwatch groups at the start line - the 2 Quad Flak, separated. 2 groups each 2 HMG-42. The FO. HQ spotters for the SPW mortars, commanding the HMGs, with the SPWs behind in full defilade. One should be the weapons HQ, the other a plus combat platoon HQ. You can leave a squad with that one if you like, or not.

Start 4 of the Panzer IVs together in full defilade initially, with your best platoon. They are the reserve and maneuver force. Use them quite late.

The poorest remaining platoon HQ keeps two squads and scouts. One squad initially move to contact and hide, the other 30m away minimum and crawling (sneak), or move to contact only inside cover. Trade off the mover when cover is reached.

The company HQ has all the transfered squads and follows the scouting platoon as the main body. The 3rd squad of the scouts can be fed forward to them if the others get blown up.

The 5th Panzer IV is initially with the company HQ. Hunt to marginal LOS of a possible enemy position. Fire at it, a full minute with HE. This is a risk tank, so no reason to save it all - you can blast five different places. Continue with the coaxial between those, for 1-2 minutes.

If a gun engages the risk Panzer, reverse it, smoking if necessary with both the Panzer and the SPWs. If overwatch HQs can see the gun, blow it up with the SPWs. If not, sneak the scout or company HQ to have LOS, and reposition one SPW (carefully) to reach its command range.

The risk panzer is *not* to charge right out into LOS to draw fire. On the contrary, it wants a marginal view area, walked forward slowly and probed by fire. Only if the scouts are badly pinned and you need spots of MG shooters, should it go beyond that, and not until.

Yes it is slower. Instead of being dead and stopped, or on the objective and mopping up, in 5 to 7 minutes, you will probably kill the first enemy gun in that time frame. You may have traded off a little infantry, even losses or better.

Now consider the exchange equation. You have about 16 minutes of 81mm mortar fire, on map. You have 2 on map guns that can duel enemy guns with at least equality (double rate of fire, stealthier, accurate, sufficient blast). You have 4 HMGs to maintain pins. You have 60 rounds of 105mm reactive, not fired blind and unaimed at set up. Before you even dip into the panzers and what they take out themselves.

If all goes well that much overwatch might knock out not 3-4 guns, but more like a dozen. It won't all go well. But the enemy with 4 minus whatever that kills will still need to kill 5 Panzer IVs. Including a fist of 4 at once if you think you "have them" and can push.

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[undead reindeer cavalry]

pamak1970,

there are also RAND studies (based on NTC data) on tactical level that suggest that more aggressive tactics are more effective and cause less friendly casulties.

the above of course with trained commanders who supposedly know what they are doing. they probably wouldn't do the sort of stuff that was relatively common in WW2. e.g. attack just for the sake of being able to attack, send a panzer company to take a meaningless village and then lose it all to a AT ambush.

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[pamak1970]

Reckless haste is simply a dominated strategy. Needless to say, our manueverists instead preach reckless haste as a panacea. The line about any decision violently executed now being better than delay, is lifted straight from the Marine corps warfighting manual.

It is not only that you insist on avoiding answering simple questions i asked to show you the fallacy of your statements, you come up with even more distortions.

A new question for you to answer.

If the marines preach "reckless haste as a panacea" , can you explain the existance of the following document?

http://www.projectalbert.org/files/MWS2001On-line.pdf

Title

Maneuver Warfare Science 2001

From

http://xrl.us/bjmty

Mary Leonardi

"Work Experience:

Ø More than 10 years of experience in conducting and managing operations research studies, managing software development projects, conducting in depth independent research on topics such as complex adaptive systems, coevolution, multi-dimensional decision making, nonlinear dynamics, complexity, modeling and simulation, data analysis, evolutionary computation, decision theory, and other artificial intelligence topics.

Ø Spent 10 years on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps, where she has recently been a scientific analyst, providing analysis and recommendations to senior leadership on a wide variety of emerging technologies. She is still a Major in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, conducting analyses for Headquarters. She has authored numerous papers and briefings for conferences in the areas of operations research and artificial intelligence. She has recently edited the Marine Corps Publication “Maneuver Warfare Science 2001,” to which she also contributed material on the topic of coevolution."

