Panzers East! The Marcks Plan

[Halder]

Major General Erich Marcks was the first person on the German General staff directed to devise a plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1940.

He created a plan which entailed a two prong thrust into Soviet Russia. A northern thrust which ending at Leningrad and turning south towards Moscow and a southern thrust parallel to the Northern move.

Hitler reviewed the plan and modified it. His modifications split the German offensive into a three prong thrust and diversified the German objectives.

Strategic Command is an excellent game in which General Marcks original "Barbarossa" can be recreated and implemented.

We would need the orginal German/Soviet OOB for the Marcks Offensive, though I would imagine it would be pretty much the same as Barbarossa though with different deployment on the German side.

Food for thought and discussion.

Halder

"He who defends everything, defends nothing"

Frederick the Great.

[JerseyJohn]

Interesting idea.

I believe the maps of that plan show a northern arrow hooking through the Baltic to take Leningrad before veering south for Moscow while the southern pincer skirts the Black Sea to Rostov before also hooking, this time north for Moscow. Along the way major cities would have been bagged but the idea would have been the taking of Moscow in the shortest possible time.

It's hard to say how that translted into the real campaign as Hitler might have taken Leningrad and Moscow if he'd have treated them like real objectives. Instead he made the famous southward diversions of his armor, first sending AG North's panzers and then AG Center's panzers to conduct those huge encircling moves near Kiev to bag a group of Soviet armies.

I think Barbarossa strategy had to be carried out from north to south, first Leningrad, then Moscow regardless of anything else.

Although it isn't reflected in the game, with it's absense of a Russian winter, Hitler's generals talked till they were blue in the face about the necessity of moving with the Russian weather patterns instead of against it. In the final Moscow drive Hitler forced a situation where the attack was from south to north as the weather grew worse from the north to the south.

All a big diversion from your original point; sorry!

My main experience in this is guys like Rannug tend to kill me in Russia from the Baltic south to the Black Sea. Unless they feel like doing it the other way, of course.

One thing all the German generals agreed upon was the fact Germany didn't have the military resources to pursue three drives simultaneosly.

[kurt88]

Instead of going for the cities with political or symbolical importance,Hitler followed the original directive of Barbarossa :'to destroy the Russian forces deployed in the west and to prevent their escape into the wide-open space of Russia.'

Already from July 1941 he choose for the methodical destruction of the enemy.

A simple outline,but vastly complex and elusive in practice.After the first major victories the German front broadened and the divisions fanned out.Supply,maintenance,auxiliary service all became more and more difficult.

And thus the original plans layed down by Halder and Warlimont were very soon put aside.

[ September 03, 2003, 07:53 AM: Message edited by: kurt88 ]

[jon_j_rambo]

The Germans were OVER-RATED when it comes to their so called Generals & battle plans for Barbarossa. Why? They lost.

What experience did these so called Generals even have to be deemed Generals? They had a little batting practice on France & wiped out a few farmers on horseback in Poland. The Sleeping Bear (Russia) was no different for the first 12-months of the war. Any General can trash armies sitting upfront, so a plan wasn't that difficult to make for the early part of the war. Bomb 'em & drive in tanks to the rear, while the Army goose steps forward.

Far as the "Big Picture"...just buy a map & a box of crayons, say a few buzz words, salute strong to the Fuherer...and suddenly you might be a General. It's all about politics to get ahead in the world, not being a smart General. I'm sure it took more brains to be a Supply Sergent or a mechanic who can fix a Panzer.

Rambo

P.S. It's easier to destroy a stronghold with a thousand soldiers than to win the heart of one man with words.

[ September 03, 2003, 07:08 AM: Message edited by: jon_j_rambo ]

[Bullwinkle]

In stark contrast to Rambo's drivel above, here are some sensible comments on the subject, as I have been a student of this campaign for over 40 years.

Regarding the actual campaign, Hitler is often criticized for his sudden move south to create the Kursk pocket. But I don't think that that was a poor decision. There were over a half-million men in the Kursk area and any drive for Moscow would have exposed a very vulnerable southern flank for the Germans. Sure, they would have taken Moscow, but like Napoleon, it would have been a pyrrhic victory.

