So the germans win Kursk...

[juan_gigante]

But using an A-bomb on Berlin would leave only one for Japan. And the nuclear weapon production program was sorely strained to produced the three bombs it did (test at Trinity, Little Boy, Fat Man) as quickly as it did. I think that a nuke to Berlin would force a quick surrender from Germany (Hitler would be dead, and his successor hopefully wouldn't be quite as insane), but that might make it harder to extract a surrender from Japan.

But I do not feel that a German victory at Kursk would substantially lengthen the war. As Andreas mentioned, the Soviets were putting on pressure in other places. And Allied production capability would still vastly outpace that of the Germans. Even if the Germans won at Kursk, I wouldn't expect the war to go into '46. Numerical superiority and the landings in Sicily and eventually in France would do in the Germans. The only difference would be that more people would die along the way.

[MikeyD]

D'oh! Yeh, A-bomb. What he said. What I meant.

[Philippe]

Since we're playing the what-if game, and I'm in a particularly dark mood, I'll add my two pfennigen.

The Germans win Kursk, but not by a knock-out. They take heavy casualties themselves, and the net effect on their West Front deployment is negligible.

Next summer the Western Allies invade Normandy and the Soviets launch the offensive that in the real world caused the destruction of Army Group Center. No change from reality in the West, but in the East the Russians are really playing catch-up: damaging the Germans and rolling them back, but nothing like the catastrophic events in Byelorussia.

The end-game plays out much as in reality, but the Russians are many months behind schedule. When the Western Allies drive into Germany, the Soviets are stalled at Brest-Litovsk.

So now comes the big departure from reality: Eisenhower caves in to the generals who want to go for Berlin, and sends Patton and Montgomery racing each other for the final prize.

Patton gets to Berlin first and the Germans are pleased as punch to surrender to the Americans. By this time the Soviets have liberated Warsaw, and Stalin feels betrayed.

The Americans drop their A-bombs on Japan as scheduled. It's September, the war is over, and there is considerable ambiguity throughout Eastern Europe because the Americans and the British are administering territories that should have been under Russian occupation. In the midst of the bickering about relocation of displaced refugees a Civil War starts in Greece. The British intervene and Stalin has had enough. He attacks.

And I have no idea what would have happened next.

[roqf77]

good story? but you meant bradley and montgomery right?

[Wicky]

The US had a third bomb ready to fly from the US which would have been potentially dropped on Tokyo on Aug 17 or 19 Aug.

IIRC the US was churning them out roughly exponentially every month from Aug thereafter. So there wan't a shortage.

There was already a report floating around at that time "Estimated Bomb Requirements for Destruction of Russian Strategic Areas" written by General Groves stating that 204 bombs were needed to wipe out 66 major Soviet cities.

The Soviet atomic program used Uranium ore taken from Germany and didn't test its first weapon until Aug 1949.

Originally posted by juan_gigante:

But using an A-bomb on Berlin would leave only one for Japan. And the nuclear weapon production program was sorely strained to produced the three bombs it did (test at Trinity, Little Boy, Fat Man) as quickly as it did.

[ August 03, 2005, 11:51 AM: Message edited by: Wicky ]

[juan_gigante]

You got a source for that, Wicky?

“The Manhattan Project yielded three atomic bombs” (Trinity Test, Hiroshima, Nagasaki)

http://www.me.utexas.edu/~uer/manhattan/bomb-design.html

In most stuff I’ve read, it says that it would have taken the US a while to get their act together for a third drop. Unfortunately, I’m at work, but there’s a great book called Brotherhood Of The Bomb about the Manhattan Project that I’ve got at home. Wait a few hours, and I’ll post something from there.

[Wicky]

Lt Col Tom Classen*, the 509th's Composite deputy commander, took off from Tinian Thursday afternoon Aug 9 ... his orders were to collect the third atomic bomb. General Groves reported to Marshall the next day , "the bomb should be ready for delivery on the first suitable weather after August 17th or 18th". The favored target was now Tokyo itself. But as the first indications of a Japanese surrender reaching the US, Truman decided to delay further their atomic bombings...

'Shockwave - The Countdown to Hiroshima' by Stephen Walker

Which sourced the info from 'Day One: Before Hiroshima and After' by Peter Wyden.