P S . The exact paragraph from warfighting manual says

"Finally, since all decisions must be made in the face of uncertainty

and since every situation is unique, there is no perfect

solution to any battlefield problem. Therefore, we should not

agonize over one. The essence of the problem is to select a

promising course of action with an acceptable degree of risk

and to do it more quickly than our foe. In this respect, “a good

plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed

next week.”"

If your summary of the above is "any decision violently executed now being better than delay", i do not wonder you seem so confused with the whole subject.

[ April 20, 2008, 11:43 PM: Message edited by: pamak1970 ]

[hoolaman]

Originally posted by JasonC:

I report the order as unreasonable and attack in the reasonable and deliberate manner. No framed certificate from a higher up excuses needless loss of a subordinate's life.

For insubordination, you are sentenced to death. The sentence will be carried out immediately.

[JasonC]

Hoolaman - hardly. Field grade does it routinely, and the muckety mucks don't want to take responsibility for overruling them. When they do anyway and predictably stuff things up royally, they are dropped themselves.

"Why didn't you carry out this order?" "It could not be executed." "This is treason, why couldn't it be executed?" "It ordered me to attack 3 hours before it was delivered". Silence, subordinate wins. A daily event in the Red Army, let alone others that actually understand initiative and opportunity pull.

[JasonC]

pakmak - it is all ideological guff directed purely at straw man. The first pretends attrition is rarely decisive because armies don't fight to the last man, for example. Pure straw pounding.

On the last paragraph you quote, it is the pure rejection of OR. The officer is not to think there is a right answer, because a straw man of perfection can be constructed and pounded. Therefore he is to do something soon in profound ignorance, sure in his ideological conviction that no rational means of picking a truly "right" approach can exist.

Which is meant to train subordinates to trust their own judgement, to inculcate initiative, to avoid second guess carping, etc. As a training "slant", it is understandable for what the corps wants its officers to be able to do. But as a pretended military fact it is a complete distortion of the reality of war. Which is, instead, that most things anyone ever dreams of trying are strictly dominated strategies, knowably so ahead of time.

The corps has simply abdicated its duty to teach its junior officers what the superior tactics are, in the common situations. It probably doesn't actually even know anymore. Instead the men writing the guides are covering their backsides by being irrefutably vague, the net result of which is to leave the officer to his own unaided intuition.

[pamak1970]

On the last paragraph you quote, it is the pure rejection of OR. The officer is not to think there is a right answer, because a straw man of perfection can be constructed and pounded. Therefore he is to do something soon in profound ignorance, sure in his ideological conviction that no rational means of picking a truly "right" approach can exist.

Actually your comment is a clear example of another one misunderstanding of yours.

OR and on a more broad sense , math, is not developed in a vacuum.

Science gives the "right answer" ASSUMING that certain anxioms hold true.

That is something that even highschool students realize. You can have Eucledian Geometry and all the "right answers" to certain questions, ONLY IF certain anxioms are taken as true.

The same questions under different set of anxioms in different geometrical systems have totally different answers.

That is why we have the Non-Euclidean geometry systems.

Similar cases we have with OR. It gives the "right answers" only if certain "postulates" are true.

The problem is that in real life, you can not have a certainty about postulates and therefore you can not have a certainty about the results also.

That is why very often OR studies give conclusions that contradict military experience.

It is not that the scientists did "wrong calculations" , it is that certain premises did not prove to be right.

For example the predictions about the casualties of allied forces before the first Gulf war. The models fell far by many thousands .

The equations though were "correct", the premises were wrong though.

This does not mean that Marine Corps rejects OR.

They allocate funds effort and stuff for OR studies as i presented in the link which analyze their concept of fighting.

It must be obvious that you can debate about the results of any OR study, regardless if you are an attritionist or maneuverist

[ April 21, 2008, 05:23 PM: Message edited by: pamak1970 ]