With any semblence of coordination, Moscow would have been encircled and with the Siberians arriving, the army there could have been eliminated in a pocket reminiscent of Stalingrad.

The Marcks plan is vague, but again it leaves too much in the middle. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops could cause havoc with supply and cause the Germans to protect their supply as much as push forward to Lenningrad and the southern push to Rostov.

Overall, I believe that the Germans created the best plan - on paper - that they could create. The problem, as everybody knows, is that they didn't have the manpower to fulfill the eventual demands the long front made on the Wehrmacht. Of course there are other reasons, but all considered, the Germans carried out a damned good campaign.

One last vignette, I don't know where I read this, but a foreign general was visiting the Caucasus Moutains after the war as a guest of the Soviets. Here he was shown the limit of the German advance - the climb to the top of Mount Elbrus, whereupon the general voiced his complete astonishment. The Soviet hosts interpreted this as a compliment to their army and warmly thanked him for his respect and admiration of their victory.

The general then abruptly turned and said that he wasn't complimenting the Russians. He was astonished that the Wehrmacht had advanced so far and had managed to even climb to the top of Elbrus!

Anyone who is a serious student of WWII and Barbarossa cannot help but be in awe of the German's tenacity and fighting skill (all comments by the ignorant Rambo put aside).

[Archibald]

Bullwinkle, I think you meant Kiev rather than Kursk.

As for the foreign general, this refers to a visit by De Gaulle to the ruins of Stalingrad in late 1944. On seeing the city he is reported to have said:

"Quel peuple!"

When his entourage agreed with this perceived assessment of the Soviets, he replied:

"Mais non, je parle des Allemands. S'être rendu jusqu'ici !"

[Shaka of Carthage]

Bullwinkle

There was a topic awhile back about the drive on Moscow and the campaign against Russia in general.

The issue about taking Moscow, comes down to a couple of weeks, when elements from Army Group Center were sent south to help Army Group South. You could also point out that the campaign in Greece delayed Barbarossa a couple of weeks as well, in combination having the weather catch the Germans before they took Moscow.

The thing I like to point out, is that despite everything Moscow was to Russia, I don't think the capture of Moscow would have ended the war or caused Russia to collapse earlier. I believe that the key to the collapse of Russia was Stalin. If Stalin was captured, then yes, Russia has problems. But even if Moscow falls, when Stalin still free, Russia wouldn't have fallen.

The "Marcks" plan, which took into consideration the number of troops Germany had, tried to accomplish the defeat of Russia with a two prong approach. But as you pointed out, the General Staff was very fearful of the exposed flanks that left to Army Group North and South. No one expected the Russians to be as bad as they were.

And you are correct as well, in that the whole fasicination with the Eastern Front, is that Germany was able to accomplish so much with so little, for so long. Very few wargames are able to recapture that.

[JerseyJohn]

Shaka, Archibald, Bullwinkle, Halder and anyone interested in the Barbarossa Campaign . . ..

An excellent book, Hitler's War: Germany's Key Strategic Decisions 1940-45 by Heinz Magenheimer (not to be confused with Hitler's War by Edwin Hoyt, subtitled "A Love Song to the Fuhrer!) Covers much of this in detail and debunks many of the myths and half-truths that most people have traditionally been told about the early fighting.

The original plan, though moving upon three objectives, called for a quick advance along the Baltic coast and speedy capture of Leningrad. After taking the city, Fourth Panzer Group was to be transferred from Army Group North to Army Group Center for the capture of Moscow. These objectives were to be taken before bad weather began moving south from Finland region.

Because the early attacks and encirclements had gone so well, Hitler ordered Fourth Panzer transferred druing August with Leningrad un-fortified and poorly garrisoned. His orders to the astonished Fieldmarshal von Leeb was to besiege the city instead of taking outright when he had the chance to do so. The transfer left AG North too depleted to even properly cut the city off from reinforcements.

Seeing how well FM von Bock's AG Center was doing, or so he supposed, Hitler decided to go a step further and order all his available armor further south for the great envelopment already described. His reasoning was the war would be won in any case with such a huge cache of Soviet POWs. Moscow could meanwhile be reached and the attack prepared while the Armor was shifted back to AG Center.