The third bomb

*Jabit III - 8th down

Production estimates given to Sec. Stimson in July 1945 projected a second plutonium bomb would be ready by Aug. 24, that 3 bombs should be available in September, and more each month - reaching 7 or more in December. Improvements in bomb design being prepared at the end of the war would have permitted one bomb to be produced for every 5 kg of plutonium or 12 kg of uranium in output. These improvements were apparently taken into account in this estimate. Assuming these bomb improvements were used, the October capacity would have permitted up to 6 bombs a month. Note that with the peak monthly plutonium and HEU production figures (19.4 kg and 69 kg respectively), production of close to 10 bombs a month was possible.

When the war ended on August 15 1945 there was an abrupt change in priorities, so a wartime development and production schedule did not continue. Development of the levitated pit/composite core bomb ground to a halt immediately. It did not enter the US arsenal until the late forties. Plans to increase initiator production to ten times the July 1945 level were abandoned.

Fissile material production continued unabated after the S-50 and alpha calutron shutdowns though the fall, but plutonium shipments from Hanford were halted, and plutonium nitrate concentrates were stockpiled there.

In early 1946, K-25 and K-27 were reconfigured to produce weapon grade uranium directly, but the extremely costly Y-12 beta tracks continued to operate until the end of 1946. By that time Y-12 had separated about 1000 kg of weapon grade uranium. From this point on gaseous diffusion enriched uranium was the mainstay of weapon grade fissile material production in the US, dwarfing plutonium production, until highly enriched uranium production for weapons use was halted in 1964.

The Hanford reactors accumulated unexpected neutron irradiation damage (the Wigner effect) and in 1946 they were shut down or operated at reduced power. If war had continued they both would have been pushed to continue full production regardless of cost or risk.

The effects of these priority changes can be seen in the post war stockpile. Although Los Alamos had 60 Fat Man units - that is the non-nuclear components to assemble complete Fat Man bombs - on hand in October 1945, the US arsenal after had only 9 actual Fat Man type bombs in July 1946, with initiators for only 7 of them. In July 1947 the arsenal had increased to 13 bombs. There was probably sufficient fissile material on hand for over 100 bombs though.

http://www.fas.org

[ August 04, 2005, 05:52 AM: Message edited by: Wicky ]

[Sergei]

Originally posted by Philippe:

The end-game plays out much as in reality, but the Russians are many months behind schedule.

What schedule? Teherance conference took place in November 1943, months after Kursk. And it wasn't really until Yalta in 1945 that the post-war situation was agreed on.

[juan_gigante]

When he said schedule, I think he meant the schedule they followed in real life; taking certain things at certain times.

Wicky, you may be right after all. This evening, I shall know more.

[Sergei]

But then this would lack logic; why would Stalin be so upset at US and Brits for going further than what happened in reality, if in this situation a different schedule was agreed upon, that he'd start a war (especially when being in no position to do so)?

[juan_gigante]

Not an agreed upon schedule. Schedule is perhaps not the best word to describe it. The point is that it would take the Soviets longer to doefeat the Germans, and Anglo/American forces would take Berlin first. Stalin would be most displeased about that. Of course, this requires the assumption that we couldn't have taken Berlin first anyways, and gave it up to Stalin as a political thing.

[RCHRD]

The Germans were shocked that the same Soviet units that were supposedly gutted during the Kursk battle fell upon them in august. The Germans were outnumbered 2-1 across the Ost Front and with the strategic momentum enjoyed the Russians even greater odds at selected points. In guns and tanks the Germans were paupers, the Soviets as rich as the kings of Persia. Even if the Germans had cut off the Kursk salient they could never win the war.

[Xenophile]

I can't really accept the basis of the speculation - what different circumstance would allow the possibility of the Germans winning at Kursk? Even had they somehow hacked their way across the salient, surely there was no possibility of inflicting more damage to the Soviet forces than they themselves would have suffered? Winning operationally would probably have left them in a worse strategic imbalance.

From a purely military perspective, the Germans might have been better adopting the Soviet approach - await the enemy offensive, defeat it, then move on to the offensive. The problem with this approach is also on the strategic level. The Soviet forces are getting stronger the longer they wait, while the US and UK are increasingly threatening in the west. The Germans themselves seem to have seen the operation at Kursk as essentially defensive and in effect acknowledged that they could not force a strategic defeat on the Soviet Union in the near term.

Nevertheless assuming Guderian's doubts sway Hitler (because it is fun to speculate) and the Germans adopt a defensive posture what might have happened? Although the weight of the German preparations for Kursk have drawn much of the Soviet forces south, the Soviets have the strength to use much the approach they used once the Germans did break off at Kursk. The disparity in armour is not as great but even if the Germans can hold and even roll back two breakthroughs, the third will surely force them to give ground. Maybe the outcome might have been somewhat less unfavourable than they in fact suffered but I doubt the course of the war would have been much changed.

