Jump to content

So the germans win Kursk...


Recommended Posts

Originally posted by JasonC:

"The problem for Operational Group Kempf was a lack of Infanty to initiate the offensive"

They broke through the front line RDs in less than 12 hours. It is simply erroneous that infantry had to lead, that was Model's theory in the north where the attacked stalled. More infantry would have sustained the offensive and helped keep the ground gained, certainly. But the claim as stated is wrong.

Sorry I wasn't clear I meant it in terms of support and sustaining the attack from what I have read the one Infantry Division that was assigned and split into thirds was not fond to be effective.

As for coup de main, it is laughable....

I wasn't serious about that, please read it in context, the schwerpunkt being re-inforce with two extra SS Divisions at least and Panzer Divisions from the other two Pz Korps in the Southern attack may be perhaps replaced in line by re-inforcing / replacing Infantry Division from I don't know the Kuban?

As for the Hoth comments, they simply ignore tha actual argument in front of you, that a single half strength panzer corps on its own has no business trying to attack the entire Russian army, and a fresh *army group* of reserves, in particular.

True but I am talking more in the realms of what ifs, hopefully possible ones say like what if the Luftwaffe assets shifted to the Orel area earlier in the battle were returned or even not have been withdrawn from the Southern group at all. It certainly many have made an inpact on the 12th to be sure.

As for 5th Tank, its various units and attachments actually opposite the SS corps brought 615 tanks to the fight. The Germans claimed 350 and the Russians say they lost 300, reduction in runners that were repairable combined with TWOs. There were thus around 300 tanks left on the field on the Russian side, not 150. The Germans had under 300 at the start of the clash, gave no report for the day of the fight, and fell to 227 on the 13th. That included all of 4 Tigers, 64 StuGs, 65 Pz IV longs, and 11 T-34s. The rest were marginal against a T-34. For comparison, at the start of the offensive the SS corps had about 500 runners, of which 300 were superior types that could kill a T-34 at range easily.

No I disagree with you as to the number of tanks left to 5th Guards Tank Army it had only 150 runners as reported by its commander on the 13th IIRC, that is all that I would consider effectively to have survived without damage and esp. if the Germans weren't delayed re-organising themselves that day as well. The other 150 or so were damaged and who knows how long it took for them to have been returned to opperations, at least the majority of them within time. Mind you the numbers of Russian tanks lost or left in the 5th Guards Tank Army doesn't concern me all that much, I think if there were enough there might have been another Death ride with simmilar results. IIRC wasn't it the 5th Guards Tank Army that suffered 500 tank losses trying to rush around and liberate Kharhov in just 3 days in August 43 against no more than 2 Panzer Divisions a few Infantry Divisions and some Flak!

[ August 19, 2005, 08:37 PM: Message edited by: Zalgiris 1410 ]

Link to comment
Share on other sites

  • Replies 52
  • Created
  • Last Reply

Top Posters In This Topic

5th Tank is an accounting entry, as its subordinated units change. The force opposite the SS panzer corps for the attack was 18th and 29th Tank corps, both formally part of 5th Tank, plus 2nd Guards Tank corps, which wasn't. The 5th Guards Mech corps (formally part of 5th Tank) was also present, though its frontage overlapped the German III panzer corps as well as part of the SS corps.

There were also 3 SU regiments, and two other weak armor formations - a regiment that was part of 5th tank but not in a corps, and leftovers of an independent brigade that wasn't in 5th Tank but was in the sector as leftover from previous units burnt out there.

Russian reports of TWOs through the 16th (well after the famous clash),in the formally subordinated units of 5th Tank, were 222 T-34s, 89 T-70s, 12 Churchills, and 11 SUs, which comes to half of the wholly subordinated force of 676 the day before the clash.

5th Tank was the main armor force of the Steppe Front, committed on the 12th to stop the SS corps, as the last still driving effectively. While it was the main body, Steppe front kept additional strong reserves at the front level, including the 1st and 2nd Mech Corps, 3rd Guards Mech corps (not to be confused with the 3rd Mech, which fought farther west earlier), and the 4th Guards Tank corps.

They weren't remotely going to break through all that with 130 long 75 AFVs, which is all they had left. As for other PDs not yet committed in the south, they were by no means the sort of full strength formations topped off for the original offensive. 5th SS had 23 long 75mm AFVs. 6 PD and 17 PD had less than 35 apiece. They averaged another 25 Pz IIIs apiece, marginal against T-34s. That was all the armor south of the main battlefield, to hold the line clear to the Black Sea.

They were simply well and truly stopped. Nowhere did they have a local odds edge anymore, whether through possession of the initiative, kills scored to date, weapon superiority, etc. They could defend well enough, having PAK about as numerous as their AFVs. But they had no business trying to attack army after army with a single step-reduced panzer corps. All the others were stopped. In the north, the Russian Orel offensive happened at the same time as the southern clash, and cancelled all further offensive plans by all of Army Group Center.

So on the 12th there were two rather important pieces of new infomation. (1) the German offensive had one less *army group* taking part in it, because AG Center was now strictly defensive and (2) the Russian defense had one more *army group* taking part in it, because Steppe Front showed itself and committed to the southern face.

To scratch around the whole southern front of to its last single battalion-strength armor formations expecting them to counteract little bits of new information like that is clearly futile. As it pretending it was about Sicily and other such apologetics.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Originally posted by JasonC:

So on the 12th there were two rather important pieces of new infomation. (1) the German offensive had one less *army group* taking part in it, because AG Center was now strictly defensive and (2) the Russian defense had one more *army group* taking part in it, because Steppe Front showed itself and committed to the southern face.

O.K. JasonC I conceed that the idea that the SS Korps even if re-inforced with availiable reserves or replaced Panzer Divisions in mid July 1943 was not going to secure victory, I don't seriously believe that they could have by then. I meant it fairly flipantly. Thanks for the stats but you haven't mentioned the 23rd PzD down with 6th Army and needed there to be sure just above the Sea of Azov.

I don't agree with you that the existance of the forces of the 5th Guards Tank Army and of the Steppe Front was totally new information for the Germans. Hoth had not only taken it into account but had actually estimated and guessed its likely appearance accurately and planned to meet it as he did. His plan was hamstrung by the poor mechanical reliability of the Panthers and of the lack of successful support of his flanking Panzer Korps etc.

I'm not disputing your figures for the 5th GTA of the 16th, I'm not going to claim that they picked up replacements or re-inforcements but I'll stress that I am referring to runners not to total numbers.

Your second point here that Army Group Middle had to go on to the defensive and was therefore no longer able to continue with the offensive is to be seriously considered to be sure. What was knew information was the strength of the Russian reserves and availiable forces that were attacking elsewhere - the Germans found out that they had lost the strategic balance which was what they were attempting to achieve with Operation Citadel.

In fact this supports my opinion that the attack needed to be lanched in early May 1943 to have succeeded in this goal and create an operational reserve for the Eastern Front. I still don't think such a force would have altered the outcome of the war too significantly as it would have been eventually exhusted counter-attacking all those coming Russian offensives.

[ August 21, 2005, 08:35 PM: Message edited by: Zalgiris 1410 ]

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Unfortunately, your content contains terms that we do not allow. Please edit your content to remove the highlighted words below.
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.


×
×
  • Create New...