FM von Rundstedt's AG South, meanwhile, was behind schedule and stalled south of Kiev. Traditional reasoning has been that the bulk of the diverted troops for the Yugo-Greek campaign had come from this force, which is true, but the offensive was not energetically handled and large numbers of Soviet troops had been allowed to escape from their frontier positions to Kiev, where they were eventually bagged, but before that they served to slow down the AG South drive, causing the diversion of troops from North and Center described above.

Of the three Fieldmarshal's, von Leeb with AG North did things most methodically, securing his flank, but then he only had one to worry about. He was the furthest ahead of schedule and wound up being penalized for it!

Fieldmarshal Ritter von Leeb

AG Center wound up with problems because von Bock paid too little attention to his flanks. He assumed outflanked Soviet formations would retreat east, instead many of them remained where they were and others actually withdrew into the Pripyet Marshes region. While moving on Minsk and Smolensk, Bock had to detatch forward units to turn and mop up his rear areas, though despite this fact they remained on or ahead of schedule.

Fieldmarshal Fedor von Bock

In the south, von Rundsted had problems with swollen rivers and securing bridges and crossings. Too much of his armor had been diverted to the Balkans and was only beginning to reach him again as the Russians began regrouping. In other words, the initial lack of armor had prevented him from cutting into the rear areas and disorganizing the defending infantry, the basis of Blitzkrieg, as he had successfully applied it a year earlier in France and before that in Poland.

Fieldmarshals Erwin Rommel and Gert von Rundstedt in 1944 discussing the Atlantic Defenses.

The author makes another interesting point. Due to mud and flooding, the earliest practical starting date of the campaign was not May 1st as traditionally given, but June 10th! So Barbarossa commenced twelve days behind schedule instead of the six weeks normally cited.

Another interesting point is that Hitler and his top generals concluded on July 25, 1941, that the campaign in Russia would be over before the onset of winter and began reducing army allotments in favor of the air force and navy. In other words, Hitler, assuming the campaign to be a sure thing, began shifting gears for a naval war and air war against Britain and, in short order, the United States.

Newly manufactured tanks were not sent to the ever weakening Panzer forces already engaged in battle, but instead formed into new units for inteded use in the Middle East.

[ September 05, 2003, 01:48 AM: Message edited by: JerseyJohn ]

[Bill101]

Ritter Von Leeb wrote a good book on Defense which is based on First World War experiences, and is available in volume 3 of the Roots of Strategy series.

Basically he believed in an active and flexible defense while the army prepared its own offensive. Sensible ideas really.

One of his colleagues, Marshal List, once commented that if he smiled it would have cracked his face. Judging by the picture, List seems to have been correct!

Bill

[DragonFlame]

Very intersting thread.

Good to see that in this community are several people with interest in history.

A wargame that covers the east front well in my eyes is "War For The Motherland" by Masahiro Yamazaki.

Anybody knows this game?

[Shaka of Carthage]

War for the Motherland?

Never heard of it. Is it a computer or a board game?

[JerseyJohn]

In the interest of giving equal time, this is a photograph of Fieldmarshal Wilhelm List, who does indeed look more affable than his friend Ritter von Leeb.

The following link has photographs of all the German Fieldmarshals, both army and air force, as well as GrossAdmirals Raeder and Doenitz.

Click Here for Photos of German Five Star Officers

Bill Enjoyed it, he does look a tad humorous, will be on the lookout for that book.

Flamingknives Thanks for sharing it, will be on the lookout for that one as well.

[Shaka of Carthage]

In the interest of staying on the original topic, and since no one else has posted it, here is the German military 1941. I won't list the individual divisions for reasons I'll explain later.

6/22/41 OOB

Norway ... XXXVI Corp, Norway Corp (Gebirgskorps Norwegen)

North, Leeb ... XXIII Corps, 18th Army (I & XXVI Corps), 4th Panzers (XXXVIII, XXXXI, LVI), 16th Army (II, X, XXVIII)

Center, Bock ... LIII Corps, 9th Army (VIII, XX, XXXXII Corps), 3rd Panzers (V, VI, XXXIX, LVII), 4th Army (VII, IX, XIII, XXXXIII), 2nd Panzers (XII, XXIV, XXXXVI, XXXXVII).