I'd prefer a speculation on how different things might have been if Paulus had held much of his armoured and motorised forces out of Stalingrad as a mobile reserve, or if Guderian's forces hadn't been used to help surround the Soviets around Kiev, but attempted to continue towards Moscow. Or even if those forces had done *anything* in July instead of wasting time trying not to move south?

[Andreas]

Originally posted by Xenophile:

The disparity in armour is not as great but even if the Germans can hold and even roll back two breakthroughs, the third will surely force them to give ground.

Actually, the disparity in armour will be far worse for the Germans if the battle is not fought as it occured historically, since they lost next to no tanks during their attack, while the Soviets lost hundreds.

All the best

Andreas

[MikeyD]

A counter-intuitive result of a German victory:

Let's say they did the deed they planned to do (stabilize the front), and inflcted lots of casualties besides. The Russian front quiets down while the Soviets lick their wounds. The Germans grow overconfident and foolishly shift more forces west than they ought for the coming Normandy invasion. Then, when the Russians resume their big push they find far fewer German troops facing them than they wouldv'e otherwise. seizing the opportunity, the Russians bypass Berlin, reach the Rhine, and annex ALL of Germany.

[Zalgiris 1410]

Originally posted by Andreas:

</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Zalgiris 1410:

Recent oppinion on Kursk goes something like this AFAIK the SS led Southern prong had broken the 5th Guards Tank Army at Prokhorovka and could still have continued to achieve an operational break through but that the attack was called off, not lost. IMO Hitler lost his nerve sending the SS and Panzer Divs to other places on the Russian front or to Italy, the reason he gave for calling off Operation Zitadel was the Allied landings on Sicily!

That recent opinion somehow appears to be ignoring that the Soviets had another front standing ready to defend. Also, only one division was sent to Italy (LSSAH), and it is open to question how much of its equipment it took. Finally, the Soviet attack on the Mius was a serious threat that needed to be defeated, and Armeeabteilung Hollidt was not capable of doing so without reinforcement.

At the same time the Soviets were putting serious pressure on the 2nd Army front around Orel.

In these circumstances an operational breakthrough by one pincer would have been meaningless, because it would not have achieved any of the aims which the operation was trying to achieve.

So I think that this recent opinion is somewhat optimistic about the ability to break-through in the first place, and using blinders to studiously ignore what was going on elsewhere, making it less valuable or relevant as it may appear at first. </font>

[Mad Russian]

I think that a German operational victory at Kursk would have meant a strategic disaster. If you will remember the Red Army launched offensives both at Orel and Khar'kov even while the fighting at Kursk was still active. If the Germans had won the battle they would have had their forces farther east when the flanks caved in.

I would think that Operation Bagration would be the answer to your question of what could happen to the German Army later. In mid-1944 the Red Army fooled the German Army into watching Army Group Centre destroyed and then losing the entire area of Russia and parts of Eastern Europe before the Red Army had to stop and regroup.

Why would you need to drop an A bomb on Germany when the Russians were more than capable of finishing the job. Win or lose at Kursk.

Someone said that the Soviets were low on manpower. By the end of the war who wasn't? By the end of the war the British had stopped sending infantry replacements, the US had made several manpower combs through service troops to get more rifle strength and the Germans were using 12 year old boys. It's not like the Soviets were the only ones with a manpower strength issue.

Germans win at Kursk, the best the Germans get is, MAYBE, some extra time. The worst they get is another Stalingrad or destruction of Army Group Centre, only in July 1943, not June 1944.

Just my $.02

[JasonC]

"Recent oppinion on Kursk goes something like this"

Sorry, that is nonsense. The Russians lost a third of the tanks in 5th Tank but it was an intact formation larger than the SS corps after its losses, standing in the line in front of them. And that corps was the last still attacking,, all the others had been stopped, and had lost half its tanks and front line infantry (look at runners not TWOs) and essentially all its superior AFVs.

It makes no sense to attack the entire Russian army with one half-strength panzer corps. That is why the attack was halted. The northern attack failed a week earlier, halted by Russians reserves, with its third echelon panzer corps diverted to defensive use by the Orel attack.

In the north the first echelon was an infantry corps with tons of assault guns, giving it as much armor as a panzer corps. The second was a panzer corps that was fully committed and failed. The third was another panzer corps in column behind those two, positioned to help but not committed because Orel came first.

In the south they tried a line deployment instead of a column, again three panzer corps in strength. The left corps failed a few days earlier, halted from its left flank inward. 3rd PD stalled out a week before the rest. The remainder of the corps had to repeatedly hook left to clear its flank. It caused large losses to continual Russian counterattacks there but was spent and on the defensive.

AD Kempf on the right was separated from the other two. It failed as well, sooner. The initial break in was successful as it was everywhere, for the first few days. Then reserves arrived, runners and infantry trench strength were cut in half by attrition fighting with layers of Russians reserves, and the rest forced onto the tactical defensive.

You attack by concentrating entire panzer corps against small sectors, enemies they outnumber and can run over. That is how you make break-ins. You can brawl with even numbers of opponents if you have a quality edge and are fresh, though doing so "trades down" both sides instead of killing cleanly. But you can't attack an entire front with the thin wedge of a single depleted corps, having no odds edge. It makes no sense and will predictably fail.

That is what the operation as a whole had been reduced to by the time it was called off. The piece of new information was simply that the Russians were not about to run out of reserves, the Germans were not about to break into the clear in some replica of the fall 1942 or the 1941 breakthroughs. But instead, the Russians still had an entire front in reserve. On the front of the SS corps, they had a few hundred AFVs remaining facing several times their number even after the Russian losses. They threw in the towel because they clearly had no business still attacking, not for any mythical Sicily excuse.

Layered reserves in depth are simply a higher card in the same suit than offensive concentration of armor. The Russians applied the correct remedy to concentration and it worked. It didn't work cleanly or inexpensively, but it worked. The Germans made headway where offensive concentration gave them a local odds edge, and were attrited and then stopped everywhere arriving reserves took that edge away.

The scale of additional forces the Germans would have needed to succeed as in 1942 after outlasting the Russian reserves in attrition fighting, against the force the Russians had, was on the order of 25 additional infantry divisions and two additional panzer corps, in addition to the ones remaining in AGs center and south but not committed historically (or used defensively vs. Orel etc). At the time the offensive was stopped, the Russians had 30 divisions left in their reserve and the Germans could not remotely match them.

In 1942 and 1941, numbers had not be able to stop offensive concentration of armor because they had not been correctly used. In 1943 they were correctly used and they did stop offensive concentration of armor. There is no mystery to any of it, only unwillingness on the part of German side historians to admit their previous successes had depended on failings of their opponents rather than specific aspects of their own side decisions or abilities. When those failings were corrected the Germans lost the ability to achieve operational results merely through concentration of armor, offensively.

They still had great tactical abilities which helped rack up high loss rates, but without operational or strategic results. Those loss rates no more mean Kursk was a victory than the overall higher losses of the Russians in the whole war mean Germany conquered Russia. The bar for winning was considerably higher than that and the Germans stopped clearing that higher bar at Kursk.

[roqf77]

the fact that the russians were aware of kursk before it happend and built up accordinly had nothing to do with it then?

[JasonC]

They were aware of lots of previous offensives before they happened and lost entire armies in huge pocket battles, along with entire provinces, while the Germans racked up 5 and 10 to 1 kill ratios in addition. That stopped happening at Kursk, because the Russians employed sufficient reserves, correctly, to counteract the local odds and armor advantages the attackers deliberately engineered at their chosen points of attack.

Chosing those points still enabled the attackers to break in at will. Nowhere did the front line defenses hold, most were penetrated miles in the first day. The front line RDs were very roughly handled, sometimes hit by entire panzer corps with 500 AFVs or more. What being ready meant was simply that Russia reserves in depth slide in front of the penetrations. Break in did not become break through. The front line armies were deployed 30 kilometers deep, and there were additional armies behind those.

The idea of a full strength army group without assigned frontage, not while in process of formation but just as a reserve to meet events, was something no one had ever done before. Hastily thrown together "backstops" had been used in the 1941 campaign, on a similar scale, just to deal with fronts that moved a hundred miles in a week. The reserves would be railed in far enough back to form before the front got to them. But deliberate deployment in a static setting of a full army group without frontage, was unprecedented. And that is what it took to stop multiple armored corps concentrating for breakthrough at a few chosen points.

[roqf77]

?

[Zalgiris 1410]

Interesting but IMHO Stalingrad was more decisive.

[ August 19, 2005, 08:40 PM: Message edited by: Zalgiris 1410 ]

[Zalgiris 1410]

Germany had lost the production war by Kursk.