South, Rundstedt ... 17th Army (IV, XXXXIX, LII), 6th Army (LV, XVII, XXXXIV), Panzer I (XIV, III, XXIX, XXXVIII), 11th Army (XI, XXX, LIV). There was also the 1st Army Hungary, 3rd and 4th Army Romanians.

Within AG North, Center and South there are Flak units, Engineer units and Security divisions. Some even have infantry divisions and a/t units. There is also a "Leichte" division, anyone know what that is?

I actually went thru the '39 and '40 OOBs and tracked the divisions, Corps and Armies. But there is a easier way for this discussion.

Divisions June '41

Russia ... 134

France/LC ... 38

Norway/Finland ... 13

Denmark ... 1

Balkans ... 7

Africa ... 2

Thats 195 divisions total, of which 34 were "motorized". 32 motorized in Russia, 2 in Afrika.

Since SC uses a "generic" unit, with the Corp being half that of a Army, I concluded that a German Army was eight (8) divisions. Panzer Group is four (4) divisions. Now its a little easier to take the total divisions, put them into Armies to get your hypothetical German OOB for a two prong attack.

[Halder]

Some great points being made here.

I am curious though, would the troops (armour) that were instead sent to North Africa under Rommel really have made a signficant difference on the Eastern Front?

I am in agreement with statements being made about Moscow. It seems that in some past discussions I have had on this subject many students of the Second World War suggest that Moscow should have been taken. I have disagreed. It would have been another Stalingrad as previously stated and a undefendable objective.

Much stock has been put into the fact that Barbarossa started much later than it was suppose to (due to troubles in Yugoslavia/Greece). Some argue that if the Germans had stuck to their original schedule they would have faired better. I am not so sure.

I agree that the Germans made some remarkable achievements in the Eastern War. The amount of Soviet troops and equipment captured in the first month of the war alone is mind boggling. The German Army at the time of Barbarossa were a highly skilled, highly trained and well equiped force. No debate here.

I also consider that had Stalin not freed the various commanders sent to the gulags during one of his paranoid based purges he likely would have lost. Stalin did not win the war for the Motherland, the likes of Zhukov, Chuikov, Rokossovsky and Koniev did. Left to Stalin, Russia would have fallen.

I think that two key errors were made by the Germans in regards to the Eastern Front that likely cost them the war.

The first, Stalingrad. Every effort should have been made to break out of Stalingrad and save the 6th Army. Hitler's order to hold at all costs, was ludicrous.

Secondly, The Germans should have gone to a wholly defensive strategy much earlier in the campaign. The exact timing of this can be argued. But had the Germans adopted a purely defensive strategy (which they were very skilled at, How long did they hold up allied troops in the Bocages of France? In Holland?), say after Stalingrad they would have faired better. I make this comment while considering that the newer German heavy tanks of the time (Tiger, Ferdinand, Jagdpanzer,King Tiger) were much more suitable for defensive tactics then the offensive battles they were used in.

Lastly, some further reading (thanks for the recommendations so far by the way),

STALINGRAD: The fateful Seige 1942-1943

Anthony Beevor

FIGHTING IN HELL: The German Ordeal on the Eastern Front.

Peter G. Tsouras (ed).

Great thread guys.

Halder

"He who defends everything, defends nothing"

[Shaka of Carthage]

I am curious though, would the troops (armour) that were instead sent to North Africa under Rommel really have made a signficant difference on the Eastern Front?

Divisions June '41

Russia ... 134 (32 motorized)

Africa ... 2 (2 motorized)

Would two (2) more motorized divisions have made a difference in Russia? Not a bit. But doubling Rommel's forces would have had a major impact on the course of the war.

[kurt88]

Not a bit. But doubling Rommel's forces would have had a major impact on the course of the war.

It sure would have.Imagine Rommel going past the Suez canal,linking up with Iraqi and Egyptian forces that were pro-Germany.Another Russian front could have been openend,lot's of oil going to Germany,even Hitler's dream of his panzers pushing into India would have been possible.

And Turkey would have entered the war,probably on German side.

Then consider what Halder said about a defensive stand on the eastern front.

With a bit of luck the nazis might have won the war.

[Bill101]

Giving Rommel two more divisions would only have been useful if the extra logistical support could also have been provided. Otherwise it would have been a waste.

Another good book I'd recommend is Martin Van Creveld's Supplying War, which discusses the effect logistics has had on strategy (focussing on the period from the Thirty Years War until 1945).

Logistics is a neglected subject, and Creveld's book is a useful reminder of it's importance (it's also a more interesting book than one might have expected).

Bill

[Shaka of Carthage]

Bill101

Agree about the logistics. Espeically since many wargames don't properly represent it or abstract it at best. Its one of the many strengths of SC, that are not properly appreciated.

But assuming Rommel got two (2) extra divisions, then you could also bet that the plans to invade Malta would have been taken more seriously, and would have had some effects on a later invasion of Crete (assuming one still was needed).

Then, one of the biggest problems with the German logistical system would be highlighted. With Malta in Axis hands, Axis merchant shipping could supply the forces in North Africa. But now you have a problem in that you can't get the supplies from the port to the field units. Axis never had enough supply trucks. Given time, I imagine they could have built a railroad or the Italians could have developed some sort of amphib resupply system.

[JerseyJohn]

A few quick comments.

Moscow's main military significance was as a communications hub; road and rail network.

A history professor of mine in 1967 was a retired Army colonel who'd worked on a study of the war in Russia. He told me that one of their most indesputable conclusions was that the Germans had to take Moscow as quickly as possible and could have done so before diverting Guderian and the other panzer units for Kiev. As he put it, the poorly organized and almost unsupplied Soviet troops around Kiev weren't going anywhere and posed little threat of a counter offensive; Moscow could have been taken first and they'd have remained where they were.

Of course, much has come to light during the past 36 years but I still agree with his assessment.

Also, there's no reason to believe von Bock would have set himself up to be surrounded in Moscow. Even with his armor removed he could easily have defended the city and it's flanks. The Siberian reserves could not have detrained in an organized manner anywhere near the captured city. I disagree entirely with the Moscow/Stalingrad premise. The circumstances were not at all similar.

Regarding Rommel, much of his supplies were delivered to Tripoli (which, in reality, is a port) and not Benghazi or Tobruck. Consequently, by moving so far into Egypt, his supply lines, aside from being extremely vulnerable to air and small motorized party raids, were also very far from their base. Trucks bringing fuel to the front consumed more of it than was ever delivered to him! The Americans experienced similar problems on the Burma Road.

Rommel created many of his own supply problems. To show how much emphasis he put on this aspect of running his army, the officer in charge was only a major!

Ironically, the Allies never cracked the Italian Naval Code. Information on Convoys that were only communicated by the Italians arrived savely in North Africa. The more important shipments, which Rommel insisted on handling through German communications, were nearly always attacked and often heavily damaged.

[ September 06, 2003, 10:49 PM: Message edited by: JerseyJohn ]

[Bill101]

This raises the interesting question of railways. Does anyone know if there were any in Italian North Africa, whether before or after the war?

The British built a railway to supply their campaign against the Mahdists in the Sudan in the 1890s, so 40-50 years later it shouldn't have been beyond the Italians to have built one. Or was it?

Could a railway have made all the difference in the African campaign?

Bill

[JerseyJohn]

Interesting indeed.

I think the Italians had one in Cyrainica but I'm not sure.

In 1940 Marshal Graziani was moving slowly into Egypt and I believe he was linking Mersa Matruh and Sidi Barani to Tobruck, either by a decent road or rail. If he was building a railroad it would have taken ages to reach Alexandria, which might well have been what he had in mind!

On the other side, I think the railroad line ran west and stopped just short of El Alemain.

[ September 07, 2003, 09:42 AM: Message edited by: JerseyJohn ]

[Blashy]

Originally posted by jon_j_rambo:

The Germans were OVER-RATED when it comes to their so called Generals & battle plans for Barbarossa. Why? They lost.

What experience did these so called Generals even have to be deemed Generals? They had a little batting practice on France & wiped out a few farmers on horseback in Poland. The Sleeping Bear (Russia) was no different for the first 12-months of the war. Any General can trash armies sitting upfront, so a plan wasn't that difficult to make for the early part of the war. Bomb 'em & drive in tanks to the rear, while the Army goose steps forward.