[ August 19, 2005, 08:41 PM: Message edited by: Zalgiris 1410 ]

[Zalgiris 1410]

Originally posted by JasonC:

The Russians lost a third of the tanks in 5th Tank but it was an intact formation larger than the SS corps after its losses, standing in the line in front of them. And that corps was the last still attacking,, all the others had been stopped, and had lost half its tanks and front line infantry (look at runners not TWOs) and essentially all its superior AFVs.

It makes no sense to attack the entire Russian army with one half-strength panzer corps. That is why the attack was halted.

We also need to look at the runners for the 5th Guards Tank Army from the 12th July 1943, IIRC it was down to about 150, though you are right that these were probably mostly heavies.

In the south they tried a line deployment instead of a column, again three panzer corps in strength. The left corps failed a few days earlier, halted from its left flank inward. 3rd PD stalled out a week before the rest. The remainder of the corps had to repeatedly hook left to clear its flank. It caused large losses to continual Russian counterattacks there but was spent and on the defensive.

True all 9 PZDs/PGDs were emloyed line abreast but they did have 2 more supposedly in reserve, the 3rd and 5th SS but they were not positioned close enough to exploit the tactical gaps and gains which did occur. These were unable to be re-inforced with the Panzer forces immediately availiable to AGS because they were all employed line abreast. Also the lack of Infantry to relieve commited Panzer units and transfer them quickly to better avenues of attack effected the outcome of the battle as many of the German Generals gave as the reason for failure. (Lack of Infantry.)

AD Kempf on the right was separated from the other two. It failed as well, sooner. The initial break in was successful as it was everywhere, for the first few days. Then reserves arrived, runners and infantry trench strength were cut in half by attrition fighting with layers of Russians reserves, and the rest forced onto the tactical defensive.

AFAIK the right of the Southern Pincer was supposed to be extending a defensive flank protecting front anyway and the Raus Korps (XI from the 17th July IIRC) performed its role on the extreme right effectively as planned without Panzers against continueous Soviet counter attacks. The problem for Operational Group Kempf was a lack of Infanty to initiate the offensive and to replace the Panzer units for optimal employment.

You attack by concentrating entire panzer corps against small sectors, enemies they outnumber and can run over. That is how you make break-ins. You can brawl with even numbers of opponents if you have a quality edge and are fresh, though doing so "trades down" both sides instead of killing cleanly. But you can't attack an entire front with the thin wedge of a single depleted corps, having no odds edge. It makes no sense and will predictably fail.

Ever heard of a Coup de main? I figure you must have. That is what I am taking about to a point, well O.K. rather a Schwerpunkt actually.

That is what the operation as a whole had been reduced to by the time it was called off. The piece of new information was simply that the Russians were not about to run out of reserves, the Germans were not about to break into the clear in some replica of the fall 1942 or the 1941 breakthroughs. But instead, the Russians still had an entire front in reserve. On the front of the SS corps, they had a few hundred AFVs remaining facing several times their number even after the Russian losses. They threw in the towel because they clearly had no business still attacking, not for any mythical Sicily excuse.

Actually I said that Hitler gave the Sicily landings as the excuse, Munstein had to convince him to let Hoth keep attacking with the SS Korps.

The battle had gone according to Hoth's general plan, it was he who both considered a right turn with the SS Korps to Prokarovka as essential to the success of Citadel. He expected to meet the main Soviet armoured strategic reserves up the high country here and obviously did so and I would say operationally successful. It seems to me that it was more a case of the Germans running out of opperational reserves / re-infforcements here than the fact that the Soviets still had plenty, which certainly they did.

Layered reserves in depth are simply a higher card in the same suit than offensive concentration of armor. The Russians applied the correct remedy to concentration and it worked. It didn't work cleanly or inexpensively, but it worked. The Germans made headway where offensive concentration gave them a local odds edge, and were attrited and then stopped everywhere arriving reserves took that edge away.

Certainly that is what the Russians seem to have done at Kursk, but it was the obvious location for the next main German pincer attack to take place and all they did was prepare for it correctly as best they could. Its a no brainer theory mind you Stalin still had to be convinced by Zhukov of its merit! However to see the battle only this way is to deny the Russian (meaning Zhukov) grand strategic plan - let the Germans attack that heavily built up and re-inforced salient protrubing out around Kursk and once they have committed themselves there lanch offensives elsewhere with the ultimate objective of exhusting both the German reserves and main forces to the point of defeat.