Far as the "Big Picture"...just buy a map & a box of crayons, say a few buzz words, salute strong to the Fuherer...and suddenly you might be a General. It's all about politics to get ahead in the world, not being a smart General. I'm sure it took more brains to be a Supply Sergent or a mechanic who can fix a Panzer.

Rambo

P.S. It's easier to destroy a stronghold with a thousand soldiers than to win the heart of one man with words.

I do think you forget one thing, a TON of their strategies were always turned upside down by Hitler.

Allies Generals stated (after the war) that the ideas that some of his Generals had (Axis) would have given Hitler europe, but he thought he was a military genius, not just a political genius (I hate giving compliments to that bastard).

BUT in defense of Rambo's post , they were stupid enough to follow his dumbass tactics even if they knew it was a lost cause.

NOTE: Many of the combatants on both sides had WW1 experience, best xp you can have.

[DragonFlame]

Originally posted by Shaka of Carthage:

War for the Motherland?

Never heard of it. Is it a computer or a board game?

Its a board game by Rampart Games.

Units are corps, with Soviet armies and (a few) Axis divisions and "Kampfgruppen".

Turns range from a week to a month, depending on the season. (Just like SC!)

Here is a review:

http://www.grognard.com/reviews/warmoth.txt

I dont agree to all conclusions the author made, specially not that every game runs the same. Its possible for Germany to take AND hold Moscow while driving South, but we also had games the Germans did not came far more east than Kiev before the Russians organized their defense.

Leningrad is much harder to take as in SC and quasi impossible if you want to take Moscow.

PS.

"Leichte Division" means light division.

[VigaBrand]

I think give Rommel two mot Divisions more, you must conquer Malta. For that you need a german Air Fleet and the german Fallschirmjäger. So you must decide beetween Kreta and Malta. And you have one air fleet in italy and not in Russia (1942 Hitler took the 2.Luftflotte (Kesselring) to italy.

For victory over russia german must take leningrad in 1941. That means that the german Tank group take leningrad (and that were possible) and after that they get to ArmyGroup Center. If Leningrad falls, the german navy can transport supplies over baltic sea, where no partisan can attack them.

And german can get the 16. army free for operations and not for stand before leningrad.

Second important mistake was the attack of murmansk. the finn allies say that you only can attack with two divisions in this Landscape. That is right for finlanf which has not so many Troops and possibilities for support more troops, but german can two that.

So german only must concentrat there 4 divisions in finland and than not attack Murmansk only attack the railroad and disconnected Murmansk from russia.

Over Murmansk the americans and britans give russian war-material.

If someone will have the numbers of material post and i will search for.

[santabear]

a foreign general was visiting the Caucasus Moutains after the war as a guest of the Soviets. Here he was shown the limit of the German advance - the climb to the top of Mount Elbrus, whereupon the general voiced his complete astonishment. The Soviet hosts interpreted this as a compliment to their army and warmly thanked him for his respect and admiration of their victory.

The general then abruptly turned and said that he wasn't complimenting the Russians. He was astonished that the Wehrmacht had advanced so far and had managed to even climb to the top of Elbrus!

The "foreign general" was Charles de Gaulle. He made the remark at a reception in Moscow, no less. I think there's an account of it in "Russia at War" by Alexander Werth (which has been roundly trashed in this forum before, but which has some good information).

Jersey John: I'm not sure about your enthusiasm for Magenheimer's book. He presents a lot of good new material, but seems to be pretty free in drawing conclusions from it. I also have never understood his concept of multiple turning points. I do, however, like the fact that he views the victory of the RAF over the Luftwaffe as the first (perhaps THE) turning point of the war. But I digress...

About Moscow/Stalingrad: The circumstances were, I think, substantially different. With the Moscow railheads in German hands, the Russians would not have been able to unload or supply an army very well at all. They maintained control of the east bank of the Volga throughout the Stalingrad battle, and so had good supply lines. It was also a year later in the war. It would have been interesting to see the Russians try to run the Soviet Union's war effort from Kubiyshev (sp??). They might have still won the war, but it would have been even more of a near thing.

...a very interesting thread, and as always, a source of some new information!

[ September 16, 2003, 08:30 PM: Message edited by: santabear ]