The scale of additional forces the Germans would have needed to succeed as in 1942 after outlasting the Russian reserves in attrition fighting, against the force the Russians had, was on the order of 25 additional infantry divisions and two additional panzer corps, in addition to the ones remaining in AGs center and south but not committed historically (or used defensively vs. Orel etc). At the time the offensive was stopped, the Russians had 30 divisions left in their reserve and the Germans could not remotely match them.

Strategically they could have, at least theoretically, many of the Germans wanted to see the Kuban abandoned or felt that it should have been to release the forces from their before Kursk. There were too many Divisions still occupying Norway, the West and even in Italy and may be also in the Bulkans that could have been shed for the East. That said I do not believe that the German logistics system could have handled all of the massive moves and supplies involved for this really; for the 25 Divisions you mentioned estimated to be needed.

In 1942 and 1941, numbers had not be able to stop offensive concentration of armor because they had not been correctly used. In 1943 they were correctly used and they did stop offensive concentration of armor. There is no mystery to any of it, only unwillingness on the part of German side historians to admit their previous successes had depended on failings of their opponents rather than specific aspects of their own side decisions or abilities. When those failings were corrected the Germans lost the ability to achieve operational results merely through concentration of armor, offensively.

You are right in saying that Russian numbers were used in the correct method - layered deap defense, but IMHO it was only allowed to be developed becouse of the delays in the lanching of Operation Citadel by Hitler. The battle should have taken place in May 1943 not July. The earlier the better, as soon as the ground conditions were ready. The 6 weeks+ delay period allowed the Russians the time to improve their positions and arrange their strategic forces for the obvious place of the immpending German attack so much so that they practically seccured for themselves the strategic intiative to the point of garenteeing victory. During the delay period also as much as the Germans managed to consentraite their forces IMHO they lost the balance of foces ratio significantly, the Russians received proportionally a much greater increase in strength.

They still had great tactical abilities which helped rack up high loss rates, but without operational or strategic results. Those loss rates no more mean Kursk was a victory than the overall higher losses of the Russians in the whole war mean Germany conquered Russia. The bar for winning was considerably higher than that and the Germans stopped clearing that higher bar at Kursk.

Obviously, but the effects of the Germans winning at Kursk, by which I can only take to mean them successfully cutting off the salient and destroying the trapped Russian forces as planned would not have been a decisive victory. I am only postulating about if some how the Germans had managed to pull that off what the effect have been in turms of the general (end of war) timeline. As I view a German win at Kursk as of a limited in scope operational achievement that could have been done possibly somehow :confused: which may have shortened the front line while inflicting replacable damage to the Russians I don't think that it would have been enough of a gain to win the war or even in the East. The Germans may have gained for themselves an operational reserve for the Russian front and create some additional delays and problems for the Russians that would only have ultimately eventuated in the drawing of the war in Europe by a couple of months at the most.

[ August 19, 2005, 08:32 PM: Message edited by: Zalgiris 1410 ]

[JasonC]

"The problem for Operational Group Kempf was a lack of Infanty to initiate the offensive"

They broke through the front line RDs in less than 12 hours. It is simply erroneous that infantry had to lead, that was Model's theory in the north where the attacked stalled. More infantry would have sustained the offensive and helped keep the ground gained, certainly. But the claim as stated is wrong.

As for coup de main, it is laughable, we are talking about the last of 5 attacking panzer corps (a sixth diverted to defense) petering out, reduced by half, over a week into one of the largest offensives in history. Not grabbing a bridge by surprise on a front where the enemy is napping.

As for the Hoth comments, they simply ignore tha actual argument in front of you, that a single half strength panzer corps on its own has no business trying to attack the entire Russian army, and a fresh *army group* of reserves, in particular. Excuses, commanders, directions, predictions, none have anything to do with it. 6 panzer corps were planned as necessary to sustain an operationally significant attack, and half of one was left attacking. The whole thing had patently failed. Period.

As for 5th Tank, its various units and attachments actually opposite the SS corps brought 615 tanks to the fight. The Germans claimed 350 and the Russians say they lost 300, reduction in runners that were repairable combined with TWOs. There were thus around 300 tanks left on the field on the Russian side, not 150. The Germans had under 300 at the start of the clash, gave no report for the day of the fight, and fell to 227 on the 13th. That included all of 4 Tigers, 64 StuGs, 65 Pz IV longs, and 11 T-34s. The rest were marginal against a T-34. For comparison, at the start of the offensive the SS corps had about 500 runners, of which 300 were superior types that could kill a T-34 at range easily.

[ August 16, 2005, 05:33 AM: Message edited by: JasonC ]